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ABSTRACT 
This study examined the consequences of Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance 
interactions within South Africa’s FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies from 2008 to 
2016. The study’s objectives were to examine the prevalence of Principal-Agent and 
Corporate Governance problems, to ascertain potential costs of these problems, to 
establish their socio-economic consequences, and evaluate the effectiveness of the 
governance codes. The study is anchored in Principal-Agent theory. Mixed methods 
methodology was employed, specifically Concurrent and Exploratory Sequential 
Mixed Methods design logics. The main findings include that, 23.91% of sample 
companies experienced Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems- 
significantly exceeding the study’s expectations that negligible governance problems 
exist and reveals the pervasiveness of these problems; executive compensation plays 
a bigger role in exacerbating Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems 
than expected and often considered in governance mechanisms; multi-billion rands 
potential costs are ascribed to Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems 
incurred by principals; unjustifiable salary inequalities resulting in other inequalities 
that build social mistrust; and there is limited conviction that current governance codes 
are effective. This study’s contributions include; proposing an executive remuneration 
model that considers governance of the company in determining executive 
compensation; formulating a governance index calculated based on King III and King 
IV recommendations to standardise the measurement of the quality of governance in 
companies; the salary Gini was used to establish compensation gaps and red-flag 
potential Principal-Agent problems and flaws in governance systems; and used value 
at risk procedures to quantify potential Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance 
costs. The main theoretical implications of the study’s findings are; agency theory 
needs extension to capture socio-economic costs and not only focus on the principal; 
remuneration models should consider the executive’s company governance and social 
and economic egalitarianism; flexibility of ‘comply or explain’ should subordinate socio-
economic consequences, suggesting a hybrid approach which makes certain 
governance code provisions compulsory; and finally, behavioural finance theories 
should be used in governance research for better insights. 
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KAFUSHANE NGOCWANINGO 
Lolu cwaningo lwacubungula futhi lwahlolisisa imiphumela yokuxhumana phakathi 
kwesimo seNhloko ne-Ejenti, i-Principal-Agent, (lapho umuntu eqoka omunye ukuba 
athathe izinqumo kanye/noma izinyathelo egameni lakhe) nokuPhathwa 
nokuLawulwa Kwenkampani, ezinkampanini ezingama-40 ebezikleliswe phezulu 
ohlwini lwe-FTSE/JSE eNingizimu Afrika kusukela ngowezi-2008 kuya kowezi-2016. 
Izinhloso zalolu cwaningo kwabe kuwukubheka ukuthi zivamise kangakanani futhi 
zisabalele kangakanani izinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye 
nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani ukuze kutholakale ukuthi zingakanani 
izindleko ezibangelwa yilezi zinkinga, nokuthola umthelela walokhu kwinhlalomnotho, 
kanye nokuhlola ukuthi zisebenza kahle kangakanani izinkambiso zokuphathwa 
nokulawulwa kwezinkampani. Lolu cwaningo lwakhelwe  phezu kwethiyori yeNhloko 
ne-Ejenti. Kwasetshenziswa izindlela zocwaningo ezixubile, ikakhulukazi izindlela 
ezixubile zokuhlola kusetshenziswa izinyathelo ezenziwa kanyekanye noma 
ngesikhathi esisodwa kanye nezinyathelo ezilandelanayo. Okusemqoka 
okwatholakala ocwaningweni kubandakanya nokuthi izinkampani okwenziwa kuzona 
ucwaningo ezingama-23.91% zahlangabezana nezinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko 
ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani – okuyinani elingaphezulu 
kakhulu kwalokho obekulindelekile ocwaningweni, ngoba phela kwakulindeleke ukuthi 
zibe yingcosana kakhulu izinkinga ezikhona eziphathelene nalokhu, kepha-ke 
ucwaningo lwaveza ukuthi lezi zinkinga zixhaphakile impela; imiholo yabaphathi 
abakhulu bezinkampani idlala indima enkulu ekubhebhethekiseni izinkinga 
eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani 
kunalokho obekulindelekile futhi esikhathini esiningi lokhu akuyona neze into evamise 
ukubhekisiswa uma kwenziwa izinqubo zokuphatha nokulawula; zibalelwa 
kwizigidigidi zamarandi izindleko ezingena kuzona izinhloko zezinkampani 
okucatshangwa ukuthi zibangelwa yizinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye 
nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani; ukungalingani ngokwemiholo, 
ngaphandle kwesizathu esizwakalayo salokhu, okuyinto eholela kokunye futhi 
ukungalingani, okudala ukungathembani emphakathini; futhi kuncane kakhulu 
ukuqiniseka nokukholelwa ekutheni zisebenza kahle izinkambiso zokuphatha 
nokulawula ezikhona njengamanje. Igalelo lalolu cwaningo libandakanya 
isiphakamiso semodeli yemiholo yabaphathi abakhulu ebhekisisa nodaba 
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lokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwenkampani ngenkathi kucutshungulwa udaba lwemiholo 
yabaphathi abakhulu; ukuhlanganiswa kwenkomba yokuphathwa nokulawulwa 
kwenkampani ebalwa ngokususela kwizincomo ze-King III kanye ne-King IV 
zokusetshenziswa kwesikali esifanayo sokukala ikhwalithi yokuphathwa nokulawulwa 
kwezinkampani; isikali semiholo se-Gini sasetshenziswa ukuhlonza amagebe akhona 
phakathi kwemiholo kanye nokuxwayisa ngezinkinga ezingahle zivele eziphathelene 
neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani kanye  
namaphutha nobuthakathaka obukhona ezinhlelweni zokuphatha nokulawula; futhi 
kwasetshenziswa izinqubo zezikali zobungozi bokulahlekelwa kwenkampani ukubala 
inani lezindleko okungenzeka kungenwe kuzona ngenxa yezinkinga eziphathelene 
neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani. 
Imibonongqangi evele kulokho okutholakale ocwaningweni yilena elandelayo;  ithiyori 
echaza ubudlelwano phakathi kwenhloko ne-ejenti kumele yelulwe ukuze ifake 
phakathi nezindleko eziphathelene nenhlalomnotho futhi lokhu kungagcini nje kuphela 
kwinhloko; amamodeli omholo kumele abhekisise nendlela ephethwe ngayo 
inkampani ngabaphathi abakhulu kanye nemfundiso yokulingana kwabantu bonke 
ngokwenhlalo nangokomnotho; ukuguquguquka ‘kokuthobela umthetho noma 
ukuchaza’ (‘comply or explain’) kumele kube ngaphansi uma kuqhathaniswa 
nemiphumela yenhlalomnotho, ukuze kuqhanyukwe nendlela exubile ephoqelela 
ukusetshenziswa kwezinkambiso zokuphatha nokulawula ezithile; kanti futhi, 
okokugcina, ocwaningweni lokuphatha nokulawula kumele kusetshenziswe 
amathiyori aphathelene nesimo somqondo sabaphathi ngenkathi bethatha izinqumo 
nezinyathelo eziphathelene nokuphathwa nokusetshenziswa kwezimali ukuze 
kuqondakale kangcono konke okuphathelene nalokhu. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie studie het van 2008 tot 2016 die gevolge van die wisselwerking tussen 
hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering in Suid-Afrikaanse FTSE/JSE Top 40- 
genoteerde maatskappye bestudeer. Die oogmerke was om die voorkoms van 
probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering te ondersoek; die moontlike koste 
en die sosio-ekonomiese gevolge daarvan te bepaal; en die doeltreffendheid van die 
regeerkodes te evalueer. Hierdie studie berus op die hoofagentteorie. Gemengde 
metodes is as metodologie gebruik, in die besonder gelyklopende en verkennende, 
opeenvolgende metodes. Die belangrikste bevindings is dat 23,91% van 
steekproefmaatskappye probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering 
ondervind. Dit is beduidend hoër as die persentasie wat verwag is, en ŉ aanduiding 
van hoe diepgaande hierdie probleme is. Die vergoeding van uitvoerende beamptes 
is ŉ groter oorsaak van die probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering as wat 
verwag is en waarvoor in regeermeganismes voorsiening gemaak word. Die 
potensiële koste, wat miljarde rande beloop, word gewyt aan die probleme met 
hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering wat prinsipale hulle op die hals haal. 
Onregverdigbare salarisverskille lei tot ongelykheid wat sosiale wantroue wek. 
Hierbenewens is daar bedenkinge oor die doeltreffendheid van die huidige 
regeerkodes. 
Die bydrae van hierdie studie behels ŉ vergoedingsmodel vir uitvoerende beamptes 
wat korporatiewe regering in ag neem. Hierdie studie formuleer ŉ regeerindeks wat op 
King III- en King IV-aanbevelings berus, en die meting van die gehalte van 
korporatiewe regering standaardiseer. Verskille in vergoeding, potensiële rooivlag-
hoofagentprobleme en gebreke in regeerstelsels is met behulp van die salaris-gini 
bepaal. Waarde-op-risikoprosedures is gebruik om die potensiële koste van 
hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering te kwantifiseer. Die belangrikste teoretiese 
implikasie van die bevindings is dat die agentskapsteorie uitgebrei moet word sodat 
die sosio-ekonomiese koste vasgestel word, en daar nie alleen op die hoofsom 
gekonsentreer word nie. Afgesien hiervan moet vergoedingsmodelle rekening hou met 
ŉ uitvoerende beampte se korporatiewe regering en met maatskaplike en ekonomiese 
egalitarisme. Voorts moet die sosio-ekonomiese gevolge ondergeskik wees aan die 
buigsaamheid van “voldoen of verduidelik”. Dit impliseer ŉ hibridiese benadering wat 
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die bepalings van sekere regeerkodes verpligtend maak. Ten slotte behoort 
finansieringsgedragteorieë in regeernavorsing aangewend te word om groter insig te 
verkry. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, 
research themes and objectives 
This chapter outlines the 
foundation of this thesis and puts it 
into context. The contents of the 
chapter are listed below.  
Chapter 1 Contents 
1.1 Introduction and 
background 
1.2 Research themes and 
questions 
1.3 Research objectives 
1.4 Benefits of study 
1.5 Ethical considerations 
1.6 Thesis structure 
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CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH THEMES 
AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Principal-agent (P-A) problems are inherent in corporate governance (CG) structures, 
and are mainly due to the separation of ownership and the way companies are 
governed and managed. Agency theory identifies shareholders and debt holders as 
the main providers of capital (equity and debt respectively). They contract with 
executives and give them a mandate to manage the shareholders’ assets or debt 
holders’ funds in a way that maximises value for them. The consequences being 
examined in this study emanate from the conflicting objectives1 and P-A problems that 
exist between the principal and the agent, and the mechanisms put in place to achieve 
goal congruence. 
These conflicting objectives have caused severe problems to companies and 
economies, even presenting in proportions that threaten the existence of countries (for 
example, Iceland in 2008 as cited by Boyes, 2009) as well as the collapse of the global 
financial system in 2008/2009. The 2008 financial crisis provides evidence that 
economies are vulnerable when exposed to the problems arising from P-A and CG 
problems. To this end, Maskara, Eser and Claassen (2012) conducted a study of 
companies that collapsed in the recent past: Barings Bank in 1995, Enron in 2001, 
Arthur Andersen in 2002, WorldCom in 2002, Bear Stearns in 2008, and Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. Their findings showed that P-A problems explain some of these 
biggest corporate failures in history. 
Without proper governance controls and systems, agents may pursue their own 
objectives resulting in unintended consequences for the principal, the economy and 
possibly the global financial system. Given the continued existence of agency 
problems, questions arise as to whether or not the CG structures are effective in 
                                            
1 Mallin (2010) states that potential problems arising from principal-agent relationships were identified 
by Smith in 1838. Mallin (2010) refers to the work of Smith (1838) who posited that directors (agents) 
who are charged with governance manage other people’s (shareholders’/debt holders’) funds and thus 
cannot be expected to manage it vigilantly as their own. Managers can pursue their own personal 
objectives that are not aligned to the objectives of shareholders. Thus, the separation between those 
that own and control companies inherently creates conflicting objectives. 
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resolving the conflicting incentives of agents. Accordingly, CG structures have been 
developed to try and find ways of minimising the prevalence of agency problems. In 
other words, governance structures have been put in place as a means of finding ways 
in which principals (owners or shareholders) can control agents (executives) in such 
a way that the latter prioritise the interests of the former. In South Africa, the King III 
and King IV2 codes have been major instruments in ensuring goal congruence 
between principals and agents, as well as the CG structures of companies. 
Research into CG as a discipline has intensified in the last two decades, although it is 
still considered to be a relatively new field of study (Mallin, 2010; McNulty, Zattoni & 
Douglas, 2013). Prominent CG researchers, with their distinguished research work, 
(Jensen & Meckling (1976); Fama & Jensen (1983); Farmer & Winter (1986); Shleifer 
& Vishny (1997); Edmans & Gabaix (2009); Shah (2014)) have explored mechanisms 
that assist in aligning the objectives of principals and agents, and that may alleviate 
CG problems. However, empirical evidence still reveals the existence and complexity 
of P-A and CG problems, even after two decades of research into CG (Maskara et al., 
2012; McNulty et al., 2013; Chapple & Truong, 2014; Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2017). 
The existence and complexity of P-A and CG problems are exacerbated by the 
breadth and nature of P-A relationships and CG mechanisms. Moreover, CG research 
is characterised by the use of various theories which are not unified and show limited 
understanding on whether CG practices substitute or complement each other (Brown, 
Beekes & Verhoeven, 2010). The silver lining is that while research work continues to 
expose the existence and complexity of P-A and CG problems, immense contributions 
are being made to CG as a practice in companies and the field of study. 
Most CG research focuses on either company-internal characteristics which are a 
culmination of decisions and actions by principals and their appointed boards, or 
                                            
2 The ‘King Code of Governance Principles’ (King III and King IV) are codes of best practice functioning 
on the “apply or explain” and “apply and explain” basis which allow flexibility of application and an 
explanation as to why the reporting entity deviated from best practices. King III and King IV function on 
a non-legislative basis which reveal an appreciation that best practices are not just a compliance issue 
but consider the benefits of applying best practice principles. The intention of the King III and King IV 
principles are to ensure that those charged with governance operate in the best interest of the company, 
and achieve fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. Read more from the Introduction 
and Background section of the King III and King IV Reports in the Institute of Directors of Southern 
Africa- King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 and 2016. 
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external characteristics which include monitoring by external parties such as 
regulators, institutional investors and activists (Brown et al., 2010). Further, a review 
of CG literature by Brown et al. (2010) reveals that most CG research in the fields of 
accounting and finance focuses on financial outcomes. The financial outcomes focus 
on relationships between P-A and CG characteristics and company performance, 
capital structure, cost of capital, dividend pay-out policy and agency costs. This study 
has incorporated both internal characteristics (as it examined the strength of 
governance through board indices, executive compensation and ownership structure) 
and external characteristics (monitoring by regulators, media reports and institutional 
investors). 
In South Africa, a number of large-sized companies have exemplified weak and poor 
governance systems stemming from observable agency and governance problems. 
Chapple and Truong (2014) asserted that companies not complying with the laws, 
regulations and recommended best practices reveal weak or poor governance. For 
instance, companies that have had to pay significant penalties imposed by competition 
authorities for engaging in anticompetitive conduct (for example, collusion), as cited 
later, have exemplified weak governance and agency problems linked to the possible 
behaviour of the executives - the agents. Among others, the following companies fall 
into this category: Tiger Brands, MTN Group Ltd., Vodacom, Sasol, British American 
Tobacco Plc, Netcare Hospital Group and Steinhoff. The potential scale of the 
problems in terms of the size of these companies, the key sectors they operate in, 
their role in the economy and the magnitude of the fines imposed by competition 
authorities provided red flags. These red flags indicate possible prevalence, costs, and 
socio-economic problems that are caused by agency problems and flaws in CG 
structures. 
For brevity, this study examined the consequences of CG interactions in the 
FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies from 2008 to 2016, rather than venturing into the 
main stream focus of aforementioned finance outcomes. CG interactions are 
considered in this study as relationships put in place to achieve goal congruence by 
defining, directing, controlling and monitoring the dealings that exist between the 
principal and agent. These CG interactions become the vehicles employed to try and 
align the interests of both the principal and agent. Also, the CG interactions are 
designed to monitor the behaviour and actions of the agent as he or she has both the 
Page | 5  
motivation and ability to divert from the principal’s interests. The reason for 
concentrating on the consequences of CG interactions is that finance outcomes focus 
on the impact of CG relationships, mostly related to principals, and not so much on the 
socio-economic consequences of CG interactions between principals and agents. 
Thus, this research study sought to find answers to thematised research questions 
covering the prevalence of P-A and CG problems, the role of executive compensation 
and potential costs, the socio-economic consequences, and effectiveness of current 
CG codes. The context of the research is South African FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies. 
The FTSE/JSE Top40 companies are the largest 40 listed companies (by market 
capitalisation). Companies listed on this index represent over 80% of the total JSE 
market capitalisation, are among the most traded shares and have wider institutional 
ownership (Courtney Capital Private Wealth, 2013). These characteristics were 
identified by GIM (2003) as positively linked to governance. These features arouse 
expectations that negligible P-A and CG problems should exist because they influence 
the agent’s behaviour, and governance systems that restrain agency and CG 
problems. Furthermore, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 companies have a very strong influence 
on corporate governance and tend to shape corporate behaviour in a country, hence 
the focus on these companies.  
South Africa’s unique circumstances in relation to past political and social injustices, 
the current political system and cultural diversity makes it prone to P-A and CG 
problems similar to those found in developed countries. Literature cited in this study 
(for example Maake & Masote (2013); Massie, Collier & Crotty (2014); Crotty (2018); 
Rose (2018); Rossouw (2018)) revealed that there are widespread P-A and CG 
problems. However, the frequency of the problems is becoming higher and more 
complex leading to more severe crises that warrant the attention of scholars, law-
makers, policy-makers, and investors, among others. This is the phenomenon that 
motivated the study. Moreover, the increase in reported incidences of corporate 
scandals involving top South African executives placed this study in context. 
Section 1.2 that follows provides an outline of the problem statement, research themes 
and related questions that the study sought to answer. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT, RESEARCH THEMES AND 
QUESTIONS 
It has been proven that P-A and CG problems do exist and are at the heart of some of 
the past corporate failures (Maskara et al., 2012). This study differs from other 
prominent corporate governance studies that focus on financial outcomes of company 
performance, capital structure, cost of capital, dividend pay-out policy and agency 
costs. What is missing in extant governance literature are explicit consequences tied 
to P-A and CG problems. As such, the study’s primary purpose is not to assess the 
existence of P-A and CG problems in South Africa, but rather to examine the 
prevalence, costs and socio-economic consequences of P-A and CG problems in 
South Africa, including the effectiveness of governance codes. Thus, the problem to 
be examined is: what are the consequences of the P-A and CG interactions in South 
African companies, with a particular focus on FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies. This 
study’s thematised research questions further deconstruct the problem statement by 
investigating the consequences of CG interactions related to selected internal and 
external CG characteristics found in sample companies. As a result, the study 
attempted to answer the following questions which are categorised into four themes. 
1.2.1 Theme I: Incidence and interaction with company success or 
failure  
This theme covered the incidence and interaction with the company’s success or 
failure. The related research questions were: 
 What is the prevalence of P-A and CG problems in South Africa’s FTSE/JSE Top40 
listed companies? 
 Have these P-A and CG problems been at the heart of some of the corporate 
failures3 or problems in South Africa? 
1.2.2 Theme II: Costs arising from P-A and CG problems  
This theme covered the costs arising from P-A and CG problems. The related research 
questions were: 
                                            
3 Failure included both financial failure and involvement (for example, involvement in collusion) in 
conduct which attracted penalties and other sanctions or reputational damages. 
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 What is the role of executive compensation schemes in exacerbating P-A and CG 
problems in South Africa? 
 What are the potential costs and who bears these costs of P-A and CG problems?  
1.2.3 Theme III: Socio-economic consequences of P-A and CG 
problems  
This theme covered the socio-economic consequences of P-A and CG problems. The 
related research question was: 
 To what extent do the P-A and CG problems contribute to socio-economic 
inequality in South Africa? 
1.2.4 Theme IV: Effectiveness of governance codes in South Africa  
This theme covered the effectiveness of governance codes in South Africa. The 
related research question was: 
 How effective have the current codes of good CG been in mitigating P-A and CG 
problems and consequences? 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The aforementioned research questions were answered by pursuing the following 
research objectives: 
i. To examine the prevalence of P-A and CG problems in South African companies 
and to determine if these problems could explain some of the corporate failures 
(including both financial failure and involvement in collusion) and conduct which 
attracted penalties and other sanctions or reputational damage. Achieving this 
objective provided insights into the pervasiveness of P-A and CG failures in some 
of South Africa’s largest companies and the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of 
board and board committee oversights. Furthermore, the attainment of this 
objective provided comparative insights into how the occurrences of P-A and CG 
problems in South Africa compare to research carried in developed countries by 
researchers like Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017), who cite Renders, 
Gaeremynck, and Sercu (2010), Guest (2008), and Dahya and McConnell (2007). 
Regulatory authorities should take a keen interest in research with this type of 
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objective so that they can formulate policies and laws that mitigate the 
pervasiveness of P-A and CG problems and their consequences. 
ii. Ascertaining the potential costs of agency problems and the role of executive 
compensation in exacerbating P-A and CG problems, in light of the severe 
distress caused to companies, economies4 and investors losing their savings. 
The study sought to discern the potential pecuniary impact of agency and CG 
problems in South Africa. The pecuniary severity of P-A and CG problems need 
to be ascertained for agents to discern that the consequences are not only at the 
micro-level, but at the macro-level as well. In addition, it was necessary to 
ascertain the role played by executive compensation in exacerbating CG 
problems in South Africa, given the conclusions by Nordberg (2011) that 
compensation schemes are the biggest aspect of CG. Pursuing this objective also 
permitted the researcher to formulate and propose an executive remuneration 
model that captures pertinent aspects of CG in incentivising executives. The 
model attempts to address the assertions by Kirkpatrick (2009) which suggested 
that mismatches in incentive systems may cause weaknesses in CG. 
iii. To establish the potential relationship of P-A and CG interactions with the socio-
economic challenges and inequality in South Africa (for example, the widening 
income gap in the face of deep poverty). This objective supported the call by 
Germain (2010) who posited that financial crises events, and by inference CG 
problems, must consider the social impact in the long term and not just events 
impacting capital markets players. Moreover, Rezaee (2009) advocated for CG 
to be used to address socio-economic concerns. Accordingly, the researcher 
sought to establish the level of inequality, as measured by the s-Gini that was 
formulated, and also discussed the probable socio-economic burdens potentially 
carried by the country’s fiscus. 
iv. To evaluate the effectiveness of the current South African governance codes, 
despite the international reputation of King III and King IV. The attainment of this 
objective required the evaluation of the other theme-findings and arose from the 
observations by McNulty et al. (2013) that after decades of CG prescripts, P-A 
                                            
4 Highlighted in the studies by Maskara, Eser, and Claassen (2012), and Mallin (2010). 
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and CG problems still exist. Tracking this objective enabled this study to establish 
the alignment of that which the sample companies preach regarding the adoption 
of the King III and King IV recommendations and their real actions based on 
evidence. This objective made it possible to compare our South African findings 
with those from studies done in developed countries by Seidl (2007), Shah 
(2014), and Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017). Factors that weaken the efficacy of 
CG codes were also established and discussed. 
A mixed methods research process with a pragmatist worldview was employed to 
achieve the above objectives and to answer the associated thematised research 
questions. The mixed methodologies and pragmatist worldview were appropriate to 
address the scope of the research questions and objectives. Moreover, the research 
strands and their steps, procedures and expected outcomes, design logics, mixed-
methods timing, integration, weighting, archival research strategy, inductive reasoning 
and interpretative enquiry enhanced the achievements of the study’s objectives. 
1.4 BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The study provided deeper insights into P-A and CG problems in some of South 
Africa’s largest companies. Some of the benefits of this study are outlined below: 
i. The study contributes by providing a better approach to the construction of 
governance indices (proxy for governance). This approach is more relevant to 
South Africa as it used recommendations (which are called provisions in this study) 
from King III and King IV. In addition, this approach standardised the provisions 
and made it easier to assess the quality of governance in companies, despite 
differences in industry, size, board composition and other variations that may exist. 
This approach to the construction of a governance index standardises the 
measurement of the quality of CG in companies. 
ii. This study adds to the CG body of knowledge by attempting to quantify the rand 
cost of identified CG events. A risk management technique called Value at Risk 
(VaR) was employed to ascertain how much each of the considered CG events 
cost the principal and other stakeholders. The employment of VaR is testimony of 
the multidisciplinary nature of CG. Hence, the study contributes by showing that 
insights in CG issues can be obtained by using existing models from other fields 
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of study. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study was the first to 
employ VaR in CG and attempt to quantify the cost of P-A and CG problems in 
FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies. The establishment of the rand-cost of P-A and 
CG problems was a bellwether, especially considering that studies done in the 
past linked agency and governance problems to company performance, capital 
structure, cost of capital, share prices, board composition, and not potential rand 
cost. 
iii. Another contribution made by the study was the formulation of the salary Gini 
(called s-Gini) which was adapted from the Gini coefficient to measure the levels 
of inequality between executives and other employees in the sample companies. 
This study contributes by exposing the opportunism displayed by executives. This 
opportunism resulted from the unintended consequences of agency theory 
propositions that endeavour to align the objectives of the principal and agent.  
iv. Further contributions made by the study are through the recommendations to 
extend the agency theory to cover socio-economic costs and to not only focus on 
agency costs. The study contributed by highlighting socio-economic costs that 
need considerations. The opportunism and the socio-economic gap exposed in 
the study is likely to attract the attention of lawmakers and other CG scholars. 
v. This study made further contributions by proposing an executive remuneration 
model that captures pertinent aspects of CG in incentivising executives. 
Combined, the contributions made by this study add to the existing understanding of 
P-A and CG in South Africa, and a reasonable basis is provided to allow comparisons 
with findings from studies conducted in other developed countries. 
1.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The research held the minimum risk of ethical implications for the researcher, the 
sample companies and the University of South Africa (UNISA), as the data used was 
publicly available. Moreover, the researcher obtained an ethical clearance certificate 
from UNISA before any data was acquired from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE), a company called Profile Data and collected from company websites. 
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1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This section provides a brief layout of the chapters in this thesis. 
Chapter 1: Introduction and background 
This chapter provided an explication of this research and placed it in context. The 
research questions and their themes were discussed. This chapter also presented the 
objectives of the study, as well as a brief discussion of the methodology employed and 
the benefits of the study. A summary of the structure of the thesis was also provided.  
Chapter 2: Literature review 
The chapter reviewed the literature pertaining to P-A and CG theories, the separation 
of ownership and control, executive compensation, rewarding systems and the 
effectiveness of CG codes. The discussion included an integration of the theoretical 
and empirical issues related to CG. The literature discussion concluded by highlighting 
the disjoint between the heightened reporting on corporate scandals involving 
executives, amidst the robust recommendations of King III and King IV that have been 
adopted by companies. This placed the study in context. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter 3 provided a discussion of the mixed methodologies, design logics, timing, 
integration, weighting, archival research strategy, inductive reasoning and 
interpretative enquiry employed in the study. Furthermore, this chapter extensively 
discoursed the approaches used in the construction of governance indices, executive 
compensation model, Event Studies (ES), VaR and s-Gini. Data inputs into the 
governance indices, executive remuneration estimation model, ES, VaR and s-Gini 
are also outlined in the chapter. 
Chapter 4: Data analysis and discussion 
In this chapter, the findings and results obtained from the research methodologies 
employed are presented and discussed. The findings from Theme I through Theme IV 
are presented separately, as well as integrated, to support the conclusions reached 
by this study. The concurrences and divergences between this study’s findings and 
those of other researchers are discussed, and possible reasons for the differences are 
provided. Finally, the inferences drawn from the findings are cogently discussed. 
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Chapter 5: Summary of conclusions and recommendations for future research 
This final chapter summarises the conclusions reached by this study. The theoretical 
implications of the findings, the contributions of the study, a summary of 
recommendations, and suggestions for future research are outlined as well. The last 
section of the chapter highlights possible shortcomings of the study which are 
discussed as areas for future research. 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce and provide context to this study. After 
the introduction and background, the discussions that followed covered the thematised 
research questions, the objectives of the study, its benefits, ethical considerations and 
the structure of the thesis. 
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This chapter focuses on the 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
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literature review unfolds. 
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CHAPTER 2:   LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will present the background to and provide an introduction to agency 
theory and corporate governance problems. In addition, key findings from previous 
empirical studies will be discussed. 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
Mallin (2010) and McNulty et al. (2013) have identified CG as a relatively new area of 
study that is still developing and which draws a strong influence from the fields of 
finance, economics, accounting, law, management, psychology, sociology and 
organisational behaviour. Durisin and Puzone (2009) also highlighted similar fields 
from which practical CG implications have been drawn. 
According to Dühnfort, Klein and Lampenius (2008), and McNulty et al. (2013), there 
are generally four broad popular CG theoretical frameworks, namely; principal-agent 
theory (P-A theory) also known as agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder 
theory and political/social theory. It is worth noting that the agency theory is the 
dominant theory in CG (Clarke, 2004; Dühnfort et al., 2008), as was also 
acknowledged by Mallin (2010) who pointed out that agency theory has provided the 
main theoretical framework which has had significant influence in the development of 
CG as a field of study. Further to the dominance of P-A theory in CG, Otten and 
Wempe (2009) assert that the agency paradigm features strongly in the CG body of 
knowledge. This is despite the fact that an acceptable theoretical foundation and 
conceptual framework for CG that sufficiently show the reality of CG practices is still 
being sought. This study focused on the dominant P-A theory due to its significant 
influence on the development of CG principles. This study employed the P-A 
theoretical lens (agency theoretical lens) in its approach to examining consequences 
of CG interactions in South Africa’s FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies. 
In this study, the CG principle is anchored in the goal of P-A theory, which aims to find 
governance structures and control mechanisms that minimise the problems created 
by the separation of ownership and control or management. The P-A theory attempts 
to create ways in which owners or shareholders of a company can control executives 
(agents) to ensure that shareholders’ (principals’) interests are foremost. This may be 
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a ‘forced’ way of trying to achieve goal congruence, as both the principals and agents 
may have different objectives. 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
The study employed a mixed-methods research design, and used P-A theory as a 
framework to inform the various aspects of the literature review, data collection, and 
the analysis and interpretation of both the qualitative and quantitative data. The P-A 
theory was incorporated into the mixed methods design in the form of a social sciences 
theoretical framework (Creswell, 2014) as a way of achieving the research objectives. 
Eisenhardt (1989) presented a compelling argument and advocated for the adoption 
of the P-A theory when one examined problems related to P-A relationships. As such, 
the study adopted the P-A theory as a lens that shaped the examination of the 
consequences of P-A and CG interactions in South Africa’s FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies. The review of key literature and the mapping of the chapter unfolds as 
depicted in Figure 2.1: 
 
Figure 2.1: Key literature and mapping of literature review chapter 
Source: Researcher’s inferences from literature 
The literature review chapter unfolds from the P-A theory and transitions to consider 
literature that covers the variables that are of temporal order, which Creswell (2014) 
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explains as one variable that precedes another in time and affects or probably causes 
another variable, and can be observed or measured. This includes a review of the 
literature on the separation of ownership and control, executive compensation, 
rewarding systems and effectiveness of current CG codes. 
2.3 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
2.3.1 How the Principal-Agent relationship arises 
Principal-Agency theory (P-A theory) identifies shareholders and debt holders as the 
main providers of capital (equity and debt respectively). They contract with executives 
and give them a mandate to manage the shareholders’ assets or debt holders’ funds 
in a way that maximises value for them. There are a host of various P-A problems that 
arise between shareholders (principals) and executives (agents). Shah (2014) asserts 
that if the interests and incentives of the agent are not aligned with the principal’s 
interest, the principal will find it difficult to monitor the behaviour and actions of the 
agent as he or she has both the motivation and ability to divert from the principal’s 
interests. This is what is termed the P-A problem.  
The P-A problems in the relationship being investigated emanate from the conflicting 
objectives amongst the parties involved and the mechanisms put in place to achieve 
goal congruence. Therefore, the CG mechanisms become the vehicle employed to try 
and align the interests of both the principal and agent. As a consequence, CG 
mechanisms are used to define, direct, control and monitor the interactions that occur 
between the principal and agent. These CG mechanisms and the resultant interactions 
have consequences that are examined in this study. Figure 2.2 depicts the simplest 
possible interactions that may exist between the principal and agent. Lambert (2001) 
describes this P-A relationship in terms of the roles of the principal and agent. He 
further mentions: 
 The principal’s role is to supply capital, carry the residual risk and structure 
incentive packages for the agent so as to attract the best skill. Moreover, Lambert 
(2001) suggests that the principal can be seen as a ‘representative shareholder’ or 
the board of directors. 
 The agent’s role is to make decisions on behalf of the principal and bear some risks 
that are in line with the principal’s risk appetite. 
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Figure 2.2: Possible CG interactions  
Source: Researcher’s inferences from literature 
As depicted in Figure 2.2, the principal and the agent can interact directly with one 
another without any governance systems, as is generally found in a smaller owner-
managed business and where there are only one or two other employees. However, 
in publicly listed companies (which is the focus of this study) there are legislative and 
JSE listing requirements, as well as other requirements which may be stipulated in the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI), that mandate the formal appointment 
of the senior management, including the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) (Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2009). Thus, the formal 
mandate and appointment of senior executives entails that there be contracts and 
systems which govern the relationships or interactions between the principal and 
appointed agent and their functions within the company. The result is a ‘nexus of 
contracts’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) between the principal and agent, designed to 
enforce agent-compliance and the alignment of interests which give rise to agency 
costs. Otten and Wempe (2009) classify these into monitoring costs and bonding costs 
(incentives). The discussions around the agency costs are revisited later in this review.  
From another perspective, but not different from the depiction in Figure 2.2, Lambert 
(2001) presents what he called a ‘plain vanilla principal-agent model’ which is germane 
to the sequence of events leading to the establishment of a P-A relationship. 
 
Figure 2.3: Plain vanilla principal-agent model 
Source: Lambert (2001) 
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Lambert’s (2001) ‘plain vanilla principal-agent model’ seems to support the Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) assertion that a company is a ‘nexus of contracts’ because the 
P-A relationship in his model is governed by the agreed-upon contract. In addition, 
Lambert (2001) highlighted that the principal determines the performance evaluation 
system and performance measures which form the basis of the agent’s compensation.  
The agent’s compensation is based on observable performance outcomes which are 
contracted upon (Lambert, 2001). However, Lambert (2001) accentuates that there is 
an implicit assumption that the property rights of the agreed-upon outcomes belong to 
the principal. This could be the reason why the agent may embark on earnings 
management and fraudulent financial reporting in order to acquire a slice of the 
uncontracted property that belongs to the principal, especially considering that there 
is a possibility that the principal compensates the agent based on information provided 
by the agent. The result is a moral hazard which may require the principal to verify the 
information provided by the agent to ensure that there is a deterrent on the agent’s 
behaviour and to limit the impact of his/her actions (Negash, 2011). This provides a 
plausible reason why the compensation of the agent is an important component of the 
P-A theory.  
Tied to performance evaluation, performance measures and compensation are the 
decisions made by the agent (defined in Lambert’s model as ‘agent selects actions’). 
These decisions can be categorised into operating decisions, financing decisions and 
investment decisions. All three categories of decisions are prone to interference by the 
personal motives of the agent, and have the capacity to impact the long-term wealth 
of the principal, as well as widening the divergence in the interests of the principal and 
agent. 
2.3.2 Sources of P-A problems and assumptions of P-A theory 
P-A problems are inherent in CG structures due to the separation of ownership and 
the way companies are governed and managed. Eisenhardt (1989) concluded that 
empirical evidence reveals the presence of P-A problems between the shareholders 
and top executives because of conflicting objectives. Furthermore, Otten and Wempe 
(2009) asserted that CG problems exist when serving the interests of any group of 
stakeholders involved with the company. Moreover, the aforementioned authors argue 
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that these CG problems do not only emanate from conflict of interests and differing 
objectives, but also from varying opinions, expectations, notions and perceptions of 
what is best for the company.  
Eisenhardt (1989) classified assumptions about P-A into the following categories: 
 The people, which include aspects related to self-interest, constrained rationality, 
risk aversion, and so on. 
 The company, which include issues around the conflict between those involved 
with the company in terms of the vision, strategic direction, differing objectives, and 
so forth. 
 Information, where those who are involved with the company on a daily basis, and 
who have certain valuable expertise, have more information than the principals or 
shareholders who are supposed to control and monitor the activities of the agents 
who are hired to maximise value for them. As a result, information and expertise of 
the agent become a commodity that can be sold by the agent to the ‘highest-
bidder’. 
In addition to the above categories of assumptions, Eisenhardt (1989) considered 
more pertinent aspects of the contracts that govern the relationships between the 
principal and the agent by classifying P-A contracts into: 
 Behaviour-oriented contracts which focus on salaries and hierarchical governance 
(a top-down structural arrangement that reveals how governance interactions in a 
company occur); and 
 Outcome-oriented contracts which focus on commissions, share options, transfer 
of property rights to the agent, and market governance. 
Eisenhardt (1989) questioned which of the two types of contracts was the most 
efficient in governing the P-A relationship. To this end, she (the aforementioned 
author) suggested that the question of which was the most efficient P-A contract 
(behavioural or outcome-oriented contract) could be applied to company phenomena 
covering issues around compensation, ownership and capital structure, among others. 
Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1989) asserted that agency theory was rooted in information 
economics, and cited Jensen (1983) in highlighting that the theory had developed 
along the lines of positivist and P-A streams.  
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The development of the two streams, namely positivist and P-A, are based on similar 
assumptions as mentioned above, and use a contract as the unit of analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the positivist and P-A streams diverge on mathematical 
rigour, dependent variable, and style (Eisenhardt, 1989). Developing the positivist line 
further, Eisenhardt (1989) posited that positivist studies are replete with P-A 
relationships between the shareholders (owners) and executives of publicly listed 
companies (citing Berle and Means, 1932). In addition, she (the abovementioned 
author) highlighted that the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on company 
ownership and structure had influenced how share ownership by executives can assist 
in the alignment of objectives with shareholders. Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that the 
positivist’s theoretical perspective explores governance mechanisms that seek to 
solve the P-A problems that arise due to the separation of ownership and control. In 
concluding, Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that positivist results in outcome-oriented 
principal-agent contracts that minimise opportunistic behaviour by the agent and 
produce information which the principal can use to monitor and control the behaviour 
of the agent (which is the purpose of the board). On the other hand, the line of P-A 
research as opposed to the positivist research seeks a general theory of P-A 
relationship which can be applied to other P-A relationships, such as auditor-client, 
employer-employee, lawyer-client, and so forth (Eisenhardt, 1989, citing Harris & 
Raviv, 1978).  
This research, however, did not focus on other P-A relationships that may exist within 
the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies other than the positivist approach to the P-A 
relationship that exists between the owners/shareholders (principals) and executives 
(agents). Even though this study leans heavily on the positivist line, as suggested by 
Eisenhardt (1989), it uses the two lines of P-A theory as complements to ensure that 
the efficiency of contracts under varying levels of outcomes, risk tolerance, information 
and other observable variables are considered. 
2.3.3 Nature of the P-A problems 
There are various P-A problems which manifest themselves in different ways in the 
interactions between the principal and agent. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) pointed out 
the nature of P-A problems which manifest in the course of interaction between the 
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principal and agent. The discussion below briefly explains the nature of P-A problems 
as pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
 Transfer pricing: The agent may expropriate funds from the principal through 
transfer pricing. This occurs where the agent owns a business interest (outside of 
that in which he is an executive) that supplies goods and/ or services to the one in 
which he is an executive, or his personal business is a customer of the business 
he is an executive. In such instances, there needs to be investigated whether the 
pricing arrangements are not detrimental to the principal. This aspect of P-A 
problems requires that related party transactions should be carefully examined and 
they should be disclosed in the financial statements to ensure that these 
transactions are disclosed in accordance with International Accounting Standard 
24 (IAS 24-Related party disclosures). The examination of related party 
transactions would cover how they are recognised (included), measured and 
disclosed in the financial statements to ensure that they are not materially 
misstated to mislead the principals. 
 Empire building: P-A problems are also related to empire building as the agent 
ring-fences his/her power. This happens when the agent uses his/her control rights 
to pursue projects or activities that benefit them more rather than the principal. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) term these ‘private benefits of control’. The existence 
of these ‘private benefits of control’ need to be carefully examined to find out if 
agents are not acting contrary to maximising wealth for the principal. 
 Managerial entrenchments: Managerial entrenchments (protection through a 
nexus of contracts, including employee contracts) can also result in the 
expropriation of the principal’s wealth by making it difficult and costly for the 
principal to remove or fire the agent. In such instances, a non-performing agent 
may be protected by a nexus of contracts that will work against the principal. 
 Diversification: Diversification can reveal possible embedded P-A problems, 
especially where it can be established that the diversification benefits the agent 
more than the principal. This becomes similar to empire building which is briefly 
explained above. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) cited the work by Kaplan and 
Weisbach (1992) who documented the history of companies that went the 
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diversification route and that were shortly followed by divestures which suggested 
that the diversification was an adverse move for the principal in the first place. 
 Resisting takeovers: Companies resisting takeovers may be as a result of the 
agents’ self-serving behaviour that seeks to protect private benefits rather than 
benefiting the principal. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) posited that in takeover-
resistance situations, P-A problems emanate from the agents not wanting to lose 
private benefits. Further, they argued that executives may be less likely to resist 
takeovers if there were financial benefits that accrued to them in the form of share 
options or financial buy-outs. 
 Issuance of debt securities: This is related to management issuing debt 
securities that are least sensitive to the executives’ behaviour or the executives’ 
private information, so that debt financiers only concern themselves with the value 
of collateral and not the entire company value. This point is paramount, especially 
in terms of the 2008 global financial crisis where bondholders/creditors woke up to 
realise that the collateral was valueless or illiquid because it could not be sold. The 
majority of creditors would rarely concern themselves with the value of the entire 
company and the underlying assets. For this reason, agents might borrow 
excessively to finance their self-serving ambitions. 
The nature of the P-A problems as discussed in the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
may determine and have consequences on the CG interaction within the Top40 listed 
companies. As such, the nature of the P-A problems needs to be examined to address 
Theme I of the research questions. Theme I is concerned with the incidences and 
interactions with company successes and failures (failure includes both financial 
failure and involvement in conduct, for example, involvement in collusion, which might 
attract penalties and other sanctions or reputational damage). In addition, the nature 
of P-A problems as listed above, namely, transfer pricing, empire building, managerial 
entrenchments, diversification and takeover resistance would encroach into the other 
three themes which are concerned with the costs, socio-economic consequences and 
the effectiveness of the current codes of good governance. 
At this point and pertinent to this study, it is worth signifying the inclusion of P-A theory. 
The study is anchored in P-A theory because it is open to the examination of: 
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 The conflicts of interest that exist between the principals and agents or the conflict 
of interest situations that the agent is susceptible to in a P-A relationship; 
 The incentive problems that result in the agent acting in their own interest and not 
that of the principal; and 
 The CG mechanisms put in place to deal with the two issues above. 
The above three aspects, as highlighted by Lambert (2001), are important because 
they are at the core of well-managed, well-directed and well-controlled companies 
which make significant contributions to the economy and are good corporate citizens. 
Furthermore, Lambert (2001) accentuated that the P-A theory provides a framework 
to examine issues like the separation of ownership and control, executive 
compensation, rewarding systems and effectiveness of CG codes. These issues are 
also vital in the decision-setting of any company. Moreover, CG mechanisms need to 
be safeguards against the agent diverting the company’s (principal’s) resources for 
personal gain, and his/her susceptibility to focusing on the short-term performance at 
the expense of the long-term good of the company (Lambert, 2001; Bolton, 
Scheinkman & Xiong, 2006).  
The CG mechanisms also need to deal with effort aversion, which Comerford and Ubel 
(2013) defined as a situation where the agent chooses to avoid effortful work even if it 
is predicted that the work will provide him/her with better work experience. This effort 
aversion, Lambert (2001) asserted, is one of the reasons why a conflict of interest may 
exist between the principal and agent. The other reasons for the existence of conflict 
of interest are identified by Lambert (2001) as the agent’s potential to divert the 
principal’s resources for personal benefits and the differential in time horizon, that is, 
the agent being focused on short-term performance as well as associated rewards, 
and the principal concerned with the long-term good of the company. 
2.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORY 
Empirical evidence accentuates the recognition that CG interactions can significantly 
impact shareholders (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, 2004). Taking a step back and trying 
to understand why CG systems must be in place for companies to operate efficiently 
and in the interest of all shareholders, Balc, Ilies, Cioban and Cuza (2013) traced the 
origin of the term governance from the Latin word ‘gubernare’ which means ‘to lead’. 
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Therefore, CG would entail all the processes and systems that ensure that companies 
are led efficiently and effectively. In addition, Guillén (2000) espoused the argument 
that CG plays a critical role in the economy by contributing to economic efficiency and 
social equity as well as having political and managerial implications. Furthermore, 
Guillén (2000) maintained that good CG enables companies to pursue their intended 
as well as emergent strategies, while on the contrary, poor and/ or weak CG can cause 
mayhem in the economy as it may lead to the misallocation of resources and failure 
to curb exploitative behaviour. Guillén (2000) advocated for more research to be 
carried out to understand how CG may impact the various societal groups. This study 
hopes to contribute towards the call by Guillén (2000) as it seeks to ascertain the 
socio-economic consequences of CG interactions in South Africa. 
With regards to the financial and the capital markets, Padgett (2012) noted that good 
CG by companies aids economic development in developing countries, especially 
when coupled with financial sector reforms. Consequently, good governance enables 
access to capital which is critical for growth or expansion of companies. Good CG in 
companies improves the monitoring of the agent’s activities and leads to greater 
efficiencies and profits, as well as better performance as measured by operating or 
market returns (Padgett, 2012). Padgett (2012) also argued that in emerging markets, 
improved governance leads to better company performance, lower cost of capital and 
increases share price (company value goes up) as investors are willing to pay a 
premium for well governed companies (citing McKinsey & Co., 2002). Well governed 
companies are noted by Padgett (2012) as having improved monitoring systems, 
better disclosures or accountability and stand out against their competitors with 
regards to share-price performance. In the analysis done by Padgett (2012), she 
concludes that good CG by companies results in higher valuations, encourages 
investors (local and international investors) to enter into capital markets, makes capital 
available for companies, leads to growth or expansion in companies which may end 
up listing on the stock exchange and contributes to the growth and development of the 
economy. The snowball results are better economic, social, health and educational 
improvements which reduce the inequalities between the various groups of people 
who live in the country (Padgett, 2012). By inference, poor and or weak governance 
yields the opposite results. 
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Padgett (2012) further extended her argument to link CG to reputational risk and the 
ability of the company to list on stock exchanges beyond its parent country’s borders. 
She posited that there is good empirical evidence that reveals that companies that 
decide to list outside their parent country will encounter tougher listing requirements, 
but good CG serves as an indicator of corporate quality that finds favour from overseas 
capital markets. Moreover, Padgett (2012) emphasised the importance of this fact for 
companies that are parented in developing countries with a reputation for being 
corrupt, as their success may be associated with the corrupt environment they come 
from. 
In general, CG has to do with the systems and structures by which companies are 
governed and controlled or managed5. Hence, the owners of and investors in the 
business will appoint a board of directors with a chairperson at its helm. The board 
can be comprised of numerous board committees, for example, nominating, 
remuneration, audit, risk management and social and ethics committees, depending 
on its size, the requirements of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008, c.2, and 
whether it is listed or not. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) maintained that there are three 
main CG systems around the world. These CG systems are: 
 The Anglo-Saxon system which consists of mixed boards dominated by outside 
non-executive (mostly independent) directors as in the UK and the US. This is by 
and large the system adopted in South Africa; 
 The German system which has a two-tiered supervisory and management board, 
and the Japanese one which is insider-dominated; and 
 The rest of the systems around the world that are family-owned systems with a few 
large outside investors and banks. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) posited that these different CG systems emanate from the 
nature of the legal obligations executives have to shareholders or bond-holders, and 
how courts interpret and enforce these obligations. Furthermore, the aforementioned 
                                            
5 This study does not intend to concentrate on the definition of corporate governance, thus its adoption 
of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) definition. The IFC defines Corporate Governance as the 
structures and processes by which companies are directed and controlled. (ifc.org/corporate 
governance (January 2014)). Cadbury Report (1992) has a similar definition and was adopted by The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (OECD, 2009). 
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authors asserted that the best CG system is the one that integrates the legal protection 
of investors and concentrated ownership. Moreover, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (2009) suggested that the purpose of such a CG 
system in companies is fundamentally connected and necessitated by the separation 
that exists between shareholders and executives. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) went a 
step further to highlight the characteristics of a good CG system. These characteristics 
include that the system has extensive rules that protect minority rights, allows the 
transfer of shares, keeps directors’ elections from management interference, and 
allows extensive shareholder-power to hold the agent to account (even to sue the 
agent).  
The source of the shareholder power is the legal protection (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1999) that the legislative framework 
affords the principal, and the withdrawal of capital from the company (that is, by selling 
their shareholding) that large institutional investors have as a way of controlling or 
expressing their dissatisfaction with the agent’s behaviour (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
The decision by principals to dispose of their shareholding in a company is a way of 
taking decision power on their investments away from agents. Furthermore, the 
alienability of the ownership of listed companies also acts as an outside governance 
mechanism (Rezaee, 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) asserted that democratic companies have governance systems that have more 
shareholder rights and allow less manager power or managers’ interference in the 
shareholder control processes. Such democratic governance systems permit 
principals to vote on the assets and other important decisions that affect the company, 
for example, board nominations, mergers and acquisitions, and so on.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) highlighted circumstances where the agent usurps power 
or control from the principal and renders the monitoring of the agent’s behaviour in 
making important decisions ineffective. The circumstances where the agent usurps 
power from the principal may arise when the principal is not qualified or does not have 
the competences required to run the business or does not have time to do so. The 
principal becomes vulnerable if the agent has more expertise than the principal, and 
this may expose the principal to the self-serving behaviour of the agent. The agent’s 
personal benefits will also be heightened if there are differences in the expertise levels 
between the principal and the agent and this can be considered as a way the agent 
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can gain power or control over the principal. Fortunately, the power-sharing 
relationship between the principal and agent is defined by the CG arrangements 
(Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003).  
The hired agent with heightened competence might end up with more knowledge 
about the business and this may result in information asymmetry. Such situations 
result in eclectic limitations on the principal’s voting rights, that Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) list as: 
 Management’s interference in the voting process and too much control on the 
Annual General Meeting’s (AGM) agenda; 
 Weak legal systems and Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) that result in 
shareholder rights being violated; 
 Threats to the principal to vote in a particular way that favours management. This 
includes all kinds of coercion that may be experienced by the principal to vote with 
the agent; 
 Failures to notify shareholders of meetings. This may include the late dispatch of 
meeting notices, or inefficient modes of delivering meeting notices, for example, 
using the South African Post Office which is notoriously unreliable, and other 
operational problems; 
 Blocking shareholders who are perceived to be hostile through technicalities. The 
agent may also use techniques to block or limit the voting power of the principal. 
The techniques used may include declaring voting limits on some shares illegal, 
requiring a super-majority for an item to be put on the meeting agenda, losing 
voting records, and so forth; 
 Flaws in the voting process, including those who count the votes. External auditors 
maybe used but they may also be compromised as they are agents who may 
peddle their agenda to retain a client who may be a source of significant revenue 
in other service engagements; 
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) highlighted that majority shareholding only works when 
the voting mechanism grants the power to dictate the decisions of the company. 
For minority shareholders to exercise decision control, they need to amass 
significant votes and obtain some proxies which are, however, susceptible to 
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interference by the agent. Furthermore, minority shareholders have limited 
incentives to be informed on how to vote as they are normally diversified in their 
investment portfolios (Fama, 1980). Fama (1980) postulated that the principal 
diversifies across shares in different sectors and within the same industry to avoid 
the concentration of his wealth depending on one company. The principal will not 
have any special interest to personally oversee the daily activities of any of the 
companies he/she has shareholding in. In such instances, the minority 
shareholders would focus on share-price growth and dividend pay-outs as they 
seem to accept that they have no ‘muscle’ to fight the agent who has 
entrenchments that are expensive to deal with. These managerial entrenchments 
come in the form of the entitlement to terminal benefit pay-outs, automatic bonuses 
or share-based schemes in the event of termination, balloon payments, severance 
packages because of the change in control, and other pay-outs to executives due 
to loss of office (Gompers et al., 2003); 
 The subordination of equity to other debt instruments makes the protection of 
shareholders’ voting rights inferior and poorer, as the equity holders have residual 
claims on the company. The decline in residual claims reduces the wealth of the 
principal due to the conflicting interest between the principal and agent. Companies 
that are heavily geared are likely to be in the control of debt-holders and the 
shareholders will lose control of the company. This limits or eliminates the 
shareholder power, as control of the company is surrendered to the debt financier 
because of the self-serving behaviour of the agent that may have yielded power to 
debt-holders. In such instances, debt-holders become better protected than 
shareholders as the debt covenants restrict some operational aspects of the 
company, and places limitations on the riskiness of projects to be embarked on, as 
well as decisions and behaviour of agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, 
Gompers et al., (2003) suggested that shareholders consciously accept restrictions 
on their voting rights and power to control the agent in exchange for their wealth 
maximisation. As such, the principal may become acquiescent to the unethical and 
illegal behaviour of the agent. 
Maskara et al. (2012) argue that the CG system introduced to deal with the misaligned 
interests of the principal and agent has had aforementioned consequences which have 
been detrimental to the shareholders and economies. Kirkpatrick (2009) further 
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asserted that the 2008 financial crisis which the world economy is still smarting from 
(at least nine years later) can be attributed to failures in CG interactions. He added 
that the possible causes of the CG failures were a result of the poor governance 
procedures, rather than inadequate computer models, risk management being seen 
as a task and not being enterprise-based, boards approving company strategies 
without appropriate monitoring systems in place, and remuneration systems which 
were not linked to the company strategy, risk appetite as well as long-term interests of 
the company. Kirkpatrick (2009) presented a compelling argument that weaknesses 
in CG can be perfected by a mismatch in the executive incentive system, risk 
management6 and internal control systems. Alternatively, according to Kirkpatrick 
(2009), these mismatches may cause weaknesses in CG systems.  
The ensuing discussion zeroed-in on the literature that focuses on the P-A 
relationships, with the emphasis on the separation of ownership and control, executive 
compensation, rewarding systems, information asymmetry and other agents’ 
behaviour that cause or exacerbate P-A problems. The mapping of the literature 
discussion and research themes is as follows: 
o Theme I: addressed by literature on separation of ownership and control in 
Section 2.5. 
o Theme II: addressed by literature on executive compensation, rewarding 
systems and agency costs in Sections 2.6 and 2.7. 
o Theme III: addressed by literature on separation of ownership and control, 
executive compensation and rewarding systems. The separation of 
ownership and control, executive compensation and rewarding systems 
have socio-economic costs or consequences considered in this theme. 
o Theme IV: addressed by literature discussed in Section 2.8. 
                                            
6 The study considered the behavioural and CG aspects of risk management. The behavioural aspect 
of risk management considers the risk the company finds itself exposed to due to the behaviour of the 
agent and principal. The CG aspect of risk management considers how the information generated by 
risk management systems/models is transmitted or used by or within the company’s governance 
structures. 
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2.5 SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
A separation exists between shareholders and those that direct or manage 
(executives) the companies on a day-to-day basis.  
2.5.1 Reasons for the separation 
Those that direct or manage the companies on a daily basis are compensated for their 
expertise and time. Fama (1980) suggested the following possible reasons for the 
separation: 
 Shareholders and those who manage companies each have a market for their 
services. For example, the shareholder has capital markets for his investment 
which she/he chooses to invest in company A instead of company B. He/she can 
buy shares in any of the listed companies and become a shareholder depending 
on the preferred risk-return trade off. Similarly, there is a market for the expertise 
and time of the executives who run the companies. These would require a market-
related compensation and they may be susceptible to following their personal 
interests other than the interests of the shareholders who hire them.  
 Shareholders and executives are each able to explore alternative opportunities. 
For example, shareholders can diversify their portfolios, transfer funds from one 
share to another at relatively low transaction costs, and sell off their shareholding 
in a company as a way of showing their dissatisfaction with the decisions taken by 
the executives. Executives also have alternative opportunities in terms of which 
companies to join and they are rewarded appropriately for their expertise and time. 
 Both the shareholder and executive have motivations that will influence their 
behaviour. The shareholder will be motivated to own shares in company A if she/he 
envisages that there is greater potential for a maximised return. On the other hand, 
the executive might be motivated by incentives, potential ownership through share 
schemes offered by the company, empire under his control, other private benefits, 
and so on. However, the agent may deviate from the contractual arrangements, 
especially in circumstances where the deviation results in greater personal wealth 
than when he abides by the contractual arrangements. Situations where 
contractual deviations are more rewarding for the agent result in the agent 
engaging in risky behaviour that goes beyond the principal’s risk preferences, 
although at times the principal may be complicit during periods of excess returns. 
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Demsetz and Lehn (1985) further highlighted the determinants of the ownership 
structure as: 
 Value-maximising the size of the company: The aforesaid authors refer to this 
factor as the risk-neutral effect of the size of the company on ownership. The 
authors maintain that the higher price of shareholding should minimise 
shareholding concentration. In effect, the increased cost of providing share capital 
to the company will discourage the ownership of large blocks of shares which could 
result in concentrated ownership. The optimal size that allows the company to 
compete at a level that maximises value for shareholders is attained when there is 
a greater diffusion of ownership. 
 Control potential: The authors argue that it is the profit potential which results in 
the principal exercising more effective control in the company. Furthermore, the 
authors assert that the principal can achieve wealth gains by effectively monitoring 
the agent’s performance. However, monitoring the agent’s performance has cost 
implications for the principal (which will be discussed later as part of monitoring 
costs). The authors suggest that the more unstable the company’s operating 
environment is, the more the principal should implement and maintain tighter 
controls, and the costlier it becomes. That is, the more unstable the environment, 
the more there should be concentrated ownership of the company. This analogy 
suggests that the governance structures should be stronger and more 
concentrated in unstable or volatile environments as well as in unstable 
companies. 
 Systematic regulation: The authors state that this restricts the options available to 
the principal and in the process erodes the control potential discussed above.  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Bhabra and Luu (2015) maintained that the main effect 
of regulation can be called ‘subsidised monitoring’, where rules and regulations 
monitor the actions of the agent. Non-compliant management will be disciplined, 
however, the law increases risk and exposes the agent to the risk of being dismissed. 
Moreover, the authors argued that the primary impact of regulation is that it may 
reduce the concentration of ownership in favour of a greater diffusion of ownership, 
especially in key economic sectors and industries, some of which are highly regulated. 
On the other hand, the spread of ownership tends to have consequences that pose 
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constraints on the power of the shareholder against the agent. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) argued that the spread of ownership results in the agent sacrificing the wealth 
of the principal to serve his/her own interest. 
2.5.2 The role of the executive (agent) 
Whatever separation and ownership structures exist, even beyond those suggested 
by Fama (1980) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985), the shareholder, as the principal, will 
hire an executive, as an agent, to act on his/her behalf and to maximise the principal’s 
interest. This arrangement between the principal and agent is what is known as the 
P- A relationship.  
There are inherent problems that emanate from conflicting interests between the two 
parties. Mallin (2010) stated that the potential problems arising from P-A relationships 
were identified by Smith as long ago as 1838. Mallin (2010) referred to the work of 
Smith (1838) who posited that directors (agents) who are charged with governance 
manage other people’s (shareholders’/debt holders’) funds and cannot be expected to 
manage it as vigilantly as their own. Consequently, the separation between those that 
own and those who control companies inherently creates conflicting interests. 
Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that there is a separation that exists 
between decision management (which includes initiation and implementation of 
decisions) and decision control (which includes decision ratification and monitoring). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) emphasised that control of P-A problems through the 
decision process is important because of the separation that exists between ownership 
and management. 
The realities of the separation between shareholders (principals) and management 
(agents) as discussed by Berle and Means (1932) is also acknowledged by Mallin 
(2010), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Dühnfort et al. (2008) as being essential in 
explaining the relationships that exist between companies and shareholders. Mallin 
(2010) went further by stating that the work by Berle and Means (1932) has had a 
significant influence in shaping the thinking around how companies are owned, 
managed and controlled.  
Balc et al. (2013) expanded further on the separation between shareholders and 
management when they highlighted that the concept of an ‘absent’ shareholder 
became prevalent after the Second World War. The result was that management 
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(agents) were leading companies and shareholders were content to receive dividends 
without taking part in the operations of the business. Boards of directors were then put 
in place to oversee the interests of the shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
sustained the argument by stating that the boards had the power to employ, dismiss 
and compensate the top decision executives and to ratify and monitor important 
decisions taken by these executives. The boards are to exercise control rights over 
the top decision executives to ensure decision management and control (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983).  
Balc et al. (2013) highlighted that in the 70s and 80s there were a few boards that had 
independent directors that were dominated by the CEO and the chairperson of the 
board which led to fractures in the decision-control and monitoring systems. In 
addition, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the other source of dominance by 
the agent, apart from the expertise and time discussed above, is the agent’s ability to 
manipulate the company’s decision-control and monitoring systems.  
To mitigate the possible effects on the principal’s wealth due to the agent manipulating 
the decision-control and monitoring system, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that the 
principal could put in place a multi-member board that would make it difficult for agents 
within the company to collude to the detriment of the principal’s wealth. Fama (1980) 
sustained that the absence of a multi-member board may result in agents engaging in 
collusive behaviour and the expropriation of the principal’s wealth. To lower the 
chances of collusive behaviour and expropriation of the principal’s wealth, as well as 
to enhance the efficacy of the board as a low-cost internal governance mechanism, 
Fama (1980) proposed that a company should have non-executive board members 
(outside directors). These directors would be able to curtail collusion and the 
expropriation of wealth that might take place at industry, as well as company level. 
The separation of ownership and control has resulted in the concept of the ‘absent’ 
shareholder (Balc et al., 2013), as highlighted above. This absence causes an 
information asymmetry, where managers (agents) have more information about the 
business. The agents may be highly tempted to use the information at their disposal 
to their full advantage and to the detriment of the principal. To limit the impact of 
information asymmetry, the board may seek information on decision-initiation and 
implementation from both the lower levels and the top executives of the company by 
incorporating executives into the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, 
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Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the top executives on the board can use the 
board platform to peddle their agendas, as they may prevent information flow to the 
board. Moreover, executives may make it difficult or costly to dismiss them as they 
may influence the MOI’s requirements to require a certain majority to dismiss them. 
2.5.3 Agency costs 
To keep the goals of the shareholders (principals) aligned to those of executives 
(agents), the principal would incur ‘agency costs’ which Meinhövel (1999) 
differentiated into monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss.  
Hoskisson, Castleton and Withers (2009) submitted that the intensive monitoring of 
management may transfer the risks of running the business to the executives, who 
need to be paid higher packages to reward them for the high employment risks taken 
as key individuals in the company. This is the high-risk, high-return attitude of the 
agent, while the principal will seek to incur the least amount of agency costs.  
The agency costs are regarded by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as unavoidable due 
to the separation of ownership or P-A relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggested that the enormity of the agency costs is determined by: 
 Tastes of the agent/executive; 
 Ease with which they can exercise their own preferences, rather than value 
maximisation in decision-making; 
 Costs of monitoring and bonding activities;  
 Costs of measuring and evaluating the agent’s performance; 
 Costs of devising ways of compensating the agent in a manner commensurate with 
the shareholder’s value maximisation; 
 Costs of devising and enforcing policies and procedures that guide the agent’s 
behaviour; and 
 Competition or demand for the agent’s expertise, and the availability of his/her skill 
in the market may make his/her services cheaper or more expensive. 
The aforesaid determinants of the magnitude of agency costs can be viewed as the 
costs of conflicting interests that exist between the principal and agent, as well as a 
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means of transferring wealth from the principal to the agent. In reality, agency costs 
are also the real costs incurred by the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
2.5.4 The ‘absent’ shareholder (principal) 
In examining the aforementioned ‘absent’ shareholder concept, it can be said that it 
provides a breeding ground for shareholder value-destroying behaviour, which Fama 
(1980) stated would only be detected later due to the assumption that most 
shareholders tended to diversify their portfolio holdings and would normally be distant 
from internal details of each investment. The assumption that the principals 
(shareholders) are well diversified, hence their absence, may result in excessive 
corporate salaries that cause great company losses due to the number of mergers and 
acquisitions designed to justify salaries earned by executives (Balc et al., 2013). Balc 
et al. (2013) further maintained that the acquisition of shares, and the mergers and 
acquisitions did not improve the performance of companies studied but were actually 
motivated to increase the advantages of companies that were overvalued.  
In the same analogy of the ‘absent’ principal, in South Africa, Murray & Roberts is a 
case in point where the principal denied knowledge of the anti-competitive behaviour 
of the agent (executive). Henry Laas, the CEO of Murray & Roberts was quoted by the 
Business Times (July 2013) denying that the board and shareholders were aware of 
the management’s collusive behaviour. The denial by Murray & Roberts CEO is similar 
to the findings cited by Bris (2010) on Lehman Brothers where the examiner’s report 
stated that the board was not aware of Lehman’s Repo 105 programme and 
transactions. The self-serving behaviour highlighted by Bebchuk and Fried (2006) is 
revealed by some South African companies, for example, in the case of Fidentia boss, 
J. Arthur Brown who was the CEO when the R1,4 billion fund meant to support the 
widows and orphans of mine workers that his company administered, could not be 
accounted for or disappeared (Davis, 2013). Another example is that of CIPLA Medpro 
as reported in the Business Times (June 2013) where the CEO, CFO and Human 
resources director were allegedly investigated by the board for paying themselves 
unauthorised pay increases and bonuses among other charges. This incident resulted 
in the external auditors Mazars, being replaced by KPMG in December 2012 (Maake 
& Masote, 2013).  
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The above cited South African cases of Murray & Roberts, Fidentia and CIPLA are 
possible red flags that point to the deep entrenchment of P-A and governance 
problems. The cases ameliorate the possible demise of these companies as can be 
seen in the case of Fidentia’s liquidation. 
2.5.5 In conclusion 
The discussions above covered the possible reasons for the existence of separation 
of ownership and control (Fama, 1980), the determinants of the ownership structure 
as highlighted by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), issues about decision management and 
control, as well as board structure (Fama & Jensen, 1983), the concept of the ‘absent’ 
shareholder, and how information asymmetry arises (Balc et al., 2013), the 
determinants of the enormity of the agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), among 
other literature aspects and problems that arise due to the separation of ownership 
and control.  
In considering the above, the study examined the agent’s behaviour in the absence of 
the principal and the possible costs to the principal arising from potential conflicting 
interests. In establishing the costs of the agent’s behaviour, the study tried to ascertain 
the socio-economic impact of such costs, especially when things go wrong.  
The separation of ownership and control is possibly the foremost variable that 
precedes the other variables (temporal order variables as per Creswell, 2014). Hence, 
the study considered the CG principles to be anchored in the goal of P-A theory, which 
is to find governance structures and control mechanisms that minimise the problems 
created by the separation of ownership and control or management. 
2.6 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
The compensation of executives is a controversial topic (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009). 
However, CG also incorporates issues around executive (agent) compensation and 
therefore warrants inclusion in this research. Also, this study took on the challenge by 
Kirkpatrick (2009) who recommended that there be more scrutiny on executive 
compensation structures and their implications on CG. Taking on the challenge, this 
study was interested in understanding compensation structures, because in many 
cases they are used as CG mechanisms and have consequences that need to be 
examined to establish the impact on the principal’s wealth, the company, the economy 
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and effectiveness of the governance codes. The effectiveness of boards needs further 
granulated scrutiny (Kumar & Zattoni, 2014a) in the face of the impact of executive 
compensation on CG. 
The theory suggests that executive compensation is designed and set by the board to 
seek a way to maximise shareholder value by formulating and signing contracts that 
attract talented executives, rewarding them for their efforts in exploiting growth 
opportunities, minimising costs and rejecting wasteful projects (Edmans & Gabaix, 
2009). The aforementioned authors further asserted that empirical evidence suggests 
inconsistencies with theory, citing examples from the United States (US) where the 
compensation of executives has substantially increased at a faster pace than company 
performance and average salaries. Edmans and Gabaix (2009) provided what seemed 
to be plausible explanations of the driving forces behind the faster increases in 
executive compensation. These driving forces are: 
 The size of the company and growth in the size of the company. 
 The transferability of human capital which increases the executive’s external 
options. 
 The possibility of job switching which entices the executive to engage in short-term 
projects (at the expense of long-term projects), which when successfully 
implemented will increase the executive’s marketability and rise in compensation. 
 An increase in multinational companies entering developing economies and 
attracting talented executives at a lower cost to the foreign company, although the 
cost will be higher in the developing economy given the weaker exchange rates. 
 Complex company structures and tight CG systems that increase the pressure on 
the executive and increase the risk of the executive being fired. An increase in the 
risk of being fired demands a higher compensation, namely, the high riskhigh 
return assumption. 
 To boost market perception of the company, based on the assumption that higher 
compensation equals good performance. 
Despite the seeming plausibility of the driving forces in the rise of executive 
compensation, Edmans and Gabaix (2009) mentioned that there appeared to be a 
very small relationship between the executive’s wealth and the performance of the 
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company, and/ or the insensitivity of the executive’s compensation to company 
performance, especially in larger companies. Moreover, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
suggested that executives endeavour to maximise their own wealth through 
compensation which they set for themselves. This executive-acquired wealth appears 
to have a weak relationship with company performance, resulting in a major outcry for 
CG reforms that convey more shareholder power on executive compensation 
(Edmans & Gabaix, 2009).  
The phenomenon discussed above justified the inclusion of executive compensation 
(as a variable) in this study of FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies in South Africa, as 
well as revealing its relationship with CG. Further and pertinent to this study was the 
fact that executive compensation may be structured in such a way that it entices the 
executive to hedge a component of his share-compensation against market risk and 
to favour projects that hedge his/her compensation position (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009), 
thus compromising governance interactions. Kirkpatrick (2009) presented a very 
strong assertion that remuneration and incentive systems cause the development of 
untenable positions on the company’s balance sheet. In such instances, there may be 
excessive aggregate risk in the economy (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009) resulting in 
unforeseen socio-economic consequences, therefore they were included for 
examination in the study. 
One of the contributing factors to the P-A problems may include the agent’s 
compensation structure (Shah, 2014). Munzig (2003) further mentioned that executive 
compensation and attempts to align shareholder-executive interests are part of CG, 
and as such, are directly linked to agency problems. Shah (2014) agreed with this 
assumption by stating that when there was a divergence between the principal’s and 
agent’s interests and monitoring was difficult, agents may act in their own interests 
which did not necessarily reflect that of the principal. As a result, in governance 
systems, the implications are that the shareholder will bear heavy monitoring costs, as 
well as the high costs of enforcing the negotiated contracts to attempt to maximise 
value on the invested capital. Therefore, the structuring of the contract negotiated 
between the principal and agent is important, as the agent may act contrary to his/her 
fiduciary responsibilities.  
Shah (2014) cited the survey of 250 financial services industry role-players on Wall 
Street which was carried out by Sorkin (2013). This survey discovered that 26% of the 
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participants believed that compensation and bonus structures within their companies 
were major reasons why employees compromised ethical standards and legislative 
violations. The survey further pointed out that 17% of participants believed that leaders 
chose to ignore, supposedly ‘top performers’ when they were violating ethics and the 
law. Moreover, 15% of the participants suggested that the leaders will not report such 
violations. The survey inferred that where conflicting interests existed, the agent had 
both the incentive and capacity to act undetected, and this situation may have been 
ongoing for a long time. A case in point, where the agent had the incentive and 
capacity to act undetected, is that of Olympus, a Japanese camera maker, which hid 
losses for more than 20 years (Hawkes & Goodley, 2011). This points to the fact that 
weaknesses in board oversight systems can impact the efficacy of CG codes. 
The costs of trying to attain shareholderexecutive goal congruence may include, for 
example, profit-related/ economic value-added pays, attractive share offers to 
executives, and share option schemes. Balc et al. (2013) pointed out that excessive 
salaries and generous expenses have been the result of trying to align the agent’s 
objectives, and these have been incorporated in the majority of companies as part of 
executive compensation. These excessive compensations have resulted in an ever-
increasing compensation gap, to the extent that executive perks are often seen as 
‘obscene’. The situation is further compounded by the diversity of incentive structures 
that may exist within companies, and among executives, and which result in more 
difficulties in monitoring the agent (Shah, 2014, citing the work of Laffont & Martimort, 
2002).  
The various incentive structures within and among executives may stem from the 
compensation negotiations with the appointments of new executives, which then result 
in the distortions of the existing compensation structures. A case in point is that of 
Prudential, a UK company that hired a new executive and agreed to pay £513 750 
towards the stamp duty for the purchase of his personal house and a further interest 
of £56 604 per annum for a period of three years (Pratley, 2016). These benefits were 
not extended to his predecessor or other executives.  
This goes to the heart of contract theory which asks two sets of questions between the 
principal and agent: questions before the contract is agreed upon, and questions after 
the agreement has been reached. For example, beforehand questions are asked 
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about acceptable optimal behaviour, and after the agreement has been reached, 
questions are asked about actions caused by misaligned incentives like the agent 
shirking duties (Shah, 2014). This study mainly considered the agent’s behaviour 
which may emanate from conflicting incentives, and private information that may be 
acquired by the agent after the contract has been agreed upon. Moreover, this study 
cogitates on issues raised by Shah (2014) around adverse selection (problems arising 
from hidden knowledge) and moral hazards (problems arising from hidden actions) by 
the agent. This study does not explicitly distinguish between adverse selection and 
moral hazards but sought to investigate subtle issues around them which may be the 
cause of P-A problems that weaken the CG interactions.  
Furthermore, without delving deeply into the constructs of contract theories which 
study the aspects of how individuals and companies generate and develop legal 
contracts or agreements, the research conceded that contract theory may be 
paramount to the issues around executive compensation. However, the researcher 
considered certain aspects of contract theory that analyse how the contracts between 
the principal and agent may influence decisions under certain environmental 
conditions and in the presence of information asymmetry as well as governance 
structures. Consideration was also given to the notion that contracts can be 
incentivised so that the principal can achieve certain outcomes which may result in 
moral hazards to the agent (that is, the agent does not sign the contract in good faith). 
This complicates contracts and places more of burden on compensation contracts in 
the real world than that suggested by contract theories (Lambert, 2001). 
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) maintained 
that the modern-day executive pay schemes are instruments for ‘rent-extraction’ from 
principals. Scholars, such as Colvin (2001), have gone further to label these executive 
pay schemes as ‘highway robbery’. The ‘rent-extraction’ and ‘highway robbery’ are 
accelerated by the principal’s ‘short-termism’, especially when they base their 
investment decisions on the short-term performance evaluation of the agent (Shah, 
2014). Shah (2014) asserted that ‘short-termism’ is broadly acceptable as an aspect 
of human nature in investing, but the author cited Rappaport (2005) who described 
short-termism as ‘a disease’ and its carrier is the obsession with short-term ‘earnings’. 
Shah (2014) argued that earnings have limited informational power for the principal, 
as the agent can manage the reported earnings, and current earnings are just a small 
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portion of a company’s future life-long earnings. Alas, in most instances the agent’s 
compensation is based on current company earnings.  
Shah (2014) stated that short-termism has its roots in a number of established 
psychological effects which include recency (the focus on recent-past experiences) 
and saliency (overweighting an issue at hand and underweighting an issue which is 
distant in thought). Thus, the high demand for short-term performance and the 
associated bonus, or lack thereof, placed on the agent by the principal (recency) 
results in the agent overweighting short-term performance at the expense of the future 
good of the company which may be underweighted by the agent. In addition, Shah 
(2014) cited the work of Kay (2012) who stated that the principal causes of short-
termism are the decrease in trust and misalignment of incentives in the share-
investment arena.  
This short-term performance focus results in the search for immediate gratification for 
both the principal (in investment returns) and agent (in compensation), with 
consequences on the long-term value of the company. An example where the long-
term value was sacrificed for short-term performance is provided by Shah (2014) who 
cited Crotty (2009) who found out that AIG’s Financial Products division paid $220 
million in bonuses for the year to its employees, while the company lost $40.5 billion 
in 2008. Further examples are cited by Schumpeter (2016) who highlighted the £3.7 
billion loss made by Anglo American whilst the executive was paid a bonus of almost 
£1 million in 2015. In such cases, the principal becomes complicit in the agent’s 
company-value-destroying behaviour.  
Short-termism by the principal has consequences for the CG interactions. The impact 
and consequences may be that the agent will sacrifice the long-term interests of the 
company for speculative gains which fuel the misalignment of interests. Hence, there 
will be an increase in excessive short-term speculative behaviour which increases 
market volatility or risk (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009), risk-taking by the agent, complexity 
in compensation structures, and which may entice the agent to neglect the long-term 
best interest of the principal (Shah, 2014). This brings into focus the whole concept of 
shareholder value maximisation by reflecting on whether the agent should be overly 
concerned with short-term period investors or whether the agent should be mainly 
concerned with continuing shareholders who hold company shares for a set period of 
time, for example, a minimum of five years (Rappaport, 2005). 
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Gompers et al.7 (2003) upheld the view that modern-day complex executive pay 
schemes are problematic, as they make it difficult to fire or change the executives of 
companies that have a number of governance provisions. This is because the 
provisions and managerial entrenchments limit the rights of a shareholder or other 
stakeholders, and hence, increase the control or influence of the executives. In 
consequence, the independence of the board committees and its monitoring capacity 
is compromised (Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008). The end result is that executives may 
end up extracting personal benefits at the expense of shareholders (principals), 
leading to a higher degree of agency costs and decline in the value of the company. 
These personal benefits are significant, and in some instances, do not reflect the 
magnitude of their impact on the company’s current and future value. Crotty, (2009) 
cited by Shah (2014), highlighted that Merrill Lynch’s executives received $240 million 
over an eleven-year period (1997-2008), while the company lost all the earnings of 
that period in two years (2007 and 2008). The situation is exacerbated by the fact that 
the agent may employ private information to further his/her interests at the expense of 
the principal (Shah, 2014 citing Crotty, 2009). 
Reflecting back to the modern-day complex executive pay schemes as raised by 
Gompers et al. (2003), Shah (2014) cited the 2006 research by Kirkpatrick (2009) 
which revealed that the executive compensation structures of European banks 
comprised 24% in fixed salary, 36% in cash bonuses and 40% in long-term benefits 
(which were not specified). The compensation structure in European banks varied 
significantly from that of six US banks, which Kirkpatrick (2009) found, only paid 4-6% 
in salary and the balance in share compensation. According to Shah (2014), a higher 
percentage in share compensation entices the agent to take excessive risks, to make 
excess returns, manage earnings and engage in fraudulent financial reporting, all 
designed to keep the share price high. This may suggest a possible explanation for 
the scandal at Olympus (mentioned earlier) which hid losses for more than 20 years 
(Hawkes & Goodley, 2011).  
The high compensation levels through shares and options can be viewed as a way of 
transferring shareholder wealth to the executive. The consequences of the modern-
                                            
7 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) developed the index known as the GIM which will be discussed at 
a later stage. 
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day complex executive pay schemes, which may be dominated by share 
compensation, are that agents may fail (perhaps deliberately) to put in place, and/ or 
override the systems that inform the principals of excessive risks they might be taking 
to keep the share prices high. In addition, the agent may be taking strategic decisions 
(which may be approved by the principal) that do not have appropriate control and 
monitoring systems in place (Kirkpatrick, 2009). This situation creates and intensifies 
problems associated with information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, 
as well as rendering existing CG systems ineffective.  
Kirkpatrick (2009) asserted that in the pre-2008 financial crisis period, board members 
failed in their governance responsibilities of representing shareholders, in detecting 
excessive risks taken by agents and in implementing monitoring systems to keep the 
agents in check. The 2008 financial crisis was a consequence of P-A and CG problems 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009) which resulted in financial bail-outs to avoid a total collapse of the 
global financial system. Thus, by nature, the financial bail-outs were a consequence 
of the problems in P-A and CG interactions between the principal and the agent. 
Although outside the scope of this study, it’s worth mentioning that the bail-outs need 
to be examined from the socio-economic perspective, that is, their likely impact to the 
economy. Government ‘printing’ money (or ‘quantitative easing’ which refers to the 
injection of new money into the money supply equation by Central Banks), and 
diverting funds that could have been used for social upliftment to preserve companies 
that would have had a severe impact on the economy if they collapsed. 
According to Edmans and Gabaix (2009), citing Bebchuk and Fried (2004), executive 
compensation is set by the executives themselves. Furthermore, Bebchuk et al. (2006) 
have argued that actions to monitor and reward management have realised limited 
success in reducing and governing the executive’s self-serving behaviour. The said 
authors mentioned that executive rewarding systems are unreasonably high in some 
instances, and have spiked much more sharply than the performance of the 
companies (as previously discussed). In proving the existence of excessive rewarding 
systems, Mergence Investment Managers (2014), cited by Pickworth (2014), observed 
in a survey report that, on average, the CEO of a JSE-listed company earned more 
than 300 times what an average South African employee earned in 2013 (the year 
previous to the report). The report also stated that in South Africa, Shoprite had the 
highest compensation gap of 725 times. In the US, Guillén (2000) recorded that the 
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compensation gap was 419 times in 1999, up from 44 times in 1965 (citing O’Sullivan, 
1999). Meanwhile, the highest paid CEO in the UK earned 1 374 times more than the 
average salary earned by a Reckitt Benckiser employee in 2008 (Padgett, 2012).  
Massie, Collier and Crotty (2014) highlighted the seriousness of the compensation gap 
that translates to some CEOs earning approximately R55 000 per day (assuming a 
365-day year), which is what most low-paid workers earn in a year in many South 
African industries. In some cases, the compensation structure includes share options 
which, when exercised, can give the agent (executive) an additional sizable stake in 
the business. For example, Crotty (2014) noted that share options granted to the 
CEOs of African Rainbow Minerals and Sanlam in 2013 gave them shares worth 
R71.8 million and R41 million respectively. An accumulation and exercise of these 
share options over time will result in the executive being among the top largest 
shareholders in a company, thus putting them in a serious conflict of interest situation. 
Massie et al. (2014) further highlighted how share options can significantly widen the 
compensation gap by using the Naspers example, where the company’s CEO was 
awarded 12 million options which vested over his five-year contract period. Although 
the Naspers CEO was not being paid a salary and bonuses, the pre-tax face-value of 
these options vested in 2012 at a value in excess of R1 billion, even though he did not 
exercise the options then. The value of the CEO’s options will increase as long as the 
share price increases. 
Farmer and Winter (1986) argued that offering management share option schemes 
are ineffective in resolving the agency problem. Farmer and Winter (1986) 
demonstrated that share options can only be effective if the outside stakeholder's 
position (long and short position on the share) is equivalent to risk-free debt. 
Nevertheless, the proponents of share-based compensation argue that compensating 
the agent with shares is forward-looking, as the share price represents the present 
value of future cash flows, based on publicly available information (Lambert, 2001). 
The forward-looking nature of share-compensation benefits the principal because it 
addresses the concerns around the agent’s decision-making horizon (Lambert, 2001). 
That is, the agent is incentivised to make long-term decisions that are good for the 
principal as well as his/her wealth creation.  
Lambert (2001), however, presented a counter-argument by Barlcay, Gode and 
Kothari (2000) who stated that the forward-looking nature of share-compensation can 
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be detrimental to the principal. Barclay et al. (2000), as cited by Lambert (2001), 
asserted that share prices echo market expectations and possible future decisions, 
thus compensating the agent, and based on that, it is tantamount to rewarding the 
agent before the delivery of results. The disadvantage is to the principal should there 
be a contract dispute and the agent leaves the company as there is no provision for 
the agent to reimburse the compensation made based on expected delivery. Edmans 
and Gabaix (2009) added to the argument by stating that the risk-aversion trait of an 
agent may result in him/her preferring options to shares, as options limit any down-
side risk. This seems to be the case with the Naspers CEO’s case previously cited. 
Maskara et al. (2012) argued that the performance bonuses paid to agents 
(executives) to try and achieve goal congruence with shareholders and to diminish 
agency problems may create complications for the principal. They maintained that by 
paying performance bonuses, as is current common practice, the principal effectively 
grants the agent a call option on the performance of the company. Thus, the agent 
shares profit with the principal, yet there is no sharing of losses with the principal. The 
authors further argued that this method of mitigating agency problems creates an 
unruly incentive scheme that results in the agent taking excessive risk. Maskara et al. 
(2012) posited that this performance call option given to the agent is what enticed Nick 
Leeson who was held responsible for the demise of Barings Bank in 1995. Similarly, 
in 2008, Jerome Kerviel cost the French bank, Societe Generale losses that amounted 
to $7 billion. In both cases they took derivative positions that exceeded their approved 
trading limits and concealed their unauthorised positions. Edmans and Gabaix (2009) 
elaborated further on the subject and pointed out that most executives have severance 
packages that reward them for failing or poor performance that results in dismissal. 
They point out that, even though the severance package may be designed to protect 
the agent from the principal’s unfair treatment, it may be abused by the agent. 
The widening compensation gaps caused by huge executive salaries, share options 
and other complex executive incentive schemes, are likely to cause socio-economic 
problems in South Africa where the greater proportion of the population live below the 
poverty datum line and are paid meagre wages, as well as trade unions that have 
significant influence in economic policies. Jones (2016) and PwC (2013) noted that 
attention on widening compensation gap is gaining impetus both locally and globally, 
with the risk of regulatory intervention which may result in undesired consequences. 
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Another phenomenon related to executive compensation and agency costs that are 
worth considering is a discovery made by a study carried out in Germany by Elston 
and Goldberg (2003) that revealed that where there is greater concentration of share 
ownership, there is less capacity for the executive to extract higher compensation. For 
this reason, the CG dimensions on executive remuneration need to be compatible with 
the ownership structure, interests and risk-appetite of the principal (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Kirkpatrick (2009) cited KPMG (2008) which stated that boards and their audit 
committees need to improve their effectiveness in addressing risks exposures driven 
by the executive compensation structures. More so, at a time when the 2008 financial 
crisis exposed how managers could pocket millions, while the shareholders and 
economy are left to pick up the pieces, as well as the amount of public anger which 
was provoked by the widening inequalities worsened by huge pay-gaps (Schumpeter, 
2016). This is critical, especially in South Africa’s economy where the public perceives 
the executive pay as excessive. As a result, the study examined the interaction 
between executive compensation and other monitoring costs in relation to the 
occurrence, extent and socio-economic consequences of the P-A and CG problems. 
2.7 REWARDING SYSTEMS 
Citing some of the world’s biggest and well-known corporate failures, Kirkpatrick 
(2009) suggested that although no absolute causal relationship between the failures 
and CG deficiencies can be found, weaknesses in governance ameliorated the 
practices that caused poor performance. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) accentuated the 
existence of significant flaws in the compensation systems which are injurious to the 
principal, and might even encourage practices that exacerbate inequalities between 
the executives and other employees.  
Mallin (2010) ruminated on the inequities between how the agent is rewarded and the 
underperformance of the companies they direct. Mallin (2010) concluded that it is the 
principal who incurs huge losses, sometimes even losing life savings, while employees 
are seriously disadvantaged as they may end up with shorter working weeks, lower 
salaries or retrenchments as the company tries to save costs. While these and other 
aspects of executive compensation were discussed in the previous section, it is also 
necessary to consider fair rewarding systems that ensure that there is goal 
congruence between the shareholders and executives.  
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There has to be a performance measurement and rewarding system that will not 
incentivise both the principal and the agent to engage in value-destroying behaviours, 
such as participating in creative accounting, choosing the timing of announcements to 
suit their purposes, issuing misleading earnings forecasts, increasing dividends or 
agent salaries and bonuses, and other behaviours that may result in similar crises that 
the global economy is currently battling with.  
Schumpeter (2016) noted that although companies are supposedly making rewarding 
systems conditional on performance, some complexities still exist in the alignment of 
compensation and performance. Furthermore, Schumpeter (2016) asserted that 
setting comprehensive performance targets for the executive may result in distorted 
behaviour by the executives, as well as tipping the company towards failure (citing 
Valeant, a Canadian-based drug-speciality company that ended up setting ambitious 
growth targets which resulted in ‘improper’ financial reporting in 2014 and 2015 
(Steele, Mcnish & Benoit, 2016)). 
2.7.1 Principles of a rewarding system 
Louw and Venter (2013) advocated for a strategically aligned rewarding system that 
embeds the following principles that are: 
 Internally equitable, acceptable to employees and that monitor the gap between 
the highest and lowest paid workers. 
 Market-related to retain skills and experienced staff. 
 Have a healthy balance between financial and non-financial rewards. 
 Linked to output and overall company performance. 
 Have a low time gap between the performance period and when the reward is paid 
out. 
 Taking diversity of the workforce into account to ensure that it is suitable to the 
local environment. 
 Not rewarding below par and poor performance. 
These principles of a rewarding system should align the executive’s compensation, 
risk, and the company strategy in such a way that they encourage performance, and 
retain skill and experience, while ensuring that the agent does not take excessive risk 
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in his/her performance. Mallin (2010) further highlighted and discussed the 
remuneration guidelines of the Association of British Insurers which state that 
compensation packages should be balanced between fixed and variable pay; 
performance-based pay should be aligned to the business strategy and objectives; 
pay packages should consider the conditions within the company, the economy and 
the size and complexity of the business; and everything should be aligned to the long-
term interests of the principal.  
2.7.2 Short-termism and rewarding systems 
The rewarding system should not be engrossed in short-term earnings that Rappaport 
(2005) calls ‘short-termism’ which he refers to as a disease that is transmitted by an 
obsession with earnings and tracking error (that is, how close are the portfolio returns 
to the index benchmark). Short-termism by the agent is exacerbated by his/her need 
to build or protect his/her reputation which is measured or supported by an increase 
in the company’s share price, and hence the rewarding system becomes focused on 
short-term measures like quarterly earnings (Rappaport, 2005). To further fuel short-
termism, the principal (in this case collective market investors) has tempted the agent 
by demanding and rewarding short-term results to feed his/her short holding period 
and speculative habits. These short holding periods and speculative habits were 
confirmed by Rappaport (2005) who revealed that the holding period for investors has 
become shorter. He asserted that in the mid-1960s, the average holding period for an 
investor was approximately seven years, while the current holding period is less than 
a year for professionally managed investments. It is this reduction in the holding period 
that has enticed the agent to focus on acceptable short-term performance measures 
like earnings (Rappaport, 2005).  
Coupled with shorter holding periods, is the belief that by meeting the earnings 
expectations, the agent influences an increase in share prices, provides assurance to 
outside stakeholders and improves the reputation of the company (Rappaport, 2005). 
However, earnings as a performance measure have limitations as they are a 
combination of facts and assumptions that are made when financial reports are being 
prepared (Rappaport, 2005). Moreover, the agent is tempted to push for short-term 
performance as he/she may be compensated by, and hold shares which should 
increase in value to create wealth for him or herself. The result is that the agent 
becomes conflicted and his/her short-term focus compromises long-term shareholder 
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value by delaying or foregoing value-creating operating, investment and financing 
decisions, as well as exploiting accounting discretion that permits certain transactions 
to be recognised in a way that conceals the true nature of the financial transactions.  
To support the assertion that the agent’s short-term focus compromises long-term 
shareholder value, Rappaport (2005) cited the survey by Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2004) that revealed that 80% of the respondents (400 financial executives 
were surveyed) would forgo or delay value-creating investments, or delay spending 
on research and development, advertising and hiring so that they could meet short-
term earnings expectations. More boldly, Rappaport (2005) declared that the greater 
impairment to good governance and long-term value creation for the principal is the 
obsession with earnings in the short-term. He raised more contention by stating that 
the four main reasons why the efficacy of share options is limited as a way of rewarding 
the agent in promoting long-term value maximisation for the principal are: 
 Low performance targets (also identified by Allcock (2012)); 
 Very short holding periods or investment horizon; 
 Underwater options (that is, a call option whose exercise price is higher than the 
market price or a put option whose exercise price is lower than the market price) 
undermine motivation and retention; and 
 Options can entice risk-aversion or risk-taking. 
The impact of rewarding systems that are based on short-term performance targets, 
as well as share options which vest in shorter periods, are that they fuel a rapid 
increase in share prices (creating a bubble), encourage executives to manage 
earnings, exercise their options quickly and cash out on their options (Rappaport, 
2005).  
Compounding the impact of the loss to the company and principal are the negotiated 
generous severance packages that almost resemble a ‘pay for failure’ which 
guarantees the agent a pay-out when he/she underperforms (Mallin, 2010). Mallin 
(2010) further concluded that the severance packages to departing executives reduce 
the value of the company and threaten the livelihood of other employees, and board 
governance has the responsibility to ensure that the greater good of the company is 
preserved. 
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Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Prendergast (1999) suggested that results-based incentive 
alignment systems should only be used when measured results are comprehensive, 
difficult to manipulate, and reveal the agents’ behaviours as agreed by principals. The 
implementation of such systems will nullify the notion that pay is the major factor 
exhibiting a strong association with performance, especially where performance 
measurement lures executives (agents) to ‘misbehave’, manipulate financial 
information and window dress figures to perpetuate the agency and governance 
problems that may exist.  
2.7.3 Rewarding systems should be simple 
Schumpeter (2016) suggested that rewarding systems should be simpler and have no 
performance-based conditions, but should have restrictions on the selling of share 
options to encourage a focus on long-term performance. Unfortunately, empirical 
results by Padgett (2012) revealed that the most common rewarding systems for 
executives are complicated, and are inclined to measure performance based on profit, 
earnings per share growth (EPS), relative total shareholder return (TSR), and deferred 
bonuses, with a deferral period averaging three years (which is hardly long-term for 
value creation). Padgett (2012) further argued that rewarding systems based on the 
aforementioned can be manipulated by the agent through the accounting systems 
used to produce the financial information. She cited Enron as an example of how the 
bases of the rewarding systems can be manipulated by the agents in various 
capacities.  
In light of the Enron example mentioned by Padgett (2012), Rappaport (2005) raised 
a pertinent point that should be entrenched in all CG systems with regards to executive 
compensation and rewarding systems. He stated that incentives offered to the agent 
should consider a trade-off between the desired performance levels that reward the 
principal for taking the equity risk and keeping the agent motivated at his/her level of 
expertise. Furthermore, Padgett (2012) cited Osterloh and Frey (2004) who advocated 
for an independent directors’ rewarding system that paid a fixed compensation to 
reduce the incidences of self-serving decisions, and which ultimately resulted in 
strengthened CG systems. 
Gordon (2002) also raised a defining point on the impact of the rewarding systems 
that tend to focus in the short-term. He presented an argument against strategies that 
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are said to justify improvements in the value of the company. Gordon (2002) stated 
that rewarding systems that involve factors such as share options, which are based 
on an improvement in company value, may tempt the executive to take drastic 
measures to reduce the company risk, and thus there is a risk of failure to achieve the 
agreed performance targets. The drastic measures that may be taken, for example, 
include the following: the company exiting certain markets, closing manufacturing or 
mining plants, redeploying assets, and other strategies that disrupt the livelihood of 
employees (Gordon, 2002; Pitelis & Clarke, 2004), local communities and other 
stakeholders, such as pension funds, that would have invested in the company. 
However, in improving performance, company value, and reducing company risk in 
such ways (factored in rewarding the executive), there are serious socio-economic 
consequences which are considered in Chapter 4.  
2.8 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES 
In considering the seemingly ineffective practices that the principal may implement to 
monitor the agent, Conyon (2006) argued that, although the current monitoring 
systems are not completely effective, they are more necessary than ever, and need to 
be strictly enforced. The tight enforcement may be through increased number of 
independent outside stakeholder representations on boards of directors and board 
committees, as promoted by the so-called good CG systems, such as South Africa’s 
King III and IV, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (US), the Combined Code (UK), and 
the listing requirements of most stock exchanges, including the JSE. However, 
McNulty et al. (2013) observed that after two decades of research and reforms, CG 
problems still exist, despite the increase in prescriptive codes and other forms of 
regulations that have been implemented for better governance.  
An explanation for this phenomenon might be that the ‘apply or explain’ and ‘apply and 
explain’ basis upon which the governance codes, like the King III and King IV, 
respectively, are based (Mallin, 2010; Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2009, 
2016) have provided escape routes that permit agents to indulge in practices that 
weaken the effectiveness of the codes (Andres & Theissen, 2008; Arcot, Bruno & 
Faure-Grimaud, 2010), as long as they can ‘explain’ their rationale. Furthermore, the 
ability to explain the non-compliance deviations, combined with boards approving 
company strategies without implementing appropriate controls and monitoring 
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mechanisms that oversee risk exposures render CG codes ineffective (McNulty’s et 
al., 2013 argument augmented by Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
The failure in the board oversight role erodes the effectiveness of governance codes 
to the extent that Bogle and Sullivan (2009) were cited by Shah (2014) as suggesting 
that governments should impose a tax on very short-term gains made by executives 
to curtail speculative trading. Blinder (2009), also cited by Shah (2014), suggested 
governments should implement interventions to curb compensation structures that 
result in the misalignment of interests. However, Blinder (2009) conceded that the 
project he was involved in and that had attempted to implement governmental 
interventions did not yield positive results as the boards reflected the interests of 
executives more, as opposed to interests of shareholders. Shah (2014) further pointed 
out that for the governance codes to be effective, the way in which non-executive 
board members are compensated needs to change so that their interests are aligned 
with those of the ultimate shareholders. It is a fact that a P-A relationship may also 
exist between the appointed non-executive board members and the ultimate 
shareholder whom they represent. 
Weaknesses in the effectiveness of the governance codes are worsened by the 
related-party transactions (between non-executive board members and the company) 
as described by International Accounting Standard 24 (IAS 24, Related Party 
Disclosures). These related party transactions put the non-executive board members 
in a conflicted situation (Crotty, 2009, cited by Shah, 2014). Kirkpatrick (2009) went on 
to suggest that for the board and prescripts of governance codes to be effective in 
implementing higher standards of accountability, shareholders have to be active with 
regards to voting, and board members need to be educated on company risk issues, 
understand the company risk appetite and risk-adjusted company performance.  
The risk and audit committees have to be independent and be constituted by people 
with technical financial skills, as well as solid business experience (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
The technical financial experience among non-executive directors ensures that they 
understand the many dimensions contained in the information packs provided by the 
agent (Lambert, 2001).  
Kirkpatrick (2009) further posited that weaknesses in CG may be embedded in the 
limited or poor understanding of the company’s risk management methodologies by 
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the majority of board members. The author also presented a picture that revealed that 
the majority of the non-executive board members may have limited knowledge of the 
business, more so if they are members of technical committees with no or limited 
expertise when one considers the functional requirements of the committees. This has 
implications for the implementation and effectiveness of the prescripts of governance 
codes. In other words, the question can be asked: will the board understand the 
importance and requirements of the codes or they will simply disregard them because 
they are viewed as not important to the running of the business?  
A counter-argument related to the notion that the board should be comprised of more 
independent people with technical financial skills and solid business experience 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009) was forwarded by Gordon (2002) who suggested that this would 
not have been effective in the case of Enron. Gordon (2002) pointed out that the Enron 
board had 14 members of which two were executive. These board members were 
astute professionals who had diverse skills and senior-level experience. However, 
Gordon (2002) stated that the board governance was ineffectual as the board 
members were compromised by the share option compensation granted to them. The 
high share option compensation was to attract highly qualified board members, but it 
compromised their independence, ability to question the executives, as well as 
resulting in subtle pressures on future board nominations (Gordon, 2002). Further 
compromises related to the independence of Enron’s non-executive directors were 
uncovered through external networks with executives (Goh and Gupta, 2016) which 
Gordon (2002) termed ‘soft-conflicts’, and included the company making financial 
contributions to charitable organisations where board members were patrons.  
Thus, from the codes of best practices across the world, and King III and King IV in 
South Africa, this study investigated if these codes were effective in minimising the 
incidences, costs and socio-economic impact of the P-A and CG problems in the 
presence of above-mentioned issues. 
Ahrens, Filatotchev and Thomsen (2011) suggested that the 2008 financial crisis has 
revealed that much more insight is required into the CG arena to fully understand its 
major socio-economic and political significance on a global scale. In a study of the 
largest corporate failures, from the demise of Barings Bank in 1995 to the bankruptcy 
of General Motors in 2009, Maskara et al. (2012) concluded that despite myriad 
reasons given as causes for the failures, the majority of the cases were due to agency 
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and governance problems. Empirical evidence in their study revealed that the 
companies that ultimately failed had deteriorating CG measures over the time running 
up to their demise.  
Could it be that the companies operating in South Africa might be facing the same 
agency problems that are a threat to the socio-economic and political stability? In 
South Africa, the King III [now King IV] code is applauded for advocating for companies 
to report on how its economic activities impact the communities and environment it 
operates in, as well as sustainability being a major aspect of company performance 
(Mallin, 2010). However, there seems to be a disjoint between the ‘integrated 
sustainable reporting’ advocated by King III and King IV, and the corporate scandals 
involving executives’ self-serving behaviour that is detrimental to the communities, 
environment and the principal. 
In investigating the complex incidence, extent, costs and socio-economic 
consequences of the P-A and CG problems, this thesis provides significant insights 
into the debate from a South African perspective, as well as exposing the effectiveness 
or lack thereof of these codes. 
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CHAPTER 3:   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the study’s research design and methods that were used to 
answer the research questions raised. In answering these four research question 
themes, the study employed a mixed methods research approach to examine the 
consequences of P-A and CG interactions within companies listed on the FTSE/JSE 
Top40. Mixed research implies a process of research where at least one quantitative 
approach and at least one qualitative approach are integrated (Plano Clark & 
Ivankova, 2016, citing Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004)). Furthermore, the term ‘mixed 
research’ was used as a more inclusive term to mean a wider range of mixing 
possibilities than only mixing quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis 
methods (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016). 
3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL WORLDVIEW 
The research subscribes to the pragmatic view as it arises from an effort to try to 
understand the actions, situations and consequences (Creswell, 2014) of the P-A and 
CG interactions within companies listed on the FTSE/JSE Top40. Moreover, Creswell 
(2014) posited that the pragmatist worldview is the most appropriate philosophical 
foundation for a mixed methodology for the following reasons which were accepted by 
the researcher: 
i. The pragmatist view is not committed to any one philosophy and provides the 
researcher with the freedom to employ both qualitative and quantitative 
assumptions in their research. Thus, the mixed methodologies that were 
employed in this study addressed wider concerns which touch on a broader 
spectrum of role players involved in the CG and P-A (shareholder-executive) 
relationships, particularly at a time when major financial uncertainties and 
regulatory changes were experienced. Furthermore, the pragmatist view allowed 
the researcher to use various methods, techniques and procedures that best 
suited the needs and purposes of the research work. Various data collection and 
analysis techniques were applied without being limited to one worldview. The 
methodologies employed in the study enabled the researcher to enhance 
understanding and to ascertain the nature of the phenomenon being investigated 
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as well as to achieve the stated objectives. The study’s pragmatic view is aligned 
to the mixed methods research employed. 
ii. The pragmatic worldview is best suited for the study as it examined the 
consequences of P-A and CG interactions in the South African Top40 companies. 
Employing a mixed methods approach to the study enabled the application of 
multiple methods, different worldviews, different assumptions, as well as different 
forms of data collection and analysis. Thus, it permitted the researcher to ride on 
the strengths of each view, assumption and form of data collection and analysis. 
The pragmatic approach was suitable for the South African context of the study in 
order to significantly contribute to the existing body of CG knowledge that is largely 
based on the developed world. McNulty et al. (2013) observed that the milieu in 
which most of the P-A and CG interactions are studied are in developed countries. 
In this study, the focus was on assessing the prevalence, costs and socio-
economic consequences of the P-A and CG interactions in South Africa, as well 
as assessing the effectiveness of CG codes. This South African focus was vital, 
especially in light of the reported occurrences of corporate scandals involving top 
South African executives. From Dewey’s8 work, cited by Cherryholmes (1992), 
the adoption of the pragmatist’s view for the study was not just to record and report 
corporate scandals, and P-A and CG problems in South Africa. Instead, as 
Dewey’s work, documented by Cherryholmes (1992), highlighted the study that 
has a pragmatic foundation needs to understand the basis of how these P-A and 
governance interactions can be improved, and their socio-economic 
consequences be mitigated to achieve better effectiveness in the adopted codes 
of good governance. The pragmatic view and the aligned mixed methods 
approach enhanced the achievement of a comprehensive research output. 
Cherryholmes (1992) further asserted that pragmatists aspire to replace the 
desire to be in touch with reality with that of willingness to be in harmony with the 
community. This study’s pragmatic view accepted the assertion by Cherryholmes, 
in that it sought to understand how the agents and those charged with governance 
can be in harmony with shareholders and other stakeholders. In addition, 
                                            
8 Cherryholmes (1992) cited quotations from Dewey without providing specific in-text references from 
research papers. However, in the Reference section of the paper, Cherryholmes (1992) listed the 
publications by Dewey in 1917, 1931, 1934 and 1980. 
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Cherryholmes (1992) cited the work of Dewey (1917, 1931, 1934 and 1980) who 
advocated that pragmatists tend to value the communities (shareholders and 
other stakeholders) more. This view supports the research focus as it sought to 
examine the socio-economic consequences (that is, impact on South African 
communities) of the P-A and CG interactions. 
iii. Creswell (2014) advocated the notion that the pragmatic view, with its alignment 
to mixed methods research, is most appropriate when researching in relatively 
new fields or areas where not much research has been done. This study adopted 
this notion, since CG as a discipline is considered to be a relatively new field of 
study (Mallin, 2010; McNulty et al., 2013) and the application of the pragmatic 
view and mixed methods research was therefore appropriate. 
In answering the four research question themes and in efforts to achieve the research 
objectives, a pragmatic worldview was adopted and a mixed research method was 
employed which was supported by the aforementioned justifications. The researcher 
believes that the pragmatic view and its alignment to the mixed methods research are 
most appropriate for the study as it examined the consequences of P-A and CG 
interactions within companies listed on the FTSE/JSE Top40. 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
This section of the thesis presents the research design in terms of the methodology, 
notations, design logics, design typologies and other methodological considerations. 
3.3.1 The methodology 
A mixed methods research process was applied by combining both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to allow for the building of a quantitative study using the results 
of a qualitative research, or building a qualitative study using the results of a 
quantitative research process (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Applying a mix of methods 
helped in developing a richer picture and was a means of checking and ensuring the 
robustness of the results. Furthermore, the use of mixed methods neutralised the 
weaknesses of each form of data (Creswell, 2014). Creswell (2014) emphasised that 
the use of mixed methods provides a way of: 
 Integrating qualitative and quantitative data and allows for checking the accuracy 
(validity) of the dataset; 
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 Explaining other datasets that can explore various types of research questions; 
 Using tools or techniques better suited to a sample or population being considered 
in the study; and 
 Building other datasets, especially in fields like CG research, which are considered 
relatively new (Mallin, 2010; McNulty et al., 2013) and longitudinal studies that are 
likely to be conducted in the near future. 
Having considered the philosophical view and justifications for employing mixed 
methods research in this study, it is prudent to next discuss the notations and the 
design logics which incorporate the mixed methods timing, integration/mixing and 
weighting/priority as used in the study. 
3.3.2 Notations  
The notation system used was adapted from Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) which 
in its turn, is based on the work of Morse (1991, 2003). The notation used in the study 
is presented in Table 3.1: 
Table 3:1: Notation system 
Notation Description 
Quan, 
Qual 
The capitalised shorthand refers to either the quantitative or qualitative 
component of a mixed methods study without any indication of the relative 
priority or weighting of the method.  
QUAN, 
QUAL 
Full capitals indicate a higher priority or weighting of either the quantitative 
or qualitative method in the study. 
quan, qual Indicates a lower priority or weighting of either the quantitative or qualitative 
method in the study. 
+ Indicates that the quantitative and qualitative strands9 are implemented 
concurrently in the study. 
→ Indicates that quantitative and qualitative strands are done sequentially in 
the study. 
Source: Adapted from Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) 
                                            
9 A strand is a component of a mixed method study that encompasses the basic process of conducting 
quantitative or qualitative research, that is, research question, data collection and analysis and 
interpreting the results (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016, citing Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
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3.3.3 Design logics, timing, integration and weighting of methods  
As far as a mixed methods design is concerned, Creswell (2014) highlighted that there 
are three main designs that are found in the social sciences research arena. These 
designs are Convergent Parallel Mixed Methods (or Concurrent Qual + Quan Mixed 
Methods, which terms will be used hereafter in the study), Explanatory Sequential 
Mixed Methods (Explanatory Sequential Quan → Qual Mixed Methods) and 
Exploratory Sequential Mixed Methods (or Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Mixed 
Methods which are the terms used hereafter). The discussions that follow focus on 
Concurrent Qual + Quan Mixed Methods and the Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan 
Mixed Methods design logics employed in this study, as well as other pertinent mixed 
method research aspects that need considerations. The other methodological aspects 
centre around the timing, integration or mixing, and weighting or priority of the mixed 
methods and are embedded in the discussions. 
As previously mentioned, the Concurrent Qual + Quan mixed methods design logic 
was adopted which Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) asserted implies concurrent 
timing10 of the qualitative and quantitative strands. Moreover, Creswell (2014) 
explained that in the Concurrent Qual + Quan design, the study converges or merges 
the qualitative and quantitative data (to embed each other) so as to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the data to answer the research questions. He further 
asserted that both qualitative and quantitative data are collected at the same time and 
integrated when interpreting the results11 to pick up contradictions or similarities from 
the findings, and efforts are also made to interrogate further to find explanations, as 
well as better insights into the phenomenon. The results from the two strands were 
combined to draw inferences in response to the research questions. The design logic 
is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
                                            
10 Concurrent timing implies that the researcher collects and analyses both quantitative and qualitative 
data at the same time or independent from each other. 
11 Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) refer to this integration approach as combining quantitative and 
qualitative data sets of results as they are jointly interpreted at the completion of data collection and 
analysis. 
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Figure 3.1: Concurrent design logic showing timing and integration 
Source: Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) 
The employment of the Concurrent Qual + Quan design is advantageous in that it is 
bound to produce well validated and substantiated findings, due to the concurrent 
strands that permit the obtainment of different but complementary data on the same 
topic (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016, citing Morse, 1991). Furthermore, this design 
allowed the researcher to collect and analyse both qualitative and quantitative data 
within a short period of time which saved time and costs associated with carrying out 
the study (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016, citing Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
In addition to the Concurrent Qual + Quan Mixed Methods, in some instances, the 
Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Mixed Methods were applied. The two are 
consubstantial and felicitous to achieving the objectives of the study. The Exploratory 
Sequential Qual → Quan Mixed Methods design logic is depicted in Figure 3.2. The 
Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan design logic implies the sequential timing of the 
two strands. The qualitative strand was completed first, before the quantitative strand, 
and the results of the first strand informed the next strand. The sets of results were 
connected at the conclusion to develop inferences that addressed the research 
questions. 
 
Figure 3.2: Exploratory sequential design logic depicting timing and integration  
Source: Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) 
With the Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Mixed Methods designs, Creswell’s 
(2014) argument that is aligned to the intentions of the study. Creswell (2014) 
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reasoned that in the Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan design, qualitative data is 
collected and analysed to build quantitative data sets, like the governance scores from 
the governance recommendations implemented as provided in King III and King IV. In 
this study, with the application of the Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Mixed 
Methods design it became clear that a sequence needed to be followed by first 
collecting qualitative data from King III and King IV, Annual Statements and/ or 
Integrated Annual Reports.  
Having identified and analysed the King III and King IV governance recommendations, 
the governance provisions were formulated and scored into the board indices which 
are seen as governance proxies. That is, the mixed methods design was sequential in 
the sense that the researcher collected and analysed qualitative data from King III and 
King IV, Annual Statements and/ or Integrated Annual Reports first, and then 
transitioned into quantifying the information to construct governance indices. 
Furthermore, qualitative methods were targeted at ensuring that the state and nature 
of P-A and CG interactions in South African companies are ascertained. The 
qualitative information was expected to identify the essential provisions, quality of 
governance, and independence required in ascertaining potential P-A and CG 
problems nuanced in governance indices.  
The qualitative data was used to build quantitative instruments that best suited the 
study, and specific variables used in the quantitative models were also identified and 
defined. In this case, the quantitative data and its analysis were ‘nested’ in the 
qualitative data without necessarily placing any greater weighting or priority on any 
one of the two methods. This was done so that the quantitative results would verify 
and generalise the initial exploratory qualitative findings. The ‘nesting’ of the 
quantitative data and its analysis in the qualitative data were aimed at constructing the 
governance indices, and determining the potential costs of P-A and CG problems in 
South African companies to the principal, the company, as well as the economy.  
Hence, quantitative methods were employed to exemplify the magnitude of the 
problems and potential costs. The advantages of this design are that it was 
chronological, more predictable and made it easier for one researcher to implement. 
It was also suitable in situations where the researcher wanted to understand a 
phenomenon with a small sample size, but needed to generalise it to a larger 
population (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016).  
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The use of qualitative data and its analysis to ‘nest’ the quantitative data analysis was 
plausible, considering the observations by McNulty et al. (2013) who pointed out that 
qualitative methods in CG are gaining popularity as they provide better insights into 
understanding or interrogating the problems than quantitative methods. McNulty et al. 
(2013) observed that a small fraction of CG researchers uses qualitative research, and 
these are mostly developed by UK and European scholars and published in European 
journals. They further noted that most of the studies tend to focus on boards of 
directors more than other governance-related issues.  
It was beneficial for this study to primarily employ qualitative research methodologies 
(not necessarily with greater weighting) in exploring and gaining insights into the 
incidence, costs and socio-economic consequences, as well as effectiveness of CG 
codes. In support of the insights that qualitative research brings, Yasin, Muhamad and 
Sulaiman (2014) argued that many of the quantitative studies ignore processes related 
to key CG activities and mechanisms, and these need to be addressed by qualitative 
research methods. 
The use of the Concurrent Qual + Quan and Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan 
Mixed Methods designs also gave the study a basis of challenging and re-thinking 
some of the major assumptions and meanings of how CG role-players function. In 
addition, the recent CG issues are challenging researchers to go beyond input and 
output models (McNulty et al., 2013) which are based on agency assumptions. Hence, 
the use of a mixed methods research provided a better understanding of the complex 
realities of P-A and CG issues, as well as allowing the researcher to push theoretical 
boundaries. 
Using Concurrent Qual + Quan and Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Mixed 
Methods designs also addressed the call by McNulty et al. (2013) suggesting that the 
CG arena is now ripe for, and requires enquiries that must intensely explore, describe 
and compare these phenomena with sensitivities for the diversities and context in 
which P-A and CG are embedded. This is particularly relevant when it is considered 
that most of the P-A and CG researches are based in Europe, UK, US and other 
developed countries. In this study, a South African perspective was considered, given 
the differences in cultures, political set-up, past political and social injustices which are 
traits that may make corporate South Africa susceptible to P-A and CG problems.  
Page | 64  
The employment of the above-discussed mixed methods designs enhanced the 
exploration of current P-A and CG processes and interactions in practical contexts, 
and unearthed the issues covered by the research questions. This became vital as the 
research moved beyond the prescriptions provided by current CG codes. 
3.3.4 Design typologies 
The discussions on the design logics, timing, integration and weighting above 
culminated in a typological design that has characteristics described in Table 3.2. A 
design typology refers to a set of different possible mixed methods designs that 
attempt to convey the range of design options available to the study (Plano Clark & 
Ivankova, 2016). The mixed method design typologies provide a variety of paths or 
ideal design types that may be selected to achieve the goals of the study (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009, cited by Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016).  
By adopting a typology-based approach, the researcher selected a particular mixed 
methods design from a set of available alternatives, and adapted the chosen design 
to suit the study. The typology was adapted from Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) 
and they refer to it as Interactive-Independent Dimension Design Clusters. The 
typology entails the convergence and integration of mixed methods designs that have 
the following characteristics: 
Table 3:2: Typology considerations and their characteristics 
Typology 
Consideration 
Characteristics 
Timing 
Timing of data collection and analysis was concurrent and 
sequential. 
Integration or mixing 
Integration took place across all the stages of the research or at 
the interpretation of the results. 
Weighting or priority The weighting or priority of each method was equal. 
Source: Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) 
Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) asserted that the typology is suitable when the 
researcher writes in the context of evaluation and social sciences. The authors’ stated 
assertion was suitable for the context of this study and hence, it was adopted for the 
current study. 
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3.3.5 Other methodological considerations 
Creswell (2014) highlighted a few defining characteristics of the qualitative research 
strand that required some reflection from the researcher to be able to address the 
raised research questions effectively. These characteristics are: 
 Data collection is in the natural field setting allowing the researcher to go to the 
primary source of the information. Since this study employed archival analysis or 
research12, it used administrative records filed (for example filed with the JSE) by 
those charged with governance, and these records and documents were the 
principal sources of data (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). It is worth noting that 
in this case, the filed records and documents were not to be considered or conflated 
as secondary data, as they will not be when used in an archival research strategy 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Saunders et al. (2009) provided a compelling argument 
that resonated with this study when they asserted that the administrative records 
and documents used in an archival research strategy are not secondary data as it 
would have been originally collected for a different purpose, for example, reporting 
on the company’s performance. Thus, when the information is used in an archival 
research strategy, it is analysed with a lens that considers that the data is a product 
of the daily activities of the company (Saunders et al., 2009, citing Hakim (2009). 
That is, the company is reporting on its day-to-day activities and that is what 
produced the data. Therefore, the data produced is the reality that is being studied 
in the research and not “having been collected originally as data for research 
purposes” (Saunders et al., 2009:150). As a result, the original data is collected 
and analysed for purposes other than for which it was generated, in order to 
investigate and ask new questions of the ‘old’ data. The use of the archival 
research strategy permitted the researcher to focus on the past and changes over 
time, which suited the analysis of the governance indices, VaR and s-Gini. In 
addition, the researcher was persuaded by Corti (2004), as she suggested that 
archival analysis enables researchers to immerse themselves in the found archived 
data to evaluate, review, reclassify and discover emerging issues (for example, 
board independence and the magnitude of compensation gap) over time. 
                                            
12 Archival research can be defined “as the locating, evaluating and systematic interpretation and 
analysis of sources found in archives” (Corti, 2004:20) 
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 Multiple data sources (for example, documents and reports produced by 
companies and regulatory authorities), as there will be stakeholders who provide 
information that can be triangulated for accuracy. The study evaluated the validity 
and reliability of the data, based on the assumption that the filed records and 
documents are official and a true or fair representation of the companies’ position 
at the time the records and documents were filed with the JSE and Competition 
Authorities. A content analysis was then employed, as one of the traditional social 
science analytical approaches (Corti, 2004), on the filed records and documents to 
determine the presence of certain words or concepts that have implications on P-
A interactions, and governance provisions that improve or worsen the constructed 
governance indices. 
 Allows for inductive reasoning, so as to focus on meanings extracted from the 
records and documents filed by companies to observe possible newly generalised 
patterns that can be explained. This is referred to as pattern explanation (Blaikie, 
2004) which permits more data to be collected to strengthen or verify the possible 
newly generalised patterns. This process of induction allowed the researcher to 
move from particular statements to generalised statements (Blaikie, 2004). In this 
case, particular statements that were made and filed by companies were 
examined, as well as generalised statements that were used to address the 
research questions and reach generalised conclusions about the consequences of 
P-A and CG interactions in South Africa. 
 Allows for interpretive enquiry13 that gleans lessons learnt from the data collected 
and analysed. The interpretations are based on the researcher’s personal 
understanding influenced by culture, history, experiences, interests, and values 
(Smith, 2012; Creswell, 2014). Thus, Smith (2012) advocated that interpretive 
enquiry should not be viewed as a scientific activity, but as a practical and moral 
undertaking. This argument was suitable, as the researcher sought to examine the 
socio-economic consequences of P-A and CG interactions. Therefore, P-A and CG 
interactions have practical and moral considerations that need understanding so 
that they inform and shape the economic policies of the country. Moreover, 
                                            
13 Interpretive enquiry focuses on understanding the meanings, purposes and intentions behind actions 
and interactions with others (Smith, 2012). 
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Creswell (2014) argued that the interpretations may also be influenced by 
comparisons to the reviewed literature and theory. This may result in unexpected 
questions emerging from the data analysis, providing the basis for recommending 
future researches in the CG field. Furthermore, this study applied a theoretical lens 
to form interpretations that call for action agendas for transformation (Creswell, 
2014). Consequently, it permitted the researcher to revisit the literature at the end 
of the research process to compare the findings and literature reviewed (Creswell, 
2014). 
The above characteristics enabled the researcher to interpret the data (filed records 
and documents), to interrogate governance relationships, and provided the researcher 
with an understanding of the behavioural traits that arise due to the CG structure and 
P-A contracts that are in place.  
Over and above these characteristics, qualitative research methodologies were 
appropriate for this study as McNulty et al. (2013) found that qualitative studies tend 
to focus on a single country more than quantitative articles do. McNulty et al. (2013) 
supplied reasons for this due to “both the difficulties in accessing data in qualitative 
study and the strong impact of legal and cultural institutions on governance 
phenomena and mechanisms”. The focus of qualitative research methodologies on a 
single-country context enhanced the evaluation of the effectiveness of CG codes in 
the context of South Africa’s economic, political, legal and cultural set-up. 
Overall, the employment of a qualitative strand ensured a deep engagement with the 
P-A and CG issues raised in the research questions. This study acceded to the 
compelling suggestion by Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) that CG theory and 
reforms in governance should be informed by the main qualitative methods on existing 
key governance relationships and interactions. 
Although qualitative research methods have challenges related to the trustworthiness 
and integrity of access to information, data collection, analysis and presentation, when 
compared to quantitative methods, McNulty et al. (2013) argued that in the face of 
such challenges, they should not inhibit the researcher from undertaking high quality 
research in CG and its facets. The McNulty et al. (2013) argument was supported by 
Tracy (2010) who highlighted the characteristics of excellent qualitative research 
which include rich rigor, sincerity, credibility, resonance, significant contribution, ethics 
Page | 68  
and significant coherence. The researcher believes that the application of the above-
discussed design logics, mixed methods timing, integration, weighting, the archival 
research strategy, inductive reasoning and interpretative enquiry helped encompass 
these characteristics to enrich its quality. These characteristics also ensured that the 
quantitative strand was fed with credible and reliable information that provided integrity 
to the results. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 are diagrammatical views of the strands and their steps, 
procedures and expected outcomes from applying the above-discussed design logics, 
mixed methods timing, integration, weighting, the archival research strategy, inductive 
reasoning and interpretative enquiry. 
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Figure 3.3: Pictorial view of the Concurrent Qual + Quan Mixed Methods Research Design Logic applied in this study 
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Figure 3.4: Pictorial view of the Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Mixed Methods 
Research Design Logic applied in this study 
Note: There are overlaps of some of the procedures and expected outcomes from the Concurrent Qual 
+ Quan and Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Design Logics which are inherently addressed by the 
typological considerations of timing, integration and priority within the Mixed Methods application. For 
example, the Content Analysis applied in both the Concurrent Qual + Quan and Exploratory Sequential 
Qual → Quan Design Logics were similar procedure(s) that were expected to produce similar outcomes 
but the timing of the procedures varied. 
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3.4 GOVERNANCE INDICES AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
MODEL 
The data required in the mixed methods research design described above was 
necessary to feed into the comprehensive P-A and CG measurements that were used 
in this study. The Governance index (G-index) and E-index (Entrenchment index) were 
identified by Maskara et al. (2012) as the most popular CG measurement methods. 
The indices have been used in most recent governance studies to identify companies 
that had agency problems in the years preceding their demise. The study by Maskara 
et al. (2012) observed that over 1 600 governance studies cited the Gompers et al. 
(2003)14 index which is known as the G-Index, while the Bebchuk webpage lists more 
than 75 studies that used the E-Index. The G-index uses 24 company-specific 
governance provisions, while the E-index by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) 
gleaned six company-specific provisions from the Gompers et al. 24 company-
provisions. Gupta, Krishnamurti and Tourani-Rad (2013) also use company-specific 
provisions. 
Brown and Caylor (2006) developed a Governance Score which has 51 firm-specific 
provisions and they then simplified it to a ‘parsimonious index’ that used seven of the 
51 firm-specific provisions. Maskara et al. (2012) observed that the results obtained 
from the E-Index “fully explained the results documented by the GIM”.  
The two indices seem to be most popular and validate each other. Maskara et al. 
(2012) used the G-Index and the E-Index in their studies as they attempted to identify 
the companies that ultimately failed primarily due to the agency and governance 
problems that overwhelmed these companies. Maskara et al. (2012) discovered that 
although there have been many CG studies that have attempted to establish and 
provide evidence of the influence of CG on, among others, securities valuation, 
information disclosure, firm performance, and financial distress, there are conspicuous 
similarities in the CG measurement methods utilised in the various studies. 
This study did not design a new measurement method, but adopted the same index-
construction architect as used by aforementioned researchers. However, this study 
showed a variation in the index construction regarding the source of provisions used 
                                            
14 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), are commonly referred to as GIM (2003) in the field of study. 
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in the index calculations. The provisions were drawn from the King III and King IV 
recommendations, whereas the provisions of the cited studies where drawn from 
company MOIs. That is, the King III and King IV recommendations, which include 
principles and practices, and provisions that exemplify the strength of governance 
within the sample companies, were mapped. The mapping of the recommendations to 
the provisions are depicted in Appendix 1. The mapped provisions are related to the 
various oversight functions by the board and board-committees to allow the study to 
comprehensively capture the strength and quality of CG. By adopting this approach, 
the study was able to develop indices that are rooted in agency theory and that are 
supported by empirical evidence (Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2017). 
Twenty provisions from the King III and King IV recommendations, broadly covering 
board and committee independence and compliance to laws and regulations, were 
extracted. The focus was on the King recommendations regarding the oversight 
functions of the nominating, remuneration, audit, risk, social and ethics committees, 
committee overseeing technology and information governance, and compliance to 
laws, regulations, rules, codes and standards.  
This approach to constructing the indices enabled the researcher to establish a 
measurement that was analysed over a period of time in evaluating deteriorations or 
improvements in the governance of companies. This revealed the prevalence of 
agency problems in corporate South Africa with a focus on the changes in these 
governance indices over time, thereby providing a cross-sectional analysis of the 
indices. In addition, using the provisions extracted from the King III and King IV 
recommendations made them relevant to South African companies.  
The trends in the adapted South African board indices were examined and the 
deterioration or improvement in the P-A and CG problems from 2008 to 2016 were 
assessed. The trends are important for South Africa to try and avoid similar financial 
catastrophes that were, and have been, caused by agency and governance 
problems15 experienced by the developed world and have been filtering to the 
emerging markets since 2008. Moreover, a cross-sectional and attribution analysis 
                                            
15 Some researchers, for example Ahrens et al. (2011), Maskara, et al. (2012), McNulty et al. (2013) 
and Balc et al. (2013) directly and indirectly ascribe the 2008 and other recent financial crises to weak 
or deteriorating CG structures.  
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provided indications of provisions that contributed to changes (whether deterioration 
or improvement) in the overall indices and the effectiveness of the adopted 
governance codes. In carrying out an attribution analysis, the researcher potentially 
ascertained the areas where the governance codes were and were not effective within 
sample companies. 
3.4.1 Calculation of Governance Indices  
As elucidated in Section 3.3.5, the researcher collected quantitative data on 
companies that were listed on the FTSE/JSE Top40 index from 2008 to 2016. This 
study uses data from 2008 to 2016 as this period is acknowledged by King III report 
that since the 2008 financial crisis, South African listed companies were regarded as 
amongst the best governed emerging market companies by foreign institutional 
investors. In addition, King III highlights that South African listed companies are 
benefiting from implementing good CG principles and practices. These CG best 
practices attracted significant investment inflows into South Africa’s capital markets 
(King III, 2009:7). Also, 2016 was the end period that had all officially published and 
available company data that suited this study’s timelines bearing in mind that 
companies have different financial reporting periods during the calendar year. The 
data was collected from the IAR, JSE, and other regulatory authorities like the 
Competition Commission and Tribunal, Annual Financial Statements, Cautionary 
Statements, media reports, and other publicly available records and documents. This 
data was from companies that are found in the following categories (a) South Africa’s 
FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies from 2008 to 2016 (that is, the 40 largest 
companies by market capitalisation16) (b) former FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies 
that were no longer on the index within the 2008 to 2016 period, and (c) Steinhoff, 
which was part of the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies but was initially excluded 
due to some missing data. However, Steinhoff was separately included and analysed 
                                            
16 Market capitalisation =  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒. This study will use the Top40 
companies, as it accepts the claims by Courtney Capital Private Wealth which states that  
“The Top 40 index is a fair reflection of what happens to the South African stock market as a whole, 
because even though it contains only 40 out of the roughly 400 shares listed on the JSE, it represents 
over 80% of the total market cap of all JSE listed companies.”  
Statement as at June 2013. http://www.courtneycapital.co.za/jse-top-40-shares/ [Accessed: 08 May 
2015]. 
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in this study due to apparent major P-A and CG problems that were reported at the 
end of 2017 and the first quarter 2018.  
A total number of 46 companies fell in the aforesaid (a) and (b) categories. All the data 
from 2008 to 2016 was available for these 46 companies. The targeted sample of 46 
companies and Steinhoff enabled the researcher to determine the prevalence of P-A 
and governance problems in the largest listed companies in South Africa. In addition, 
these companies are among the most traded, with yearly-weighted average traded 
volumes, and they have wide institutional ownership, which are characteristics 
identified by GIM (2003) as positively related to governance indices.  
These characteristics gave rise to expectations that negligible P-A and CG problems 
should exist because of their influence on the agent’s behaviour, and governance 
systems that restrain agency and CG problems. However, the characteristics may also 
exacerbate the P-A and CG problems. For example, the size of a company by market 
capitalisation may put pressure on the agent’s (executive’s) performance which results 
in the agent wanting higher compensation at the expense of the principal 
(shareholder). There is also an implication on performance management and 
measurement resulting from the agent taking undue risk and empire-building at the 
cost of the principal. Coupled with the performance measurement problem is the 
pressure to keep the share price high, thus enticing the agent to engage in unethical 
dealings, fraudulent accounting and/ or financial reporting, and non-compliance with 
legislative and JSE Listing Requirements. Sometimes, the principal benefits and 
becomes complicit in the process. 
Apart from being the biggest companies by market capitalisation, these FTSE/JSE 
Top40 listed companies17 were selected for the study, based on the following reasons: 
 They need to comply with listing and legislative requirements, hence one would 
expect the P-A and CG problems to be minimal, and they should be a good 
indicator to foreign investors looking to South Africa as a destination for foreign 
portfolio and foreign direct investments. Further, the governance structures in 
these companies, coupled with the compliance to listing and legislative 
                                            
17 This study included companies that have fallen in and out of the FTSE/JSE Top40 index from 2008 
to 2016.  
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requirements, ensure that the South African financial markets and companies are 
integrated to the global financial system, particularly when one considers the dual 
listing of some companies. Also, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 companies have a very 
strong influence on corporate governance and tend to shape corporate behaviour 
in a country, hence the focus on these companies. 
 There are disclosure requirements and institutional investors who require both 
private and public information to perform their due diligence before they invest, and 
this made information readily available or relatively easy to find. 
As explained in Section 3.3.5 above, an archival research strategy (Saunders et al., 
2009) was employed to collect qualitative data. Content analysis was applied to the 
collected qualitative data to identify provisions that informed the construction of 
indices. The identified provisions were converted into a governance index for each 
company in the sample. The researcher systematically evaluated the information 
provided under the Governance Sections of each of the 423 Annual Integrated Reports 
for the years from 2008 to 2016. The calculated governance indices over the period 
were used to determine the incidence, deterioration or improvement in the agency and 
governance problems. 
The 20 provisions were equally weighted. The provisions were converted into a 
governance index by adding 1 where the company complied and 0 for non-compliance 
with the King III and King IV recommendation. This suggests that the calculated 
governance index, as a proxy of governance, has to be closer to 20 for better governed 
companies, and closer to 0 for poorly governed companies. This is aligned to GIM 
(2003), and Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017). As previously mentioned, there are 20 
provisions and a company that fully complied with the King III and King IV 
recommendations would have a governance score of 20, and a fully non-compliant 
company would have a governance score of 018. The final governance indices 
calculated for each of the sample companies are tabulated in Table 4.2 (later in this 
thesis). 
                                            
18 Gratitude to Professor Grzegorz Trojanowski (Professor of Finance, Director of Xfi, Head of Finance 
at University of Exeter, Business School, UK) who provided clarity and guidance on the construction of 
the index in Excel through our email communications. 
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To ascertain which of the 20 provisions were not fully complied with, per year, by all 
the companies in the sample, from 2008 to 2016, the use of a Microsoft Excel 
COUNTIF function was employed. For each sample company per year, per provision, 
the researcher determined its compliance status across 2008-2016 and a tick was 
inserted for non-compliance in the year. The number of sample companies that did not 
comply during the years was determined by using the COUNTIF function. For each 
provision per year, the researcher observed and included the number of companies 
that did not comply with the specific provisions and expressed the companies as a 
percentage of the total companies in the sample. The results of the COUNTIF function 
also indicated the period of greater adoption of the King III and King IV 
recommendations by a decline in the percentage of sample companies that were non-
compliant. Appendix 2 depicts the percentage of non-adherence by the sample 
companies to each of the 20 provisions, per year. 
To establish provisions that were major contributors to deteriorations and or 
improvements in governance indices, the researcher also used the Microsoft Excel 
COUNTIF function. The results are presented in Appendix 3 and the researcher did 
an exegesis of changes in the governance indices. Indices that changed from one year 
to another were identified, and the provisions that contributed to the change in the 
indices were determined. The number of provisions that caused the change across 
companies in each of the years was established. The researcher then expressed the 
number of decline-changes or improvements per provision, as a percentage of the 
total declines and improvements for all the provisions during the 2008-2016 period. 
The results are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 (in Chapter 4). 
To complement the calculated indices as explained above, the qualitative strands in 
the Concurrent Qual + Quan and Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Design Logics, 
and the combined interpretations of their results provided plausible inferences and 
supported the attribution analysis that responded to the research questions. Therefore, 
it was possible to cogently perform pattern explanation from the results (Blaikie, 2004).  
3.4.2 Executive Compensation Model 
Theory signals that executive compensation structures are designed to align the 
objectives of the principal and agent (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009). For this reason, 
executive compensation structures are part of CG mechanisms, and Theme II sought 
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to determine the role of executive compensation in exacerbating P-A and CG 
problems.  
In endeavouring to make the determination, the researcher proposed the model 
depicted by Equation 3.1. The researcher factored in the strength of governance by 
the company executive in the compensation structure. As a result, the researcher 
proposed that executive remuneration should be determined by the governance index 
(governance proxy measure), performance (revenue), GDP, inflation, ownership 
structure, executive net share trades (net buyer or seller of the company’s shares), 
number of share-trades by executives, and the number of board members who traded 
in the company’s shares per year. The estimation of the executive compensation 
relationship is expressed as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐺𝑜𝑣 + 𝛽𝑖4𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽𝑖5 𝐼𝑛𝑓 +  𝛽𝑖6𝑂𝑆 +
 𝛽𝑖7𝑁𝑇 +  𝛽𝑖8𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽𝑖9𝐷𝑇𝑌 +  ℇ𝑖𝑡  
Equation 3:1:   Estimation of executive compensation relationship 
Source: Researcher’s proposed model 
Where: 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡,  
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, 
𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡,  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦19,  
𝐺𝑜𝑣 = 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,  
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡,  
𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,  
𝑂𝑆 = 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒,  
                                            
19 Padgett (2012) cited Shire Plc, a global specialty biopharmaceutical company with dual listing on the 
London Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Exchange, which uses revenue as a measure of short-
term performance measure. Bhabra, Kaur and Seoungpil (2016) also used revenue as a measure of 
performance. Hence, this study’s adoption of revenue as a measure of performance. 
Page | 78  
𝑁𝑇 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠,  
𝑇𝑌 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟,  
𝐷𝑇𝑌 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟,  
               𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 
                          ℇ𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡. 
The approximation of the relationship that should exist between remuneration and the 
suggested independent variables is expected to align what the executive earns with 
how well they run the company (governance and performance), company ownership 
(ownership structure), their share-trading activities (through the exercise of their 
options) and the general economic environment (GDP and inflation are included in a 
similar way as Mensah and Abor (2014) who included inflation and other 
macroeconomic variables like interest and exchange rates in determining net interest 
rates spreads that in-turn influence executive compensation in Ghanaian banks). 
These variables should be the main determinants of the executive’s remuneration. 
The researcher ran the proposed model in a statistical software package called 
STATA. The following data inputs were used: 
 Each of the 46 sample companies and the period covering 2008 to 2016 (inclusive). 
 Governance indices calculated for each sample company over the period, as 
explained earlier. 
 The researcher lagged the executive remuneration because the current year’s 
remuneration is usually based on last year’s remuneration adjusted for 
performance, inflation and other adjustments. The executive remuneration data 
was publicly available, as officially disclosed by sample companies, as required by 
the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
 Dual or single listing of the sample companies. A dummy variable of 1 was used if 
dually listed, and 0 otherwise. 
 Ownership structure with a dummy variable 1 where the sample company had 
concentrated ownership (top five institutional shareholders) and 0 otherwise. 
 Revenue as a measure of performance was lagged, because revenue targets are 
based on previous years with adjustments based on inflation and other 
Page | 79  
performance factors. The information was publicly available, as officially disclosed 
by sample companies in the Annual Financial Statements. 
 GDP and inflation figures obtained from Statistics South Africa databases. 
 Directors’ trades per year, and the number of directors who traded on the 
company’s share (buying and selling of shares) is information that was publicly 
available, as officially disclosed by sample companies, as required by the South 
African Companies Act 71 of 2008, and JSE listing requirements. 
 The net trades were calculated by subtracting the value of shares bought (call 
options exercised) from the value of shares sold (put options exercised). 
Having the aforementioned data inputs, the researcher employed the Hausman Test 
which has the null hypothesis that the preferred model is the random effects, and the 
alternative hypothesis is the fixed effects model (Torres-Reyna, 2007). The Hausman 
Test helped in determining which model was efficient and consistent between the 
Fixed and Random Effects. The researcher also incorporated a robust test to control 
for heteroscedasticity which corrects multi-collinearity20 and non-normality among 
other redundancies. Further, pooled effects, random effects, generalised least 
squares (GLS), the two-step generalised method of moments (GMM), and least 
squares dummy variable corrected (LSDVC) models were run for diagnostics and 
validation purposes. Brown et al. (2010) and Aslan and Kumar (2014) also applied 
similar models. The model and diagnostic results are presented, discussed and 
analysed in Section 4.4.1, Chapter 4. 
3.5 EVENT STUDIES (ES) 
Event Studies (ES) assist in measuring the impact of new information or events on the 
return of a single financial asset, like a share. The impact of the event information on 
a single share can be extrapolated to establish the statistical significance of identified 
CG events to the principal and economy. 
                                            
20 Multi-collinearity takes place in circumstances where two or more independent variables are highly 
correlated. That is, one independent variable can be used to predict the other. The result of multi-
collinearity is the generation of redundant information that skew regression model results. 
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3.5.1 Use of ES in the study 
The adaptation of the ES in this study was useful in assessing whether the identified 
CG events were statistically insignificant or significant enough to warrant the next step 
of calculating the costs to the principal and economy using the VaR procedures 
(discussed in Section 3.6). The use of ES also gave an indication of the magnitude of 
the damage caused by the identified CG events, which was validated by the calculated 
costs using VaR procedures. 
The datum of ES is that it is anchored in the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) which 
purports that information that is known, or can be known, about a company is inherent 
in the current share price (semi-strong form of the EMH). Thus, as information on 
identified CG events, announcements and cautionary statements filter into the market, 
share prices should change in reaction to the information. The researcher assumed 
that the FTSE/JSE Top40 Index is efficient in the semi-strong form, suggesting that as 
the company information filtered into the market, share prices also changed as 
reflected in the historic share prices used in the study.  
The historical analysis of share prices in ES helped create an understanding of their 
past behaviour, and the current analysis of the prices on the event and post-event 
dates helped create an understanding of the change in price behaviour in relation to 
the significance of the event being analysed (Muzata, 2006, citing Elton, 1967 and 
Gummesson, 2000).  
It is on this premise that the researcher advanced the notion that the identified CG 
events caused movements in the company share price, market and the economy, 
depending on the size or influence of the company on the economy. Hence, ES 
provided a plausible way of testing the statistical significance of the identified CG 
events to the principal, company and economy. The logic of employing ES in 
ascertaining the statistical significance of the identified CG events is outlined below. 
 Statements on CG events filtered into the market and share prices moved up or 
down to reflect the sentiments of investors regarding the event and/ or statements. 
 Share prices represented the value of a company or the value of the principal’s 
investment. 
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 The share price movements, in response to the identified CG events, resulted in 
returns that were statistically significant to the principal, company and economy.  
 The possible positive abnormal returns may reflect situations where the principal 
is complicit in the agent’s ‘bad’ behaviour (CG event) in good times and may be 
statistically significant to the company and economy. 
 The researcher then aggregated the abnormal returns and tested the statistical 
significance and impact of the identified CG events. 
Having considered how the ES can be adapted to statistically test the significance of 
the identified CG events, the study adopted the steps discussed by Saponara (2003). 
3.5.2 Statistical significance of identified corporate governance events 
using ES 
This section will discuss the steps to calculate the statistical significance of the 
identified CG events, using ES. The steps are listed below: 
1. The researcher identified the event dates when official statements about the 
identified CG events, for example, a Cautionary Statement, or Announcements by 
the company, JSE and regulatory authorities were released on the Stock 
Exchange News Service (SENS)21. That is, the date the Announcement or 
Cautionary Statement was publicly released. This was assumed to be the date 
when the information was first known market-wide. The idea is to narrowly define 
the event date to allow for an accurate measure of the impact of the identified CG 
event on the share price. Before discussing the subsequent steps as listed by 
Saponara (2003), it is prudent to depict the ES timeline as used in this research in 
Figure 3.5. The identified company’s CG events are depicted in Section 4.2.1, 
4.2.2 and summarised in Appendix 4. 
                                            
21 Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) is the system established by the JSE to disseminate real-time 
company information to the market (JSE Limited Listings Requirements, n.d). 
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Figure 3.5: Event Study timeline  
Adapted from Benninga (2014) 
2. The researcher defined the event window which is the number of trading days 
preceding, and days after, the event date and were viewed as necessary to 
capture the impact of information leakages and wide information filtration into the 
market. The event window didn’t need to be too long as many events may occur 
that result in the conflation of events and then the specific impact of events may 
be missed. In this study, the event window of 30 trading days started 15 trading 
days (-15 trading days) before the CG event was announced to ensure that the 
pre-event information leakages were captured, event day (1 day) and extended to 
14 trading days after the announcement (+14 trading days) to capture post-event 
effects. The 30-day event window is longer than Benninga (2014) recommended 
because the JSE Listing Requirements compel companies that have issued 
Cautionary Statements to issue further Cautionary Statements every 30 business 
days if the ‘matter’ regarding the Cautionary Statement is not finalised. The 
implication on the event window of the JSE Listing Requirements might be that 
some event windows will be longer than 30 trading days if further Cautionary 
Statements were issued by some of the companies in the sample. However, the 
JSE Listing Requirements recommend that the information pertaining to the 
Cautionary Statement must be communicated to the JSE and the market 
immediately. 
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3. The researcher defined the estimation period of time where no CG event or 
Announcement or Cautionary Statements were released. This period was used to 
calculate how the companies’ share returns should have behaved in the absence 
of the identified CG event, for example, an Announcement or Cautionary 
Statements. The estimation period covers the time before the identified CG event 
or Announcement or Cautionary Statements were released. The researcher 
covered a total of 216 trading days as the whole event period for each event (𝑇0  
to 𝑇3), namely, the 126
22 trading days estimation window (𝑇0  to 𝑇1), the 30 trading 
days event window (𝑇1+1  to 𝑇2), and the 60 trading days post-event window (𝑇2+1  
to 𝑇3 ) over which the share prices, their returns, abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns were observed and calculated. A 126 trading-day estimation 
window was used to establish the normal behaviour of the companies’ share prices 
in relation to the FTSE/JSE Top40 index in the absence of the identified CG event. 
The 60 trading-day post-event window is designed to evaluate the performance of 
the companies’ share prices after the identified CG event was announced. The 
post-event window allowed for the longer-term impact of the identified CG event 
to be assessed (Benninga, 2014). 
4. The sample of companies was constituted by the 14 FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies that had contraventions reported (as discussed in Section 4.2.1 and 
4.2.2). Some companies in the sample had more than one CG event and the 
significance of each event was tested. Companies that had more than one CG 
event included MTN Group Ltd., Tiger Brands, Sasol and Mediclinic. For the 
interest of ES, the researcher used purposive sampling to gather and analyse the 
data of the companies in the population that had identifiable CG events. The 
researcher tested the significance or insignificance of the identified CG events. 
The application of ES on a purposively selected sample was cost- and time-
effective for this study as it only tested the significance and/ or insignificance of 
identified CG events. The CG events tested were envisaged to have greater 
influence on the principal’s wealth and the socio-economic well-being of other 
stakeholders. For the companies that were found to have significant CG events, 
                                            
22 We adopted the minimum 126-day estimation window recommended by Benninga (2014) with the 
assumption that events that may have happened during this period were at most ‘noise’ that was not 
material for the events considered in this study (ibid). 
Page | 84  
VaR was employed to calculate the cost of the identified CG events to the principal, 
the company and the economy. The one exception was Steinhoff for which the 
significance was not calculated using ES. This was because the magnitude of the 
initially reported losses were very high in absolute values and were assumed to be 
significant. 
5. The researcher calculated the ‘normal’ returns (returns outside of the event), that 
is, returns that the principal’s investment would have achieved if the event had not 
occurred. The ‘normal’ behaviour of the companies’ daily shares prices, in the 
absence of the identified CG events, during the estimation window (126 trading 
days) were observed, and the shares’ returns using the market model were 
estimated. A multifactor statistical model could also be used to calculate the 
returns, but this study accepted the assertion by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1997) that in practice there are minimal gains in using multifactor models. 
Campbell et al. (1997) observed that there is negligible explanatory power that 
additional factors provide beyond the market factor and there is an insignificant 
reduction in the variance of abnormal returns. For this reason, the market model 
was used to estimate the returns and is a regression of the companies’ share 
returns against the market index (Benninga, 2014). In the case of this study, the 
market return was that of the FTSE/JSE Top40 index. The market model was 
applied as below: 
mtiiit RR    
Equation 3:2:   Market model   
Source: Adapted from Benninga (2014) 
Where itR is the return on Company i's share at time t, calculated using the 
holding period return (HPR), which incorporates the shares’ capital gains or 
losses, as well as dividends paid, with the assumption that the dividends were 
paid at the end of the holding period. mtR  is the market return (FTSE/JSE Top40 
index) at time t, calculated using the HPR; i  is the estimated return for 
Company i in the absence of market return sensitivity and i  is the sensitivity 
of returns to changes in market return for Company i. The market model can 
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also be used to estimate the iˆ  and iˆ  given the itR  and mtR calculated by 
HPR. The calculation of actual returns over the 216 trading days were based 
on the daily share prices and dividends of purposively sampled companies. The 
calculation of actual returns, based on daily share prices and dividends, is 
standardised across ES, as it allows for the accurate measurement of abnormal 
returns and is more informative when studying announcement effects (Muzata, 
2006, citing Rhodes, 1994; Khotari & Warner, 2006). 
6. The researcher calculated the abnormal returns ( itAR ). The application of the 
market model or equation during the estimation window permitted the 
researcher to evaluate the impact of identified CG events on companies’ 
returns in the event window. This was done by observing the ‘normal’ behaviour 
of the companies’ share returns in the estimation window, and then comparing 
them with the companies’ actual returns in the event window between time T1+1 
(which is the start of event window), 0 (which is the event date, that is, 
announcements of the identified CG events) through to T2 (which is the end 
date of event window). The difference between the companies’ actual returns 
in the event window (between time T1+1 through T2) and the companies’ 
expected returns, using the market model is referred to as abnormal returns. 
These abnormal returns itAR  are given by: 
)( mtiiitit RRAR    
Equation 3:3:   To calculate abnormal return 
Source: Adapted from Benninga (2014) 
Where itR = Actual return on Company i's share at time t and )( mtii R   is the 
return predicted by the share’s i , i  and market return at time t (Benninga, 
2014). 
The interpretation of the abnormal returns ( itAR ) calculated by Equation 3.3 is 
that they measure the impact of the identified CG events on the market value 
of the companies’ shares. The implicit assumption in this interpretation is that 
the changes in the returns are as a result of the identified CG events. 
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7. Calculate the cumulative abnormal returns. The event window abnormal 
returns were aggregated to calculate Cumulative Abnormal Returns ( iCAR ) 
from time T1+1 through T2 (end of event window). 
8. Calculate the statistical significance of the abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns. The determination of the statistical significance or 
insignificance of an event was the main goal of ES as it revealed the event’s 
impact or lack thereof. To determine the statistical significance of the itAR  and 
iCAR  from time T1+1 through T2, the study tested the null hypothesis that the 
itAR  and iCAR  are equal to zero (Campbell et al., 1997). This suggests that 
the identified CG event does not have statistically significant impact. The null 
hypothesis will be rejected if the itAR  and itCAR  are not equal to zero, and the 
alternative hypothesis that suggests that the identified CG event is statistically 
significant will be accepted. The test was done on the itCAR  for the event 
window. The itCAR  was then used to calculate the t-statistic as follows: 
𝑡 =
itCAR
𝜎𝑖𝑡
 
Equation 3:4:   To calculate the t-statistic    
Source: Adapted from Benninga (2014) 
Where 𝜎𝑖𝑡 is the standard error of the abnormal returns during the estimation 
period. 
The abnormal returns of all shares in the sample during the event window were 
calculated to determine the average abnormal returns ( itAAR ), which 
aggregate to calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns ( itCAAR ). The 
itAAR  will be a simple average of the sum of the individual itAR  in the sample. 
The t-statistic would then be calculated as follows: 
𝑡 =
itCAAR
𝜎𝑖𝑡
 
Equation 3:5:   To calculate the t-statistic using it
CAAR
   
Source: Adapted from Benninga (2014) 
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The standard deviation in this case was the simple average of the individual 
share’s standard deviation, assuming that no co-variance exists between the 
shares and there are no overlaps in the event window. 
In calculating the t-statistic or testing the statistical significance of the identified 
CG events as above, the researcher assumed that the regression residuals are 
normally distributed (Benninga, 2014). In such a case, the calculated absolute t-
statistic values which are greater than 1.96 (positive or negative) suggest that 
the abnormal returns are statistically significant at 95% level. This suggests that 
the likelihood of the calculated abnormal return being random and statistically 
insignificant will be less than 5% (Benninga, 2014). 
At this point, it is worth highlighting that all the above calculations were carried out 
using the Microsoft Excel Data Analysis regression function. The Excel regression 
calculations were over the estimation window, event window and post-event window. 
The results are presented and discussed in Section 4.4.2. Appendix 5 also provides 
the full results generated by Excel. 
Moreover, the researcher employed Value at risk (VaR) procedures on companies 
with identified CG events that had calculated absolute t-statistic values greater than 
1.96 (positive or negative). The calculated VaR (discussed next in Section 3.6) 
determined the magnitude of the cost, the consequence of the identified CG events to 
the principal, the company and possible inferences to the economy. 
3.6 VALUE AT RISK  
This study sought to establish the pecuniary impact of P-A and CG problems. As such, 
Value at Risk (VaR) was employed to measure the cost of the identified CG events to 
the principal, company and possible inferences to the economy. VaR is a risk 
management measurement technique and can be defined as the maximum amount 
the company is likely to lose over a period of time at a given level of confidence (Dowd, 
1998). According to Dowd (1998:39), “VaR is the maximum expected loss over a given 
horizon period at a given level of confidence”. Dowd (1998) further highlighted that a 
VaR procedure is a numerical, statistical or mathematical procedure that produces a 
VaR figure or number. In risk management, VaR procedures produce a summarised 
single statistical measure of possible losses that can be incurred by a single asset or 
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portfolio as a result of normal or abnormal market movements. With assumptions in 
the VaR calculation, VaR aggregates risks into a single measure that can be used for 
various reporting and disclosure requirements. That single measure gives an idea of 
the magnitude of the likely losses to be incurred. 
3.6.1 Application of VaR in the study 
The VaR method was adapted to calculate the maximum likely cost or loss incurred 
by the principal due to the identified CG event and agent’s behaviour at a given 
confidence level. The VaR approach has the advantage of being adaptable, as 
different VaR procedures can be applied to suit different circumstances, which in the 
case of this study, included the separation of ownership and control, compensation 
schemes, rewarding systems and other agent behaviours. All these formed part of the 
CG aspects that were identifiable, and their significance and costs were calculated to 
suit the objectives of this study. As can be deduced from the steps discussed later, the 
VaR approach made it possible to quantify the total monetary losses incurred by a 
company as a result of the agent’s self-serving behaviour and ultimately can be 
extrapolated to measure the cost to the company and economy. 
The use of VaR gave a comparable and consistent way of measuring cost across 
different positions and risk factors. In the same way, when measuring the cost to the 
principal of the identified CG events and agent’s behaviour, VaR provided a 
comparable and consistent way of measuring the cost of the agent’s behaviour as 
seen in different decisions or actions that were identified as self-serving and not 
maximising value for the principal. Thus, the measuring of the cost to the principal was 
done with a common yardstick, regardless of the nature of the identified CG event and 
self-serving decision or action. 
Cheung and Powell (2012) explained the step-by-step procedures of calculating VaR 
as a parametric method where asset returns are purported to follow a known 
probability distribution. Cheung and Powell (2012) further argued that the assumed 
normal trading conditions allow for simplified VaR calculations that have a distribution 
of risk factors which belong to a family of parametric families, like normal distribution. 
Cheung and Powell (2012) assumed that asset returns are presented as probability 
distributions, rather than values.  
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In this study, the same Microsoft Excel parametric method as used by Cheung and 
Powell (2012)23 to calculate the VaR of a single asset was adopted. This method 
enabled the researcher to ascertain the magnitude of the loss or cost incurred by the 
principal/shareholder of a single company as a result of an agent’s perceived self-
serving behaviour, or an identified CG event that would have been statistically tested 
for significance. The researcher was concerned with establishing the magnitude of the 
loss or cost that the agent’s behaviour or the identified CG event caused to the 
principal and company. In addition, the aggregation of these costs gave an idea of 
how much the behaviour of agents or the identified CG event cost the economy. To 
determine the cost, the researcher considered the total value of the principal’s 
investment as the market capitalisation provided by the JSE at the time (𝑡) in the year 
in which the Announcement or Cautionary Statement was made public (that is, 
published on SENS and announced by Regulatory Authorities). In this case, the risk 
factor is the share price and the Confidence Levels (𝛼) are 95%, 99% and 99.9%24. 
This means that the researcher was concerned with ascertaining the worst possible 
daily cost that the principal of a company could have incurred in, for example, 95 out 
of the 100 times. Further, the researcher considered the risk factor as the share price 
(𝑝), the risk horizon period is the trading day when the Announcement or Cautionary 
Statement was made public, the historical data series of the FTSE/JSE Top40 index 
covering the study’s period, and the Confidence Levels (𝛼) of 95%, 99% and 99.9%.  
Before proceeding to the steps discussed by Cheung and Powell (2012) in their 
simplified parametric method for a single asset in Microsoft Excel, it is worth noting the 
assumption of normal distribution in share prices and returns. Cheung and Powell 
(2012) pointed to the work by Bachelier (1900) who used the central limit theorem to 
derive a normal distribution in the price movements of the Paris Stock Exchange. 
                                            
23 For more on the step-by-step procedure to calculate VaR in Microsoft Excel, read Cheung, Y. and 
Powell, R. 2012. Anybody can do Value at Risk: A Teaching Study using Parametric Computation and 
Monte Carlo Simulation. Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 6 (5 Article 7), pp. 
101-118. 
24 The Confidence level is an arbitrarily selected parameter (Dowd, 1998:39) and this study used the 
95%, 99% and 99.9% Confidence Level, which means that the VaR covered all but the highest 5%, 1% 
and 0.1% of the losses respectively. 
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Since that time, the normal distribution assumption in share price movement has been 
acceptable, hence the use of that assumption in this study. 
3.6.2 Steps to calculating VaR (cost to the principal) 
Cheung and Powell (2012) discussed the essential steps and calculations that need 
to be carried out when using Microsoft Excel to determine the VaR of a single asset. 
The calculations included the mean and standard deviation of the normal distributions 
from the historic price data. When these two calculations were carried out, the 95%, 
99% and 99.9% Confidence Levels were applied to obtain the VaR which represents 
the maximum possible loss or cost the principal may have incurred due to the identified 
CG events or agents’ behaviour. In essence, the Khan (2011)25 Invest-Excel website 
sums up the steps by Cheung and Powell (2012) into the following Microsoft Excel 
steps which were adopted for the study. 
1. The researcher determined the market value of each sample company. For this 
study the market capitalisations at the end of the year in which the CG event 
occurred were used. The market capitalisation data was provided by the JSE. 
2. The researcher calculated the sample companies’ average returns for a single 
period of time, which could be a day, month or year. The researcher used daily 
average returns. 
3. The standard deviation of the companies’ returns for a single period of time were 
calculated. 
4. The researcher applied the 95%, 99% and 99.9% Confidence Levels. 
5. The calculations of the minimum expected return with respect to the selected 
Confidence Levels were done. In Microsoft Excel, the researcher used the 
NORMINV (probability, mean, standard deviation) function. 
6. The researcher then calculated the minimum expected return in Rand value at the 
given Confidence Levels. 
                                            
25 Samir Khan has a website that has various Microsoft Excel models of which one is titled: “Calculate 
Value at Risk in Excel”. He discusses similar steps in the VaR calculations of a single asset using Excel 
as Cheung and Powell (2012) but his steps are more simplified. To read more on Samir Khan’s steps 
visit http://investexcel.net/calculating-value-at-risk-in-excel/ [Accessed 20 August 2015]. 
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7. The researcher obtained the VaR for a single period of time (that is, the Value in 
step 1, minus the Value in step 6). 
The researcher interpreted the final value obtained as the loss or cost per day to the 
principal caused by the identified CG event and self-serving behaviour of the agent or 
executive. To convert the daily VaR calculated as above to a monthly VaR that 
represents the loss or cost to the principal, the daily VaR is multiplied by the square 
root of the total number of trading days (𝑛) in the month. Thus, 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ = 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑅 𝑥 √𝑛 
Equation 3:6:   To convert the daily VaR to a monthly VaR  
Source: Adaptation from Cheung and Powell (2012) 
However, the researcher did not proceed to calculate the monthly VaR, as the study 
was focused on ascertaining the daily maximum possible losses incurred due to the 
identified CG events at 95%, 99% and 99.9% Confidence Levels. 
3.7 GINI-TYPE COEFFICIENT 
Section 3.4.1 explained how the governance indices were calculated in order to 
evaluate the deteriorations or improvements in the governance of companies. Section 
3.5 tested the statistical significance of the identified CG events, and Section 3.6 
calculated the cost to the principal, company and economy. This section discourses 
the calculation and use of the salary Gini (an adapted Gini-type coefficient) to enable 
comparisons of the compensation gap within and between the companies in the 
sample.  
The salary Gini (termed s-Gini hereafter) within a company was used as an indicator 
of the agent's self-serving enrichment at the expense of the principal and other 
stakeholders like employees who play a part in the performance, reputation build-up, 
corporate citizenry and sustainability of the company, and for which they also ought to 
be fairly remunerated. This indicator was used to red-flag potential P-A problems and 
flaws in the governance system, particularly in the performance measurement systems 
and effectiveness of remuneration committees.  
The remunerating system should monitor this s-Gini across the company's grading 
system to reduce the chances of wider compensation gaps between the lowest paid 
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employees and the executives. If anything, the compensation gap should be 
consistently maintained. An aggregated widening compensation gap may spill over 
into the socio-economic arena and potentially cause problems with Unions and lead 
to social unrest in a country with strong labour movement that is in coalition with the 
ruling political party. The researcher sought to calculate the compensation gap and 
suggests that HR practitioners should track it as part of good governance. An equitable 
distribution of income ensures that no one is worse off, and there will therefore be less 
need for re-distribution laws or policies. Hence, the s-Gini within the company should 
frequently be calculated, monitored and evaluated to ensure that the compensation 
gap is taken into account as a key component of a company’s governance systems.  
Moreover, this study was interested in discoursing about the potential socio-economic 
consequences arising from the income gap between executives and other employees. 
This addressed the socio-economic consequences of P-A and CG interactions that 
the researcher endeavoured to establish. The calculated s-Gini was analysed in 
relation to the governance indices, remuneration estimation model and costs were 
established through VaR. 
3.7.1 The s-Gini calculation 
The Gini coefficient is widely accepted as a measure of inequality, especially wealth 
inequality. The coefficient is measured as a ratio which has values from 0 to 1 and can 
be multiplied by 100 to convert into a percentage. A calculated value of 0 reveals 
perfect equality (for example, perfect income equality where everyone earns the same 
amount) and a value of 1 reveals perfect inequality (for example, perfect income 
inequality where people earn different incomes due to myriad reasons). Evidently, a 
value of 0 can only be ideal and not realistic. The calculated values are expected to 
incline towards 1 as people earn different incomes. 
Thomas, Wang and Fan (2001) investigated educational inequality and modified the 
traditional direct method for calculating the Gini Coefficient due to the difficulty in 
attaining educational data from most countries and the fact that attaining education is 
a discrete variable. The direct method modified by Thomas et al. (2001) is depicted in 
Equation 3.7: 
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Equation 3:7:   Traditional direct method for calculating Gini coefficient  
Source: Modified by Thomas et al. (2001) 
Where 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 is the Gini coefficient being calculated, 𝜇 is the mean of the income as a 
variable, 𝑁 is the total number of observations, and 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑦𝑗 are the currency values 
of income earned by individuals. 
As stated, Equation 3.7 was modified to address several identified obstacles that made 
it difficult to apply the conventional direct method. Thomas et al. (2001) then 
formulated a formula that gave plausible measures of educational inequality. Equation 
3.8 became the formula Thomas et al. (2001) formulated to measure education 
inequality. 
𝐸𝐿 = (
1
𝜇
) ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑖−1
𝑗=1  
𝑛
𝑖=2 |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗|𝑝𝑗  
Equation 3:8:   Final equation used by Thomas et al. (2001) to calculate education 
inequality   
Source: Thomas et al. (2001) 
Where: 
𝐸𝐿= the education Gini based on educational attainment distribution, large 
population; 
𝜇 = is the average years of schooling for the concerned population; 
𝑝𝑖 and 𝑝𝑗 = the proportions of population with certain levels of schooling; 
𝑦𝑖 and 𝑦𝑗 = the years of schooling at different educational attainment levels; 
𝑛 = the number of levels/categories in attainment data, and n = 7 
The researcher adapted the formula being used by acquiescing to the reasoning by 
Thomas et al. (2001) when dealing with data difficulties in measuring educational 
inequality, as previously alluded to. The logic to adapt the coefficient equation is also 
supported by Chen, Tsaur and Rhai (1982) who assert that the Gini can be properly 
adjusted to suit certain circumstances. These adaptations were due to the difficulties 
encountered in obtaining an individual worker’s income data, as a result of the 
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confidential nature of salary information. Furthermore, formula modifications were 
necessitated by the big population sizes (that is, the total number of employees per 
industry (N)), which for practical and cost purposes could not be completely surveyed, 
and the high salary differentials per company and within industries (that is, the 
differences between the average lowest salary earned in an industry and the highest 
salary earned by a company executive).  
This study had to simplify the formula to capture the significantly big population sizes, 
as this study used the total number of employees in each of the industries, due to 
difficulties experienced in obtaining credible sources to provide an accurate number 
of employees per company from 2008 to 2016. For the aforesaid reasons, Equation 
3.9 was formulated to measure the s-Gini which is also based on the coefficient 
measure as below: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  
1
2 
(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)†  
†
The difference is relative to the mean 
Equation 3:9:   Researcher’s own formulation to measure s-Gini   
Source: Researcher’s proposition 
Equation 3.9, therefore, becomes: 
𝑠 − 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =
1
2
(
𝑌𝑖−𝑌𝑗
𝜇
)    
Equation 3:10: Final equation used to calculate the s-Gini  
Source: Equation formulated by the researcher 
Where: 
𝑠 − 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑎  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦,  
 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦, 𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
′𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, 
𝑌𝑗 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜇 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  
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Data from Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) was used, which provided the total number 
of employees per industry per quarter, and ultimately per year, as well as the average 
quarterly and annually lowest salaries per industry. The actual executive salaries were 
obtained from the companies’ Annual Financial Statements which are a mandatory 
disclosure under the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008. That meant that there were now 
two categories to the population, that is, executives and other employees whose 
average data was obtained from Stats SA. The modifications were necessitated by 
our N, salary differential (𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌𝑗) and ultimately the mean (). This modification of the 
formula provided plausible results corresponding to the number of times the 
executives’ salaries exceeded the average salary earned by employees in the 
industries. The s-Gini results are presented and discussed in Section 4.5.1. 
3.7.2 Data inputs into the s-Gini calculation  
Deininger and Square (1996) asserted that to improve the quality of data input into the 
Gini calculation, there has to be standardised individual assessments, comprehensive 
coverage of the population and income sources. This study encapsulated these 
qualities in that the: 
 individuals considered were the employees in salary bands in the industry in which 
the companies operated. Since this study sought to measure inequality caused by 
compensation in the workplace, it used salaries. The average industry salaries, 
within the quantiles or categories, provided more accurate and standardised 
measures of inequality in the s-Gini across companies. To measure the inequality, 
the gross income of the employees in the industry in which the company operates 
were used, as published by Stats SA. On the other hand, the executive 
compensation was obtained from the published Annual Financial Statements as 
well as other publicly available information like options granted to executives, and 
are reflected in directors’ share dealings. 
 the population of the number of employees in each of the industries the companies 
operate in was also obtained from Stats SA, 
 the income sources considered are the salaries earned by the employees in the 
respective industries, based on Stats SA data. 
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All three data inputs for the s-Gini were used for all the sample companies. The s-Gini 
calculations were carried out in Microsoft Excel, and the results are tabulated in 
Table 4.15, while the full results are presented in Appendix 12. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
This methodology chapter started by outlining the pragmatic philosophical worldview 
applied to the study. The philosophical worldview section discussed the need for the 
pragmatic foundation to aid in understanding the basis of P-A and governance 
interactions and how their socio-economic consequences can be mitigated to achieve 
better effectiveness in the adopted codes of good governance. From the philosophical 
worldview, the discussions transitioned into the research design, design logics, timing, 
integration and weighting, which are key elements in mixed methods research. This 
section of the chapter focused on the Concurrent Qual + Quan Mixed Methods and 
the Exploratory Sequential Qual → Quan Mixed Methods design logics and its related 
aspects of timing, integration and weighting.  
Having laid this foundation, the chapter presented pictorial views of the design logics 
that reflected the strands, procedures followed and the expected outcomes of every 
procedure followed. Given this framework which was shaped by the study’s 
philosophical worldview, design logics and their procedures and expected outcomes, 
the chapter delved into explaining how the governance indices, remuneration 
estimation model, ES, VaR procedures and s-Gini were calculated. The calculated 
indices were designed to reveal declining trends or improvements in governance 
within the companies (addressing the prevalence of P-A and CG problems). The 
remuneration estimation model aimed to incorporate governance in executive 
compensation, while the ES aimed to test the statistical significance of identified CG 
events.  
Furthermore, the chapter explained how the VaR procedures were carried out to 
establish the cost to the principal, company and cost-inferences to the economy. The 
chapter went a step further by discussing the measurement of the compensation gap 
by using an adapted Gini coefficient, which it called a salary Gini (s-Gini). The data 
collection and analysis techniques were integrated in the sections that discussed the 
governance indices, remuneration estimation model, ES, VaR and s-Gini. 
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The researcher believes that the application of the archival research strategy, 
inductive reasoning, pattern explanation and interpretative enquiry, as well as the 
techniques discussed in this chapter, enriched the quality of the research and enabled 
an exploration for answers to the four research question themes. Table 3.3 
summarises the research methods used to answer each research question in the four 
themes. 
Table 3:3: Themes, Research Questions and methods used 
Theme Research Questions Method used to answer the research 
question 
Theme I: 
Incidence and 
interaction with 
company 
success or 
failure 
What is the prevalence of P-A and CG 
problems in South Africa’s FTSE/JSE 
Top40 listed companies? 
 
Archival research and content analysis 
on archived records were employed to 
check reported cases of CG failures or 
problems from 2008 to 2016. Board 
indices were also calculated to evaluate 
the strength of governance in the 
sample of companies. To complement 
the calculated indices, the qualitative 
strands in the Concurrent Qual + Quan 
and Exploratory Sequential Qual → 
Quan Design Logics, and the combined 
interpretations of their results provided 
plausible inferences and supported the 
attribution analysis that responded to the 
research questions. Therefore, it was 
possible to cogently perform pattern 
explanation from the results (Blaikie, 
2004). 
Have these P-A and CG problems been 
at the heart of some of the corporate 
failures or problems in South Africa? 
Theme II: 
Costs arising 
from P-A and 
CG problems 
What is the role of executive 
compensation schemes in exacerbating 
P-A and CG problems in South Africa? 
The study ran some dynamic panel data 
estimation models, analysed executive 
compensation against the minimum 
wages in the sectors which the 
FTSE/JSE Top40 operate in and 
employed an adapted Gini coefficient 
(called salary Gini, s-Gini henceforth).  
Page | 98  
What are the potential costs and who 
bears these costs of P-A and CG 
problems? 
Conducted Event Study to establish the 
significance of identified P-A and CG 
problems in Theme I. VaR procedures 
were then applied to calculate the 
potential costs to the principal who is the 
shareholder. In addition, who bears the 
cost was ascertained by the losses 
reported in fund Factsheets. 
Theme III: 
Socio-
economic 
consequences 
of P-A and CG 
problems 
To what extent do the P-A and CG 
problems contribute to socio-economic 
inequality in South Africa? 
The study uses the s-Gini and executive 
salary multiples over the lowest paid 
employees in industries to capture the 
socio-economic consequences 
emanating from P-A and CG problems. 
In addition, P-A and CG problems in 
Theme I were used to indicate 
inequalities that may snowball to other 
socio-economic areas. 
Theme IV: 
Effectiveness 
of governance 
codes in South 
Africa 
How effective have the current codes of 
good CG been in mitigating P-A and CG 
problems and consequences? 
The board indices and findings in Theme 
I through to Theme III were evaluated to 
establish the effectiveness of current CG 
codes. 
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis and 
Discussion 
This chapter presents the findings 
and results of the thesis. It separately 
discusses as well as integrates 
findings and results obtained from 
Theme I through Theme IV. Findings’ 
concurrences, divergences and 
inferences drawn are cogently 
conversed in the chapter. 
Chapter 4 Contents 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Theme I: Identified CG events 
4.3 Board indices 
4.4 Theme II: Role of executive 
compensation and potential 
costs 
4.5 Theme III: Potential socio-
economic consequences 
4.6 Theme IV: Effectiveness of 
governance codes in South 
Africa 
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CHAPTER 4:   DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 discussed agency theory as the dominant theory in CG (Clarke, 2004; 
Dühnfort et al., 2008), and the acknowledgement by Mallin (2010) that agency theory 
provided the main CG theoretical framework. It is for this reason that the analysis of 
findings in this chapter is through the agency theory lens. The previous chapter also 
considered how agency theory is rooted in information economics (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
citing Jensen, 1983). The data used in this study is publicly available through the 
SENS, the companies’ websites, the JSE and regulatory authorities’ websites. The 
data is related to the separation of ownership and control, executive compensation, 
reward systems and governance principles, the recommended practices and 
outcomes of the King III and King IV reports. 
This chapter discusses the results of the research study, and examines the issues 
pertaining to the research questions in each of the four themes as presented earlier. 
The chapter begins by presenting and discussing the results addressing Theme I, 
which ascertains the prevalence of CG failures amongst FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies. In the subsequent section, the results of the role of executive 
compensation and the potential costs of P-A and CG problems are presented and 
discussed under Theme II. The chapter concludes by presenting the results 
addressing the potential socio-economic consequences in Theme III, and the 
effectiveness of CG codes in Theme IV. 
4.2 THEME I: IDENTIFIED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EVENTS 
Chapter 1 identified CG events as corporate failures which include both financial 
failure and the involvement in conduct which attracts penalties and other sanctions 
from regulatory authorities, or conduct resulting in reputational damage (for example, 
involvement in collusion which attracts penalties from the Competition Commission or 
Tribunal).  
As found by Chapple and Truong (2014), the role of the board of directors is to monitor 
and ensure that the company complies with all laws and regulations that govern the 
operations of the business. The board and its committees are a fulcrum in governance 
(Chapple & Truong, 2014, citing Gillan, 2006) and monitor the agent’s performance 
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including the compliance with laws and regulations (Chapple & Truong, 2014, citing 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Carter et al., 2010). In addition, King III states that the Audit 
Committee should be informed and be aware of ‘reportable irregularities’ which was 
not the case in the tabulated cases. The cited literature by Chapple and Truong (2014) 
and the King III recommendations imply that the companies in Table 4.1 (on the next 
page) had failures in CG interactions which possibly emanated from the board and 
board committee’s failure as fulcrums in governance. This implies that the boards’ 
governance interaction systems failed to effectively restrain, monitor and ensure that 
the agents (executives) complied with the applicable laws and regulations resulting in 
fines and or other sanctions being imposed by the regulatory authorities. 
4.2.1 Corporate governance failures manifested in contraventions of 
laws and regulations 
Table 4.1 depicts the companies in the sample that had CG failures and it reveals the 
pervasiveness of problems in the CG interactions within companies listed on the 
FTSE/JSE Top40 index.  
Table 4.1 and the subsequent discussions address the research questions under 
Theme I, as well as the first objective that examines the prevalence of P-A and CG 
problems in South African companies.
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Table 4:1: Companies in the sample that had CG failures  
Company name Nature of the identified CG event  Event date  
Tiger Brands’ 
subsidiary Albany 
Bakeries 
Contravention: Price fixing of bread and dividing markets in contraventions of Chapter 2 of the 
Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998). 
Outcome: Fined R 98 874 869.90 according to Competition Commission Press Statement dated 
5 May 2008. 
14 February 2007 
Tiger Brands’ 
subsidiary Adcock 
Ingram Critical 
Care (Pty) Ltd 
(“AICC”) 
Contravention: Collusive tendering and market allocation, both of which are contraventions of 
Section 4 of the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998). The Competition Commission alleged 
that certain directors of the parent company were aware of the competition law breaches. 
Outcome: Fined 8% of turnover amounting to R53 502 800.00. The highest penalty then, according 
to Competition Commission Press Statement dated 9 May 2008. 
11 February 2008 
Sasol’s subsidiary: 
Sasol Chemical 
Industries Limited 
Contravention: Abusing fertiliser market dominance by charging excessive prices and collusion to 
fix prices of certain fertilisers with its competitors such as Kynoch and Omnia. 
Outcome: Fine amounted to R250 680 000.00, according to the Competition Commission Consent 
Order Decision dated 20 May 2009. 
3 May 2005 
Sasol’s subsidiary: 
Sasol Chemical 
Industries Limited 
Contravention: Sasol engaged in collusive conduct as a result of the implementation of the supply 
agreement, including the operation of the pricing formula and the exchange of information relating 
to the pricing of polypropylene. Sasol was found guilty of charging domestic customers excessive 
prices for purified propylene and polypropylene between January 2004 and December 2007. 
Outcome: Fined R534 000 000.00, according to Competition Tribunal Press Statement dated 
5  June 2014. 
12 August 2010 
MTN Group Contravention: The Competition Commission investigated MTN for price discrimination in 
contravention of Section 9(1) of the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998). The Commission 
alleged that MTN’s conduct substantially reduced competition between telecommunication 
network operators. The amount of the fine could not be established. Further contraventions and 
non-compliance by MTN Nigeria (a subsidiary of the group) in 2015 culminated in a fine. 
Outcome: A fine of US$5 200 000 000.00 imposed by Nigeria Communications Commission 
(NCC) on 26 October 2015 (MTN, 2015). As a consequence of this fine, the JSE temporarily 
30 July 2007 
(CCSA 
investigation), 26 
October 2015 (NCC 
fine), Turkcell 
announcement (29 
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Company name Nature of the identified CG event  Event date  
suspended the trading of the MTN shares on 2 November 2015. The final amount of the fine of 
US$2 573 000 000.00 was settled between NCC and MTN in June 2016 (MTN, 2016). 
Other contraventions: In addition to the two aforementioned MTN incidences of flouting laws and 
regulations, Fin24 (2015) narrates the company’s history of breaching laws in various countries it 
operates in. The highlighted cases include: 
Incidence: MTN employees in Uganda allegedly manipulated the mobile money platform and 
swindled a substantial amount of money in 2011. Loss: about US$160 000 000.00. 
Incidence: Turkcell (a Turkish telecommunications operator), a competitor in Iran accused MTN of 
bribing Iranian officials in 2012. The case between Turkcell and MTN continued in 2017 with the 
South Gauteng High Court (South Africa) granting Turkcell a go-ahead with a lawsuit against MTN 
(van Zyl, 2017). Potential Loss: about US$4 200 000 000.00. 
Incidence: MTN’s IT specialist in Zambia allegedly manipulated the company’s Let’s Go BEEG 
promotion to allow his girlfriend to win in 2012. Potential loss: about US$500 000 000.00 as of 
23 April 2012. However, the loss was averted as MTN conducted a re-draw of the competition 
prize. 
Incidence: MTN’s Chief Corporate Services Officer was accused of diverting sponsorship funds in 
2013. Loss: undisclosed. 
March 2012 and 28 
November 2013) 
Vodacom Contravention: The Competition Commission laid criminal charges against a Vodacom Executive 
Director in terms of Section 73 of the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998). Section 73 
provides that it is an offence to knowingly provide false information to the Commission. The 
Commission asserted that the Executive Director intentionally provided false information to 
mislead it and contravened the Act.  
Outcome: Vodacom is alleged to have failed to provide the Commission with pertinent documents 
pertaining to the acquisition of Glocell by Vodacom. Furthermore, in a Competition Commission’s 
Press Statement dated 24 July 2008, The Competition Tribunal stated that they believed that 
Vodacom deliberately withheld pertinent information from the Commission. The Tribunal observed 
that the strategic rationale provided by Vodacom to the Commission for acquiring Glocell was 
substantially different from that contained in the company’s Board Minutes. Upon further 
investigations by the Commission, the true rationale of acquiring Glocell by Vodacom was to 
eliminate competition that was threatening its profit margins, according to the Competition 
24 July 2008 
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Commission’s Press Statement dated 24 July 2008. The amount charged could not be 
ascertained. 
Netcare Hospital 
Group 
Contravention: The Competition Commission alleged and Netcare accepted that it implemented a 
merger with Community Hospital Group (Pty) Ltd without the Commission’s approval, thus 
contravening Section 13 A(3) of the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998). In addition, 
Netcare contravened Section 4(1)(b) of the Act by having a similar pricing structure for tariffs it 
charged in its hospitals with those charged by Community Hospital Group (Pty) Ltd before the 
unauthorised merger. According to the Consent Order issued on 10 March 2008. 
Outcome: Netcare was fined a total of R6 000 000.00. The fine amount of R6 000 000.00 was 
initially rejected by the Competition Tribunal but was eventually upheld by the Competition Appeal 
Court of South Africa, based on the hearing that took place on 27 October 2008. 
10 March 2008 
Rand Merchant 
Bank 
Contravention: Allegations of dividing the grain trade market in which they compete by allocating 
territories and customers. This follows an agreement entered into by RMB and NWK in 2005 in 
respect of grain owned by RMB and stored in NWK silos in contravention of the Competition Act, 
1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998). 
Outcome: Fined R2 100 000.00, according to Competition Commission’s Press Statement dated 
6 June 2011. 
17 March 2009 
Supermarkets:  
Pick n Pay Stores, 
Shoprite/Checkers, 
Woolworths and 
Massmart (this 
study excluded 
Spar and Metcash 
as they are not part 
of the sample but 
were part of the 
investigation by the 
Commission) 
Contraventions: The Commission’s investigations focused on abuse of buyer power, category 
management, exclusive long-term leases and information exchange with regards to staple foods. 
The commission found no evidence on abuse of buyer power, category management and 
information exchange. However, the Commission raised serious concerns relating to long-term 
exclusive leases in shopping malls which are structured in ways that may constitute contraventions 
of the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998), particularly where supermarkets have market 
power. The Commission’s concern is that the long-term exclusive leases in the local markets are 
not justifiable and result in anti-competitive outcomes that enhance market power and that can 
stifle competition from independent and small retailers. Furthermore, the Commission found that 
a third party service provider like AC Nielsen and Synovate gathered scanner data from these 
supermarkets and disseminated it to suppliers. The commission alleged that this conduct impacted 
on competition. As at the announcement date of 27 January 2011, the Commission was still 
investigating the long-term exclusive leases and information-sharing through third parties. 
29 June 2009 
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Outcome: No penalties were imposed as investigations are ongoing as per the Competition 
Commission’s Press Statement dated 27 January 2011. 
Liberty Group Contravention: Liberty colluded to divide markets by allocating customers and territories through 
two deeds of restraint. The conduct was found to contravene Section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition 
Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998). 
Outcome: Fine amounted to R272 187.95 according to the Competition Commission Consent 
Order Decision dated 10 October 2012. 
13 March 2011 
Mediclinic Contravention: Investigated for alleged price fixing on 10 February 2012 and another on 26 
February 2013, based on the relationship that Mediclinic had with Victoria Hospital Proprietary 
Limited, Newcastle Private Hospital Proprietary Limited, Howick Private Hospital Holdings 
Proprietary Limited, Mediclinic Tzaneen Proprietary Limited, Mediclinic Hermanus Proprietary 
Limited and Mediclinic Upington Proprietary Limited. The basis of the price fixing investigation was 
the fact that Mediclinic negotiated and determined tariffs on behalf of each of the stated hospitals. 
Outcome: The Commission concluded that the tariff determination arrangement between 
Mediclinic and the managed hospitals contravened Section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Competition Act, 1998 
(Act No. 89 of 1998). This is based on the Consent Order dated 18 March 2015. There was no 
administrative penalty imposed by the Commission but there was an agreement on non-pecuniary 
remedies. 
10 February 2012 
and 26 February 
2013 
British American 
Tobacco Plc 
Investigative journalism discovery: The BBC Panorama Programme (2015) conducted a five 
months’ investigation into alleged bribes paid by BAT employees to politicians, public officials and 
people working for competitors to damage competitors’ reputations. 
Outcome: The uncovered documentary evidence by the BBC Panorama Programme (2015) 
revealed that the alleged bribes were of significant amounts as follows: 
US$26 000.00 paid to public official in Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros Islands. The amounts were 
paid to three officials connected to the United Nations in 2012. Other significant amounts paid and 
reported by the BBC (2015) were US$20 000.00 and US$10 000.00. The evidence submitted by 
BAT to the Employment Tribunal confirmed that the payments made were a series of ‘unlawful 
bribes’ (BBC, 2015), and were at the behest of the company’s East Africa Corporate and 
Regulatory Affairs department (Gillard, 2016). Gillard (2016) reported that BAT’s Legal and 
30 November 2015 
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Intelligence Department at its head office were aware of the ‘unlawful bribes’. BAT also faced 
allegations of corruption in Kenya and investigations by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (Gillard, 
2016). 
In addition, an amount in excess of US$300 000.00 was allegedly paid by BAT (over a 13-year 
period) to erode the competitors’ competitive advantage (Webb, 2015). The investigations 
extended to South Africa where BAT was purported to have committed corporate espionage 
against its competitors (Connett, 2016). 
Aspen Pharmacare 
Holdings Ltd 
Contravention: The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) charged and found Aspen guilty of 
infringing Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union26 by setting excessive 
prices for life-saving and irreplaceable drugs in the treatment of oncohematological patients. 
Outcome: A fine of €5 200 000.00 (approximately R73 700 000.00) was imposed on Aspen 
Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. Furthermore, Aspen failed to disclose the fine to shareholders via 
SENS, stating that the amount was insignificant (Crotty, 2017). 
29 September 2016 
Source: Researcher’s findings 
                                            
26 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) addresses the abuse of market dominance which affects trade between European Union 
Member states. 
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4.2.2 Contraventions of laws and regulations 
A total number of 46 sample companies were analysed, which included companies 
that are currently, and those that were once, part of the FTSE/JSE Top40 index, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Eleven27 out of the 46 sample companies contravened and/ 
or did not comply with laws and regulations that govern their operations. The laws and 
regulations that were contravened and/ or not complied with are highlighted in Table 
4.1.  
The 11 companies in Table 4.1 represent 23.91%28 of the total FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies included in this study. The 23.91% significantly increases to 30.43% if 
industry-wide collusion by dominant supermarkets is assumed. The reason for this 
assumption is that the Competition Commission investigated the supermarket industry 
as a whole and if each investigation is considered as a separate occurrence, the 
number of companies that flouted laws increases to 14. That is, 30.43% denotes that 
14 out of 46 sample companies contravened and/ or were non-compliant. 
Nevertheless, these discussions and analyses will regard the Competition 
Commission’s investigation of the supermarkets as a single incidence. For this reason, 
the analyses focus on the 23.91% result. 
As previously stated, the cited literature by Chapple and Truong (2014), King III and 
King IV imply that the companies in Table 4.1 experienced failures in CG interactions. 
The 23.91% constitutes a substantial proportion of the sample of companies and 
reveals the pervasiveness of P-A and CG failures, especially considering the size of 
the companies, the role they play in capital and investment allocation, as well as their 
contributions to South Africa’s economic performance. Also, 23.91% of the sample of 
the largest listed companies experiencing P-A and CG problems significantly exceeds 
                                            
27 Sasol’s subsidiary Sasol Chemical Industries Limited was involved in two separate cases breaching 
the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998) in 2005 and 2010. Tiger Brands had two of its 
subsidiaries, Albany Bakeries and Adcock Ingram Critical Care (Pty) Ltd fined for contravening the 
Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998) in 2007 and 2008 respectively. 
28 The figure includes supermarkets investigated by the Competition Commission as a single incidence 
of abuse of buyer power, category management, exclusive long-term leases and information exchange 
with regards to staple foods. The Commission’s investigation was industry-wide focusing on the 
dominant players. In addition, although Steinhoff is a FTSE/JSE Top40 company, it was originally not 
part of the sample as it was excluded due to missing data in some years. For this reason, Steinhoff’s 
CG event which surfaced at the end of 2017 is considered separately in the discussions and analyses. 
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the study’s expectations that negligible P-A and CG problems exist because of the 
laws and listing regulations designed as external governance systems that restrain 
agency and CG problems as well as protecting investors from agent’s behaviour. 
Weak standards of governance in these companies may divert capital allocation, thus 
negatively affecting economic growth and productivity, ultimately leading to failures in 
meeting the expectations of workers, consumers and society (Preece, 2017).  
These CG failures provide credence to agency theory and suggest that a significant 
23.91% of FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies experienced the consequences of P-A 
and CG problems. The Steinhoff company case (also listed on the FTSE/JSE Top40 
index) suffered the consequences of agency problems over the research period. In 
addition to the cited companies, and mainly outside the timelines of our study, 
Steinhoff had reported cases of CG failures. Details were still unfolding but Steinhoff 
had reported cases of accounting ‘irregularities’ being investigated by the European, 
US and South African regulatory authorities. Steinhoff’s website had a statement 
stating that “Steinhoff has announced the restatement of financial statements, and as 
a result these documents can no longer be relied on” (Steinhoffinternational.com, 
2018). At the time of the announcement, Steinhoff had a significant weighting on the 
FTSE/JSE Top40 index, accounting for about 3.52% of the total market capitalisation 
of Top40 listed companies and was the seventh largest company, with a market 
capitalisation of R285 billion (BusinessTech, 2017). CG failures in a large company 
like Steinhoff are expected to have severe consequences for South Africa’s capital 
markets. The statistical significance of each of the aforementioned events (including 
Steinhoff’s event) and the magnitude of the cost to the principal are calculated and 
presented in Section 4.4.2. 
The cited contraventions reveal that P-A problems are inherent in CG structures due 
to the separation of ownership and the way companies are governed and managed 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The assertions by Otten and Wempe (2009) that CG problems 
exist when serving the interests of any group of stakeholders are also supported by 
the aforesaid 23.91% of sample companies and Steinhoff which contravened various 
laws and regulations. Moreover, the classification of P-A assumptions by Eisenhardt 
(1989) as discussed in Chapter 2 are affirmed in the contraventions. The 
contraventions also provide confirmation of Jensen’s (1983) assertion that agency 
theory has its roots in information economics, because Steinhoff and 23.91% of the 
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FTSE/JSE Top40 listed sample companies’ executives managed to breach laws and 
regulations without their respective governance structures picking up information on 
the breaches.  
The findings of the study confirm that company executives (agents) withheld 
information about the collusions, price fixing and financial reporting irregularities from 
the principal who is represented by the board. In these cases, relevant regulatory 
authorities conducted investigations that identified that the breaches were going on for 
a number of years without the relevant CG interactions deterring and detecting the 
executives’ misconduct. However, in some instances, the boards or directors of parent 
companies were complicit to the misconduct of the subsidiary’s executive directors. 
For example, the Competition Commission alleged that certain directors of Tiger 
Brands (the parent company) were aware of the competition law breaches in Adcock 
Ingram Critical Care (Pty) Ltd (a subsidiary company). The existence of information 
asymmetry in CG interactions between agents and principals was confirmed by the 
findings of this study because the respective boards of the cited companies failed to 
deter and detect the misconduct for some time. Ultimately, it can be plausibly 
suggested that CG interactions in the companies presented in Table 4.1, and 
Steinhoff, failed to monitor the agent’s performance including compliance with laws 
and regulations. This submission is aligned to Chapple and Truong (2014) and Carter 
et al. (2010). 
In addition to Eisenhardt’s (1989) assertion that agency theory is rooted in information 
economics, Jensen (1983) highlighted that agency theory has developed along the 
positivist and P-A streams, as previously discussed in Chapter 2. The positivist and P-
A lines have similar assumptions and use a contract as the unit of analysis. 
Considering that a contract is a unit of analysis, there is acknowledgement that there 
is separation of ownership and control resulting in incentivising the agent through basic 
compensation, performance bonuses, share options, and so forth. These incentives 
are susceptible to self-interest, moral hazards (problems arising from hidden actions) 
and adverse selection (problems arising from hidden knowledge). Hence, it is plausible 
for this study to assert from the results that Steinhoff and the 23.91% of the sample of 
companies that were cited for contravening various laws and regulations, were driven 
by the self-interest of agents, at the expense of their principals.  
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It can be safely assumed that the core of the self-interest is to maximise the agent’s 
compensation as it would be based on performance as previously mentioned. The 
justification of this assumption is that the nature of the contraventions is designed to 
maximise the agent’s performance which is the basis of his/her compensation. The 
contraventions include price-fixing and collusion (Tiger Brands, Sasol, RMB, Liberty 
and Mediclinic), abuse of market dominance (Tiger Brands, Sasol, supermarkets), 
bribing politicians (MTN and BAT), and paying illicit amounts to employees of 
competitors to acquire trade secrets (BAT) to maximise business revenue, profitability 
and share prices.  
To fix prices means that the consumer becomes a price-taker, and coupled with abuse 
of market dominance, the company then has the power to determine profit margins, 
resulting in the agent attaining the revenue or profit targets agreed with the board. 
Moreover, market allocation eliminates the competition and ensures a better degree 
of the agent’s performance, as a market for the company’s products is guaranteed, 
regardless of the quality of service. Bribing politicians to bypass country laws which 
protect the local economy, people and competition, for example, support for anti-
smoking laws (Owen, 2015), and to obtain an operating licence, as alleged in the case 
of BAT and MTN, ensures the continued achievement of the agent’s performance 
targets. The nature of these contraventions are designed to maximise the 
compensation due to the agent within the agreed contract period.  
The mentioned contraventions support the assertion by Shah (2014) and Bolton, 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) that high demands on short-term performance and the 
associated bonuses offered to the agent by the principal may result in the agent 
overweighting short-term performance at the expense of the future good of the 
company. Moreover, the majority of the tabulated CG failures recorded some of the 
highest s-Gini (perfect salary inequality) and the highest number of times an executive 
earns more than the lowest paid employee. (Salary inequality is discussed later in 
Section 4.5.1.) What can be noted at this stage is that the salary inequality seems to 
support the self-serving behaviour of the agent at the expense of other employees, 
and this is a time-bomb for socio-economic crisis in a country with influential trade 
unions that have the potential to halt the economic activities of South Africa. 
The motivation by the executives in the companies listed in Table 4.1 to implement 
operating decisions that contravene stated business and country laws and regulations 
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further postulate that the agent pursued personal interests that impacted on the long-
term wealth of the principal. Progressively, short-term performance focus results in the 
search for immediate gratification for both the principal (in investment returns) and 
agent (in compensation), with dire consequences on the long-term value of the 
company (Shah, 2014, citing Kay, 2012). The agent’s compensation and the 
magnitude of the fines represent a significant cost to the principal.  
The cited misconduct by Steinhoff and 23.91% of the largest FTSE/JSE listed 
companies concurs with the findings from the study carried out by Sorkin (2013) on 
the Wall Street financial services industry in the US, cited by Shah (2014). The study 
found that 26% of all Wall Street participants believed that employees would 
compromise ethical standards and contravene laws because of the compensation and 
bonus structures within companies. The Wall Street study also found that 17% of the 
participants believed that leaders would ignore ethical breaches and contravention of 
laws by top performers, and 15% believed that leaders would not report the violations. 
These Wall Street findings concur with this study’s findings that the Competition 
Commission’s investigations discovered that some of Tiger Brands’ directors (parent 
company) were aware of the Competition Act breaches by Adcock Ingram Critical Care 
(Pty) Ltd (a subsidiary), that Vodacom’s executive director knowingly provided false 
information to the Competition Commission when applying for the acquisition-approval 
of a competitor, and some of BAT’s top leaders are alleged to have been aware of the 
bribery of politicians and illicit payments being made to sabotage its competitors. 
These ethical misconducts and contraventions of laws highlight failures in CG 
interactions to control the agent’s activities, as well as failures when the principal is 
complicit in a quest to maximise the agent’s compensation and principal’s return, 
respectively. 
Failures in the effectiveness of adopted CG Codes are also highlighted in the 
contraventions discussed above. Further discussion on the effectiveness of CG codes 
is presented in Section 4.6. However, there are bigger socio-economic consequences, 
especially considering the findings by the Competition Tribunal on Sasol’s subsidiary, 
SCI. The Competition Tribunal concluded that SCI’s mark-up on the polypropylene29 
                                            
29 Polypropylene is an intermediate product whose pricing is significant to household plastic goods like 
buckets, brooms, storage containers and industrial products like motor car parts and water tanks. 
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price over actual costs (including an appropriate return on capital) during the complaint 
period was in the range of 26.9% – 36.5%. Furthermore, the Tribunal judged that the 
local price of polypropylene was on average 23% higher than average deep sea export 
prices of polypropylene (excluding exports into Southern Africa). The Tribunal also 
discovered that: “SCI’s domestic prices charged for polypropylene were 41% and 47% 
higher for homopolymer and raffia grade polypropylene respectively in the complaint 
period compared to the discounted prices in Western Europe computed on the basis 
of feedstock costs comparable to SCI” (Competition Tribunal Press Statement, 5 June 
2014). The Tribunal’s findings reveal seemingly exorbitant and unjustifiable local 
prices that are higher than export prices and those charged in Western Europe. 
Therefore, it is reasonable for this study to posit that local South African consumers of 
industrial and household plastic products carried the burdens of CG failures through 
higher prices. These exorbitant prices result in the agent being credited with producing 
greater profitability (performance) and share price or return, both of which are the basis 
for his/her compensation. In essence, the consumer unnecessarily funds CG failures.  
While the average South African consumer is battling continued higher prices, pension 
and retirement funds, collective investment schemes, and insurance companies, and 
asset and investment managers have, on their behalf, invested in companies that have 
subsequently experienced CG failures and therefore, the consumer’s hard-earned 
savings have been significantly impacted. Conceivably, this leads to consumers failing 
to adequately provide for their retirement, school and tuition school fees and other 
investment objectives, thus increasing the pressure on government’s social spending 
and fiscus. The magnitude of potential losses and socio-economic consequences are 
discussed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.5, respectively. 
The findings and discussions above addressed the Theme I research questions and 
associated objectives. From these findings, it can be cogently concluded that P-A and 
CG failures are significantly prevalent on the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies, albeit 
in a variety of different magnitudes. The findings show that 23.91% of the FTSE/JSE 
Top40 listed companies experienced CG failures and attracted sanctions from 
regulatory authorities over the period considered in this study. This must be worrying 
to policymakers/lawmakers, listing authorities like the JSE, academia, and society at 
large, considering the size of these companies, their roles in capital and investment 
allocation, as well as economic performance. Some form of marginal CG failures in 
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the biggest 40 listed companies, by market capitalisation, would have been expected 
given the level of required compliance to various laws and listing requirements. That 
is, 23.91% significantly exceeds the study’s expectations that negligible P-A and CG 
problems exist. What should be more concerning to policy makers, scholars and 
others is that these FTSE/JSE Top 40 companies have a very strong influence on 
corporate governance and tend to shape corporate behaviour in a country. The CG 
failures amidst current compliance requirements provide credibility to the suggestion 
that the success of voluntary CG codes has been limited. However, the findings of the 
study are consistent with the outcomes of above-cited literature. 
  
Figure 4.1: Infographic of the findings on the prevalence of CG failures  
Source: Researcher’s findings 
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The next section focuses on the discussion on the findings around governance indices 
and their changes during the period from 2008 to 2016. 
4.3 BOARD INDICES 
The previous section discussed the findings that credibly suggested that P-A and CG 
failures are significantly prevalent on the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies, although 
in varying degrees. This section continues by presenting and discussing the results 
addressing Theme I research questions and related objectives. The focus is on the 
strength of CG within the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies by calculating the 
governance indices (proxy for governance) for each sample company based on their 
adherence to the provisions of the King III and King IV codes.  
This study uses the recommendations from the King III and King IV as provisions in 
the construction of the indices, similar to Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017) who used 
the recommendations from the UK Corporate Governance Code. Shaukat and 
Trojanowski (2017) found that adherence to the provisions of the codes strengthens 
the capacity of boards to monitor executives and mitigate agency and CG problems. 
For this reason, the study uses the King III and King IV provisions as opposed to MOI 
provisions. Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017) further argued that using the provisions 
of the codes condenses the quality of governance arrangements at board level within 
companies and are easier to tailor-make and amend than the MOI. The use of code 
provisions is flexible and provides governance choices under the ‘apply or explain’ 
regime. This approach in constructing the indices is rooted in agency theory 
predictions and is supported by empirical evidence (Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2017). 
4.3.1 Findings on calculated indices  
This study carefully considered recommendations dealing with board oversight 
functions from the King III and King IV reports. These chosen board oversight functions 
(including board committees) are considered to be complementary aspects of the 
robustness of board governance. The study engaged in Content Analysis (CA) by 
systematically evaluating information provided under the Governance Sections of the 
Annual Integrated Reports for each of the years from 2008 to 2016 to identify 
compliances or non-compliances with the King recommendations. The study drew 
compliance inferences from what is presented in the publicly available Integrated 
Page | 115  
Reports of each of the sample companies. A total of 423 Integrated Reports were 
systematically evaluated. 
The considered recommendations are the provisions equally weighted and 1 is added 
where the company complies and 0 for non-compliance with the King III and King IV 
recommendations in line with GIM (2003) and Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017). There 
are twenty provisions and a company that fully complies with the King III and King IV 
recommendations will have a governance index of 20, while a fully non-compliant 
company will have a governance index of 0. This suggests that the calculated 
governance index, as a proxy of governance, will be closer to 20 for better governed 
companies and closer to 0 for poorly governed companies. For example, a company 
with a calculated governance index of 18 suggests that it is better governed than a 
company with a calculated index of 11. Furthermore, increases and decreases in the 
calculated indices suggest improvements and deteriorations, respectively, in the 
governance of sample companies during the 2008 to 2016 period.  
Table 4.2 (on the next page) depicts the summary of governance indices for each 
sample of companies from 2008 to 2016 and presents averages for all the nine years. 
Refer to Appendix 1 for the mapping of the provisions to King III and King IV and 
Appendix 13 for the justifications of each of the provisions included in the index 
calculated. 
The study presents and discusses the results of the calculations in the next section. 
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Table 4:2: Summary of governance indices for the period 2008-2016 
 
Source: Research results 
Table 4.2 exhibits the calculated governance indices that are reasonably high, 
denoting greater adoption and seemingly high compliance to the King III and King IV 
recommendations. The average governance index for all companies during the study’s 
period is 16, with the lowest company recording an average index of 11, and the 
highest of 19. Generally, there is not much variation of calculated indices within 
companies from 2008 to 2016. This suggests consistency in the governance of the 
companies in the sample.  
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On the other hand, the high governance indices, on average, have not mitigated the 
incidences of corporate malfeasance, like in the cases of Steinhoff and the 23.91% of 
the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies discoursed earlier. However, the companies 
that recorded lower governance indices do not necessarily suggest having worse P-A 
and CG problems as there could be plausible reasons why they did not fully comply 
with the provisions.  
Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017) provide efficiency and costs as possible reasons that 
drive non-compliance, as benefits may outstrip costs. This is aligned to the 
fundamental reason why King III and King IV are premised on ‘apply or explain’ and 
‘apply and explain’ framework, respectively. While possible reasons exist for non-
compliance, caution and scrutiny are required as the agent may opportunistically 
expropriate the principal’s wealth (Fama, 1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) because the 
agent has the capacity to act undetected (Hawkes & Goodley, 2011; Shah, 2014, citing 
Sorkin, 2013).  
Before ascertaining the reasons that could suggest P-A problems and CG weaknesses 
in the sample companies, the significant provisions not complied with are presented 
in Table 4.3. This attribution breakdown shows which provisions were not complied 
with and the companies that did not comply as a percentage of the sample companies 
through the period of the study. For the full list of provisions not complied with, refer to 
Appendix 2. 
 
Table 4:3: Non-adherence to King III & King IV for the period 2008-2016 
Source: Research results 
The study calculated the non-compliance for each company per year and per 
governance provision in the overall index by using the COUNTIF function in Excel. 
The compliance status was determined for each sample company per year and per 
provision, across 2008 to 2016. For each provision, the number of companies that did 
not comply with the specific provisions were observed and included, and the 
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companies were expressed as a percentage of the total companies in the sample. For 
example, on the presence of deputy chair and/ or lead independent non-executive 
director, there were 17 companies not complying with this provision, and the 17 was 
expressed as a percentage of 46 to obtain 36.17%. 
Table 4.3 and the graphs in Figures 4.2 to 4.4 reveal that the adoption of the provisions 
seem to have largely occurred from 2012 onwards, two years after the effective date 
of King III which was on 1 March 2010. The percentages of non-compliant companies 
in the sample significantly declined from 2012 and they have seemed to be sticky since 
then to 2016. This is consistent with the argument by Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017) 
that the adoption of recommendations of the code initially rises and then slows down 
over time.  
The study also observed that there are individual provisions with very high adoption 
and compliance during the period 2008 to 2016. The provisions with low non-
compliance percentages across the companies include no Chair/CEO duality (average 
0.24%, in essence one company in 2016), the presence of remuneration and audit 
committees (0%, i.e. all companies complied), independent non-executive director 
(INED) chairs the remuneration committee (average 5.2%), INED chairs the audit 
committee (average 2.36%), the presence of nominating committee (average 5.67%), 
non-executive director (NED) or board chairperson chairs the nominating committee 
(average 6.15%), the presence of a risk committee (average 0.47%), and NED chairs 
the risk committee (average 3.07%).  
The study noticed that these low non-compliance percentages are dominated by 
provisions to set up key board committees and their chairing and they are not so much 
about the independence30 of committees. The presence of the recommended 
committees and their chairing by a non-executive director is only the starting point, as 
the presence, dominance and influence of an executive in a committee tends to be 
                                            
30 The concept of independence was applied, as explained by Rezaee (2009:41) that states that 
“independence in governance determines the extent to which the CG process and its related 
mechanism minimise or avoid conflicts of interests and self-dealing actions of its key personnel”. This 
concept is similar in King III and King IV. This concept of independence is referred to throughout the 
study unless stated otherwise. 
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significant and may weaken board governance arrangements (Shaukat & Trojanowski, 
2017).  
The graphs in Figures 4.2 to 4.4 depict significant non-compliance with the provisions 
on board and committee independence. Figure 4.2 shows the non-adherence to board 
independence and the presence of deputy chair or lead independent director 
provisions in the period from 2008 to 2016. 
 
Figure 4.2: Non-adherence to board independence and presence of deputy chair or 
lead independent director  
Source: Research results 
The two graphs in Figure 4.2 reveal that the adoption of board independence and the 
presence of a deputy chair or lead independent director (LID) on the board largely 
started gaining traction from 2008. However, compliance with the two provisions 
exemplify a zigzag pattern from around 2010, and steadily depict consistent 
adherence from 2013 to 2016. The level of compliance by the companies is shown by 
the slope of the line from 2008 to 2016. That is, as the slope comes down from the left 
(2008) to the right (2016), it suggests that the number of companies that complied with 
the provisions of having an independent board and LID on the board have increased. 
Nonetheless, an average of 36.17% of companies did not have a deputy chairperson 
or lead independent non-executive director on their boards. An average figure of 
36.17% of the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies is significant, and it may weaken 
governance within companies and result in executives acting opportunistically 
(Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2017). 
The study also considered the level of non-compliance to the independent provisions 
of the audit and nominating committees. The two graphs in Figure 4.3 depict the non-
compliant sample of companies as a percentage of the total number of companies in 
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the sample. The graphs show the non-adherence to the independence of audit and 
nominating committees provisions in the period from 2008 to 2016. 
 
Figure 4.3: Non-adherence to the independence of audit and nominating 
committees provisions  
Source: Research results 
The graphs show that a significant number of the sample companies did not comply 
with the provision that all members of the audit committee should be INEDs (an 
average 46.34% of companies did not comply); an average of 37.83% of the 
companies did not comply with the provision that the nominating committee should be 
composed of NEDs, the majority of whom should be independent; and a further 
average of 34.52% of the companies did not comply with the provision that the majority 
of the risk committee (not graphically depicted) should be comprised of NEDs. 
The two graphs in Figure 4.4 continue to illustrate provisions that were significantly not 
complied with as part of the independence of board committees. The graphs show the 
non-adherence to the provisions of addressing the presence of a committee 
overseeing technology and information and the independence of social and ethics 
committee in the period from 2008 to 2016. 
  
Page | 121  
 
Figure 4.4: Non-adherence to the provisions addressing the presence of a 
committee overseeing technology and information and independence of social and 
ethics committee  
Source: Research results 
The two graphs exhibit a similar pattern, showing that the adoption of the respective 
provisions largely took place around 2008 to 2009, as shown in the decline of the 
graphs. That is, as more sample companies adopted the provisions’ requirements, 
fewer companies became non-compliant leading to a decline in the percentage of 
companies that were non-compliant. The graphs show stickiness from around 2011 to 
2016, suggesting that fewer companies adopted the provisions after the initial period/ 
and/ or some of the companies that initially adopted the provisions were inconsistent 
in complying with the provisions. This is consistent with Shaukat and Trojanowski’s 
(2017) findings, and these authors also cited similar findings by Dahya and McConnell 
(2007), Guest (2008), and Hillier and McColgan (2006).  
The graphical results in Figure 4.4 reveal that an average of 60.28% of the sample of 
companies did not comply with the provision that the majority of members of the social 
and ethics committee should be NEDs, while 39.72% of companies did not have a 
social and ethics committee present. In addition, an average of 39.48% of the 
companies did not comply with the provision that there should be a committee 
dedicated to overseeing technology and information governance.  
Another important provision that was not significantly complied with was the 
independence of the remuneration committee (not graphically depicted). An average 
of 39.48% of companies did not comply with the provision that the remuneration 
committee should be comprised of NEDs, the majority of which should be 
independent. 
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The consequences of the above-stated non-compliances are magnified by considering 
the critical role played by the provisions in ensuring good governance and mitigating 
P-A and CG problems that may arise. For example, from King III and King IV, the 
social and ethics committee oversees the integrity of the companies’ reporting, 
corporate citizenry, sustainable development and stakeholder relationships; the 
remuneration committee ensures accountability on remuneration in the context of 
other employees within the company to curb the compensation gap; and the audit 
committee provides assurances on the accuracy of financial statements which are 
supposed to be free from material misstatements due to fraud and error. When 
considered together, the lack of independence in these committees can severely 
compromise the governance of companies and weaken the board’s monitoring 
capacity and that will drive the agent’s opportunism (Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2017).  
The non-adherence percentages in the study’s findings are relatively high and it was 
determined that they provide fertile ground for P-A and CG problems. These findings 
concur with the findings by Fama (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Hawkes and 
Goodley (2011), Shah (2014), and Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017). The non-
compliance may explain Steinhoff and the significant 23.91% of the FTSE/JSE Top40 
listed companies that contravened the laws and regulations as previously discussed 
in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Steinhoff and the 23.91% are alarming when one 
considers the expectation that the FTSE/JSE Top40 index is a listing of the largest 
companies (by market capitalisation) in South Africa and are envisaged to be well 
governed. The non-compliance in Table 4.1 sheds more light on the pervasiveness of 
P-A and CG problems experienced within FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies. This is 
despite the fact that the calculated overall indices are, on average, on the high end. 
4.3.2 Attribution analysis on index changes 
To discern the major contributors to the changes, namely, deterioration (denoting 
potential P-A and CG problems) or improvement (denoting decline in P-A and CG 
problems) in governance indices, the study conducted an attribution analysis to 
ascribe the changes to non-compliance with specific provisions. The study went 
through all the changes in the calculated indices from 2008 to 2016 and determined 
the provision(s) that changed. The COUNTIF function in Excel was then employed to 
find out the number of provisions that changed across companies in each of the years. 
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The study expressed the number of decline-changes per provision as a percentage of 
total declines for all provisions during the 2008 to 2016 period. The same was done 
for improvements in the indices. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 exhibit the decreases and 
increases in indices ascribed to declines and increases in specific provisions as 
tabulated. 
Table 4:4: Decreases in indices ascribed to provisions for the period 2008-2016 
 
Source: Research results 
Table 4.4 reveals that the major contributors to the deterioration in governance indices 
(denoting potential P-A and CG problems) can be ascribed to the independence of the 
nominating committee (25%), remuneration committee (22%), audit committee (18%) 
and the overall board independence (16%). Essentially, the findings correspond with 
Shaukat and Trojanowski’s (2017) findings that had similar committees dominating the 
deteriorations in indices, although their results showed greater declines in the 
remuneration provision. Aggregated, deteriorations in the governance of these 
committees create a thriving ground for executive opportunism and information 
asymmetry that weaken the board’s monitoring capacity and governance (Shaukat & 
Trojanowski, 2017, also citing Adams et al., 2010; Duchin, Matsusaka & Ozbas, 2010). 
Independence of these committees at company level may entrench the power of the 
executives leading to the board members failing to effectively represent the 
shareholders (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Failures in the independence of the remuneration 
and audit committees exposes the company to the risks of financial reporting fraud, 
creative accounting and the expropriation of the principal’s wealth. This creates and 
perpetuates existing P-A and CG problems. 
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In addition, the lack of independence in the board nominating process creates an ‘old-
boys club’ platform resulting in boards appointing members with limited knowledge of 
the business. More so, these board members become members of technical 
committees, such as audit committees, where they may have limited and/ or no 
competence, thus becoming ineffective in discharging their board responsibilities 
(Lambert, 2001; Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
The abatement in the independence of the nominating committee exposes the 
companies to related party transactions (IAS 24) that put the board members in a 
conflicted situation, as revealed by the findings of Nordberg (2011) and Crotty (2009). 
This further introduces more complications to existing challenges, as when Hawkes 
and Goodley (2011) discovered that executives have the capacity to conceal losses 
for a long time, an example of which happened with Olympus in Japan. The executives 
of Olympus concealed losses for more than 20 years. Concurring with similar findings 
regarding the concealment of losses, Schreiber and Strozyk (2018) also discovered 
that the former CEO of Steinhoff had managed to manipulate financial statements 
since 2014, but with some items referenced to the 2011 financial statements. The 
observations in the study are consistent and acquiesce with the inferences by Shaukat 
and Trojanowski (2017), citing Chan and Li (2008), who asserted that the importance 
of the independence of key board committees (nominating, remuneration and audit 
committees) is more important than the overall independence of the board. 
The results depicted in Table 4.5 (on the next page) show that there were more 
changes ascribed to improvements (134) than deteriorations (51). The improvements 
suggest adoptions and compliance to the provisions of the codes as more companies 
strive for full compliance over time, notwithstanding a slowing rate (Shaukat & 
Trojanowski, 2017, citing Renders et al., 2010; Guest, 2008; Dahya & McConnell, 
2007).  
Where companies strengthened their governance (that is, made improvements in 
governance indices), the same cohort of committees were responsible for causing 
deteriorations as previously discussed. The 23% of improvements in the indices are 
attributed to the independence of the person (NED) chairing the social and ethics 
committee; 18% is ascribed to the setting up of a social and ethics committee; 15% to 
the independence of remuneration committee; 14% to the independence of the 
nominating committee, and 13% to the independence of the audit committee.  
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Generally, these improvements in the independence of the nominating, remuneration 
and audit committees during the period 2008 to 2016 could have reversed due to 
higher percentages in deteriorations. For example, a 14% improvement in the 
independence of the nominating committee is eroded by a 25% deterioration, and a 
15% improvement in the remuneration committee independence is off-set by a 22% 
deterioration, while a 13% improvement in the audit committee independence is 
depleted by an 18% deterioration during the same period. The net deteriorations could 
explain some of the overall declines in the indices experienced by some companies, 
from one year to another during the period of the study.  
This observation is similar to Shaukat and Trojanowski’s (2017) findings. 
Consequently, overall governance would have worsened during this period. However, 
meaningful improvements in governance are recorded in the independence of the 
social and ethics committee which showed net improvements. That is, 23% 
improvements against 2% deteriorations in the NED chairing the committee, and 18% 
improvements, against 6% deteriorations in the independence of the committee. 
Table 4:5: Increases in indices ascribed to provisions for the period 2008-2016 
 
Source: Research results 
On average, the calculated governance indices are on the high end. Greater levels of 
adoption and compliance to the recommendations of King III and King IV seem to have 
mostly occurred from 2012 onwards. This is consistent with cited empirical findings 
that in the early stages of the introduction of the code there are greater levels of 
compliance which slows down in later years (Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2017, citing 
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Renders et al., 2010; Guest, 2008; Dahya & McConnell, 2007). However, the high 
indices have not mitigated the incidences of corporate malfeasance as seen in 23.91% 
of the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies.  
The study also noted greater levels of compliance in setting up board committees as 
recommended by King III and King IV. Conversely, there are low levels of compliance 
with regards to the independence of key board committees, like the nominating, 
remuneration, audit and risk committees. Aggregated, the lack of independence in 
these committees creates fertile ground for executive opportunism and information 
asymmetry that may worsen or create P-A and CG problems (Shaukat & Trojanowski, 
2017). This enhances the ability of the agent to conceal losses from the principal.  
Furthermore, the results ascribe the declines and improvements in governance indices 
to the provisions cited in the respective tables. The study noticed that the setting up of 
the social and ethics committee and the independence of its chair (chaired by NED) 
recorded net improvements after factoring in the deteriorations. On the other hand, 
there are greater percentages in governance declines ascribed to nominating, 
remuneration and audit committees that significantly erode any improvements. The 
overall outcomes are net deteriorations in governance indices, which could explain 
some index declines being observed in some companies in the years during the period 
of the study. This is in line with empirical evidence, as previously discussed. 
4.4 THEME II: ROLE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND 
POTENTIAL COSTS 
Theme II of this study covers the second objective and the two research questions 
that seek to ascertain the potential pecuniary impact of agency problems and the role 
of executive compensation in exacerbating the P-A and CG problems. From the 
methodological perspective, the study ran some dynamic panel data estimation 
models, analysed executive compensation against the minimum wages in the sectors 
which the FTSE/JSE Top40 operate in, employed an adapted Gini coefficient (called 
salary Gini, s-Gini henceforth), and conducted Event Study and VaR procedures. 
The literature review chapter cited Edmans and Gabaix (2009) who asserted that the 
compensation of executives (agent) is a controversial topic. In addition, Edmans and 
Gabaix, (2009) posited that theory signals that executive compensation is designed 
and set by the board to seek a way that maximises shareholder value by formulating 
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and signing contracts that attract talented executives, rewarding them for their efforts 
in exploiting growth opportunities, minimising costs and rejecting wasteful projects. 
The literature with findings were discussed revealing how CG incorporates issues 
around executive compensation, thus warranting the inclusion in this research.  
Accordingly, the study takes on the challenge by Kirkpatrick (2009) who recommended 
that there should be more scrutiny of executive compensation structures and their 
implications on CG. Furthermore, Gompers et al. (2003) highlighted the complexity of 
executive pay schemes which they state are problematic. This study aims to 
understand compensation structures, as in many cases they are used as CG 
mechanisms, and have consequences that need to be examined to establish the 
impact on the principal’s wealth, the company, the economy and effectiveness of the 
governance codes. The findings in this aspect of executive compensation provide the 
answers to the Theme II research questions and the associated objective of 
ascertaining the role of executive compensation in exacerbating the P-A and potential 
costs of agency problems. The results from the dynamic panel data estimation models 
run in this study will first be presented and discussed. 
4.4.1 Dynamic panel data estimation model results  
As alluded to in Chapter 3, this study sought to propose an executive compensation 
model that factored in the strength of governance by the executive into the 
compensation structure. This section presents and discusses the results regarding 
this. The proposed executive compensation model is motivated by theory and the 
notion that executive remuneration structures are part of governance mechanisms. 
Despite the existence of complex and diverse executive compensation schemes in 
companies (Gompers et al., 2003; Shah, 2014, citing Laffont & Martimort, 2002), this 
study did not come across an executive compensation structure that incorporates CG 
by the agent. During the investigation to come up with an executive compensation 
model that incorporates CG, the researcher ran some regression with panel data 
(cross-sectional time-series data). In the regression, remuneration was the dependent 
variable and the regressors are governance index (governance proxy measure), 
performance (revenue), GDP, inflation, ownership structure, executive net share 
trades (net buyer or seller of the company’s shares), number of share-trades by 
executives and the number of board members who traded in the company’s shares 
per year. The study also employed the Hausman Test, which has the null hypothesis 
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that the preferred model is the Random Effects Model, and the alternative hypothesis 
is the Fixed Effects Model (Torres-Reyna, 2007). In essence, Hausman tests whether 
the unique errors are correlated with regressors, and the null hypothesis states that 
they are not. The Hausman Test results were for the model which incorporates the 
Governance Index (gov). Table 4.6 presents the Hausman Test results from STATA: 
Table 4:6: Hausman Test Results from STATA 
Description Results 
Model with Governance Index 
Chi Square 103.86 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.0000 
Source: Research Results 
Based on the Hausman Test results, the study rejected the null hypothesis that the 
Random Effects Model is efficient and consistent31. Therefore, the Fixed Effects Model 
was chosen, as it also has the added advantage that it can be employed to study the 
causes of changes within an entity in panel data (Torres-Reyna, 2007). In the Fixed 
Effects Model, the researcher also incorporated a robust test to control for 
heteroscedasticity which corrects multi-collinearity and non-normality. A dynamic 
model was employed because the current year’s remuneration and revenue are 
usually based on the previous year’s remuneration and revenue. In addition, for 
diagnostic purposes and the validation of the Fixed Effects Model, the study ran other 
models, such as pooled effects, random effects, generalised least squares (GLS), two-
step generalised method of moments (GMM) and least squares dummy variable 
corrected (LSDVC). 
Equation 4.1 expresses the empirical estimation of the relationship between the 
executive remuneration and governance index (governance proxy measure), 
performance (revenue), GDP, inflation, ownership structure, executive net share 
trades (net buyer or seller of the company’s shares), number of share-trades by 
                                            
31 In as much as the Fixed Effects model is efficient and consistent based on our Hausman Test results, 
it’s worth noting that Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven (2010) also used the Fixed Effects Model to 
address the endogeneity problem that may arise. 
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executives, and the number of board members who traded in the company’s shares 
per year. Equation 3.1 is restated as Equation 4.1 below:  
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐺𝑜𝑣 + 𝛽𝑖4𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽𝑖5 𝐼𝑛𝑓 +  𝛽𝑖6𝑂𝑆 +
 𝛽𝑖7𝑁𝑇 +  𝛽𝑖8𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽𝑖9𝐷𝑇𝑌 +  ℇ𝑖𝑡  
Equation 4:1:   Estimation of executive compensation relationship 
Source: Researcher’s proposed model 
Where: 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡,  
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, 
𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡,  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦32,  
𝐺𝑜𝑣 = 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,  
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡,  
𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,  
𝑂𝑆 = 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒,  
𝑁𝑇 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠,  
𝑇𝑌 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟,  
𝐷𝑇𝑌 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, 
𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑   
ℇ𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡.   
The suggested model is applied to proximate the relationship that exists between the 
executive’s remuneration and the aforesaid independent variables. Kirkpatrick (2009) 
asserted that mismatches in the executive incentive system may cause weaknesses 
                                            
32 Padgett (2012) cited Shire Plc, a global specialty biopharmaceutical company with dual listing on the 
London Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Exchange, which uses revenue as a measure of short-
term performance measure. Bhabra, Kaur and Seoungpil (2016) also used revenue as a measure of 
performance. Hence, this study’s adoption of revenue as a measure of performance. 
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in CG systems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) attempted to articulate the magnitude of 
the determinants of agency costs, of which executive remuneration is one. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) viewed executive compensation as the cost of conflicting interests 
between the principal and agent. Furthermore, they posited that executive 
compensation is a means of transferring wealth and it represents the real costs 
incurred by the principal. As such, the determination of executive compensation needs 
a careful examination of its variables, albeit complex and problematic (Gompers et al., 
2003). For this reason, the researcher proposes the model depicted in Equation 4.1 
which is believed to capture pertinent variables or aspects of CG. These CG variables 
have the potential to exacerbate P-A and CG problems. Capturing the variables in the 
proposed model may reduce or slow down the salary gap and inequality that the s-
Gini results have revealed. The s-Gini results will be discussed in Section 4.5.1. 
In the analysis, the study focused on significant correlations and P-values to establish 
the significance of the relationships and the directionality of the depicted relationships 
(i.e. negative or positive relationships). The Fixed Effects Model that was run in STATA 
provided the correlations presented in Table 4.7 on the next page. 
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Table 4:7: Summary of significant correlations from STATA 
 
 
 
Source: Research results 
 l.rem gov dual inf gdp l.rev os nt ty 
l.rem 1.0000         
gov -0.0622 1.0000        
dual -0.0901* 0.1404*** 1.0000       
inf -0.0053 -0.1608*** -0.0000 1.0000      
gdp -0.0356 -0.0611 0.0000 -0.6632*** 1.0000     
l.rev -0.0251 -0.0687 0.0282 0.0284 0.0991** 1.0000    
os -0.0393 0.0621 0.1152** 0.0649 -0.0284 -0.0056 1.0000   
nt -0.0520 -0.0476 0.0937* 0.0541 -0.0345 0.0067 -0.3033*** 1.0000  
ty 0.1206** 0.0335 -0.1986*** -0.0214 -0.0209 -0.0065 -0.1469*** 0.0443 1.0000 
dty 0.0913* -0.0119 -0.1564*** -0.0051 0.0014 0.0495 -0.2937*** 0.1038** 0.7953*** 
***significant at 0.01, **significant at 0.05, *significant at 0.10 
K
E
Y 
 I.rem= lagged remuneration; gov= governance index; dual= dual listing; inf= inflation; gdp= gross domestic product; I.rev= lagged revenue; os= 
ownership structure; nt= executive net share trades; ty= number of share-trades by executives per year and dty= number of board members who 
traded in the company’s share per year. 
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Table 4.8 depicts the significant positive correlations at 1% and the alignment to theory 
and empirical evidence. 
Table 4:8: Summary of significant correlations and theory and empirical alignment 
Significant positive 
correlations between: 
Theory and Empirical alignment 
Dual listing and governance. 
Suggests that dually listed companies are better governed. 
This affirms the findings by Padgett (2012) that dually listed 
companies tend to comply with primary and secondary listing 
requirements which tend to be tougher than complying with 
requirements from one bourse. There tends to be more 
scrutiny on dually listed companies, hence improved 
governance (Padgett, 2012, citing Klapper & Love, 2004).  
Share trades by a director 
per year and the number of 
directors who trade in 
company shares per year. 
Posits that more executives frequently trade the company’s 
shares in a year and this finding is aligned to the empirical 
evidence. This might be a result of the fact that the fixed 
salary component of the executive’s compensation is 
relatively small compared to very high rewards components 
in countries like the UK and US (Padgett, 2012; Nordberg, 
2011; Bruce, Buck & Main, 2005; Rappaport, 2005) and in 
the findings of this study in South Africa. This is the rent 
extraction process that Bebchuk and Fried (2006) argued is 
the bedrock of executive pay and its aim is to do it without 
“provoking excessive social outrage”. The excessive use of 
equity-based components of executive compensation fuels 
the executive’s self-interest (Ertugrul, 2005) and are not 
socially legitimate, as argued by Bruce et al. (2005) and 
Nordberg (2011). Moreover, Padgett (2012) cited Randøy 
and Nielson (2002) and CFA (2008) who stated that high 
executive compensation is not socially acceptable in Nordic 
countries and Japan, respectively.  
Source: Research results 
Table 4.9 shows other positive significant correlations at 5% and the alignment to 
theory and empirical evidence. 
Table 4:9: Summary of significant correlations and theory and empirical alignment 
Significant positive 
correlations between: 
Theory and Empirical alignment 
Lagged remuneration and 
share trades by a director 
per year. 
Reflects that the executive’s remuneration is positively linked 
to their trading in company shares. The reason is similar to 
the explanation already provided that the fixed salary 
component of the executive compensation forms a small part 
of the total package. This is aligned to the findings in other 
countries like the UK and US (Padgett, 2012; Bruce et al., 
2005; Rappaport, 2005). 
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Significant positive 
correlations between: 
Theory and Empirical alignment 
Dual listing and ownership 
structure. 
Reveals that the dual listing of companies positively 
influences the ownership structure or that the ownership 
structure influences the decision by companies to dually list. 
This is aligned to the argument that dual listing is expected 
to influence governance (Padgett, 2012) as well as the 
ownership structure (as a governance feature that influences 
strategic decisions, internal financial and reporting systems, 
executive compensation schemes and so forth (Bruce et al., 
2005).   
Directors’ net trades in 
company shares and the 
number of directors who 
trade in company shares per 
year. 
Shows that more directors, as a proportion of the total 
number of directors on the board, are net traders of the 
company’s shares. This is verified by the finding that 77% of 
companies in our sample had directors net selling the 
companies’ shares, as opposed to 23% of net buys. This 
finding contradicts the proposition of agency theory which 
states that when executives are made part-owners of 
companies, largely through share options, their interests 
align with those of the shareholders (Padgett, 2012). 
However, the net selling revealed in the findings suggests 
that executives are essentially not interested in owning the 
companies they run, thus their self-interest is preeminent. 
The values of the share dealings and net trades vary (Bruce 
et al., 2005), as in the findings of this study. Perhaps, the 
directors’ net trades and the number of directors who trade 
in company shares have to do with shorter share option 
vesting periods, as Qu et al. (2016) assert are strongly linked 
to CG. 
GDP and lagged 
remuneration. 
Reflects the positive link between GDP as a measure of 
economic performance and the remuneration paid to 
executives in the previous year. As stated in economy 
theory: economies go through cycles (boom, recession, 
depression and recovery), the GDP also fluctuates 
accordingly. As such, economic cycles impact company 
performance which has implications on executive packages 
due to the structure of the rewarding systems. In such 
instances, the executives are tempted to manage reported 
earnings which may drive short-termism (Shah, 2014). The 
high demand for short-term performance and the associated 
bonuses results in the agent overweighting short-term 
performance at the expense of the future good of the 
company. The sacrificing of the future good of the company 
is exhibited in the findings of Crotty (2009), as cited by Shah 
(2014). Crotty (2009) found that in 2008, AIG’s Financial 
Products division paid $220 million in bonuses for the year 
to its employees while the company lost $40.5 billion. A 
further finding was cited by Schumpeter (2016) who 
highlighted the £3.7 billion loss made by Anglo America 
whilst the executive was paid a bonus of almost £1 million in 
2015.  
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Significant positive 
correlations between: 
Theory and Empirical alignment 
Such flaws in the way executives are rewarded are 
ubiquitous in that when companies underperform and 
shareholder wealth is eroded, there is no corresponding 
reduction in the executives’ compensation (Jiraporn, Kim & 
Davidson, 2005). The findings contradict the correlations 
shown in the results. Shan and Walter (2016) squarely put 
the blame on the existing performance contracts that are 
inherently flawed in design.   
Source: Research results 
On the other hand, Table 4.10 exhibits significant negative correlations at 1% and the 
alignment to theory and empirical evidence. 
Table 4:10: Summary of significant negative correlations and theory and empirical 
alignment 
Significant negative 
correlations between: 
Theory and Empirical alignment 
Governance and inflation. 
The relationship suggests that higher inflation may result in 
a decline in governance, resulting in problems such as 
fraudulent financial reports, creative accounting, earnings 
management and so forth. The opposite effect can be 
anticipated under low inflationary conditions. This 
relationship points to the same economic cycle and short-
termism discussion under the GDP and lagged remuneration 
correlation. 
Dual listing and share trades 
by a director per year as well 
as the number of directors 
who trade on the company’s 
shares per year. 
Posits that where companies are dually listed, there are 
reduced share trades by directors per year, and the number 
of directors who trade in company shares per year. 
Alternatively, companies that are not dually listed experience 
more share trades by their directors and have a higher 
number of directors who trade in company shares per year. 
The correlation is confirmed by the findings that sample 
companies, not dually listed, had the highest number of 
directors who traded shares (an average of 8 directors 
compared to 5 for dually listed companies), and the highest 
average trades by directors per year of 24 trades (compared 
to 17 for dually listed companies). This finding may be 
supported by Padgett’s (2012) assertions that dually listed 
companies tend to comply with listing requirements from the 
primary and secondary bourse. One of the two bourses may 
restrict the directors’ share trading patterns, suggesting that 
dually listed companies will have less trading activities when 
compared to the other. This aspect encroaches on varying 
restrictions on insider trading which are outside the scope of 
this study. 
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Significant negative 
correlations between: 
Theory and Empirical alignment 
Ownership structure and 
directors’ net trades in 
company shares; share 
trades by a director per year, 
as well as the number of 
directors who trade in 
company shares per year. 
Proposes that the composition of the ownership structure 
(defined by concentrated or diffused using a dummy variable 
1 for concentrated ownership or 0 otherwise) inversely 
relates to net share trades by directors. This correlation is 
confirmed by Bruce et al. (2005) who found that in countries 
like Germany this aspect of share trading tends to be 
restricted by the strong voices of ‘internal’ shareholders (for 
example, employees) who are committed to the long-term 
success of the company. Other outside stakeholders like 
banks and unions add a strong voice that regulates the share 
trades component of executives’ compensation (Bruce et al., 
2005). Rezaee (2009) also argued that shareholders (as part 
of the ownership structure) influence CG as they can 
exercise their rights to determine the MOI and provisions 
which can restrict share trades by directors. 
Source: Research results 
To summarise the correlation results, they do not exemplify strong correlations 
affirming the assertions by Brown et al., (2010) that the lack of consensus on a single 
CG theoretical framework (Clarke, 1998 and 2004; Coffee, 2006; Mallin, 2010) 
contributes to little cross-sectional correlations and predictive power. The 
consequence is the measurement of different CG constructs, and/ or a higher 
magnitude of measurement error that demonstrates unreliability (Brown et al., 2010). 
However, the correlations from the results of the study, albeit with weak cross-
sectional correlations, provide insight into the directionality of the relationships that 
exist between the variables. For example, the positive correlation between dual listing 
and governance is expected to influence better compliance, as dually listed companies 
tend to comply with primary and secondary listing requirements which are often 
tougher than complying with requirements from one bourse.  
The positive relationship (directionality) provides insight into what the synchronisation 
of the listing requirements of the primary and secondary listing can achieve with 
regards to better governance. Some insights can also be made from the negative 
associations (directionality) between the ownership structure and directors’ net trades 
in the company’s shares; share trades by a director per year; as well as the number 
of directors who trade in the company’s shares per year. These insights can further be 
informed by lessons from countries like Germany that tend to restrict the directors’ 
share trades through the strong voices of ‘internal’ shareholders who are more 
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committed to the long-term success of the company (Bruce et al., 2005). Rappaport 
(2005) and Bebchuk and Fried (2006) further support restrictions on the trading of 
shares that have been acquired through executive option schemes. The directional 
insights obtained from the results of the study may provide plausible lessons for South 
African regulatory authorities and FTSE/JSE Top40 companies in improving 
governance, and in curbing the role of executive compensation in exacerbating CG 
and associated problems (Brown et al., 2010, citing Cheng & Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Houmes & Skantz, 2010). 
In the next discussion, the thesis presents the results of the Fixed Effects Model and 
the diagnostic statistics which establish the significance and insignificance of the 
relationships, as well as the directionality (that is, negative or positive relationships) as 
generated by STATA. Table 4.11 presents the dynamic panel data estimation results, 
with executive remuneration as a dependent variable. Table 4.12 that follows shows 
the estimation diagnostic statistics, and Appendix 8 depicts the model data inputs. 
Table 4:11: Summary of Fixed Effects Model results 
 
Source: Research results  
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Table 4:12: Summary of Diagnostic Statistics 
 
Source: Research results 
The tabulated results depict a positive and significant relationship between the current 
executive remuneration and the lagged remuneration. It was expected that current 
remuneration would change, based on the previous period’s remuneration, for 
example, an increase in remuneration due to performance (measured by revenue 
growth as a key shareholder value-driver) as per studies by Rappaport (2005), Padgett 
(2012), Bender (2014) and Bhabra et al. (2016), and would be calculated based on 
the director’s package in the period of performance measurement. The results of this 
study concur with the theory that signals that executive compensation is designed and 
set by the board to seek a way to maximise shareholder value by formulating and 
signing contracts that attract talented executives, rewarding them for their efforts in 
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exploiting growth opportunities, minimising costs and rejecting wasteful projects 
(Edmans & Gabaix, 2009). However, Kirkpatrick (2009) recommended more scrutiny 
on executive compensation structures and their implications on CG. The performance 
benchmarks and measurements need to be scrutinised to ensure that executives are 
not managing company earnings, especially in companies with weaker CG (Brown et 
al., 2010, citing Aboody, Barth & Kasznik, 2006; Allcock, 2012) thereby exacerbating 
P-A and CG problems. 
As expected, the results revealed a positive relationship, although insignificant, 
between remuneration and inflation. The change in executive compensation that is 
ascribed to inflation is 9.18% (shown in the Fixed Effects Model), as minor salary 
inflationary adjustments are expected in a stable economy. Furthermore, a positive, 
but insignificant, relationship is also recorded between GDP and remuneration. This 
result suggests that when the economy performs better, as measured by the GDP, 
executive compensation increases. However, Brown et al. (2010) argued that such 
instances entice executives to manage earnings for fear of failing to meet the 
shareholders’ (market) expectations. Brown et al. (2010) suggested that one way that 
executives might manage earnings is through an understatement of expenses, thereby 
increasing profitability. This is likely to occur in companies with weaker CG systems 
(Brown et al., 2010, citing Aboody et al., 2006). The consequences are further 
weakening of governance and worsened P-A problems. 
As previously stated in the section on the GDP and remuneration model results, there 
is a consistent positive and insignificant relationship across the models, namely, the 
Fixed Effects, Pooled Effects and GLS, except for the two-step system GMM which 
exhibits a negative but insignificant relationship. The two-step system GMM result 
suggests instances of an inverse relationship, which concurs with the findings by 
Crotty (2009) and Schumpeter (2016). The GMM results accentuate flaws in the way 
executives may be rewarded in times of poor economic performance, where 
companies underperform and shareholder wealth is eroded. There will not be a 
corresponding reduction in the executives’ compensation (Jiraporn et al., 2005).  
The study’s GMM results, together with the examples of malfeasance at AIG and 
Anglo American, are convincing enough to allow the researcher to plausibly conclude 
that poor economic performance provides fertile breeding ground for earnings 
management by executives as they take the opportunity to meet performance and 
Page | 139  
market expectations. This may be especially so in companies with high-powered 
incentive contracts that create huge opportunities for the executive’s self-serving 
behaviour (Nordberg, 2011; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), thus exacerbating P-A and 
governance problems. 
The results show an insignificant negative relationship between lagged revenue and 
remuneration across models, except for the result from the two-step system GMM, 
which shows a positive relationship, albeit insignificant. The two-step system GMM 
results acquiesce to expectations of the study because directors are expected to be 
remunerated based on performance. That is, when revenue (a key shareholder value 
driver) increases, directors’ remuneration increases. However, the directionality of the 
relationship from the other models are contrary to expectations possibly because of 
the labour market for directors.  
The labour market for directors may drive their packages more than actual 
performance, especially considering Fama’s (1980) assertion that there is a market 
for the expertise and time of the executives who direct the companies on a daily basis. 
To support Fama’s (1980) assertion, Eisenhardt (1989) stated that the labour market 
for directors values their information and expertise and it becomes a commodity that 
can be sold by the agent to the ‘highest-bidder’. Moreover, Fama (1980) argued that 
the executive requires market-related compensation and may be susceptible to 
following personal interests other than the interests of the shareholders who hire them.  
However, the expertise and information may not translate into the expected 
performance. Edmans and Gabaix (2009) asserted that empirical evidence suggests 
inconsistencies in the theory, citing US examples where the compensation of 
executives has substantially increased at a faster pace than company performance 
and the average salaries of other workers. This study found evidence concurring with 
the US findings by Edmans and Gabaix (2009) that the increase in executive 
compensation (sample average of 30.33%) for FTSE/JSE Top40 companies was 
faster than the revenue growth (sample average 13.79%) during the period of this 
study. Appendix 7 presents the full contrast of percentage changes of the revenues 
against the executive compensation percentage changes from 2008 to 2016 for the 
sample of companies.  
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Despite the seeming plausibility of the driving forces in the rise of executive 
compensation (for example, company size, transferability of human capital and 
complex company structure), Edmans and Gabaix (2009) mentioned that there 
appears to be an extremely small relationship between the wealth of the executives 
and the performance of the company, and/ or the insensitivity of executive 
compensation to company performance, especially in the larger companies. 
Moreover, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) suggested that executives endeavour to 
maximise their own wealth through the compensation which they set for themselves. 
This means that P-A and CG problems may worsen. 
The ownership structure results are mixed in directionality across models, for example, 
the Fixed Effects showed a positive relationship between ownership structure and 
remuneration, while the Pooled Effects, GLS, Random Effects and GMM depicted a 
negative relationship. However, all the results are insignificant. It is a possibility that 
the directional mixed results are a reflection of the shareholder activism phenomenon 
on excessive executive compensation schemes that Bebchuk et al. (2002) and 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) stated as rent extraction instruments.  
Empirical evidence from some companies with concentrated shareholding (principals) 
in South Africa, the US and UK revealed that they are now endeavouring to restrain 
the excessive executive compensation schemes. Therefore, it is possible that the 
concentrated ownership by institutional investors may result in restricted directors’ 
remuneration. Examples of this can be seen in Allan Gray voting against the Naspers 
remuneration policy (Prinsloo, 2017), and 10 and 20% of shareholders refusing to 
support pay proposals at 62 S&P 500 companies and at 18 FTSE 100 companies in 
2017. These actions are recorded as the highest level of shareholder dissent on 
executive pay in at least five years (Wheatley, 2017). Moreover, a report by Thomson 
Reuters (2017) reveals that a substantial number of FTSE listed companies received 
substantial votes against their remuneration policy at AGMs in the 2016 financial 
reporting period. The restraints on executive compensation align with Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) who asserted that the principal can achieve wealth gains by effectively 
monitoring the agent’s performance. However, monitoring the agent’s performance 
has cost implications for the principal.  
To mitigate the effects on the principal’s wealth due to the agent manipulating the 
decision-control and monitoring system, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that the 
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principal might put in place a multi-member board that would make it difficult for agents 
within the company to collude to the detriment of the principal’s wealth. Fama (1980) 
sustained that the absence of a multi-member board may result in agents engaging in 
collusive behaviour and lead to the expropriation of the principal’s wealth through 
higher compensation. Bruce et al., (2005) further maintained that this institutional 
shareholding (ownership structure) feature, coupled with a multi-member board in 
Germany, can shape and restrain executive compensation. From the results, it can 
plausibly be concluded that the relationship between remuneration and the ownership 
structure has implications on the strength of governance. 
Directors’ net trades in the company’s shares and remuneration demonstrate a 
significant negative relationship. The results suggest that when executives are better 
remunerated, they are expected to retain the share options granted. Therefore, there 
should be a negative relationship between remuneration and net sales in line with the 
results. This is in relation to remuneration. When directors are compensated well, they 
are expected to remain invested in the companies so that goal congruence with the 
principal is achieved, concurring with the propositions of the agency theory. Despite 
the results depicting negative and significant results, the study discovered that 77% of 
companies in the sample had directors net selling the companies’ shares as opposed 
to 23% of net buying by directors. The net selling position is contrary to the 
propositions of agency theory, as directors are exercising their put options and are not 
becoming part owners who have interests aligned with those of the shareholders 
(Padgett, 2012). The net selling position suggests extensive self-serving behaviour of 
executives and renders the agency theory’s propositions ineffective. The challenge 
with the net selling position, coupled with the frequency of share trades by directors 
per year (shown as significant and positive in the results) and the number of board 
directors who trade in the company’s shares (shown as significant and negative in the 
GLS results) is that they intensify executives’ obsession with short-term performance 
(Rappaport, 2005) and become prone to earnings management (Brown et al., 2010). 
To sustain the assertion that share options increase the susceptibility to manage 
earnings, Brown et al. (2010) cited Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) who discovered 
that in the year when share options were exercised, there were greater levels of 
accounting accruals recorded in the financial statements. Other unethical and 
undesirable business behaviours arise due to the need to achieve better performance 
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which influences share prices, compliance and so forth. To empirically support this, 
Shah (2014) cited the Sorkin (2013) survey of 250 financial services industry role-
players on Wall Street which discovered that 26% of the participants believed that 
compensation and bonus structures within their companies were major reasons why 
employees compromise ethical standards and legislative violations. The survey further 
pointed out that 17% of participants believed that leaders choose to ignore, 
supposedly, top performers when they are violating ethics and the law, and 15% 
suggested that the leaders would not report such violations.  
In South Africa, the Competition Commission’s investigations unearthed that parent 
company Tiger Brands’ directors were allegedly aware of the subsidiary’s, Adcock 
Ingram Critical Care’s, breaches of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 
of 1998) but did not report it (Competition Commission Press Statement, 9 May 2008). 
Another South African example of self-serving behaviour is that of Steinhoff who had 
reported cases of accounting ‘irregularities’ investigated by the European, US and 
South African regulatory authorities. Steinhoff has had to restate its 2015, 2016 and 
2017 financial statements because of ‘irregularities’ that seemed to benefit the ‘trusted’ 
dominant executive (Steinhoffinternational.com, 2018). This accedes to the findings 
from Sorkin’s (2013) survey. The survey by Sorkin (2013), the Competition 
Commission’s findings on Tiger Brands (2008), and a statement on 
Steinhoffinternational.com (2018) all infer that where conflicting interests exist, the 
agent has both the incentive and capacity to act undetected, maybe for a long time. 
The consequences are weaknesses in CG and worsening P-A problems, or are a 
reflection of existing CG and P-A problems. 
The results showing the relationship between governance and remuneration are 
positive but insignificant, suggesting that well governed companies remunerate their 
executives better. Well governed companies tend to perform better (GIM, 2003 and 
Brown et al., 2010) and plausibly infer they remunerate executives handsomely. The 
positive relationship was in line with expectations considering Munzig’s (2003) 
argument that executive compensation and attempting to align shareholder-executive 
interests are part of CG and are directly linked to agency problems. Nevertheless, a 
significant relationship was expected, since better governed companies should 
remunerate their executives better. A credible explanation of this result can be 
obtained from the review carried out by Brown et al. (2010) on CG research in 
Page | 143  
accounting and finance. Brown et al. (2010) posited that lack of consensus on one CG 
theory that underpins the construction of governance indices (governance proxy) with 
respect to the weighting of provisions make the construction arbitrary. Brown et al. 
(2010) cited research done by Bhagat et al. (2008) and Daines et al. (2010) who have 
similar findings and arguments. The constructed governance indices employed in this 
study could have suffered from the issues highlighted by Brown et al. (2010). However, 
it is submitted that a better way of constructing the indices needs to be found, since 
executive compensation and the alignment of shareholder-executive interests are part 
of CG. This argument is strengthened by Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017) who 
recommended that the link between governance indices and executive compensation 
is required to ascertain the nuanced and realistic dynamics of board governance and 
its role in ensuring alignment of principal-agent interests. Furthermore, the study 
concurs with Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017) who recommended investigating the 
link between governance indices and other components of governance, like audit 
quality, quality of corporate reporting, mergers and acquisitions. 
To summarise the model results and address one of the aspects covered in the Theme 
II research questions and associated objectives, the study observed that executive 
compensation structures in companies play a weightier role in exacerbating P-A and 
CG problems than often envisaged and considered in CG mechanisms. This concurs 
with Nordberg’s (2011) conclusions that executive compensation has probably 
become the biggest aspect of CG. The role of executive compensation in CG needs 
further investigations as this study’s model results show an insignificant relationship, 
albeit mostly positive. 
The infographic in Figure 4.5 summarises the model results and the alignment with 
theory and the empirical findings previously discussed. 
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Figure 4.5: Infographic of the model results and alignment to theory and empirical 
findings 
Source: Researcher’s findings 
The directionality of the relationships in the study’s model results provides a compass 
for future research and may hopefully contribute towards consensus on CG theory that 
underpins further research in the field. Furthermore, the results persuaded the 
researcher to conclude that the executive compensation schemes and performance 
evaluation need to significantly factor in how well the executive has governed the 
business. The focus of executive compensation need not heavily weight on 
performance, as the study discovered from literature that executives can manipulate 
this aspect through earnings management, fraudulent financial reporting, creative 
accounting, and so forth. Thus, worsening P-A and CG problems were confirmed as 
found from the literature and the findings of this study.  
Aspects of CG need to be significantly incorporated in the executive compensation 
structures. The ‘how’ to incorporate the CG structures in the compensation structures 
requires future collaboration between governance scholars and human resources 
practitioners and researchers. This multidisciplinary approach is now imperative. 
4.4.2 Discussion and analysis of potential costs 
This section addresses the Theme II research questions and their objectives regarding 
the aspect of potential costs. 
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Previously, in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, contraventions that highlighted the prevalence 
of P-A and CG problems in the governance interactions within the FTSE/JSE Top40 
listed companies were presented and discussed. As discoursed in the methodology 
chapter, this study employed the Event Study (ES) method to assess the significance 
and insignificance of tabulated CG events. ES also indicated the magnitude of the 
damage caused by the identified CG events. Having identified companies with 
significant CG events from those listed in Table 4.1 in Section 4.2.1, VaR procedures 
were applied to calculate the potential costs to the principal who is the shareholder. 
Outside of the costs obtained from VaR calculations, the study cites some costs that 
are provided from other sources to demonstrate the enormity of the consequences of 
P-A and CG problems. 
Firstly, the ES results are presented that show the criteria used in the study to 
determine which company to use for the calculations in order to determine the potential 
costs using VaR procedures. Thereafter, the VaR results are presented and 
discussed. 
Table 4.13 (on next page) depicts the results obtained after running some regressions 
in Microsoft Excel. 
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Table 4:13: ES coefficients and p-values for companies with identified CG events 
 
Source: Research results 
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The results show that a number of companies had negative coefficients across 
estimation, event and post-event windows. Significant p-values are also depicted in 
the estimation windows of Netcare, Mediclinic (26 February 2013) and British 
American Tobacco. Only Woolworths has a significant p-value in the event window 
period. Significant p-values suggest that the events were statistically significant and 
warrant inclusion in the calculation of VaR to determine potential costs. 
With regards to negative coefficients, it means that the company is underperforming 
the stock market as given by 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 in the market model. The inclusion of 
these companies is justified as below: 
 Negative coefficients in the estimation window, but positive coefficients in the event 
window, could be explained by: 
i. the company earning negative returns in the estimation window, and the 
identified CG event (referred as event henceforth) contributed to positive 
coefficients in the event window. This suggests that the event was considerable 
enough to alter the directionality of the coefficients, although it might not be 
statistically significant. 
ii. contamination in the estimation window due to other confounding events or 
market sentiments towards the company. However, the study did not pick up 
any confounding events, suggesting that market sentiments could be the 
reason. 
iii. information leakage about the event that is already factored in the share returns 
during the event and post-event window. This supports the study’s assertion 
that the FTSE/JSE Top40 index is in the semi-strong form in the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH). The share returns in the event window have already 
captured the impact of the event. This reasoning is plausible because events of 
investigations and/ or their outcomes by regulatory authorities tend to leak into 
the market before the official pronouncements. For this reason, the share 
returns will not react in a sudden swing in the event window period and it makes 
the event seem statistically insignificant. This might be the reason why the 
events did not show statistical significance across companies. However, this 
explanation is not applicable to Steinhoff whose market value declined by an 
estimated R206 billion, representing 85% of its market capitalisation in six 
Page | 148  
weeks (Rose, 2018; Rossouw, 2018). This was after the announcement of 
Steinhoff being investigated for financial irregularities. The losses are significant 
even in absolute value. 
 Negative coefficients in the post-event window could be explained by delayed 
market reaction to the event announcement in the event window period. Thus, 
when the stock market eventually reacts, the coefficients become negative, 
showing negative excess returns. Possible reasons for the delayed stock market 
reaction could be that investors/principals are still trying to understand the nature, 
impact and/ or significance of the event. For example, it took months (from the 
announcement dated 18 September 2017 to at least the end of January 2018) for 
the market to make sense or understand the ‘accounting regularities’ Steinhoff was 
embroiled in. This is largely because the company did not provide sufficient 
information, except for the appointment of PwC to investigate the ‘irregularities’, as 
well as that the 2015 and 2016 financial statements would be restated. However, 
in this Steinhoff case, the stock market reaction to the event was severe as the 
company lost 85% of its market value. 
 Negative coefficients might also suggest reasons the company is underperforming 
on the stock market. The reason could be investors are bearish or have negative 
sentiments about the event, and as a result, returns are below the FTSE/JSE 
Top40 index’s return after considering the company’s sensitivity (𝛽𝑖) to the index. 
Where the coefficient is positive, especially in the event window period, investors 
are bullish or have positive sentiments about the impact or significance of the event 
on the company’s returns. However, it is not expected in the case of this study 
because of the nature of the contraventions to the laws governing the operations 
of the companies. Nevertheless, in cases where this occurs (for example, Netcare, 
MTN (28 Nov 2013), Shoprite, Woolworths, Mediclinic (26 February 2013) and 
British American Tobacco, it had positive coefficients in the event window), it 
suggests the principal was complicit in breaching the laws in a quest to earn better 
returns. Unfortunately, such instances reveal possible total failures in the 
company’s governance system. The failures would modify the intended functioning 
of the company’s governance system, as well as direct and informal interactions 
as shown in Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2. Therefore, the governance system, and direct 
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and indirect interactions between the agent and the principal will be distorted as 
depicted in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6: Failures in CG   
Source: Researcher’s inferences from findings 
In such cases of CG failures, external governance systems and interactions would 
need to be effective to pick and restrain the collusion between the principal and agent. 
This external governance can either be exercised through legislation or capital 
markets regulation to ensure the right balance in the governance of companies 
(Rezaee, 2009; Dallas & Pitt-Watson, 2016) and as a way of taking decision power 
from the agent (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
The earlier findings have already been cited that companies like Tiger Brands and 
Vodacom, as parent companies (at least some board members), knew about the 
competition law breaches that were taking place in the subsidiary companies. The 
collusion between the agent and principal results in suboptimal levels of governance 
that need controlling through external mechanisms. 
The CG failures depicted in Figure 4.6 have consequences that incur costs to the 
principal, the company and maybe the economy at large (Nordberg, 2011). In the next 
section, the possible costs of the CG failures to the principal are calculated by applying 
the VaR methodology, as discussed in the methodology chapter. The VaR approach 
makes it possible to quantify the total monetary losses incurred by a company as a 
result of the agent’s self-serving behaviour at 95%, 99% and 99.9% confidence levels. 
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The potential pecuniary consequences were calculated for the ten companies in the 
sample of companies that had CG events, negative coefficients and significant p-
values in any of the event periods. Table 4.14 (on the next page) depicts the potential 
pecuniary consequences ascertained by the application of VaR methodology. 
Appendix 11 depicts the VaR calculations. 
Research has revealed that corporate scandals have significant cost to investors and 
economies. Citing corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and 
Qwest (better known as the Big Four scandals), Rezaee (2009) estimated that the cost 
was more than US$460 billion. Mallin (2013) cited significant costs incurred by the CG 
failures of Barings Bank in 1995, Parmalat in 2003, Royal Bank of Scotland in 2008, 
Satyam in 2009, Olympus Corporation in 2011, just to mention a few prominent ones.  
Mostly, the guesstimated cost is measured by the reduction in the investors’ and 
pension portfolio values and debt obligations not being honoured. Other costs of 
corporate scandals and poor governance are measured by changes in the cost of 
capital (equity and debt), about which researchers like Padgett (2012), Nordberg 
(2011) and Rezaee (2009) have implied that companies with poor governance will 
incur higher cost of capital as investors seek a risk premium for additional risk resulting 
from poor governance.  
As elucidated in the methodology chapter, this study applied the VaR methodology to 
aggregate risks into a single measure that can be used to ascertain the rand-
denominated cost to the principal as tabulated in Table 4.14. That single measure that 
was obtained provides an idea of the magnitude of the likely losses incurred by the 
principal. 
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Table 4:14: Potential losses obtained from VaR calculations 
 
Source: Research results 
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From Table 4.14, it can be seen that the total possible losses for all the companies are 
R43.5 billion, R67.2 billion and R101.3 billion, at 95%, 99% and 99.9% confidence 
levels, respectively. According to the study’s VaR calculations, these total costs 
represent the maximum possible costs that may be ascribed to the events. The VaR 
calculations show the biggest cost to the principal of MTN Group Ltd. This was the 
event announced on 26 October 2015 (the US$5,2 billion fine imposed by the Nigeria 
Communications Commission (NCC) which was finally settled at US$2,573 billion). 
The study observed that from the previous two MTN Group Ltd’s events, the cost to 
the principal significantly escalated. For instance, the cost to the principal increased 
by 13.06% from the 2012 event to the 2013 event, and by 33.85% from the 2013 event 
to the 2015 event. Perhaps, the substantial increase in the cost from the 2013 to 2015 
events can be explained by the magnitude of the fine imposed by the NCC, coupled 
with the frequency with which MTN Group Ltd. has experienced CG failures. 
In addition, the biggest cost presented in the table represents 8.03%, 15.28% and 
27.05% of MTN Group Ltd.’s revenue at 95%, 99% and 99.9%, respectively. These 
costs are substantial, given that they erode revenue which is a key driver of 
shareholder value (Rappaport, 2005). In consequence, cost as a percentage of 
revenue shows how much of the shareholder value was eroded because of the MTN 
Group Ltd.’s events. Furthermore, at 99.9% confidence level, the cost of the MTN 
Group Ltd. event represented 18.02% of its market capitalisation at that stage. This is 
substantial, given that the MTN Group Ltd. event resulted in shareholders losing 
18 cents for every rand invested in the company. It is almost impossible to imagine the 
compounded effect of this kind of loss, especially if one considers the impact on 
pensioners whose income and livelihood depend on the value of investments in such 
companies.  
The results also show minimum losses ranging from R362 million to R691 million being 
experienced by Woolworths Holdings Ltd. as part of the 2009 supermarket 
investigation by the Competition Commission. The cost represented 6.66% of 
Woolworths Holdings Ltd.’s market capitalisation at that stage. This suggests that for 
every rand invested in Woolworths Holdings Ltd., investors potentially lost almost 
7 cents in every rand due to the event. Once again, this is significant for the principal 
(who could be a pensioner), especially at that time when economies were struggling 
to recover from the 2007-2008 global financial meltdown. 
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From the ascertained costs, the results show that the CG events that the 10 companies 
experienced may have substantially eroded shareholder value to the extent of 27 cents 
(at 99.9% confidence level) of every R1 revenue generated by the companies. The 
enormity of the costs incurred by the principal because of the agent’s behaviour are of 
similar proportions and consistent with the findings by Rezaee (2009). 
The next section of the thesis attempts to explore the costs carried by the principal 
due to the Steinhoff case of reported accounting ‘irregularities’ that are mostly still to 
be understood as at end of February 2018. 
4.4.2.1 A closer look at the Steinhoff scandal 
From information in the public domain, it becomes clear that Steinhoff executives 
established complex off-balance companies which made the CG structures opaque so 
as to not easily detect the ‘intended’ corporate malfeasance. Schreiber and Strozyk’s 
(2018) investigation discovered more than 2 000 companies in the network. Rose 
(2018) reported the admission by one of the board members that the board was 
‘bamboozled’ by the actions of the CEO. The board did, however, raise issues of the 
agent lying to it, and there was mistrust due to the agent’s conduct (Rose, 2018). This 
misconduct has resulted in the restatement of the 2015 and 2016 financial statements 
because they could not be trusted (Steinhoffinternational.com, 2018). 
In attempting to further highlight the magnitude of the cost to the principal due to the 
widely media-reported CG failures at Steinhoff, this study examined five fund 
Factsheets of some of the investment managers who had substantial funds invested 
in Steinhoff.  
The fund Factsheets the study examined (with their holdings in Steinhoff and fund 
values as at 30 September 2017 in parenthesis) were for: 
 Old Mutual Top Companies Fund (5.5% of R1.8 billion), 
 Coronation Houseview Equity Fund (6% of R52.5 billion), 
 Truffle General Equity Fund (6.4% of R1.6 billion), 
 Nedgroup Investments Value Fund (6.2% of R2.5 billion), and 
 SIM Top Choice Equity Fund (6.5% of R1.5 billion). 
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The study first observed that all the fund Factsheets did not reflect investment holdings 
in Steinhoff as part of the top ten investments by 31 December 2017, as was the case 
on 30 September 2017, before the event was made public. This suggests that either 
the cited investment managers decided to take or limit the losses as they disposed of 
their investment holdings in the company, or they decided to take-off the Steinhoff 
investment from their books (that is, written off as impaired investments) until such a 
time when the nature of the accounting irregularities are understood. The researcher 
believes that both reasons are applicable, as the market capitalisation of Steinhoff 
reduced to about R20 billion from about R242 billion in six weeks (Sanlam Collective 
Investments Top Choice Equity Fund Factsheet, 2018). This suggests that investors 
were selling off their Steinhoff investments to limit their losses.  
On the other hand, investment managers may have decided on a prudent approach 
to carry the Steinhoff investment as an impaired investment, given the severe 
reduction by 85% in its market capitalisation in six weeks (Rossouw, 2018). The 
decline in market capitalisation by at least R206 billion (Rose, 2018) is significant by 
any measure, and the pension and other institutional investors are bound to suffer 
severe losses, while it will also take long to recover from such losses. 
The Nedgroup Investments Value Funds Factsheet (2017) divulges that the Steinhoff 
event cost the fund 5.1% in ‘relative performance’. Furthermore, if Rossouw’s (2018) 
assertion is accepted that Steinhoff’s market capitalisation declined by about 85%, the 
exposures stated in the fund factsheets would result in the following losses: 
 Old Mutual Top Companies Fund: 5.5% ∗ 𝑅1.8 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 0.85 = 𝑅84 150 000, 
 Coronation Houseview Equity Fund: 6% ∗ 𝑅52.5 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 0.85 = 𝑅2 677 500 000,  
 Truffle General Equity Fund: 6.4% ∗ 𝑅1.6 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 0.85 = 𝑅87 040 000,  
 Nedgroup Investments Value Fund: 6.2% ∗ 𝑅2.5 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 0.85 = 𝑅131 750 000, 
 SIM Top Choice Equity Fund: 6.5% ∗ 𝑅1.5 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 0.85 = 𝑅82 875 000, 
 Total losses for these funds amount to 𝐑𝟑 𝟎𝟔𝟑 𝟑𝟏𝟓 𝟎𝟎𝟎. 
In addition to these costs, Cranston (2018) and Rose (2018) reported that Sanlam (a 
sample company) had the following exposures through other financial instruments as: 
 Exposure on the net investment return amounting to R175 million; 
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 Potential loss on collateralised loans if Steinhoff’s shares decline to zero equated 
to R580 million; 
 Foreign denominated bonds amounting to R358 million; and 
 Rand-denominated (local) bonds amounting to R771 million. 
An aggregation of the potential losses from the various financial instruments (totalling 
R1.884 billion) and investment fund exposures (totalling R3.063 billion) become 
enormous at R4.950 billion, however, it might take a while to fully ascertain the losses. 
In addition, Fin24.com (2018) reported that the Government Employees Pension 
Funds (GEPF) lost approximately R20 billion between November 2017 and 18 January 
2018.  
As a result, the study plausibly argues that the principal ultimately carries these costs. 
Our findings provide an idea of the magnitude and potential economic consequences. 
It seems the Steinhoff losses exceed the total VaR calculations of all the other 
companies from 2008 to 2016 which have been calculated at about R101,3 billion. 
This suggests that the severity of the consequences of CG failures are becoming 
catastrophic, especially for institutional investors like pension funds and investment 
managers. 
The Steinhoff event also exposes another P-A relationship that has associated costs. 
The P-A relationship is that of the executive being an agent of NED board members 
(principal). Although the study does not focus on this relationship, it is alluded to for 
the sake of highlighting the potential costs incurred by NEDs (as principals) due to 
failures in governance in other parts of the company’s overall governance structure.  
Rose (2018) mentioned that three Steinhoff NEDs incurred personal losses worth 
R37 million through the ownership of shares. The losses occurred in a matter of weeks 
and the NEDs could not transact due to the JSE insider-trading rules. Even if the NEDs 
had been able to transact the shares, there was a great possibility that the share would 
be illiquid, given the value of the sale-side investors as they jostled to off-load the 
shares when the news of the event filtered into the stock market. The costs represent 
direct losses to the NEDs as principals, although they were wearing two hats (that is, 
agent for the shareholders that appointed them and principal through their own 
shareholding). The NEDs were paid €3.3 million in 2016 in directors’ fees (Rossouw, 
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2018), but three directors lost R37 million in the value of their personal shareholding 
(Rose, 2018).  
The Steinhoff event has attained classic stature, as Crotty (2018) revealed that the 
board chairperson, who was also the biggest shareholder, was paid €325 million a few 
weeks before the demise of the company’s share price. This means that, while some 
directors lost money due to the CG event, evidence shows that others had first-mover 
advantages and benefited at the expense of other principals. The implications of such 
evidence encroaches into the issues of insider trading, which are unfortunately outside 
the scope of this study. Nonetheless, the €325 million additional loss that emanated 
from Steinhoff’s P-A and CG problems was carried by other principals. Crotty (2018) 
raised suspicion of collusion between the agent and chairperson, who is also a 
principal in this case. The fact is that €325 million in wealth was extracted from other 
principals through this collusion. 
Once again, the magnitude of the cost to the principal because of CG failures are 
consistent with Rezaee’s (2009) and Mallin’ (2013) findings. Sanlam Collective 
Investments Top Choice Equity Fund Factsheet (2018) lamented that the CG failures 
exhibited by Steinhoff are extremely concerning, given the magnitude of investor-value 
that was destroyed in a matter of weeks. Furthermore, Truffle General Equity Fund 
Factsheet (2018) and Crotty (2018) stated that there is still a greater possibility that 
Steinhoff will write off €6 billion worth of assets. Potentially, the asset values may be 
depressed, bond holders and creditors may not roll over their debts, which creates a 
liquidity crunch. This is what is also envisaged to bedevil Steinhoff’s business 
operations, as highlighted by Crotty (2018) who cited the fears of the chairperson. 
Thus, it is credible to assert that the principal will carry the residual cost of the write-
offs and potential insolvency resulting from the event. 
 
In addressing Theme II research questions and the associated objective of 
ascertaining the potential costs of CG failures, the study established that the potential 
costs are a result of CG failures in both the formal systems, and direct and informal 
interactions as depicted in Figure 4.6. The study’s VaR findings show that the events 
in the ten companies in the sample cost the principals a total of R43.5 billion, 
R67.2 billion and R101.3 billion, at 95%, 99% and 99.9% confidence levels, 
respectively. These costs represent anything from 8.03% to 27.05% of the company’s 
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revenues (at 95%, 99% and 99.9% confidence levels, respectively). The costs erode 
one of the main drivers of shareholder value. It was further established that the 
company that had the worst loss, according to the VaR calculations, lost 18.02% of its 
market capitalisation, while the lowest loss was 6.66% of market capitalisation.  
To add to the principals’ costs, the Steinhoff event cost investors more than the 
combined VaR losses of all the ten companies combined from 2008 to 2016. The 
Steinhoff event, being the most recent, highlights that the cost-severity of the CG 
failures is becoming astronomical.  
The costs are also attracting the attention of lawmakers, for example, in South Africa, 
a joint Parliamentary Inquiry was established. The joint Inquiry was composed of the 
Standing Committee on Finance, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts and the 
Standing Committee on Appropriations.  
These costs are significant in a global investment market that has seemed to be 
struggling to offer returns that can sustain pensioners, since the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. The magnitude of the potential costs established by the study give credence to 
the assertion it makes that CG failures present significant costs that are potentially 
carried by the principal. Moreover, the pecuniary consequences to the principal seem 
to increase with each reported CG failure. These costs are germane to the erosion of 
shareholder value and possibly the economy (Nordberg, 2011).  
Therefore, the study answers the Theme II research questions by concluding that the 
potential costs of CG failures are substantial, and they are carried by the principal as 
the costs expropriate value from some of the main drivers of shareholder value, like 
revenue, as revealed in the results of the study. 
Figure 4.7 is an infographic summarising the findings in this section. 
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Figure 4.7: Infographic of VaR and other cost results 
Source: Research results  
Section 4.5 below integrates the discussion of the calculated s-Gini with the potential 
costs as discoursed in Section 4.4.2 to address the thematised research questions 
and related objective. This next section provides an idea of the possible socio-
economic consequences of P-A and CG problems, given the attention currently on 
executive remuneration and the widening wealth gap in the face of deep poverty in 
South Africa. 
4.5 THEME III: POTENTIAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
Theme III addresses the potential socio-economic consequences of P-A and CG 
problems. The theme’s focus picks up on Rezaee’s (2009) suggestion that CG should 
be approached as a way to address social and economic concerns. Based on the 
magnitude of the costs established earlier in Section 4.4.2, the study is convinced by 
Germain (2010) who also posited that events like the 2007-2008 financial crisis should 
not only be viewed as a financial event, but also encompassing social impact in the 
long term. Likewise, CG failures must be understood in relation to complex linkages 
to the socio-economic impact if appropriate solutions are to be formulated.  
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For this reason, the study attempts to capture the socio-economic consequences of 
CG failures, along the reasoning by Germain (2010) and by using the s-Gini coefficient 
(the study’s adapted Gini coefficient) calculations. The focus is on the enormity and 
complexity of CG failures in both the short and long term. 
As discoursed in the methodology chapter, the Gini coefficient is widely accepted as 
a measure of inequality, particularly wealth inequality. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, at least at the time of completing this study, there has not been a study 
that employed the Gini coefficient to measure salary inequality in the CG field. The 
coefficient is measured as a ratio which has values ranging from 0 to 1. A calculated 
value of 0 reveals perfect equality (that is, everyone earns the same amount), and a 
value of 1 shows perfect inequality (that is, people earn different incomes due to 
myriad reasons). Evidently, a value of 0 can only be ideal and not realistic. As a result, 
calculated values are expected to incline towards 1 as people earn different incomes. 
4.5.1 Discussion and analysis of s-Gini calculations 
From the s-Gini calculations presented in Appendix 12, both cases of near perfect and 
perfect inequality are observed. Of the calculated average s-Gini, the lowest is 0.94, 
while the highest is 1.00, and the average is 0.98. Table 4.15 presents the average s-
Gini as calculated. 
Table 4:15: Average s-Gini from 2008 to 2016 
 
Source: Research results 
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These s-Gini coefficients are at high levels and reflect perfect inequality (with averages 
ranging from 0.94 to 1) in all industries. As explained in Section 3.7.2, a calculated 
coefficient value close to 1 or 1 shows near or perfect inequality, respectively. The 
high inequality depicted by the calculated coefficients (s-Gini) are corroborated by the 
number of times executives’ income has surpassed the average income earned by 
workers in the industries with which the companies do business. On average, 
company executives in our sample earn 157 times more than the average workers’ 
annual income for the period 2008-2016. The lowest executive’s income was 12 times 
more, while the highest was 6 490 times more than the average annual income earned 
by workers.  
It is important to note that the figure of 6 490 times has actually increased from the 
725 times as reported in 2013 (the highest then) for the same company (Mergence 
Investment Managers, 2014). The 6 490 times also surpasses the ones reported in 
the US (419 times in 1999 as reported by Guillén, 2000) and the UK (1 374 times in 
2008 as reported by Padgett, 2012). Appendix 6 shows the number of times the 
income earned by executives in the sample companies exceeded what an employee 
earned during the period 2008-2016. The South African companies’ income 
differentials are astronomical by any measure. Padgett (2012) cites Randøy and 
Nielson (2002) and CFA (2008) who stated that such high salary differentials would 
not be permitted in Nordic countries and Japan.  
The study envisages potential consequences of worsening socio-economic problems 
in a country that is struggling to create jobs and that has experienced massive 
retrenchments in industries like mining and manufacturing. To exacerbate the issue, it 
becomes difficult to justify the exorbitant executive salaries to the trade unions who 
are in alliance with the ruling political party. 
Since executive compensation is part of CG (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 
2009), poor executive compensation structures introduce weaknesses in governance 
and create income inequality within the company and economy. Mallin (2013) and 
Nordberg (2011) posited that well governed companies are able to make significant 
social contributions that reduce the level of inequality through the provision of services 
like education (schools and bursaries), affordable houses, healthcare and other social 
amenities like parks. This study did not explore the social contributions made by 
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sample companies with different governance and compensation differentials, as the 
focus is on the results of the s-Gini, in general. 
From the results, the closeness of the s-Gini figures suggests that there is not much 
inequality amongst the executives of the sample companies. Instead, the great 
inequality is shown between executives and the rest of the workers. The income 
inequality means that the ownership of companies remains in the hands of the highly 
compensated executives and their families, given that the workers are not able to buy 
shares in these companies (Padgett, 2012). This suggests that the pervasiveness of 
GC failures as presented in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 may enable and perpetuate the 
control of economic resources by the few, while it restrains the economic participation 
by the rest of the workers. This impacts the economic transformation of South Africa’s 
economy. 
Furthermore, both the CG failures and s-Gini as presented in the study may result in 
inequalities that are likely to snowball to other areas. The downstream inequality in 
education, health, quality of life, and social mistrust confirms suggestions by Mallin 
(2013) and Nordberg (2011) that companies that experience CG failures significantly 
contribute to societal inequality. 
A combination of the costs discussed in Section 4.4.2 and the inequalities discussed 
above, can present a potential recipe for serious socio-economic problems. This study 
supports the envisioned socio-economic consequences by considering the CG failures 
within Steinhoff that had reported cases of accounting ‘irregularities’ and financial 
reporting manipulations that are still to be understood, at least at the time of completing 
this study. Steinhoff’s CG failures are of such proportions that they could potentially 
affect 130 000 workers in 30 countries through job losses. The socio-economic 
consequences magnify when the following facts are considered: 
 The Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF) lost R20 billion of pension 
savings (Fin24.com, 2018), 
 The number of people who depend on the 130 000 workers for their livelihood, 
 The level of indebtedness of South Africans and their failure to manage debt, 
supported by a debt impairment level of 40% (Ferreira, 2017, also citing the 2014-
2015 World Bank Report and Global Findex Report for 2016). Ferreira (2017) 
further cites statistics that show that debt levels increased at a faster pace than 
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employment levels (18% increase in employment against 44% increase in 
consumer credit from 2008 to 2016). 
As can be clearly imagined, job losses due to the Steinhoff CG failures serve to worsen 
the social and economic circumstances of workers who are probably reeling under 
debt burdens, especially considering Ferreira’s (2017) revelation that two out of five 
consumers are already debt-stressed. The potential job losses due to the executive 
malfeasance at Steinhoff will directly and indirectly worsen the socio-economic well-
being of employees and other sectors. For example, the potential job losses and 
impact of the debts of employees will spill over into the banking and micro-lending 
sectors as bad debts are likely to worsen. The resultant bad debts will lead to job 
losses in the lending sectors of the economy, exacerbating the socio-economic woes 
of those affected. Furthermore, the worsening debt-impairments will affect access to 
funds or credit that might have stimulated economic development, and may increase 
the risk premium, thereby increasing the cost of funds and financial products. The 
investment market will also dry up, and the savings ratio and illiquidity in the financial 
markets will worsen. The result is an increase in the cost of capital which makes it 
expensive for small, medium and big businesses to finance operations and expansion. 
The likely business closures will contribute to increased unemployment, which will 
exacerbate the accompanying social ills. 
The costs of business closures and the associated job losses are incurred by the 
government in efforts to bail out the ailing companies using tax-payers’ money, and 
the quantitative easing in trying to save jobs and an economic melt-down. According 
to Mallin (2013), this has happened in the US, UK and other developed countries. This 
has not happened much in South Africa, except in 2014, when the South African 
Reserve Bank placed African Bank Investments Ltd. under curatorship. However, what 
is evident in South Africa, is the government shouldering the cost of job losses through 
a lower tax base (affecting government revenue) and increased social spending which 
directly takes care of 33% of the population (Rossouw, 2017).  
On one side there are the high levels of socio-economic struggles, while on the other 
side the other extreme is found, the executives who are seemingly enriched by their 
companies that are retrenching or closing down. This situation results in a low level of 
social trust and a weak bond, the opposite of which is imperative for the long-term 
stability of companies and economies. Padgett (2012) points out that such levels of 
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inequality would not be permitted in Nordic countries, and Bruce et al. (2005) 
suggested that this should not be socially permissible. 
To further worsen the socio-economic problems resulting from CG failures, pensioners 
and those who rely on share market performance for their income are affected by 
declines in the share prices of the companies with failed governance mechanisms. For 
example, the Steinhoff share price declined from R56.00 per share in December 2017 
(before the resignation of the CEO) to R4.11 on Friday 3 March 2018 (Theobald, 
2018). The massive decline in the share price largely represents poverty that has been 
induced by a CG event. The decline in the regular income for those who depend on 
the share-performance worsens their socio-economic position and increases their 
chances of seeking assistance from the government. This, in turn, increases the 
government’s social spending. In this finding, this study accedes to the suggestions 
by Germain (2010) that such crises plunge hundreds of millions of poor people into 
worse poverty, with the accompanying ills that attend such poverty. 
When the evidence from the VaR calculations and other potential costs are 
aggregated, and the seemingly exorbitant executive compensation and the resulting 
high levels of income inequality (using the s-Gini as a proxy) and the potential socio-
economic consequences are revealed, it leads to the realisation of the complexities 
that P-A and CG problems create for companies and countries.  
The researcher believes that the full extent of the long-term consequences cannot be 
known at the current time, although the study provides glimpses of potential pecuniary 
and socio-economic implications. Beginning with executive compensation, the 
evidence gives credence to the call by PwC (2013) who highlighted that some 
governments may move towards regulating salaries for executives. However, the 
result may be the potential loss of talent to other emerging and developed economies. 
The ultimate impact on South African industries may be the loss of competitiveness 
and possibly the loss of its place as a vibrant BRICS member.  
The researcher believes that transparency and accountability regarding executive 
salaries need improvement in order to mitigate weaknesses in CG structures, 
unethical behaviour, and potential socio-economic consequences. King IV 
acknowledges and attempts to address the gap between executive salaries and the 
lowest paid workers by recommending that executives should be fairly paid in the 
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context of the overall remuneration of other employees, and economic, social and 
environmental considerations. Furthermore, King IV states that the Remuneration 
Report should disclose how the company tried to address the pay gap in the previous 
financial year. 
From the presented findings, it is concluded that P-A and CG failures have potential 
consequences that contribute to socio-economic inequalities that snowball to other 
inequalities like education, healthcare and affordable housing. The study concurs with 
Mallin (2013), citing Charkham (1994) and Nordberg (2011), who argued that good 
CG can contribute to the improvement in people’s standards of living and increase 
social cohesion. The study also accepts that the opposite is true, namely, that when 
CG failures occur, the failures contribute to the worsening socio-economic positions 
and also weakens the social cohesion of the country’s citizens. 
4.6 THEME IV: EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNANCE CODES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Theme IV evaluated the effectiveness of CG codes, specifically the King III and King 
IV codes, based on the findings presented in Theme I, II and III. The discussions of 
Theme I, II and III’s findings contribute to the assessment of the effectiveness of the 
current CG codes. 
The discussion of the findings in Theme I through to Theme III confirms the 
observations by McNulty et al. (2013) that after decades of research and reforms, P- A 
and CG problems still exist, even though there are increased prescriptive codes and 
other forms of regulations that have been implemented for better governance. The 
23.91%, and Steinhoff, cases of CG failures as previously discussed, shift the focus 
to the effectiveness of CG codes. The cases suggest the limited effectiveness of the 
codes, although it is envisaged that the CG failures would have been worse had the 
codes been absent. Perhaps, what is needed to enhance effectiveness is improved 
monitoring and to provide more ‘teeth’ to the codes. This suggestion acquiesces with 
Conyon’s (2006) argument that the seemingly ineffectiveness of CG codes makes it 
necessary to intensify monitoring by the principals and other stakeholders. Moreover, 
the personal liability that may be imposed on directors, under the Companies Act 71 
of 2008, section 77.2, who are found to be in breach of their fiduciary duties, can 
enhance the effectiveness of CG codes and laws. 
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Failure in the oversight roles of the board and board committees erodes the 
effectiveness of the codes (Shah, 2014, citing Bogle & Sullivan, 2009). The study 
concurs with this finding as it was observed that companies that breached certain 
provisions of the code had decreases in governance indices (proxy of governance-
oversight) from one year to another. The opposite was found to be true where there 
were improvements in complying with the code’s provisions.  
The study also noted that the high board indices, which denote greater adherence to 
the code’s provisions, have not fully translated into the boards becoming more 
effective, because a number of FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies had significant CG 
failures. This possibly suggests that the establishment of recommended committees 
and other code recommendations was a tick-box exercise that is not reflective of board 
practices. This is aligned to Seidl’s (2007) proposition that companies would want to 
be seen as conforming to the code’s recommendations, but it would be just words, 
which are divorced from actions. That seems to be the case in the 23.91% of sample 
companies, and Steinhoff, which exposed the limited effectiveness of the King III and 
King IV codes.  
Furthermore, the study concurs with another of Seidl’s (2007) propositions that in 
some cases, executives adopt governance provisions which have the least 
consequences to their current practices. That is, the company appears compliant on 
paper and to outsiders, while its practices are not transformed by the ‘self-confessed 
adoption’ of the code’s provisions. This finding is supported by the fact that the study 
found board committees, as recommended by the King III and King IV, but the 
composition of those committees did not fully adhere to the provisions covering the 
relevant committees. This was evident in the provisions covering the nominating, 
remuneration and audit committees, and board independence. The study attributed 
the decline in governance indices to the partial adherence to the provisions covering 
the nominating (25%), remuneration (22%) and audit (18%), and board independence 
(16%). Non-adherence to the provisions covering the said committees may have 
reduced the effectiveness of the King III and King IV as adopted by companies. 
Regarding the independence of the board appointment process, which has the 
potential to make the board provisions ineffectual, the study found that some 
companies, like Assore Limited (a FTSE/JSE Top40 listed company), clearly state that 
executives are responsible for board appointment and the continued eligibility to 
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remain on the board (Assore Limited, 2016). In the study’s view, this restrains the 
effectiveness of the board, as the executives are responsible for appointing board 
members who are to exercise oversight over them. This scenario is flagged by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) as one of the ways that executives usurp power from the board and 
limits its voting power. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) further suggested that this situation 
exposes board members to being coerced to vote in a way that favours executives, if 
the board member is to retain his or her board seat. This scenario accentuates the 
weakness in the ‘comply or explain’ (King III) regime, of which Seidl (2007) posited 
that its effectiveness depends on secondary schemas that can only come from outside 
the company to evaluate the committees and disclosed information. The study concurs 
with Seidl’s (2007) and Andres and Theissen’s (2008) supposition that the 
effectiveness of the Assore Limited board can only be evaluated from outside and its 
disclosures would require independent testing. Seidl (2007) then suggested that to 
enhance the effectiveness of the codes, the codes need to have supplementary 
schemas that are used to evaluate the performance of committees and information 
disclosures. 
Findings related to the oversight functions of board committees have also revealed 
that in some instances, the qualifications of board committee members do not 
guarantee the effectiveness in the committees’ governance. Steinhoff’s board, like that 
of Enron, was dominated by professionals, such as chartered accountants. However, 
this professional composition of the board committees did not achieve robust 
governance, as some board members admitted to being misled and ‘bamboozled’ by 
the executive (Rose, 2018).  
The ineffectiveness of the board and its committees might emanate from external 
networks that exist between board members and executives (Goh and Gupta, 2016) 
and what Gordon (2002) termed ‘soft-conflicts’, referring to links board members may 
have outside the professional circles, such as an affiliation with a social club, or the 
executive chairing a charity organisation owned by a board member. The study did not 
investigate the suggested ‘soft-conflicts’. Nevertheless, the study infers that the 
executives’ ‘soft-conflicts’, influence, dominance and board trust can weaken the 
effectiveness of the board’s oversight, resulting in a lack of professional scepticism on 
the part of the board members. The board becomes heavily invested in trusting the 
executive and at this point, the board composition and competence cease to matter 
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as the independence of members becomes ineffective. Some directors who are 
compromised by ‘soft-conflicts’ lead committees and worsen the ineffectiveness of the 
code. In this regard, the study concurs with Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017). This was 
the case with Steinhoff (Theobald, 2018) and African Bank Investments Limited 
(Giamporcaro, 2017). African Bank Investments Limited was a FTSE/JSE Top40 
company before it went under curatorship. The same fate seems to await Steinhoff 
given the nature and magnitude of the unfurling financial reporting fraud. 
The study previously cited the conclusions by Shah (2014) that suggested that for the 
CG codes to be effective, the way executives are remunerated needs to change. The 
study’s findings support Shah’s (2014) conclusions, as cases of CG failures were 
discovered during the study that seem to be driven by self-dealings designed to 
increase the executive’s performance and ultimately compensation. A case in point is 
that of Steinhoff’s balance sheet manipulations as far back as 2014 (Schreiber & 
Strozyk, 2018). The push to achieve better performance, and the related 
remuneration, severely constrain the effectiveness of the code by introducing fissures 
in the independence of board committees and compromises disclosures that ultimately 
result in information asymmetry. Information asymmetry worsens and perpetuates 
P- A and CG problems, as the executive has the capacity to conceal losses or 
information for a long time, as in the cited cases of Steinhoff in South Africa, Lehman 
Brothers (Bris, 2010) and Olympus in Japan. 
When the findings from Theme I through to Theme III were aggregated, it was 
concluded that the existing P-A and CG problems exposed the limited effectiveness 
so far of King III and King IV. However, the frequency and magnitude of the impact 
would be worsened if King III and King IV were absent. The study conceded that King 
III and King IV have recorded considerable success in constraining P-A and CG 
problems, although the executives still have the capacity to outwit the recommended 
provisions. These findings are in line with the cited literature that discusses the 
effectiveness of CG codes. The effectiveness of the CG codes need continuous 
evaluation as the study discovered that the impact of CG events can become a 
complex Gordian knot, as the agent is bound to continue seeking ways to expropriate 
wealth from the principal as well as the country. 
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Chapter 5: Summary of conclusions 
and recommendations for future 
research 
This final chapter condensed all the 
conclusions reached in this study. Based 
on the conclusions, recommendations 
that may compass future CG practices 
and research were discussed. 
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CHAPTER 5:   SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide concluding remarks to the study’s findings, 
to discuss the theoretical implications of findings, to summarise the study’s 
contributions to the CG field, and to make recommendations and suggestions for 
future research. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of possible shortfalls of the 
study, as well as possible areas of future research to address identified limitations. 
5.2 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
This study employed an archival research strategy to examine the prevalence of P-A 
and CG problems and to determine if these problems can explain some of the 
corporate failures. The researcher searched for records and documents filed with 
regulatory authorities, official press releases by regulatory authorities, and media 
reports on the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies. A Content Analysis (CA) was done 
on the Competition Commission press releases, SENS Announcements, and media 
reports to identify the nature of the contraventions. The findings from investigations 
were collated.  
The study’s empirical findings exemplified cases of P-A and CG problems by 
tabulating the FTSE/JSE Top40 companies that experienced CG failures and 
highlighted the nature of these CG failures. These companies represented 23.91% of 
the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies in the sample. Additionally, Steinhoff33 was 
added to the list of CG failures with proportions that have effects that cut across 
jurisdictions (30 countries may be affected). The P-A and CG problems were also 
supported by findings in the attributions analysis done on the changes in the calculated 
                                            
33 As highlighted in the methodology chapter, Steinhoff was part of the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies but was initially excluded due to some missing data. However, Steinhoff was separately 
included and analysed in this study due to apparent major P-A and CG problems reported at the end of 
2017 and first quarter 2018. The magnitude of ascertained potential costs (up to the finalisation of this 
research) warranted this inclusion and made significant contributions that address the study’s 
thematised research questions and the achievement of the research objectives. 
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governance indices. Together, the findings confirmed that considerable P-A and CG 
problems are prevalent in the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies. 
The study applied CA on the Integrated Annual Reports of the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies from 2008 to 2016 to establish their adherence to the King III and King IV 
recommendations. The CG provisions were then scored to construct the governance 
indices. The calculated indices were high, denoting a greater level of adherence to the 
King III and King IV. However, the 23.91% of companies that experienced CG failures, 
and Steinhoff, have led to a limited conviction that the codes are effective in some 
instances. The findings are in line with other findings cited in Section 4.3. 
The study presents evidence showing that executive compensation structures in 
companies play a weighty role in exacerbating P-A and CG problems than what is 
often envisioned and reflected in CG mechanisms. This leads the study to concur with 
Nordberg’s (2011) conclusions that executive compensation has probably become the 
biggest aspect of CG. Therefore, the study proposes Equation 4.1 to capture pertinent 
aspects of CG which have the potential to exacerbate P-A and CG problems. The 
variables in the proposed model may reduce or slow down the salary gap and the 
inequality that the s-Gini results revealed. 
This study used Event Studies (ES) to test the significance of identified CG events, 
and to decide which of the companies to include in calculating the potential costs of 
the CG events. For companies that had had significant CG events, the study applied 
VaR procedures to quantify the potential costs to the principal and the economy. The 
findings regarding the calculated costs led to the conclusion that they are severe and 
are carried by the principals and country as a whole. The VaR calculations ascertained 
that at a 99.9% confidence level, the CG events from 2008 to 2016 cost the principals 
R101.3 billion. In addition, while the full cost of the Steinhoff CG failures is still to be 
fully established, it was discovered that the principal lost approximately R206 billion in 
six weeks. 
In the socio-economic discussions, the researcher employed an interpretative enquiry 
to consider the practical and moral considerations that are comparable to reviewed 
literature. The s-Gini calculations portray a near-perfect and perfect level of income 
inequality. The average s-Gini was calculated at 0.98, while the highest paid executive 
during the study’s period earned 6 490 times more that the average worker in the 
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industry. The study’s scrutiny into such high levels of income inequality casts some 
light into the darkness behind the veil of executive compensation and the 
accompanying potential socio-economic concerns. With considerable conviction, the 
study concludes from the results that such high levels of income inequality are 
unjustifiable. 
This study draws inferences from the potential costs, s-Gini and resulting inequalities. 
From the inferences, the study plausibly concluded that P-A and CG failures have 
potential consequences that contribute to income inequalities that snowball to other 
areas like education, healthcare and affordable housing. In other words, when CG 
failures occur, the failures contribute to worsening socio-economic positions and 
weaken social cohesion among citizens. 
When the findings from Theme I through Theme III were aggregated, the study was 
able to make conclusions regarding the effectiveness of King III and King IV. The 
conclusion is that although considerable effectiveness has been recorded by the 
codes, there are observable limitations. The limitations erode the effectiveness of the 
codes as the agents are bound to continue seeking ways to enrich themselves. The 
study has limited conviction that the ‘comply or explain’ is an effective regime. It may 
be a passport to ‘comply or breach’ (Seidl, 2007, citing Coombes & Wong, 2004; 
Andres & Theissen, 2008; Arcot, Bruno & Faure-Grimaud, 2010), making the intended 
flexibility susceptible to exploitation by the agent as long as they are able to explain 
the breaches. 
5.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
The study’s findings and conclusions have theoretical implications which are briefly 
discussed below. 
The findings on the contraventions in Section 4.2.1 and the associated costs 
discussed in Sections 4.4.2 continue to confirm that P-A and CG problems exist and 
arise from the separation of ownership and control in companies (Berle & Means, 
1932).  
The agency theory propositions of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983) have created unintended problems. In incentivising the agents to align their 
objectives with those of the principal, the results seem to show great opportunism by 
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the agent at the principal’s expense. The implications of the study’s findings are that 
agency theory may need an extension, as only focusing on monitoring and 
incentivising the agent seem to have increased the agency costs for the principal. To 
focus on agency costs (that is, monitoring, bonding and residual costs) seems to be 
inadequate, as the socio-economic costs are of a higher magnitude than the said 
costs. The researcher, therefore, suggests an extension to agency theory to include 
the broader socio-economic costs and to not only focus on the principal, because P-A 
and CG failures impact the broader society. 
Further implications of the findings are that the role of executive compensation 
requires a re-thinking of the agency theory propositions. Perhaps, the dimensions in 
which the agent are incentivised need to change because of the societal inequalities 
it brings. Models that incentivise the agent in a manner that brings about social and 
economic egalitarianism need to be formulated. This may come from unifying agency 
theory and other theories from other fields of research. The challenge is to come up 
with a theory or theories relevant to the nature and magnitude of the P-A and CG 
problems of this modern era. 
The directionality of the study’s Model results is important. The directionality of the 
results necessitates more qualitative research inquiry that interrogates the agency 
theory assumptions. The study argues that the statistical significance of CG events 
does not always reveal the intricate narrative behind the facts and that should be 
exposed to provide more insights into the CG failures. Qualitative research, especially 
the content analysis of Integrated Reports, is necessary to understand and develop 
insightful solutions premised on reality. 
Considering the study’s conclusion that the codes recorded success with some 
limitations, the study supports Seidl’s (2007) findings that there may be gaps in the 
way the codes are conceptualised. They are conceptualised as schemas of 
observations. In the observations, there is an interplay of various realities that exist in 
jurisdictions and companies. However, Seidl (2007) discourses on the similarities that 
exist in the characteristics of CG codes. These characteristics are that the provisions 
of the codes are not formally binding, they are regarded as ‘best practices’ 
recommended by experts, they are flexible, and deviations are expected to be 
explained away and they depend on capital markets for evaluation and enforcement 
as unjustified deviations are punished through negative share price movements. The 
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study’s findings and similar findings cited in this research limit the effectiveness of the 
CG codes. This dents the efficacy of the quaint ‘comply or explain’ regime which is 
supposed to provide flexibility and is non-binding. The non-binding and flexible 
characteristics of the codes cannot continue to take pre-eminence over the costs and 
socio-economic consequences that the study tried to exemplify in this research. There 
is a need for another conceptual approach which considers the socio-economic 
consequences of the broader society and which does not only focus on shareholders 
and executives. 
5.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis advances the body of knowledge on CG by making the contributions 
discussed in this section. 
Firstly, the approach to the construction of the governance indices differs from the 
popular constructions by GIM (2003), Bebchuk et al. (2004), Brown and Caylor (2006) 
and Maskara et al. (2012), however, it is similar to that of Shaukat and Trojanowski 
(2017). The difference is that this study used recommendations from the King III and 
King IV as index provisions, although the scoring is similar to the construction of other 
indices. The construction of the CG indices in this study is an improvement as 
provisions from codes are used and are more relevant to South Africa. In addition, 
they are internationally recognised as ‘best practices’, instead of MOIs which vary in 
provisions per company. This standardises the provisions and makes it easier to 
assess the quality of governance within companies. Therefore, this study compares 
apples with apples, as the source of provisions and benchmark are similar. A uniform 
assessment of the adherence to each provision and class of provisions is possible for 
each of the companies (regardless of company size, industry and so forth).  
An attribution analysis can easily be done to establish the reasons for deterioration or 
improvement in indices. Also, the basis of evaluating governance-performance 
becomes uniform, rather than using MOI which displays weaknesses in that 
governance-performance is measured, based on the provisions the companies set for 
themselves. The aforesaid uniformity in provision measures makes it possible to 
evaluate the quality of governance for a portfolio of companies even if they are in 
different industries, of different sizes, ownership structure, and any other variation that 
may exist. However, what needs to be further researched is an improved formula for 
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the weights ascribed to each of the provisions, so that overall uniformity in the index 
calculation can be achieved. Currently, equal weights are ascribed to each provision 
included in the calculation of indices (GIM, 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2004; Brown & 
Caylor, 2006; Maskara et al., 2012; Luo & Salterio, 2014 Shaukat & Trojanowski, 
2017). 
Secondly, the study contributes by attempting to ascertain the costs to the principal 
and economy brought about by the P-A and CG problems. The study noted that most 
research covers aspects of governance and ownership structures (Fama & Jensen, 
1983), performance and share prices (GIM, 2003; Brown et al., 2010), valuations 
(Brown & Caylor, 2006), executive compensation (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; 
Colvin, 2001; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk & Fried, 2006) and financial crises arising 
from P-A and CG failures (Munzig, 2003; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Maskara et al., 2012). To 
the best of the researcher’s knowledge, at the time this study was completed, this 
study was the first to apply the VaR methodology (a risk management technique) in 
the CG field of research to calculate the costs of CG failures. This is testimony to the 
multidisciplinary nature of governance as a field of research. This suggests that 
existing risk management and other quantitative techniques can be employed to better 
comprehend the magnitude of the pecuniary implications of the agent’s behaviours. 
These techniques can provide a range of cost implications at different levels of 
confidence levels. In addition, the costs can uniformly be determined for companies in 
different industries, sizes, ownership structure, and any other variation that may exist.  
Additionally, the VaR procedures yield a summarised value that exemplifies possible 
losses that can be incurred due to an incidence of P-A and or CG failure. Hence, VaR 
gives a comparable and consistent way of measuring pecuniary implications, 
regardless of the circumstances under which the P-A and CG problems arise. The 
quantification of the costs will inspire the extension of the agency theory to not only 
include agency costs, but to also capture the broader socio-economic costs. These 
socio-economic costs would capture the cost implications of P-A and CG failures to 
other stakeholders that include the government which would tend to bear the ultimate 
costs through increased social spending. The integration of socio-economic costs in 
understanding P-A and CG problems is in line with the triple bottom line approach that 
recognises that companies’ operations impact the environment and society as they do 
business. Integrating socio-economic costs recognises that governance is the third 
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aspect of ESG (environment, social and governance) and its failure has huge 
implications on the other two. Further, higher socio-economic costs may become 
expensive for the company in the capital markets, as they may be used by investors 
to assess the quality of governance and corporate behaviour. 
The third contribution made by this study is through the s-Gini adopted from the Gini 
coefficient which measures levels of inequality in a society or country. To the best of 
the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to attempt to calculate the salary 
inequalities in CG research using the adapted Gini (termed s-Gini). The measured s-
Gini is a proxy of the level of inequality arising from executive compensation as a 
component of CG. The inequality established from the s-Gini calculations portray a 
near-perfect and perfect level of income inequality. Taking cognisance of the 
undesirable implications that may arise from regulating executive compensation, the 
study believes that a hybrid of hard and soft-regulation on executive compensation by 
policy makers will constrain the gap in income inequality.  
The hybrid of hard and soft regulation may not necessarily be related to the fixed 
component of the executive compensation but may be related to other incentives, such 
as share options. Although taxes have often been used to reduce inequality, that tends 
to result in the executive wanting more money after tax, which just increases agency 
costs for the principal. This study believes that the hybrid will deal with the levels of 
inequality exposed by the calculated s-Gini.  
On the capital market side, the study advocates for the incorporation of the s-Gini in 
institutional investors’ investment decisions as best practices to promote 
egalitarianism in South Africa. After all, some of the biggest investment funds are 
pension funds, such as the Government Employees Pension Fund, the Public 
Investment Corporation, and various other pension funds managed by insurance 
companies, that invest savings by South Africans. Levels of s-Gini may form a 
considerable part of the investment statement or philosophy of institutional investors. 
In consequence, South African savings are used to achieve some degree of equality. 
This is in line with the move to integrate ESG factors into the portfolio construction and 
investment analysis (Peiris & Evans, 2010; Kocmanová & Dočekalová, 2012). This 
would encourage triple bottom line reporting as well. 
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The fourth contribution is a remuneration model that is proposed by the study. The 
remuneration model states executive compensation as a function of governance, 
performance, GDP, inflation, ownership structure, executive net share trades, number 
of share trades by executives, and the number of directors on the board who trade in 
company shares. The remuneration model is proposed in Equation 4.1 as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐺𝑜𝑣 + 𝛽𝑖4𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽𝑖5 𝐼𝑛𝑓 +  𝛽𝑖6𝑂𝑆 +
 𝛽𝑖7𝑁𝑇 +  𝛽𝑖8𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽𝑖9𝐷𝑇𝑌 +  ℇ𝑖𝑡  
 
The model proposes that executive compensation should reflect: 
 the strength of governance by the executive using the governance index as a 
proxy, 
 company performance measured by revenue in the case of this study, or any other 
performance measure as agreed by the company, 
 economic performance as measured by GDP, 
 inflation which impacts the value of money, and changes in compensation should 
consider that, 
 ownership structure, as a greater concentration of share ownership leads to less 
capacity for the executive to extract higher compensation (Elston & Goldberg, 
2003) and executive remuneration needs to be compatible with the ownership 
structure (Kirkpatrick, 2009), 
 the executive net share trades and number of share trades increase executive 
compensation as it forms the greater component of the earned income (Padgett, 
2012; Nordberg, 2011; Bruce et al., 2005; Rappaport, 2005). The compensation 
should factor in the trading activities of the executive in company shares. The 
inclusion is based on the observation that the fixed component of executive 
compensation is small compared to the share-based component. This is in line with 
other findings as previously mentioned. The inclusion of the executive’s share 
trading activities in the compensation structure might lower the s-Gini (that is, slow 
down the salary differential). As a result, inequality levels between the executives 
and the lower income earners in the industries may be reduced. This might just be 
one step, among others, in addressing the income inequality. 
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The four contributions made by this study are expected to provide better insights and 
stimulate scholarly debate and more research on governance in South Africa. The 
study envisages stimulation of scholarly debate and research in areas covering: 
 The findings of the prevalence of P-A and CG problems in some of the largest listed 
companies in South Africa. When the malfeasance is reported or exposed 
occasionally, they tend to not show their prevalence. However, the findings that 
have been discussed in the study have revealed their prevalence. More discourse 
is required to understand why such a high prevalence exists. 
 The board indices calculated based on the recommendations of King III and King 
IV. It is generally agreeable that King III and King IV are recommendations for best 
practices. However, the weighting of the provisions in the construction of the 
governance indices needs to be settled. Currently, the weightings are equal but 
one can argue that there are provisions that can carry more weight than others, 
and that needs factoring in when constructing the indices. 
 The VaR methodology employed in the study for the determination of the costs 
arising from P-A and CG failures is another area that may be expected to stimulate 
debate. Other scholars may suggest alternative models to quantify the costs. 
 The proposed remuneration model which the researcher believes may be queried 
by the executives and human resources practitioners. However, collaborating with 
practitioners will provide insights that may provide solutions acceptable to all 
stakeholders. 
 Inequalities depicted from the calculated s-Gini might also become emotionally 
debated because of the scale of income inequality revealed in this study. Also, this 
aspect has political implications that need careful management. 
Once this study’s contributions are aggregated, scholarly debate becomes imperative 
in the aforesaid areas if better solutions are to be found, given South Africa’s unique 
circumstances in relation to past political and social injustices, and the current political 
system and cultural diversity. In addition, the study’s contributions provide insights that 
inform South African regulatory authorities in setting up compliance rules that ensure 
that the economy is safeguarded against agency and CG problems that may have 
devastating consequences on the government. 
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5.5 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
From the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made: 
5.5.1 Theme I  
Even though the calculated board indices are high, denoting a greater adoption of the 
CG codes’ recommendations, this has not mitigated incidences of corporate 
malfeasance, such as in the case of the 23.91% of the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies and Steinhoff34. Furthermore, from the study’s findings, which concur with 
the observations of Shaukat and Trojanowski (2017), it is clear that a greater 
percentage of governance declines should be ascribed to the independence of the 
nominating, remuneration and audit committees.  
The study recommends a hybrid regime which may also build loyalty to the company 
by the agent as argued by Eisenberg (1998). This hybrid regime would require making 
some provisions compulsory, while others might be explained to justify non-
compliance. For example, the study recommends that the following provisions become 
compulsory: provisions that have to do with the independence of the nominating, 
remuneration and audit committees that may show susceptibility to executive 
opportunism and information asymmetry that worsen or create P-A and CG problems. 
This hybrid regime would deal with the voluntary aspects of the codes that are not 
effective as is shown by the problems in the independence of the nominating, 
remuneration and audit committees, thus making them compulsory.  
On the other hand, the areas of governance that require flexibility in order to allow full 
and truthful disclosures will be accommodated by allowing directors to explain their 
deviation from the King recommendations. This hybrid regime is a middle-of-the-road 
approach that suggests that volunteerism and compulsory requirements of the law and 
regulation can co-exist in one code. Furthermore, the hybrid regime will curb instances 
where executives are able to explain their way out or abuse the flexibility of the code 
in cases where their actions are socially and ethically unacceptable. This restrains the 
executive opportunism that exacerbates P-A and CG problems. 
                                            
34 Towards the conclusion of this study, there were reported CG cases within the Resilient Group, a 
listed company. 
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Another recommendation of the study is that the CG field of study looks to the 
behavioural finance field of study in trying to understand why the high levels of 
compliance to CG codes, laws and regulations are not achieving effective results that 
restrain the behaviours exhibited by the 23.91% of the FTSE/JSE Top40 listed 
companies and Steinhoff. Behavioural finance combines theories from behavioural 
and cognitive psychology with economic and finance theories to provide explanations 
for why people seem to make irrational and unpredicted financial decisions. 
Behavioural finance theories might assist by providing answers to the emotional and 
psychological influence on the agent’s seemingly irrational and unpredictable 
decisions.  
This recommendation is in line with the multidisciplinary nature of the CG field of 
research. In the quest for plausible explanations to the study’s findings of high 
adherences to good CG practices, but a high prevalence of CG problems35, the 
solutions might come from the behavioural finance field of study. The study posits that 
transitioning CG research into the behavioural finance field and searching for CG 
answers with a behavioural finance lens might explain the agents’ decisions that result 
in contraventions of the CG codes, laws and regulations. The behavioural finance lens 
might provide plausible explanations to the anomalies found in the study and 
contribute adequate theoretical extensions to the agency theory. An understanding of 
the agent’s behaviour is critical in taking the CG field of study forward. Hence, the 
recommendation to transition CG research into the behavioural finance field. 
5.5.2 Theme II 
The study concludes that executive compensation plays a weightier role in 
exacerbating P-A and CG problems. The study recommends a hybrid of hard and soft 
regulations related to executive pay schemes when they reach certain Gazetted levels. 
The hybrid regulations may entail the lifting of the ‘secrecy veil’ on complex executive 
pay structures, and the current disclosure requirements that do not fully explain the 
widening gap between the lowest paid employees and executives. Greater 
transparency is still needed, especially where executives are compensated through 
shares that are susceptible to manipulation by the very executives who are being 
                                            
35 CG indices are used as proxies to measure CG practices. That is, a higher index means good CG 
practices, while a low index means poor CG practices within the company. 
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monitored. Furthermore, the study recommends regressing remuneration against CG 
index to establish if remuneration considerably influence CG. Longer vesting periods 
in excess of five years are recommended, or at a minimum, the vesting period should 
at least match the average holding period of the top ten shareholders. Matching the 
executives’ shares vesting period to the average holding period of the top ten 
shareholders may bring about a better alignment of the objectives and investment 
period between the agent and principal. This study suggests that research be carried 
out to assess the impact of aligning the principal’s holding period to that of the option 
vesting period on governance. 
5.5.3 Theme III  
As part of responsible investing by institutional investors, this study recommends that 
these investors incorporate and track the s-Gini to hold the executives and board to 
account as they vote on companies’ remuneration policies and related performance. 
Consubstantial to shareholder activism, is for institutional investors to hold companies 
to account due to the consideration of investing in companies that have lower s-Gini 
(that is, better salary equality) as part of its investment process. In other words, 
institutional investors can build in the s-Gini into their investment decision-making to 
influence better levels of salary equality in companies in which they invest. This 
becomes part of their responsible investing philosophy. 
5.5.4 Theme IV 
The results of the study reveal limited success of the voluntary nature of the CG codes. 
The study recommends strengthened forms of external governance through effective 
monitoring by regulatory authorities. The study also recommends that the financial 
press and ‘whistleblowing programmes’ be strengthened or capacitated. External 
governance can take the form of scrutiny by the media, as its watchful eye ensures 
that the interests of the public and stakeholders are protected from malfeasance by 
executives. This recommendation is also nuanced by Kumar and Zattoni (2015). 
These forms of external governance would enhance the effectiveness of the overall 
governance structures of companies. Researchers are encouraged to examine the 
role of investigative journalism and ‘whistleblowing programmes’ in restraining 
corporate malfeasance and improving CG. This recommendation is informed by the 
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fact that the recent Steinhoff and Eskom (not part of this study) scandals were largely 
brought to light by investigative journalists and whistle blowers. 
Figure 5.1 presents infographics that summarise the conclusions, recommendations 
and contributions of the study. 
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Figure 5.1: Infographics summarising conclusions, recommendations and contributions of this study  
Source: Researcher’s findings 
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5.6 POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study was restricted to the FTSE/JSE Top40 South African listed companies with 
available data from 2008 to 2016. As a result, the exclusion of small to medium JSE 
listed companies could not provide the perspective of the research questions in small 
to medium-sized listed companies. The inclusion of small to medium listed companies 
could have provided more insights that could be comparable to the findings in large 
companies. Future research could include small to medium-sized listed companies 
and compare those results to the findings of this study. 
The study had to search for information that was fragmented and not standardised in 
presentation. Although the information was in the public domain as required by the 
South African Companies Act 71 of 2008, listing requirements and good CG practices, 
some of it was not fully transparent and was susceptible to manipulation to conceal 
what is believed were costs and economic consequences of the agency and 
governance problems. For example, information reported in the Integrated Reports 
was not standardised from one year to another, and in one year board members were 
highlighted as NED, while in the next year they are INED, and so forth. This clearly 
revealed deviations from the definitions of INED provided by the King III and King IV, 
and questions the independence criteria used by companies. Further research can 
contribute by examining the criteria being used by listed companies to determine the 
independence of board and committee members. This is important, given that our 
findings showed that the deteriorations in governance indices resulted from the 
independence of the nominating, remuneration and audit committees. The study also 
suggests that further research be carried out to come up with a standardised 
Integrated Reporting framework, especially after King IV in South Africa. 
Aligned to the transparency of the disclosed information mentioned above, in some 
instances, it was difficult to ascertain the criteria used in determining the performance 
of executives. Also, the disclosed executive compensation schemes become complex 
to understand and they need to be simplified (Becht, Bolton & Röell, 2011). 
Sometimes, the compensation benchmarks used to peg executive salaries that 
justified increases in compensation seemed different. Executive compensations were 
benchmarked on the basis of salaries earned by industry peers, but these companies 
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seemed to use different measurements. Scholarly work is needed to design simplified 
and standardised executive compensation frameworks and benchmarks that can 
contribute to good governance. 
Finally, the model results showed weak relationships although its directionality 
provided valuable insights. Screening some of the variables may provide significant 
statistical relationships, especially between remuneration and governance. For this 
reason, the researcher suggests that further economic modelling is necessary. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: 
Mapping of King III and King IV recommendations to the governance provisions 
 
  
Mapping King III & IV Principle & Practice Page in King
No Chair/CEO Duality King III, Principle 2.16 & King IV, Principle 7, Practice 34 24/53
Majority of NEDs on board are Independent King III, Principle 2.18, Practice 2.18.1 & 2.18.2 Majority NEDs 25
Presence of Deputy Chair and or Lead INED (LID) King III, Principle 2.22, Annex 2.1 & King IV, Principle 7, Practice 32 45,53/53
Presence of Remuneration Committee King III, Principle 2.23, 2.25, 2.26, 2.27, Practice 2.23.6 & King IV, Principle 14, Practice 26-39 28-30/64-67
INED Chairs Remuneration Committee King III, Principle 2.16, 2.23, 130, 131, 45.2 Chapter 2 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 67 36/57
Remuneration Committee comprised of NEDs & majority are INEDs King III, Principle 2.23, Practice 2.23.7 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 66 29/57
Presence of Audit Committee King III, Principle 3.1, Practice 3.1.1 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 51, 56, 57 31/56
INED Chairs Audit Committee King III, Principle 3.3, Practice 3.3.1-3.3.3 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 57 32/56
All Audit Committee members are INEDs King III, Principle 3.2, Practice 3.2.1 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 56 31/56
Presence of Nominating Committee King III, Principle 2.23, Practice 2.23.6, 130 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 60, 61 29/57
NED or Board Chair chairs the Nominating Committee King III, Principle 2.23, Practice 2.23.6, 40.3, 45.3, King IV, Principle 7, Practice 36 (C) 29, 34, 36/53
Nominating Committee comprised of NEDs & majority are INEDs King III, Principle 2.23, Practice 2.23.7 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 61 29/57
Presence of Risk Committee King III, Principle 2.23 & 4.3, Practice 2.23.6 & 4.3.1, 4.3.2.1 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 62 29, 36/57
NED Chairs the Risk Committee King III, Principle 2.16, Practice 45.4 & King IV, Principle 7, Practice 36 (b) contradicts by permitting board Chair to chair Risk Committee 36/
Majority of Risk Committee members are NEDs King III, Principle 4.3, Practice 4.3.2.2 & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 64 36/30,57
Presence of a Committee overseeing technology and information governance King III, Principle 5.1, Practices covered in Chapter 5 & King IV, Principle 12, Practice 10-17 82/63
Presence of a Social and Ethics Committee King III, Principle 1.1 & 2.23, Practice 9, 130 (Section 72 (4), 43 & 26 (20) of Companies Act & King IV, Principle 8, Practice 68-70 20, 46/57
NED Chairs the Social and Ethics Committee King IV, Principle 7, Practice 36(e) 53
Majority of Social & Ethics  Committee members are NEDs King IV, Principle 8, Practice 70 57
Compliance  with laws, rules, codes & standards i.e. no reported breaches King III, Principle 6.1, Practice 6.1.6 & King IV, Principle 13, Practice 18-25 41,42/63,64
APPENDIX 1: MAPPING SUMMARY OF GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS TO KING III & KING IV
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Appendix 2:  Summary of non-adherences to King III and King IV provisions 
 
  
Non-Adherence to King III & IV (Non-compliant companies as % of Total Sample) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
No Chair/CEO Duality 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.13% 0.24%
Majority of NEDs on board are Independent 23.40% 17.02% 17.02% 19.15% 14.89% 17.02% 12.77% 12.77% 10.64% 16.08%
Presence of Deputy Chair and or Lead INED (LID) 36.17% 36.17% 36.17% 36.17% 36.17% 36.17% 36.17% 36.17% 36.17% 36.17%
Presence of Remuneration Committee 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
INED Chairs Remuneration Committee 8.51% 8.51% 8.51% 6.38% 4.26% 2.13% 2.13% 4.26% 2.13% 5.20%
Remuneration Committee comprised of NEDs & majority are INEDs 46.81% 42.55% 46.81% 51.06% 38.30% 36.17% 31.91% 34.04% 27.66% 39.48%
Presence of Audit Committee 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
INED Chairs Audit Committee 4.26% 4.26% 4.26% 2.13% 0.00% 0.00% 2.13% 2.13% 2.13% 2.36%
All Audit Committee members are INEDs 55.32% 48.94% 44.68% 48.94% 46.81% 44.68% 42.55% 44.68% 40.43% 46.34%
Presence of Nominating Committee 8.51% 6.38% 4.26% 6.38% 6.38% 6.38% 4.26% 4.26% 4.26% 5.67%
NED or Board Chair chairs the Nominating Committee 8.51% 6.38% 4.26% 6.38% 6.38% 6.38% 4.26% 6.38% 6.38% 6.15%
Nominating Committee comprised of NEDs & majority are INEDs 40.43% 36.17% 40.43% 44.68% 42.55% 36.17% 29.79% 38.30% 31.91% 37.83%
Presence of Risk Committee 2.13% 2.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.47%
NED Chairs the Risk Committee 6.38% 6.38% 2.13% 2.13% 2.13% 2.13% 2.13% 2.13% 2.13% 3.07%
Majority of Risk Committee members are NEDs 42.55% 42.55% 34.04% 34.04% 31.91% 31.91% 31.91% 29.79% 31.91% 34.52%
Presence of a Committee overseeing technology and information governance 42.55% 42.55% 40.43% 38.30% 38.30% 38.30% 38.30% 38.30% 38.30% 39.48%
Presence of a Social and Ethics Committee 85.11% 85.11% 85.11% 53.19% 12.77% 8.51% 8.51% 8.51% 10.64% 39.72%
NED Chairs the Social and Ethics Committee 87.23% 87.23% 87.23% 57.45% 14.89% 10.64% 10.64% 10.64% 12.77% 42.08%
Majority of Social & Ethics  Committee members are NEDs 89.36% 89.36% 87.23% 68.09% 42.55% 40.43% 42.55% 42.55% 40.43% 60.28%
Compliance  with laws, rules, codes & standards i.e. no reported breaches 6.38% 2.13% 2.13% 0.00% 4.26% 4.26% 0.00% 4.26% 2.13% 2.84%
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Appendix 3:  Attribution of changes in governance indices 
 
 
Company Name Name Sector Year TOTAL
Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2014 14 √
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2013 15
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 15
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2010 14
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2014 19 √
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2013 20
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2016 16
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2015 15 √ √ √
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2014 18
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2013 17 √
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2012 18
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2011 15
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2010 14
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2009 14 √ √
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2008 16
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2014 19
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2013 18 √
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2012 19
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2011 16 √
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2010 17
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2009 16
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2008 14
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2009 16
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2008 15
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2014 16
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2009 14
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2008 12
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2012 13
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 12
Index decrease ascribed to non-independence of: 
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Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2016 18
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2015 16 √
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2014 17
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2013 15
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2011 11 √ √
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2010 15
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2016 18
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2015 17
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2012 17
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2011 13
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2016 18
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2015 15 √
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2014 16
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2012 16 √ √
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2011 18
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2015 19
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2014 18
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2012 18
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2011 14
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2009 16 √
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2008 15
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2015 19
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2014 18 √
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2013 19
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2011 19
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2010 15
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2012 17
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2011 14
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2016 19
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2015 18
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2014 18
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2013 17
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2012 17
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2011 15
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2010 15 √
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2009 16
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Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2015 16 √ √
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2014 20
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2013 18
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2012 17
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2011 18
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2010 14 √
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2009 15
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2008 14
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2011 20
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2010 16
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2013 19
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2012 13
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2011 13 √ √ √
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2010 16
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2009 16
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2008 13
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2016 18
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2015 16
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2014 15
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2012 15
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2011 12
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2010 12 √
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2009 13
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2008 12
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2015 16
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2014 15
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2015 15
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2014 14 √
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2013 15
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2009 13
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2008 11
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2012 19
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2011 17
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2015 17 √
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2014 18
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2013 17 √
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2012 18
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2011 17
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2010 14
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2009 13
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2008 14
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RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2016 19
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2015 18
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2013 18
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2012 15
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2016 15 √ √
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2015 17 √
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2014 18
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2013 18
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2012 17
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2011 17
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2014 18
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2013 17
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2012 16
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2011 9
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2010 10 √
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2009 9
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2015 14 √
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2014 15
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 15
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2010 12
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality2012 20
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality2011 18
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2013 15 √ √
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2012 17
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2011 12
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2010 12 √ √
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2009 14
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2011 13
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2010 11
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2009 9
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2012 19
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2011 15
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2010 15
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2009 14
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 15
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2010 13
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2012 12
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 10
APPENDIX 3: ATTRIBUTION OF CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE INDICES (CONTINUED)
Page | 212  
 
  
Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2014 18
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2013 17 √
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2012 18
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2011 18
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2010 15
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2009 14
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2013 16 √
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2011 13
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13 √
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2009 14
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2013 19
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2012 18
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2011 14
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2010 14
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2009 13 √
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2008 14
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2013 18
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2012 17
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2011 17
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2010 15
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2009 14
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2015 19
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2014 18
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2013 17
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2012 16 √
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2011 17
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2010 13
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2013 19
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2012 18
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 18
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2010 15
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2011 15 √ √ √ √
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2010 17
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2009 16
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Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2015 16 √
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2014 17
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2013 16 √
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2012 17
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2011 16
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2009 16
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2008 14
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2016 16
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2015 14 √ √
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2014 16
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2013 15
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2012 15
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2011 13
8 1 2 11 9 13 1 2 1 3
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Company Name Name Sector Year TOTAL
Board LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2014 14
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2013 15
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 15 √
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2010 14
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2014 19
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2013 20
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2016 16 √
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2015 15
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2014 18 √
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2013 17
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2012 18 √ √
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2011 15 √
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2010 14
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2009 14
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2008 16
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2014 19 √
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2013 18
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2012 19 √ √
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2011 16
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2010 17 √
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2009 16 √ √
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2008 14
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2009 16 √
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2008 15
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2014 16 √
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2009 14 √ √
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2008 12
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2012 13 √
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 12
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Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2016 18 √ √
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2015 16
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2014 17 √
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2013 15
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15 √ √ √
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2011 11
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2010 15
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2016 18 √
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2015 17
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2012 17 √ √ √
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2011 13
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2016 18 √ √ √
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2015 15
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2014 16
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2012 16
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2011 18
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2015 19 √
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2014 18
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2012 18 √ √ √
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2011 14
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2009 16
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2008 15
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2015 19 √
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2014 18
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2013 19
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2011 19 √ √ √
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2010 15
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2012 17 √ √
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2011 14
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2016 19 √
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2015 18
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2014 18 √
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2013 17
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2012 17 √
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2011 15
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2010 15
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2009 16
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Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2015 16
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2014 20 √
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2013 18 √
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2012 17
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2011 18 √ √ √
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2010 14
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2009 15
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2008 14 √
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2011 20 √ √
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2010 16
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2013 19 √ √ √ √ √
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2012 13
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2011 13
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2010 16
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2009 16 √ √ √
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2008 13
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2016 18 √ √
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2015 16 √
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2014 15
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2012 15 √ √
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2011 12
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2010 12
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2009 13
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2008 12
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2015 16 √
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2014 15
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2015 15 √
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2014 14
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2013 15
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2009 13 √
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2008 11
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2012 19 √
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2011 17
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2015 17
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2014 18 √
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2013 17
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2012 18 √
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2011 17 √ √
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2010 14
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2009 13
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2008 14
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Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2016 19 √
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2015 18
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2013 18 √ √
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2012 15
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2016 15
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2015 17
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2014 18
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2013 18 √ √
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2012 17
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2011 17 √ √
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2014 18 √
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2013 17 √ √
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2012 16
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2011 9 √
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2010 10
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2009 9
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2015 14
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2014 15
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 15 √ √
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2010 12
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality2012 20 √ √
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality2011 18
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2013 15
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2012 17
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2011 12 √ √ √ √
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2010 12
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2009 14
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2011 13 √
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2010 11 √
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2009 9
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2012 19 √ √ √
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2011 15
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2010 15 √
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2009 14
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 15 √
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2010 13
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2012 12 √
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 10
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Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2014 18 √
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2013 17
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2012 18
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2011 18 √ √
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2010 15 √
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2009 14
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2013 16
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15 √
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2011 13
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2009 14
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2013 19 √
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2012 18 √ √ √
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2011 14
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2010 14 √
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2009 13
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2008 14
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2013 18 √
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2012 17
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2011 17 √
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2010 15 √
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2009 14
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2015 19 √
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2014 18
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2013 17 √
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2012 16
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2011 17 √ √ √
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2010 13
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2013 19 √
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2012 18
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 18 √ √
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2010 15
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2011 15 √
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2010 17
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2009 16 √
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Year TOTAL Board No LID
RemCom 
Chair RemCom AuditCom NomCom
RiskCom 
Chair RiskCom
SocialCom 
Chair SocialCom
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2015 16
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2014 17 √
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2013 16
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2012 17 √
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2011 16
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2009 16 √ √
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2008 14
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2016 16 √ √
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2015 14
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2014 16 √
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2013 15
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2012 15 √
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2011 13
9 1 6 19 18 18 2 4 30 23Total changes ascribed to each provision
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Company Name Name Sector Nature of Identified CG Event Event date
Start of 
Estimation 
Window
Event 
Window
End of 
Event 
Window
Post-event 
Window
Estimation 
Period
Event 
Window 
Period
Post-Event 
Window 
Period
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 
The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) charged 
and found Aspen guilty of infringing Article 102 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union by setting excessive prices for life-saving 
and irreplaceable drugs in the treatment of 
oncohematological patients. 29-Sep-16 11-May-16 14-Sep-16 13-Oct-16 12-Dec-16 126 29 60
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare
The Competition Commission alleged and 
Netcare accepted that it implemented a merger 
with Community Hospital Group (Pty) Ltd without 
the Commission’s approval thus contravening 
section 13 A(3) of the Act. In addition, Netcare 
contravened section 4(1)(b) of the Act by having a 
similar pricing structure for tariffs it charged in its 
hospitals with those charged by Community 
Hospital Group (Pty) Ltd before the unauthorised 
merger. 10-Mar-08 21-Oct-07 24-Feb-08 24-Mar-08 23-May-08 126 29 60
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services
Commission investigated MTN for price 
discrimination in contravention of section 9(1) of 
the Competition Act. The Commission alleged 
that MTN’s conduct substantially reduced 
competition between telecommunication network 
operators. 30-Jul-07 11-Mar-07 15-Jul-07 13-Aug-07 12-Oct-07 126 29 60
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services
Contraventions and non-compliance by MTN 
Nigeria (a subsidiary of the group) in 2015 
culminated with a fine of US$5 200 000 000.00 
imposed by Nigeria Communications Commission 
(NCC). 26-Oct-15 07-Jun-15 11-Oct-15 09-Nov-15 08-Jan-16 126 29 60
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 29-Mar-12 09-Nov-11 14-Mar-12 12-Apr-12 11-Jun-12 126 29 60
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 28-Nov-13 10-Jul-13 13-Nov-13 12-Dec-13 10-Feb-14 126 29 60
APPENDIX 4: SUMMARY OF IDENTIFIED CG EVENTS AND DATES USED IN EVENT STUDY
Turkcell (a Turkish telecommunications operator), 
a competitor in Iran accused MTN of bribing 
Iranian officials in 2012. The case between 
Turkcell and MTN continued in 2017 with the 
South Gauteng High Court (South Africa) granting 
Turkcell a go ahead with a US$4 200 000 000.00 
lawsuit against MTN (van Zyl, 2017).
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Estimation 
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End of 
Event 
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Post-event 
Window
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Period
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Window 
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Period
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services
Charged by the Competition Commission for 
dividing the grain trade market in which they 
compete by allocating territories and customers. 17-Mar-09 27-Oct-08 02-Mar-09 31-Mar-09 30-May-09 126 29 60
Sasol Ltd.-SCI 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality
Fined for abusing fertiliser market dominance by 
charging excessive prices and collusion to fix 
prices of certain fertilisers with its competitors 
such as Kynoch and Omnia. 03-May-05 13-Dec-04 18-Apr-05 17-May-05 16-Jul-05 126 29 60
Sasol Ltd.-SCI 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality
Sasol engaged in collusive conduct as a result of 
the implementation of the supply agreement 
including the operation of the pricing formula and 
the exchange of information relating to the pricing 
of polypropylene. 12-Aug-10 24-Mar-10 28-Jul-10 26-Aug-10 25-Oct-10 126 29 60
Tiger Brands Ltd.-Albany 
Bakeries 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors
Price fixing for bread, the implementation date for 
these prices and dividing markets. All are 
contraventions of Chapter 2 of the Competition 
Act 14-Feb-07 26-Sep-06 30-Jan-07 28-Feb-07 29-Apr-07 126 29 60
Tiger Brands Ltd.-Adcock Ingram 
Critical Care (Pty) Ltd (“AICC”) 32 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 
Collusive tendering and market allocation, both of 
which are contraventions of section 4 of the 
Competition Act. 11-Feb-08 23-Sep-07 27-Jan-08 25-Feb-08 25-Apr-08 126 29 60
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services
The Competition Commission laid criminal 
charges against a Vodacom Executive Director in 
terms of section 73 of the Competition Act. 24-Jul-08 05-Mar-08 09-Jul-08 07-Aug-08 06-Oct-08 126 29 60
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services
Liberty colluded to divide markets by allocating 
customers and territories through two deeds of 
restraint. 13-Mar-11 23-Oct-10 26-Feb-11 27-Mar-11 26-May-11 126 29 60
Mediclinic 47 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 10-Feb-12 22-Sep-11 26-Jan-12 24-Feb-12 24-Apr-12 126 29 60
Mediclinic 47 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 26-Feb-13 08-Oct-12 11-Feb-13 12-Mar-13 11-May-13 126 29 60
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco
Investigation into alleged bribes paid by BAT 
employees to politicians, public officials and 
people working for competitors to damage 
competitors’ reputation. 30-Nov-15 12-Jul-15 15-Nov-15 14-Dec-15 12-Feb-16 126 29 60
13-Jul-09 11-Sep-09 126 29 60
Investigated for alleged price fixing and another 
based on the relationship that Mediclinic had with 
Victoria Hospital Proprietary Limited, Newcastle 
Private Hospital Proprietary Limited, Howick 
Private Hospital Holdings Proprietary Limited, 
Mediclinic Tzaneen Proprietary Limited, 
Mediclinic Hermanus Proprietary Limited and 
Mediclinic Upington Proprietary Limited. 
The Commission’s investigations focussed on 
abuse of buyer power, category management, 
exclusive long-term leases and information 
exchange with regards to staple foods. 29-Jun-09 08-Feb-09 14-Jun-09
Supermarkets
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Estimation window Aspen
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.264337388
R Square 0.069874255
Adjusted R Square 0.059304644
Standard Error 0.017554615
Observations 90
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.002037234 0.002037234 6.610863573 0.011814957
Residual 88 0.027118478 0.000308165
Total 89 0.029155712
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000672637 0.001850741 0.363442024 0.717146353 -0.003005322 0.0043506 -0.00300532 0.004350597
X Variable 1 0.471620624 0.183427181 2.571159966 0.011814957 0.107097647 0.8361436 0.10709765 0.836143601
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.11934857
R Square 0.014244081
Adjusted R Square -0.03504371
Standard Error 0.016628441
Observations 22
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000079909                                                0.0000799094                                                                   0.288998136 0.596794841
Residual 20 0.005530101 0.000276505
Total 21 0.00561001
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00396743 0.003610677 -1.098805744 0.284904824 -0.011499174 0.0035643 -0.01149917 0.003564308
X Variable 1 0.165979484 0.308749946 0.537585468 0.596794841 -0.478061618 0.8100206 -0.47806162 0.810020586
Post-event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.491885145
R Square 0.241950996
Adjusted R Square 0.234519143
Standard Error 0.012229705
Observations 104
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.004869253 0.004869253 32.55594482 0.0000001140     
Residual 102 0.015255701 0.000149566
Total 103 0.020124954
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00098101 0.001199312 -0.817976055 0.415277606 -0.003359837 0.0013978 -0.00335984 0.001397821
X Variable 1 0.766546263 0.134345529 5.705781701 0.000000114  0.500072543 1.03302 0.50007254 1.033019984
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Estimation window 30 July 2007 Event MTN
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.515175766
R Square 0.26540607
Adjusted R Square 0.257243915
Standard Error 0.016051793
Observations 92
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.008378246 0.008378246 32.51666715 0.00000014844  
Residual 90 0.023189405 0.00025766
Total 91 0.031567651
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000119861 0.001703622 0.070356751 0.944065812 -0.003264682 0.0035044 -0.00326468 0.003504405
X Variable 1 0.999460427 0.175272019 5.702338744 0.000000148  0.651251969 1.3476689 0.65125197 1.347668886
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.868850389
R Square 0.754900999
Adjusted R Square 0.743229618
Standard Error 0.011805704
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.009014705 0.009014705 64.6796637 0.0000000757     
Residual 21 0.002926868 0.000139375
Total 22 0.011941573
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001621209 0.002568148 0.631275496 0.534671929 -0.003719547 0.006962 -0.00371955 0.006961965
X Variable 1 0.960411876 0.119419059 8.042366797 0.000000076  0.712066347 1.2087574 0.71206635 1.208757404
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.548494533
R Square 0.300846252
Adjusted R Square 0.293784093
Standard Error 0.021887341
Observations 101
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.020407655 0.020407655 42.5997559 0.00000000289  
Residual 99 0.047426513 0.000479056
Total 100 0.067834168
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.002223134 0.002187684 1.016204101 0.312009283 -0.002117707 0.006564 -0.00211771 0.006563974
X Variable 1 1.090815312 0.167127405 6.526848849 0.000000003  0.759198281 1.4224323 0.75919828 1.422432342
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Estimation window 29 March 2012 Event MTN
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.566546288
R Square 0.320974697
Adjusted R Square 0.3132585
Standard Error 0.013951809
Observations 90
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.008097083 0.008097083 41.59752693 0.00000000587  
Residual 88 0.017129462 0.000194653
Total 89 0.025226545
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.00001344-   0.001471904 -0.009133519 0.992733282 -0.002938544 0.0029117 -0.00293854 0.002911657
X Variable 1 0.940048996 0.145752742 6.449614479 0.000000006  0.650396049 1.2297019 0.65039605 1.229701943
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.17374007
R Square 0.030185612
Adjusted R Square -0.01599603
Standard Error 0.016580409
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000179689 0.000179689 0.653628013 0.427883052
Residual 21 0.005773109 0.00027491
Total 22 0.005952798
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00323711 0.003473377 -0.93197654 0.361940506 -0.010460389 0.0039862 -0.01046039 0.003986177
X Variable 1 0.334885672 0.414220166 0.808472642 0.427883052 -0.52653232 1.1963037 -0.52653232 1.196303665
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.568502204
R Square 0.323194756
Adjusted R Square 0.316493714
Standard Error 0.011304658
Observations 103
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.006163633 0.006163633 48.23052228 0.00000000037  
Residual 101 0.012907324 0.000127795
Total 102 0.019070957
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001354637 0.001115058 1.214858014 0.227252758 -0.000857338 0.0035666 -0.00085734 0.003566612
X Variable 1 0.937062992 0.134929777 6.944819816 0.000000000  0.669398609 1.2047274 0.66939861 1.204727375
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Estimation window 28 Nov 2013 Event MTN
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.547821126
R Square 0.300107986
Adjusted R Square 0.29224403
Standard Error 0.013257765
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.006707755 0.006707755 38.16247389 0.000000019       
Residual 89 0.015643383 0.000175768
Total 90 0.022351138
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00028932 0.001407695 -0.205524551 0.837631684 -0.003086375 0.0025077 -0.00308638 0.002507744
X Variable 1 0.998704976 0.161666097 6.177578319 0.00000002     0.677477885 1.3199321 0.67747788 1.319932067
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.756714829
R Square 0.572617332
Adjusted R Square 0.551248198
Standard Error 0.013563506
Observations 22
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.004929712 0.004929712 26.7964695 0.00004587         
Residual 20 0.003679374 0.000183969
Total 21 0.008609086
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.00180548 0.002924414 0.617381862 0.543948721 -0.00429474 0.0079057 -0.00429474 0.0079057
X Variable 1 1.474859751 0.284912783 5.176530644 0.00004587     0.8805421 2.0691774 0.8805421 2.069177         
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.338132168
R Square 0.114333363
Adjusted R Square 0.105564387
Standard Error 0.012758775
Observations 103
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.002122472 0.002122472 13.03839302 0.000477143
Residual 101 0.01644142 0.000162786
Total 102 0.018563892
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000282689 0.001277821 0.221227541 0.825361906 -0.002252165 0.0028175 -0.00225216 0.002817543
X Variable 1 0.646271846 0.178979464 3.610871504 0.000477143 0.291224735 1.001319 0.29122473 1.001318958
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Estimation window 26 Oct 2015 Event MTN
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.69478851
R Square 0.482731074
Adjusted R Square 0.476919063
Standard Error 0.016228728
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.021874989 0.021874989 83.05750331 0.000000000000
Residual 89 0.023440074 0.000263372
Total 90 0.045315063
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00173694 0.001702939 -1.019967741 0.310508362 -0.005120647 0.0016468 -0.00512065 0.001646761
X Variable 1 1.121380204 0.123044852 9.113588937 0.000000000  0.876892704 1.3658677 0.8768927 1.365867705
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.54369029
R Square 0.295599131
Adjusted R Square 0.262056233
Standard Error 0.032299452
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.009193754 0.009193754 8.8125697 0.007328682
Residual 21 0.021908347 0.001043255
Total 22 0.031102101
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00791843 0.006743198 -1.174283684 0.253426625 -0.021941676 0.0061048 -0.02194168 0.006104821
X Variable 1 2.180035686 0.734365592 2.968597261 0.007328682 0.652838833 3.7072325 0.65283883 3.707232538
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.580577319
R Square 0.337070024
Adjusted R Square 0.330440724
Standard Error 0.031162893
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.049377377 0.049377377 50.84549431 0.0000000002
Residual 100 0.09711259 0.000971126
Total 101 0.146489967
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00023378 0.003086325 -0.075748395 0.939770608 -0.006356965 0.0058894 -0.00635697 0.005889397
X Variable 1 1.665384442 0.233554514 7.130602661 0.000000000  1.202018938 2.1287499 1.20201894 2.128749947
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Estimation window RMB
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.549276593
R Square 0.301704776
Adjusted R Square 0.293769603
Standard Error 0.034198663
Observations 90
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.044467635 0.044467635 38.02119705 0.0000000207     
Residual 88 0.10292027 0.001169549
Total 89 0.147387905
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000233963 0.003605026 0.064899082 0.948401555 -0.006930269 0.0073982 -0.00693027 0.007398195
X Variable 1 0.757382427 0.1228294 6.166133071 0.000000021  0.513284805 1.00148 0.5132848 1.00148005
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.491116909
R Square 0.241195818
Adjusted R Square 0.205062285
Standard Error 0.029562883
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.005833819 0.005833819 6.675124221 0.017325636
Residual 21 0.018353245 0.000873964
Total 22 0.024187064
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.003898916 0.006460236 0.603525336 0.552623078 -0.00953588 0.0173337 -0.00953588 0.017333712
X Variable 1 0.656352906 0.254043295 2.583626177 0.017325636 0.128040953 1.1846649 0.12804095 1.184664859
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.574244626
R Square 0.32975689
Adjusted R Square 0.322986758
Standard Error 0.017385892
Observations 101
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.014722808 0.014722808 48.70759822 0.00000000034  
Residual 99 0.029924654 0.000302269
Total 100 0.044647462
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000535694 0.001737884 0.308244785 0.758543713 -0.002912645 0.003984 -0.00291265 0.003984033
X Variable 1 0.743112772 0.106477138 6.979082907 0.000000000  0.53183903 0.9543865 0.53183903 0.954386514
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Estimation window 03 May 2005 Event Sasol
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.55404626
R Square 0.306967259
Adjusted R Square 0.299180374
Standard Error 0.014997713
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.008867034 0.008867034 39.42106107 0.0000000122     
Residual 89 0.020018893 0.000224931
Total 90 0.028885927
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001503048 0.001583938 0.948930808 0.345225437 -0.001644203 0.0046503 -0.0016442 0.004650298
X Variable 1 1.569363047 0.249953526 6.27861936 0.000000012  1.072710715 2.0660154 1.07271072 2.066015379
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.787407166
R Square 0.620010046
Adjusted R Square 0.601915286
Standard Error 0.010394011
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.003701794 0.003701794 34.26461888 0.000008244       
Residual 21 0.002268745 0.000108035
Total 22 0.005970539
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.002106357 0.002177684 0.96724609 0.344429375 -0.002422386 0.0066351 -0.00242239 0.006635099
X Variable 1 1.249242578 0.213414452 5.853598797 0.00000824     0.805422929 1.6930622 0.80542293 1.693062226
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.573024513
R Square 0.328357092
Adjusted R Square 0.321640663
Standard Error 0.017381614
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.014770261 0.014770261 48.88864139 0.00000000031  
Residual 100 0.030212051 0.000302121
Total 101 0.044982312
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000757561 0.001776103 0.426529896 0.670638575 -0.002766176 0.0042813 -0.00276618 0.004281298
X Variable 1 1.530653087 0.218913622 6.992041289 0.000000000  1.096334695 1.9649715 1.09633469 1.964971479
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Estimation window 12 Aug 2010 Event Sasol
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.776585706
R Square 0.603085359
Adjusted R Square 0.598625644
Standard Error 0.009671052
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.01264792 0.01264792 135.2295717 0.0000000000     
Residual 89 0.008324103 0.00009353                                                                        
Total 90 0.020972023
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000477142 0.001013843 0.47062737 0.639058237 -0.001537343 0.0024916 -0.00153734 0.002491628
X Variable 1 0.810706516 0.069715256 11.62882503 0.000000000  0.672183787 0.9492292 0.67218379 0.949229245
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.8308714
R Square 0.690347284
Adjusted R Square 0.675601916
Standard Error 0.008543043
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.003416939 0.003416939 46.81790985 0.00000091662  
Residual 21 0.001532655 0.000072984                                                                      
Total 22 0.004949594
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001881659 0.001877415 1.002260853 0.327627311 -0.002022639 0.005786 -0.00202264 0.005785958
X Variable 1 1.201808203 0.175642315 6.842361423 0.000000917  0.836540012 1.5670764 0.83654001 1.567076394
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.620555785
R Square 0.385089482
Adjusted R Square 0.378940377
Standard Error 0.00973581
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.005936001 0.005936001 62.62528796 0.000000000       
Residual 100 0.0094786 0.00009479                                                                        
Total 101 0.015414601
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000533412 0.00099754 0.534726869 0.594025713 -0.00144568 0.0025125 -0.00144568 0.002512503
X Variable 1 0.917555959 0.115946513 7.91361409 0.00000000     0.687521379 1.1475905 0.68752138 1.147590538
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Estimation window BAT
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.633434721
R Square 0.401239546
Adjusted R Square 0.3945119
Standard Error 0.009092866
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.004931081 0.004931081 59.64041102 0.0000000000     
Residual 89 0.007358538 0.00008268                                                                        
Total 90 0.01228962
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001841851 0.000953227 1.932227281 0.056512131 -5.21905E-05 0.0037359 0.000052-      0.003735893
X Variable 1 0.544602744 0.070519547 7.722720442 0.000000000  0.404481907 0.6847236 0.40448191 0.68472358
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.271456028
R Square 0.073688375
Adjusted R Square 0.031583301
Standard Error 0.014364601
Observations 24
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.00036112 0.00036112 1.750106776 0.199450078
Residual 22 0.004539519 0.000206342
Total 23 0.004900639
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.002243633 0.002942301 0.762543681 0.453834493 -0.003858326 0.0083456 -0.00385833 0.008345592
X Variable 1 0.356698814 0.269630733 1.322916012 0.199450078 -0.202481101 0.9158787 -0.2024811 0.915878729
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.332360935
R Square 0.110463791
Adjusted R Square 0.101478577
Standard Error 0.012227955
Observations 101
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001838227 0.001838227 12.29395187 0.000684583
Residual 99 0.014802765 0.000149523
Total 100 0.016640992
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000669664 0.00121678 0.550357529 0.58331385 -0.001744692 0.003084 -0.00174469 0.00308402
X Variable 1 0.337701611 0.096313547 3.506273217 0.000684583 0.146594638 0.5288086 0.14659464 0.528808584
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Estimation window Woolworths
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.580285632
R Square 0.336731414
Adjusted R Square 0.329278958
Standard Error 0.021683886
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.021245083 0.021245083 45.18395193 0.00000000165  
Residual 89 0.041846991 0.000470191
Total 90 0.063092074
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.0012311 0.00227463 -0.541231904 0.589699971 -0.005750744 0.0032885 -0.00575074 0.003288539
X Variable 1 0.773102478 0.115012478 6.721900917 0.000000002  0.544575135 1.0016298 0.54457514 1.001629821
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.448414383
R Square 0.201075458
Adjusted R Square 0.163031433
Standard Error 0.014467177
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001106217 0.001106217 5.285335985 0.031869886
Residual 21 0.004395283 0.000209299
Total 22 0.0055015
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.006692099 0.003033264 2.206237149 0.038640719 0.000384082 0.0130001 0.00038408 0.013000116
X Variable 1 0.39491352 0.171777272 2.29898586 0.031869886 0.037683126 0.7521439 0.03768313 0.752143914
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.400902171
R Square 0.160722551
Adjusted R Square 0.152329776
Standard Error 0.016808624
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.005410477 0.005410477 19.15010952 0.0000297256     
Residual 100 0.028252985 0.00028253
Total 101 0.033663462
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000379157 0.00168137 0.225504743 0.822046855 -0.002956633 0.0037149 -0.00295663 0.003714947
X Variable 1 0.684687136 0.156461157 4.376083811 0.000029726  0.374272657 0.9951016 0.37427266 0.995101615
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Estimation window Netcare
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.333846605
R Square 0.111453556
Adjusted R Square 0.101469888
Standard Error 0.01660677
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.003078748 0.003078748 11.16358804 0.001220766
Residual 89 0.024544849 0.000275785
Total 90 0.027623597
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.0040533 0.001740863 -2.328330612 0.022161047 -0.007512363 -0.000594 -0.00751236 -0.000594247
X Variable 1 0.321432493 0.096202836 3.3411956 0.001220766 0.130279507 0.5125855 0.13027951 0.51258548
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.462853539
R Square 0.214233398
Adjusted R Square 0.176815941
Standard Error 0.024914135
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.003553894 0.003553894 5.725493231 0.026145933
Residual 21 0.013034996 0.000620714
Total 22 0.016588891
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001639565 0.005199968 0.315302996 0.755643473 -0.009174359 0.0124535 -0.00917436 0.01245349
X Variable 1 0.731703341 0.305793736 2.392800291 0.026145933 0.095770453 1.3676362 0.09577045 1.367636228
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.41738988
R Square 0.174214312
Adjusted R Square 0.165956455
Standard Error 0.020006809
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.008444465 0.008444465 21.09679476 0.0000127468     
Residual 100 0.040027242 0.000400272
Total 101 0.048471708
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.000075240 0.001986787 -0.037870321 0.969866575 -0.004016969 0.0038665 -0.00401697 0.003866489
X Variable 1 0.636747122 0.138630488 4.593124727 0.000012747  0.361708183 0.9117861 0.36170818 0.911786062
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Estimation window Liberty
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.37311789
R Square 0.13921696
Adjusted R Square 0.12954524
Standard Error 0.010897819
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001709494 0.001709494 14.39423039 0.000269913
Residual 89 0.010569858 0.000118762
Total 90 0.012279352
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 6.88323E-05 0.00114591 0.060067822 0.952236295 -0.002208066 0.0023457 -0.00220807 0.00234573
X Variable 1 0.472714483 0.124596167 3.793972903 0.000269913 0.225144552 0.7202844 0.22514455 0.720284414
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.327679364
R Square 0.107373766
Adjusted R Square 0.064867755
Standard Error 0.01518361
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000582369 0.000582369 2.526084265 0.12692072
Residual 21 0.004841382 0.000230542
Total 22 0.005423751
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00450421 0.003169388 -1.421162197 0.16994998 -0.011095316 0.0020869 -0.01109532 0.002086889
X Variable 1 0.401316444 0.252500963 1.589365995 0.12692072 -0.123788054 0.9264209 -0.12378805 0.926420943
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.277405983
R Square 0.07695408
Adjusted R Square 0.06772362
Standard Error 0.009332116
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000726053 0.000726053 8.336971969 0.004761259
Residual 100 0.008708839 0.000087088                                                                      
Total 101 0.009434893
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000768757 0.000927554 0.828800238 0.409191316 -0.001071484 0.002609 -0.00107148 0.002608998
X Variable 1 0.234423472 0.08118895 2.887381507 0.004761259 0.073346908 0.3955 0.07334691 0.395500036
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Estimation window Pick n Pay
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.426225619
R Square 0.181668279
Adjusted R Square 0.17247354
Standard Error 0.023039921
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.010488218 0.010488218 19.75785171 0.0000252567     
Residual 89 0.04724458 0.000530838
Total 90 0.057732798
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000406443 0.002416878 0.168168784 0.866832069 -0.004395841 0.0052087 -0.00439584 0.005208728
X Variable 1 0.543198673 0.122204962 4.444980508 0.00002526     0.300380017 0.7860173 0.30038002 0.786017329
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.567935923
R Square 0.322551213
Adjusted R Square 0.290291747
Standard Error 0.017488911
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.003058208 0.003058208 9.998653192 0.004698953
Residual 21 0.006423102 0.000305862
Total 22 0.00948131
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001905545 0.003666816 0.519672918 0.608726335 -0.005720017 0.0095311 -0.00572002 0.009531107
X Variable 1 0.656622019 0.207656098 3.162064704 0.004698953 0.224777522 1.0884665 0.22477752 1.088466517
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.200075967
R Square 0.040030392
Adjusted R Square 0.030430696
Standard Error 0.01435104
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000858814 0.000858814 4.169964556 0.043779145
Residual 100 0.020595236 0.000205952
Total 101 0.02145405
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000575836 0.001435537 0.401129475 0.689180647 -0.002272229 0.0034239 -0.00227223 0.003423901
X Variable 1 0.272787168 0.133585019 2.042049107 0.043779145 0.007758296 0.537816 0.0077583 0.537816041
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Estimation window Massmart
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.311092138
R Square 0.096778318
Adjusted R Square 0.08662976
Standard Error 0.025381155
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.006143226 0.006143226 9.536164281 0.002686904
Residual 89 0.05733407 0.000644203
Total 90 0.063477296
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.00003667   0.002662472 0.0137717 0.989042945 -0.005253609 0.0053269 -0.00525361 0.005326942
X Variable 1 0.415724952 0.134622989 3.08806805 0.002686904 0.14823194 0.683218 0.14823194 0.683217964
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.736816959
R Square 0.542899232
Adjusted R Square 0.521132529
Standard Error 0.010516029
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.002758227 0.002758227 24.94172983 0.0000607686     
Residual 21 0.002322324 0.000110587
Total 22 0.005080551
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00162844 0.002204845 -0.738572786 0.46834126 -0.006213666 0.0029568 -0.00621367 0.002956788
X Variable 1 0.623586867 0.124862974 4.994169584 0.00006077     0.363920098 0.8832536 0.3639201 0.883253637
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.292510241
R Square 0.085562241
Adjusted R Square 0.076417864
Standard Error 0.015554999
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.002263956 0.002263956 9.356814104 0.002851222
Residual 100 0.0241958 0.000241958
Total 101 0.026459756
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00024472 0.001555969 -0.157280448 0.875340958 -0.003331723 0.0028423 -0.00333172 0.002842276
X Variable 1 0.442902734 0.144791931 3.058890993 0.002851222 0.155639667 0.7301658 0.15563967 0.730165802
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Estimation window Shoprite
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.403386064
R Square 0.162720317
Adjusted R Square 0.15331268
Standard Error 0.017194992
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.005114053 0.005114053 17.29661963 0.000073486       
Residual 89 0.026314431 0.000295668
Total 90 0.031428483
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.00002641-   0.001803747 -0.014639607 0.988352468 -0.003610413 0.0035576 -0.00361041 0.003557601
X Variable 1 0.379306643 0.091203149 4.158920489 0.000073486  0.19808793 0.5605254 0.19808793 0.560525357
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.237832998
R Square 0.056564535
Adjusted R Square 0.011639037
Standard Error 0.018492505
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000430569 0.000430569 1.259074181 0.274492913
Residual 21 0.007181428 0.000341973
Total 22 0.007611997
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001935315 0.003877235 0.499148173 0.622863846 -0.006127837 0.0099985 -0.00612784 0.009998467
X Variable 1 0.246378797 0.21957236 1.122084748 0.274492913 -0.210246924 0.7030045 -0.21024692 0.703004517
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.216801039
R Square 0.047002691
Adjusted R Square 0.037472718
Standard Error 0.014856555
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001088597 0.001088597 4.932090596 0.028618691
Residual 100 0.022071723 0.000220717
Total 101 0.02316032
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000190178 0.001486104 0.127970702 0.898429159 -0.00275821 0.0031386 -0.00275821 0.003138566
X Variable 1 0.307119939 0.138290545 2.22083106 0.028618691 0.032755435 0.5814844 0.03275544 0.581484442
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Estimation window 10 Feb 2012 Event Mediclinic
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.269589169
R Square 0.07267832
Adjusted R Square 0.062258975
Standard Error 0.00956308
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000637911 0.000637911 6.975325416 0.009760515
Residual 89 0.008139273 0.000091453                                                                      
Total 90 0.008777184
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 5.31514E-05 0.001005439 0.052863898 0.957958827 -0.001944634 0.0020509 -0.00194463 0.002050937
X Variable 1 0.196498238 0.074400598 2.641084136 0.009760515 0.048665835 0.3443306 0.04866584 0.344330641
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.093641419
R Square 0.008768715
Adjusted R Square -0.04079285
Standard Error 0.009665102
Observations 22
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000016527                                                0.0000165274                                                                   0.176925718 0.678513801
Residual 20 0.001868284 0.0000934142                                                                   
Total 21 0.001884811
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001407286 0.002065293 0.68139784 0.503434223 -0.00290084 0.0057154 -0.00290084 0.005715412
X Variable 1 -0.11810398 0.28078186 -0.42062539 0.678513801 -0.703804675 0.4675967 -0.70380467 0.467596717
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.045859781
R Square 0.002103119
Adjusted R Square -0.00777705
Standard Error 0.010140001
Observations 103
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.00002189                                                  0.00002189                                                                        0.212862742 0.645524894
Residual 101 0.010384781 0.00010282
Total 102 0.010406667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000748647 0.000999134 0.749295547 0.455420734 -0.001233367 0.0027307 -0.00123337 0.002730661
X Variable 1 0.053057505 0.114999776 0.461370504 0.645524894 -0.175071116 0.2811861 -0.17507112 0.281186126
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Estimation window 26 Feb 2013 Event Mediclinic
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.04820864
R Square 0.002324073
Adjusted R Square -0.00888577
Standard Error 0.010119032
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000021229                                                0.0000212289                                                                   0.207324329 0.649981582
Residual 89 0.009113138 0.000102395
Total 90 0.009134367
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.003407985 0.001089716 3.127405734 0.002383288 0.001242742 0.0055732 0.00124274 0.005573228
X Variable 1 0.086616596 0.190228673 0.455328814 0.649981582 -0.291363725 0.4645969 -0.29136373 0.464596918
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.502525402
R Square 0.25253178
Adjusted R Square 0.216938055
Standard Error 0.012874256
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001175945 0.001175945 7.094839928 0.014534005
Residual 21 0.003480676 0.000165746
Total 22 0.00465662
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001809002 0.002684471 0.673876527 0.507740048 -0.003773662 0.0073917 -0.00377366 0.007391666
X Variable 1 0.878838178 0.329942009 2.663614073 0.014534005 0.192686208 1.5649901 0.19268621 1.564990148
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.579137001
R Square 0.335399666
Adjusted R Square 0.328753663
Standard Error 0.015190939
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.011645853 0.011645853 50.46637035 0.00000000018  
Residual 100 0.023076463 0.000230765
Total 101 0.034722317
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.00103274 0.001504682 0.686351026 0.494080152 -0.001952506 0.004018 -0.00195251 0.004017986
X Variable 1 0.87826016 0.12362951 7.103968634 0.000000000  0.632982733 1.1235376 0.63298273 1.123537586
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Estimation window 14 Feb 2007 Event Tiger Brands
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.310674341
R Square 0.096518546
Adjusted R Square 0.086367069
Standard Error 0.014012457
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001866853 0.001866853 9.507832812 0.002724588
Residual 89 0.017475058 0.000196349
Total 90 0.019341911
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001282233 0.001488692 0.861315458 0.391378935 -0.001675765 0.0042402 -0.00167577 0.004240232
X Variable 1 0.527006753 0.170913124 3.08347739 0.002724588 0.187406016 0.8666075 0.18740602 0.866607489
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.540698232
R Square 0.292354578
Adjusted R Square 0.258657177
Standard Error 0.011010293
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001051747 0.001051747 8.675879104 0.00772466
Residual 21 0.002545758 0.000121227
Total 22 0.003597505
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00041267 0.00229585 -0.179745451 0.859075511 -0.00518715 0.0043618 -0.00518715 0.004361813
X Variable 1 0.568732473 0.19308622 2.945484528 0.00772466 0.167187697 0.9702772 0.1671877 0.970277249
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.352831367
R Square 0.124489973
Adjusted R Square 0.115734873
Standard Error 0.013788524
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.002703391 0.002703391 14.21913737 0.000275607
Residual 100 0.01901234 0.000190123
Total 101 0.02171573
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.00095558 0.001382341 0.691276705 0.49099336 -0.001786946 0.0036981 -0.00178695 0.003698106
X Variable 1 0.525386058 0.139329128 3.770827146 0.000275607 0.248961036 0.8018111 0.24896104 0.80181108
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Estimation window 11 Feb 2008 Event Tiger Brands
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.329352487
R Square 0.108473061
Adjusted R Square 0.098455904
Standard Error 0.012289735
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.001635545 0.001635545 10.82872764 0.001433457
Residual 89 0.013442345 0.000151038
Total 90 0.01507789
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00224112 0.001292519 -1.733914864 0.086395862 -0.004809325 0.0003271 -0.00480933 0.00032709
X Variable 1 0.293479793 0.089184522 3.290703213 0.001433457 0.116272048 0.4706875 0.11627205 0.470687538
Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.10981046
R Square 0.012058337
Adjusted R Square -0.0349865
Standard Error 0.018808566
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000090675                                                0.000090675                                                                      0.256315821 0.617936569
Residual 21 0.007429005 0.000353762
Total 22 0.00751968
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.00404207 0.004075418 -0.991816439 0.332578429 -0.012517363 0.0044332 -0.01251736 0.004433229
X Variable 1 0.090937551 0.179620355 0.506276428 0.617936569 -0.282603425 0.4644785 -0.28260342 0.464478528
Post Event window
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.405225406
R Square 0.164207629
Adjusted R Square 0.155849706
Standard Error 0.01910916
Observations 102
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.007174277 0.007174277 19.64694046 0.0000239097     
Residual 100 0.036516 0.00036516
Total 101 0.043690277
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001074391 0.00189396 0.567271955 0.571800694 -0.002683173 0.004832 -0.00268317 0.004831954
X Variable 1 0.602686624 0.13597031 4.432486938 0.000023910  0.332925401 0.8724478 0.3329254 0.872447847
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Appendix 6:  Average times executives earned more income than an industry worker from 
2008 to 2016 
 
Company Name Name Sector
Ave. Times Exec 
Salary exceeds 
Ave. Worker Company Name Name Sector
Ave. Times Exec 
Salary exceeds 
Ave. Worker
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 227 Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 45
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 188 Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 61
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 85 RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 39
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 84 Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 57
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 112 Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 123
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 405 Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 1063
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 433 Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 80
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 175 Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 199
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 143 Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 90
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 119 Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 84
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 126 Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 214
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 71 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 56
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 65 Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 112
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 390 Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 80
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 94 Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 148
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 48 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 51
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 363 Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 85
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 100 Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 67
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 126 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 59
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 134 Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 109
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 48 Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 208
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 58 Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 114
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 316 Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 157
1063 Max
39 Min
157 Average
APPENDIX 6: AVERAGE TIMES EXECUTIVES EARNED MORE INCOME THAN AN INDUSTRY WORKER FROM 2008 TO 2016
NB: Shoprite had the highest of 6 490 times
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Appendix 7:  Percentage of revenue and executive remuneration changes from 2008 - 2016 
 
COMPANY NAME 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Average
Anglo American Plc (in th US$)-Revenues 4.51% -24.45% -7.73% 2.31% -6.21% 9.37% 34.05% -24.25% -8.97% -2.37%
Anglo Plc Directors' Remuneration 19.60% -8.63% -7.16% 120.78% -18.21% 27.96% 23.32% -11.99% -42.92% 11.42%
Anglogold Ashanti (in th US$)-Revenues -1.94% -20.18% -6.40% -12.19% -3.09% 23.17% 19.65% 38.01% 4.11% 4.57%
Anglo Gold Directors' Remuneration 14.60% 92.99% -55.07% -17.64% -69.72% 3348.55% -88.15% 28.51% 10.20% 362.70%
Anglo American Platinum-Revenues 3.67% 7.72% 4.99% 23.34% -16.29% 0.05% 28.38% -23.05% 10.61% 4.38%
Anglo Platinum Directors' Remuneration 10.90% 68.22% -25.74% 46.84% -44.71% 21.74% 92.67% 150.80% -63.36% 28.60%
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings-Revenues 2.27% 21.39% 55.61% 23.18% 20.58% 23.95% 24.83% 77.02% 18.13% 29.66%
Aspen Directors' Remuneration 10.15% 3.50% 5.18% -0.57% 14.28% 26.83% 15.64% 18.42% 8.95% 11.38%
Barclays Africa Group Ltd-Revenues 7.69% 6.48% 6.19% 7.81% 20.39% 27.31% 1.54% 14.53% 8.97% 11.21%
Barclays Directors' Remuneration 1.97% -9.52% 58.25% -27.62% 80.04% -3.00% 9.41% -37.44% 14.86% 9.66%
BHP Billiton (in th UK£ conv from US$ at 1.32)-Revenues -18.73% -27.44% -14.51% -1.75% 5.33% 28.03% 14.86% 1.80% 26.31% 1.55%
BHP Directors' Remuneration -13.42% -8.24% 16.16% 6.89% -38.22% 9.74% -0.64% 41.42% 48.60% 6.92%
British American Tobacco PLC (in th UK£)-Revenues 11.99% -5.80% -9.08% 0.82% -1.26% 3.59% 4.76% 17.47% 20.83% 4.81%
BAT Directors' Remuneration 50.50% 21.84% -41.66% 42.03% -2.79% -16.14% 31.39% 2.17% 0.00% 9.71%
Bidvest Group-Revenues 7.67% 12.39% 5.36% 14.92% 12.82% 7.91% -2.14% 1.70% 15.27% 8.43%
Bidvest Directors' Remuneration -16.80% 13.31% -18.60% 1.82% -5.08% -16.43% 55.24% 1.22% 21.91% 4.06%
Discovery Ltd-Revenues 19.43% 19.94% 30.43% 20.50% 17.66% 28.39% 87.52% 20.80% 15.71% 28.93%
Discovery Directors' Remuneration 25.01% -22.89% 48.18% 28.77% 21.54% 21.99% 134.29% 59.57% -5.55% 34.55%
Firstrand Limited-Revenues 7.29% 11.34% 18.76% 7.34% 10.72% 26.15% 5.48% -10.23% 3.70% 8.95%
FirstRand Directors' Remuneration 4.58% 4.35% 29.71% 294.86% -65.73% 30.61% -1.17% 0.00% 0.00% 33.02%
Gold Fields (in th US$)-Revenues 8.02% -11.42% -10.68% -39.85% 3.92% 24.57% 8.66% 20.13% 17.26% 2.29%
Goldfields Directors' Remuneration -23.00% 5.35% -3.19% -43.95% 36.32% 250.96% -5.72% 85.25% -56.37% 27.30%
Growthpoint Prop Ltd-Revenues 30.28% 19.15% 14.23% 9.30% 14.63% 5.56% 27.46% 16.55% 24.60% 17.97%
Growthpoint Directors' Remuneration -44.45% 20.02% 87.51% 24.16% -13.95% 26.33% 12.57% 455.48% 52.21% 68.87%
Impala Platinum Hlds-Revenues 9.95% 13.78% -3.43% 9.50% -16.68% 30.00% -2.43% -38.47% 34.84% 4.12%
Impala Directors' Remuneration -0.77% 3.05% 6.25% -5.89% -32.08% -20.24% -6.89% -0.37% 35.13% -2.42%
Investec Ltd-Revenues 5.69% 14.95% 18.18% 13.57% 13.13% -9.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.25%
Investec Ltd. Directors' Remuneration -7.06% 54.07% 11.08% 61.50% -51.02% 60.88% 34.88% -33.99% -3.02% 14.15%
Intu Properties Plc (in th UK£)-Revenues 6.39% 5.86% 2.80% -32.74% 1.86% 22.79% -28.08% -5.54% 7.30% -2.15%
Intu Prop Directors' Remuneration 10.58% 27.49% 22.51% -22.68% 52.00% -13.79% -34.50% 40.31% -15.72% 7.35%
Life Healthcare Group Holdings-Revenues 12.12% 12.25% 10.15% 7.41% 12.16% 10.27% 12.10% 4.41% 15.29% 10.68%
Life Health Directors' Remuneration 4.86% 6.61% 0.90% -16.68% 19.98% 10.79% 47.19% 0.00% 0.00% 8.18%
Mondi Ltd-Revenues 10.26% 9.96% 11.28% 11.40% 6.18% 3.33% 9.68% -17.15% 1.21% 5.13%
Mondi Ltd. Directors' Remuneration -18.54% -9.50% 29.78% -4.23% 123.01% -1.76% 2.87% 51.38% -93.26% 8.86%
Mr Price Group-Revenues -1.08% 10.66% 13.78% 15.09% 13.63% 10.38% 12.93% 9.91% 17.83% 11.46%
Mr Price Directors' Remuneration -10.93% -3.30% 13.56% 9.34% -16.23% -7.52% 9.80% 40.40% -22.98% 1.35%
MTN Group-Revenues -4.82% 3.27% 8.62% 12.17% 0.00% 5.62% 4.51% 9.19% 40.17% 8.75%
MTN Directors' Remuneration 179.57% -41.67% -19.00% 36.95% -1.47% 83.83% -26.11% -37.50% -4.98% 18.85%
Nedbank Group-Revenues 7.19% 6.75% 7.04% 9.71% 10.54% 41.72% 9.53% -2.26% -1.57% 9.85%
Nedbank Directors' Remuneration 7.31% -0.81% 10.66% 12.18% 69.62% 17.23% 4.13% 53.44% -18.24% 17.28%
Naspers (in th US$)-Revenues 6.69% -9.74% 9.51% 10.67% 4.88% 1.24% 32.56% 36.28% 7.00% 11.01%
Naspers Directors' Remuneration -89.12% 208.94% 12.60% -7.15% 25.85% 6.44% 15.25% 18.71% 12.68% 22.69%
Netcare-Revenues 11.82% 6.46% 3.84% 18.72% 10.08% 3.96% -4.10% 5.30% 16.76% 8.09%
Netcare Directors' Remuneration 11.97% 2.97% 5.12% 2.24% 30.75% -34.66% 28.94% 24.93% -32.89% 4.37%
Old Mutual (in th UK£)-Revenues 7.77% 11.84% -13.29% -0.64% 3.93% 3.58% 14.57% -41.43% -7.37% -2.34%
Old Mutual Directors' Remuneration -17.21% -18.86% 64.29% -58.72% 169.20% -30.85% 75.49% 64.25% -44.21% 22.60%
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COMPANY NAME 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Average
Redefine Properties-Revenues 3.86% 12.70% 54.35% -11.49% 1.63% -10.39% 473.21% 38.39% -70.71% 54.62%
Redefine Prop Directors' Remuneration 25.20% 26.33% 56.85% 34.65% 36.62% -15.26% 109.94% 320.82% -53.18% 60.22%
Remgro-Revenues 8.23% 3.94% 47.77% 23.13% -10.19% 3.41% 22.96% 3.44% 21.00% 13.74%
Remgro Directors' Remuneration -21.87% 12.77% 5.61% 0.13% -47.58% 37.50% -31.51% 116.86% 0.14% 8.01%
RMB Holdings-Revenues -2.93% 22.59% 25.63% 10.25% 9.17% -26.99% 22.17% -19.81% 0.00% 4.45%
RMB Hldngs Directors' Remuneration -50.41% -6.78% 7.30% 19.34% 6.79% -10.19% 11.67% -9.45% 2.50% -3.25%
Sappi (in th US$)-Revenues -5.22% -10.49% 2.30% -7.25% -12.33% 10.86% 22.41% -8.43% 10.08% 0.22%
Sappi Directors' Remuneration -10.40% 6.29% 63.91% -38.43% -28.44% 279.62% -61.28% 152.08% 532.15% 99.50%
Standard Bank Group-Revenues 5.51% -7.07% 10.48% 9.24% 19.01% 10.01% 8.20% 1.10% 10.83% 7.48%
Standard Bank Directors' Remuneration 9.14% 10.17% -19.76% 27.57% 162.09% 3.56% -15.67% -9.97% -0.95% 18.47%
Shoprite-Revenues 13.85% 11.49% 10.50% 12.15% 14.65% 7.56% 13.93% 23.93% 22.49% 14.50%
Shoprite Directors' Remuneration 26.78% -4.47% -6.85% 49.21% -37.48% -80.71% 447.58% 108.07% 59.86% 62.44%
Sanlam-Revenues 21.05% 16.56% 10.33% 11.42% 9.75% 10.47% 8.03% 8.81% 12.49% 12.10%
Sanlam Directors' Remuneration -14.54% 57.08% 10.58% 49.50% -5.72% -11.65% 32.13% 5.67% -5.87% 13.02%
Sasol-Revenues -7.54% -8.85% 20.59% 6.94% 11.84% 16.58% -11.34% 6.34% 31.67% 7.36%
Sasol Directors' Remuneration 2.55% -6.21% 17.43% 21.17% 109.23% -36.92% 74.72% -33.85% 25.74% 19.32%
Tiger Brands-Revenues 5.46% 4.34% 7.72% 23.85% 10.18% 6.57% -9.66% 6.80% 1.03% 6.25%
Tiger Brands Directors' Remuneration 178.17% -61.71% 44.79% 7.28% 30.22% 2.73% 6.26% 22.17% 21.81% 27.97%
Vodacom Group-Revenues 1.50% 7.42% -1.54% 8.29% 4.46% 9.37% 4.55% 5.58% 14.71% 6.04%
Vodacom Directors' Remuneration 75.91% -34.04% 27.40% -38.61% 23.65% -30.13% 16.43% 0.00% 0.00% 4.51%
Woolworths Holdings-Revenues 15.49% 45.49% 12.68% 23.21% 11.60% 9.46% 5.32% 2.53% 16.69% 15.83%
Woolworths Directors' Remuneration 19.93% 40.41% 10.67% 22.97% -15.73% 14.96% 73.58% 25.21% -22.03% 18.89%
African Rainbow Minerals-Revenues -6.20% -6.16% 31.99% -54.71% 18.52% 35.73% -0.48% -13.23% 104.29% 12.19%
African Rainbow Directors' Remuneration 40.05% -23.14% -2.89% 14.50% -20.64% -8.10% 99.27% -16.21% 7.72% 10.06%
Assore Ltd-Revenues -13.99% 15.67% 44.28% -86.15% 24.10% 47.04% -21.58% -1.10% 113.84% 13.57%
Assore Ltd Directors' Remuneration -30.26% 0.05% 4.16% 8.10% -24.37% 38.05% -1.12% -8.35% 64.33% 5.62%
Barloworld Ltd.-Revenues 6.10% -4.20% 0.01% 11.41% 17.31% 18.10% -6.49% -9.72% 1251.57% 142.68%
Barloworld Directors' Remuneration -3.25% 2.22% -15.81% 14.10% 10.10% 5.94% 49.10% -3.21% 56.94% 12.90%
Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd-Revenues 21.66% 16.03% 15.46% 22.98% 39.39% 111.23% 36.76% 85.29% 27.85% 41.85%
Capitec Bank Directors' Remuneration 38.25% -1.30% 7.05% 8.54% -2.60% 18.16% 49.18% 8.88% 23.40% 16.62%
Capital & Counties Properties PLC (in th UK£)-Revenues 4.73% -2.08% 16.63% -12.36% -5.13% -4.55% -11.59% -12.63% 48.99% 2.45%
Capital & Counties Directors' Remuneration -2.52% -18.81% 288.08% 5.06% 266.77% -74.56% 32.06% 37.60% 0.00% 59.30%
Exxaro Resources-Revenues 17.65% -1.18% 21.07% -24.00% -3.84% 107.19% -38.50% 12.39% 31.99% 13.64%
Exxaro Directors' Remuneration 43.03% -54.71% -29.91% 4.95% 26.70% 43.72% 51.47% -54.35% 84.29% 12.80%
Imperial Holdings-Revenues 6.01% 6.91% 10.69% 17.00% 25.20% 20.66% 2.26% -7.43% -13.83% 7.50%
Imperial Hldngs Directors' Remuneration -4.99% -31.63% 25.46% -12.22% 19.49% 7.84% 31.06% 50.82% -22.28% 7.06%
Kumba Iron Ore-Revenues 12.78% -24.07% -12.59% 19.91% -6.41% 25.44% 65.32% 9.59% 85.74% 19.53%
Kumba Iron Directors' Remuneration -73.35% 5.99% 6.62% 73.21% -2.88% 30.12% 21.51% 51.62% -5.64% 11.91%
Liberty Hldgs.-Revenues 5.21% -6.87% 17.77% 16.48% 12.52% 19.68% 0.80% -1.55% -3.05% 6.78%
Liberty Hldngs Directors' Remuneration -31.06% -12.77% -38.60% 241.59% 11.17% 86.17% -9.73% 13.08% 501.04% 84.54%
Massmart Holdings-Revenues 7.92% 8.30% 8.09% 99.90% -40.95% 15.58% 11.65% 9.99% 8.23% 14.30%
Massmart Directors' Remuneration 9.25% 86.32% 15.27% -63.89% -75.80% 619.42% -37.84% 26.36% -43.21% 59.54%
Pick N Pay Stores-Revenues 7.01% 8.41% 6.45% 6.40% 0.53% 13.99% 5.93% -1.62% 17.30% 7.16%
Pick n Pay Directors' Remuneration 21.09% 22.78% 84.44% 35.27% -27.59% 78.83% -38.88% 22.42% -15.29% 20.34%
Truworths International-Revenues 47.11% 8.26% 7.03% 10.54% 12.32% 13.35% 10.92% 10.40% 17.04% 15.22%
Truworths Directors' Remuneration 57.57% 53.01% -30.33% -13.36% 14.02% 23.24% -8.66% 2.73% 10.28% 12.06%
Highest Revenue % Changes 47.11% 45.49% 55.61% 99.90% 39.39% 111.23% 473.21% 85.29% 1251.57% 142.68%
Lowest Revenue % Changes -18.73% -27.44% -14.51% -86.15% -40.95% -26.99% -38.50% -41.43% -70.71% -2.37%
Highest Director's % Changes 179.57% 208.94% 288.08% 294.86% 266.77% 3348.55% 447.58% 455.48% 532.15% 362.70%
Lowest Directr's % Changes -89.12% -61.71% -55.07% -63.89% -75.80% -80.71% -88.15% -54.35% -93.26% -3.25%
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Appendix 8:  Summary of model data input into STATA 
 
NB: The (-) are not missing data but the calculated values are 0 and or assigned dummy variables of 0. The study had all the data for this calculation. 
Name Year dty ty bt st nt os rev gdp inf dual rem gov
1.00        2,016      6.00        29.00      6,647,776.71           (649,023.14)              5,998,753.57             1.00        0.05        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        14
1.00        2,015      8.00        36.00      2,623,879.51           (14,083,936.00)          (11,460,056.49)          1.00        (0.24)       -         0.06        1.00        0.00        14
1.00        2,014      9.00        45.00      2,949,774.67           (11,731,325.17)          (8,781,550.50)            1.00        (0.08)       0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        14
1.00        2,013      10.00      32.00      3,742,071.19           -                           3,742,071.19             1.00        0.02        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
1.00        2,012      9.00        36.00      2,601,194.32           -                           2,601,194.32             1.00        (0.06)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
1.00        2,011      6.00        37.00      4,956,453.38           (15,676,390.47)          (10,719,937.09)          1.00        0.09        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        15
1.00        2,010      9.00        42.00      16,274,173.81          (3,079,712.06)            13,194,461.75           1.00        0.34        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        14
1.00        2,009      10.00      37.00      8,768,331.99           (25,691,424.44)          (16,923,092.45)          1.00        (0.24)       (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        14
1.00        2,008      9.00        37.00      4,005,001.77           (22,698,357.38)          (18,693,355.61)          1.00        (0.09)       0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        14
2.00        2,016      4.00        19.00      6,573,795.65           (14,201,367.11)          (7,627,571.46)            1.00        (0.02)       (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.01        19
2.00        2,015      6.00        20.00      75,455,019.28          (403,722.76)              75,051,296.52           1.00        (0.20)       -         0.06        1.00        0.02        19
2.00        2,014      6.00        9.00        8,885,405.92           -                           8,885,405.92             1.00        (0.06)       0.00        0.06        1.00        0.01        19
2.00        2,013      6.00        9.00        5,363,545.26           (7,748,256.60)            (2,384,711.34)            1.00        (0.12)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.01        20
2.00        2,012      3.00        5.00        -                          (30,767,639.92)          (30,767,639.92)          1.00        (0.03)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.01        20
2.00        2,011      1.00        4.00        299,500.00              (1,702,641.24)            (1,403,141.24)            1.00        0.23        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.03        20
2.00        2,010      1.00        2.00        290,928.00              (842,160.00)              (551,232.00)              1.00        0.20        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        20
2.00        2,009      4.00        9.00        2,289.20                  (26,205.84)                (23,916.64)                1.00        0.38        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.01        16
2.00        2,008      6.00        10.00      3,337,857.00           (1,837,118.75)            1,500,738.25             1.00        0.04        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.01        16
3.00        2,016      9.00        44.00      49,383,365.58          (30,487,267.57)          18,896,098.01           1.00        0.04        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        16
3.00        2,015      10.00      34.00      992,702.00              (101,346,641.48)        (100,353,939.48)        1.00        0.08        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        15
3.00        2,014      9.00        63.00      34,900,772.99          (165,639,721.49)        (130,738,948.50)        1.00        0.05        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        18
3.00        2,013      5.00        18.00      -                          (3,775,081.03)            (3,775,081.03)            1.00        0.23        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        17
3.00        2,012      11.00      48.00      31,382,869.06          (8,063,396.66)            23,319,472.40           1.00        (0.16)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        18
3.00        2,011      12.00      29.00      30,433,490.83          (3,009,220.56)            27,424,270.27           1.00        0.00        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        15
3.00        2,010      8.00        12.00      1,261,124.37           (215,040.00)              1,046,084.37             1.00        0.28        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        14
3.00        2,009      3.00        8.00        504,001.01              (2,904,862.77)            (2,400,861.76)            1.00        (0.23)       (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        14
3.00        2,008      4.00        9.00        14,764,514.20          (5,221,956.02)            9,542,558.18             1.00        0.11        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        16
4.00        2,016      5.00        11.00      919,200.00              (420,274.80)              498,925.20               -         0.02        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        18
4.00        2,015      14.00      22.00      9,423,325.50           (2,439,748.00)            6,983,577.50             -         0.21        -         0.06        -         0.00        19
4.00        2,014      11.00      21.00      10,076,858.13          (38,921,349.51)          (28,844,491.38)          -         0.56        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        19
4.00        2,013      14.00      20.00      13,503,607.05          (40,457,817.65)          (26,954,210.60)          -         0.23        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        18
4.00        2,012      20.00      35.00      45,173,703.31          (47,711,480.21)          (2,537,776.90)            -         0.21        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
4.00        2,011      10.00      12.00      19,680,771.52          (24,124,149.80)          (4,443,378.28)            1.00        0.24        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        16
4.00        2,010      6.00        7.00        7,723,809.30           (2,335,407.98)            5,388,401.32             1.00        0.25        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        17
4.00        2,009      6.00        9.00        30,633,335.52          (3,719,168.41)            26,914,167.11           1.00        0.77        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        16
4.00        2,008      8.00        13.00      18,924,421.29          (2,031,806.56)            16,892,614.73           1.00        0.18        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        14
5.00        2,016      5.00        10.00      -                          (2,139,230.00)            (2,139,230.00)            1.00        0.08        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        19
5.00        2,015      3.00        8.00        -                          (1,908,998.00)            (1,908,998.00)            1.00        0.06        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        19
5.00        2,014      2.00        7.00        2,923,593.50           (2,206,686.74)            716,906.76               1.00        0.06        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        18
5.00        2,013      5.00        12.00      16,435,325.03          (20,975,270.60)          (4,539,945.57)            1.00        0.08        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        19
5.00        2,012      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.20        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        19
5.00        2,011      2.00        6.00        21,889,427.29          (11,415,659.34)          10,473,767.95           1.00        0.27        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        19
5.00        2,010      1.00        1.00        254,220.00              -                           254,220.00               1.00        0.02        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
5.00        2,009      8.00        10.00      9,632,019.10           (8,574,000.00)            1,058,019.10             1.00        0.15        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        16
5.00        2,008      8.00        10.00      8,597,894.48           -                           8,597,894.48             1.00        0.09        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        15
6.00        2,016      3.00        4.00        3,053,393.78           -                           3,053,393.78             1.00        (0.19)       (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        16
6.00        2,015      1.00        3.00        -                          (14,986,049.67)          (14,986,049.67)          1.00        (0.27)       -         0.06        1.00        0.00        16
6.00        2,014      3.00        3.00        9,710,032.12           -                           9,710,032.12             1.00        (0.15)       0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        16
6.00        2,013      1.00        4.00        4,546,844.09           (39,028,147.09)          (34,481,303.01)          1.00        (0.02)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
6.00        2,012      2.00        6.00        849,511.78              (14,922,994.99)          (14,073,483.21)          1.00        0.05        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
6.00        2,011      3.00        3.00        6,579,710.64           -                           6,579,710.64             1.00        0.28        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        16
6.00        2,010      3.00        4.00        1,938,532.10           (35,617,057.25)          (33,678,525.15)          1.00        0.15        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
6.00        2,009      2.00        6.00        1,480,153.40           (8,820,043.91)            (7,339,890.51)            1.00        0.02        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        16
6.00        2,008      2.00        2.00        797,857.42              -                           797,857.42               1.00        0.26        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        16
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7.00        2,016      3.00        38.00      40,432,071.56          (46,271,964.89)          (5,839,893.32)            1.00        0.12        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        19
7.00        2,015      4.00        11.00      4,503,504.01           -                           4,503,504.01             1.00        (0.06)       -         0.06        1.00        0.00        18
7.00        2,014      4.00        24.00      734,496.34              (32,877,634.44)          (32,143,138.10)          1.00        (0.09)       0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        19
7.00        2,013      3.00        28.00      149,263.60              (101,968,247.25)        (101,818,983.65)        1.00        0.01        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        19
7.00        2,012      5.00        26.00      547,020.61              (16,877,175.40)          (16,330,154.79)          1.00        (0.01)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        19
7.00        2,011      5.00        18.00      16,953.49                (4,812,754.54)            (4,795,801.05)            1.00        0.04        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        19
7.00        2,010      4.00        28.00      8,549,966.26           (3,991,100.81)            4,558,865.45             1.00        0.05        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        19
7.00        2,009      5.00        29.00      155,795,282.95        -                           155,795,282.95         1.00        0.17        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        19
7.00        2,008      4.00        6.00        5,595.94                  -                           5,595.94                   1.00        0.21        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        19
8.00        2,016      7.00        23.00      18,197,105.22          (153,878,473.99)        (135,681,368.77)        1.00        0.08        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        16
8.00        2,015      10.00      25.00      6,249,393.96           (120,763,359.39)        (114,513,965.43)        1.00        0.12        -         0.06        -         0.00        16
8.00        2,014      7.00        28.00      12,334,228.34          (329,366,036.86)        (317,031,808.52)        1.00        0.05        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        16
8.00        2,013      8.00        21.00      32,430,393.48          (167,597,305.69)        (135,166,912.21)        1.00        0.15        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
8.00        2,012      12.00      30.00      13,262,624.34          (415,435,869.30)        (402,173,244.96)        1.00        0.13        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        16
8.00        2,011      9.00        27.00      16,880,920.00          (86,168,314.00)          (69,287,394.00)          1.00        0.08        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        14
8.00        2,010      9.00        39.00      39,242,403.60          (104,977,780.35)        (65,735,376.75)          1.00        (0.02)       0.02        0.05        -         0.00        14
8.00        2,009      10.00      43.00      24,454,632.50          (71,734,792.41)          (47,280,159.91)          1.00        0.02        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        14
8.00        2,008      6.00        13.00      19,716,079.55          (22,350,735.00)          (2,634,655.45)            1.00        0.15        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        12
9.00        2,016      9.00        21.00      780,828,821.48        (1,803,048,185.50)     (1,022,219,364.02)     -         0.19        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.01        12
9.00        2,015      17.00      65.00      717,328,413.28        (191,808,165.82)        525,520,247.46         -         0.20        -         0.06        -         0.01        13
9.00        2,014      3.00        3.00        1,064,699.57           (782,100.00)              282,599.57               -         0.30        0.00        0.06        -         0.01        13
9.00        2,013      8.00        34.00      842,836,806.55        (509,616,120.08)        333,220,686.47         -         0.21        0.01        0.05        -         0.01        13
9.00        2,012      12.00      31.00      2,764,310.14           (175,529,805.56)        (172,765,495.42)        -         0.18        0.01        0.05        -         0.01        13
9.00        2,011      8.00        28.00      1,989,929.70           (107,577,038.66)        (105,587,108.96)        -         0.28        0.02        0.04        -         0.01        12
9.00        2,010      8.00        17.00      10,652,442.40          (45,840,305.81)          (35,187,863.41)          -         0.88        0.02        0.05        -         0.01        12
9.00        2,009      9.00        34.00      51,724,460.99          (60,194,871.00)          (8,470,410.01)            -         0.21        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.01        12
9.00        2,008      12.00      55.00      167,553,721.07        (21,946,861.02)          145,606,860.05         -         0.16        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        12
10.00      2,016      3.00        5.00        15,315,910.03          (10,773,157.44)          4,542,752.59             1.00        0.07        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        18
10.00      2,015      12.00      21.00      9,413,214.23           (333,926,221.31)        (324,513,007.08)        1.00        0.11        -         0.06        -         0.00        16
10.00      2,014      7.00        18.00      271,282,915.85        (64,289,758.52)          206,993,157.33         1.00        0.19        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        17
10.00      2,013      7.00        18.00      41,832,021.61          (279,576,784.58)        (237,744,762.98)        1.00        0.07        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
10.00      2,012      3.00        7.00        30,433,091.40          (29,499,075.79)          934,015.61               1.00        0.11        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
10.00      2,011      4.00        12.00      312,756,506.37        (39,611,398.82)          273,145,107.55         1.00        0.26        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        11
10.00      2,010      2.00        5.00        7,971,032.79           (8,030,181.81)            (59,149.02)                1.00        0.05        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        15
10.00      2,009      3.00        10.00      155,531,913.60        (29,650,450.54)          125,881,463.06         1.00        (0.10)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        15
10.00      2,008      4.00        8.00        1,800,117.76           (2,856,075.90)            (1,055,958.14)            1.00        0.04        0.02        0.07        -         -         15
11.00      2,016      11.00      27.00      16,250,677.38          (29,568,236.98)          (13,317,559.60)          1.00        0.08        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        18
11.00      2,015      15.00      32.00      18,676,352.67          (21,645,119.01)          (2,968,766.35)            1.00        (0.11)       -         0.06        1.00        0.00        17
11.00      2,014      12.00      31.00      6,377,592.02           (13,944,851.15)          (7,567,259.14)            1.00        (0.11)       0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        17
11.00      2,013      12.00      42.00      17,399,243.97          (11,280,790.88)          6,118,453.09             1.00        (0.40)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        17
11.00      2,012      18.00      83.00      8,681,951.86           (69,921,814.24)          (61,239,862.38)          1.00        0.04        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        17
11.00      2,011      18.00      102.00    19,116,980.21          (61,776,762.53)          (42,659,782.32)          1.00        0.25        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        15
11.00      2,010      5.00        5.00        201,021.80              (302,050.00)              (101,028.20)              1.00        0.09        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
11.00      2,009      6.00        7.00        5,367,520.90           (366,325.00)              5,001,195.90             1.00        0.20        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        15
11.00      2,008      12.00      32.00      9,323,850.00           (1,021,777.00)            8,302,073.00             1.00        0.17        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        15
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12.00      2,016      26.00      73.00      19,857,405.95          (40,445,748.32)          (20,588,342.37)          1.00        0.30        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        17
12.00      2,015      20.00      64.00      49,266,224.47          (53,621,482.17)          (4,355,257.70)            1.00        0.19        -         0.06        -         0.01        17
12.00      2,014      22.00      63.00      226,150,820.27        (693,037,730.50)        (466,886,910.22)        1.00        0.14        0.00        0.06        -         0.01        17
12.00      2,013      20.00      80.00      615,986,456.65        (750,616,715.80)        (134,630,259.15)        1.00        0.09        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
12.00      2,012      18.00      41.00      35,930,918.80          (2,611,087.23)            33,319,831.57           1.00        0.15        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
12.00      2,011      12.00      47.00      9,943,799.60           (13,969,490.48)          (4,025,690.88)            1.00        0.06        0.02        0.04        -         0.01        13
12.00      2,010      9.00        23.00      398,322.50              (11,957,553.96)          (11,559,231.46)          1.00        0.27        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        13
12.00      2,009      12.00      41.00      14,169,162.65          (20,989,690.18)          (6,820,527.53)            1.00        0.17        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        13
12.00      2,008      8.00        22.00      17,172,282.98          (237,288.77)              16,934,994.21           1.00        0.25        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        13
13.00      2,016      11.00      21.00      -                          (8,810,324.95)            (8,810,324.95)            1.00        0.10        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        18
13.00      2,015      5.00        10.00      1,947,782.26           (201,247.08)              1,746,535.18             1.00        0.14        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        15
13.00      2,014      1.00        2.00        167,249.00              -                           167,249.00               1.00        (0.03)       0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        16
13.00      2,013      1.00        1.00        206,280.00              -                           206,280.00               1.00        0.10        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
13.00      2,012      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        (0.17)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
13.00      2,011      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.30        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        18
13.00      2,010      1.00        1.00        197,100.00              -                           197,100.00               1.00        (0.02)       0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        18
13.00      2,009      2.00        2.00        57,774.08                (149,504.00)              (91,729.92)                1.00        (0.38)       (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        17
13.00      2,008      3.00        9.00        1,284,361.68           (7,259,522.56)            (5,975,160.88)            1.00        0.35        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        17
14.00      2,016      2.00        3.00        -                          (22,466,750.00)          (22,466,750.00)          1.00        0.06        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        19
14.00      2,015      4.00        7.00        4,861,747.50           (117,268,502.50)        (112,406,755.00)        1.00        0.15        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        19
14.00      2,014      2.00        5.00        -                          (34,336,782.50)          (34,336,782.50)          1.00        0.18        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        18
14.00      2,013      4.00        7.00        7,438,000.00           (26,369,062.50)          (18,931,062.50)          1.00        0.14        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        18
14.00      2,012      4.00        9.00        22,037,525.00          (7,600,242.44)            14,437,282.56           1.00        0.13        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        18
14.00      2,011      7.00        10.00      34,713,311.36          (211,533,152.14)        (176,819,840.78)        1.00        (0.09)       0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        14
14.00      2,010      5.00        8.00        -                          (198,286,550.64)        (198,286,550.64)        1.00        0.11        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        14
14.00      2,009      8.00        18.00      30,983,850.00          (91,465,182.45)          (60,481,332.45)          1.00        0.00        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        14
14.00      2,008      9.00        22.00      113,768,563.87        (143,471,420.10)        (29,702,856.23)          1.00        0.26        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.01        14
15.00      2,016      13.00      25.00      1,301,307,383.23     (6,602,949.03)            1,294,704,434.20      -         0.06        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.01        16
15.00      2,015      11.00      40.00      2,872,763,660.05     (123,547,380.00)        2,749,216,280.06      -         0.06        -         0.06        1.00        0.01        16
15.00      2,014      15.00      35.00      1,940,783,684.52     (7,644,845.28)            1,933,138,839.24      -         0.03        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.01        16
15.00      2,013      10.00      38.00      901,178,302.20        (17,611,247.08)          883,567,055.12         -         (0.33)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.01        16
15.00      2,012      4.00        12.00      61,529,162.26          -                           61,529,162.26           -         0.02        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.01        16
15.00      2,011      5.00        15.00      104,014,008.58        (2,467,926.57)            101,546,082.01         -         0.23        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        16
15.00      2,010      6.00        17.00      2,368,972.89           (8,529,648.82)            (6,160,675.93)            -         (0.28)       0.02        0.05        1.00        0.01        16
15.00      2,009      8.00        10.00      35,712,119.72          (126,957.90)              35,585,161.82           -         (0.06)       (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.01        16
15.00      2,008      8.00        18.00      19,242,726.95          (16,549,554.14)          2,693,172.81             -         0.07        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        15
16.00      2,016      12.00      32.00      2,848,281.27           (14,052,617.98)          (11,204,336.71)          1.00        0.12        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        19
16.00      2,015      12.00      25.00      11,041,043.26          (6,087,078.41)            4,953,964.85             1.00        0.12        -         0.06        -         0.00        19
16.00      2,014      3.00        59.00      744,660.86              (1,766,000.00)            (1,021,339.14)            1.00        0.10        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        18
16.00      2,013      3.00        4.00        8,911,495.11           (26,392,590.00)          (17,481,094.89)          1.00        0.07        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
16.00      2,012      3.00        21.00      -                          (96,880,903.34)          (96,880,903.34)          1.00        0.12        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
16.00      2,011      3.00        6.00        1,472,195.49           -                           1,472,195.49             1.00        0.10        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        19
16.00      2,010      2.00        2.00        1,794,080.00           -                           1,794,080.00             1.00        0.12        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        15
16.00      2,009      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.04        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        15
16.00      2,008      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.15        0.02        0.07        -         -         15
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17.00      2,016      3.00        12.00      -                          (35,947,624.01)          (35,947,624.01)          1.00        0.10        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        17
17.00      2,015      3.00        15.00      450.12                    (40,655,657.17)          (40,655,207.05)          1.00        0.10        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        17
17.00      2,014      3.00        12.00      -                          (31,339,011.31)          (31,339,011.31)          1.00        0.11        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        17
17.00      2,013      4.00        14.00      824,350.50              (31,003,015.02)          (30,178,664.52)          1.00        0.11        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        17
17.00      2,012      3.00        12.00      -                          (28,851,858.10)          (28,851,858.10)          1.00        0.06        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        17
17.00      2,011      3.00        10.00      -                          (9,624,936.15)            (9,624,936.15)            1.00        0.03        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        14
17.00      2,010      3.00        10.00      4,276.27                  (11,126,530.94)          (11,122,254.67)          1.00        0.10        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        14
17.00      2,009      6.00        16.00      1,070,765.35           (5,834,171.58)            (4,763,406.23)            1.00        (0.17)       (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        14
17.00      2,008      7.00        12.00      1,291,318.72           (26,552.50)                1,264,766.22             1.00        0.01        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        14
18.00      2,016      4.00        31.00      51,163,818.49          (230,506,637.42)        (179,342,818.93)        1.00        (0.01)       (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        19
18.00      2,015      6.00        36.00      28,166,079.12          (447,395,790.56)        (419,229,711.44)        1.00        0.11        -         0.06        -         0.00        18
18.00      2,014      7.00        17.00      6,986,082.67           (227,130,305.40)        (220,144,222.73)        1.00        0.14        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        18
18.00      2,013      6.00        23.00      7,041,082.96           (95,378,798.11)          (88,337,715.15)          1.00        0.15        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
18.00      2,012      6.00        22.00      5,346,319.21           (210,757,775.31)        (205,411,456.10)        1.00        0.14        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
18.00      2,011      6.00        20.00      43,544,719.00          (135,406,982.12)        (91,862,263.12)          1.00        0.10        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        15
18.00      2,010      2.00        2.00        18,400,000.00          (4,639,320.63)            13,760,679.37           1.00        0.13        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        15
18.00      2,009      7.00        18.00      16,158,600.00          (37,481,704.63)          (21,323,104.63)          1.00        0.10        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        16
18.00      2,008      2.00        4.00        6,643,164.00           (138,960.00)              6,504,204.00             1.00        0.18        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        16
19.00      2,016      4.00        14.00      845,440.27              (123,465,703.81)        (122,620,263.54)        1.00        (0.05)       (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        16
19.00      2,015      13.00      22.00      15,458,362.63          (7,061,153.78)            8,397,208.86             1.00        0.03        -         0.06        -         0.00        16
19.00      2,014      3.00        4.00        276,828,109.53        (391,334,869.05)        (114,506,759.52)        1.00        0.09        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        20
19.00      2,013      5.00        12.00      7,661,374.45           (45,715,308.65)          (38,053,934.21)          1.00        0.12        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        18
19.00      2,012      2.00        3.00        318,773.70              (3,743,308.80)            (3,424,535.10)            1.00        (0.00)       0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
19.00      2,011      1.00        3.00        1,372,950.00           (9,831,339.00)            (8,458,389.00)            1.00        0.06        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        18
19.00      2,010      9.00        26.00      24,049,524.89          (481,197,576.35)        (457,148,051.46)        1.00        0.05        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        14
19.00      2,009      10.00      40.00      399,523,618.06        (612,966,885.99)        (213,443,267.93)        1.00        0.09        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        15
19.00      2,008      5.00        15.00      339,611,884.66        (108,524,302.52)        231,087,582.14         1.00        0.40        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        14
20.00      2,016      5.00        36.00      44,612,764.00          (16,744,918.14)          27,867,845.86           1.00        0.07        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        20
20.00      2,015      9.00        56.00      77,437,415.64          (40,388,356.43)          37,049,059.21           1.00        0.07        -         0.06        -         0.00        20
20.00      2,014      6.00        33.00      7,506,180.82           (29,810,215.05)          (22,304,034.23)          1.00        0.07        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        20
20.00      2,013      6.00        24.00      42,058,652.37          (40,188,688.07)          1,869,964.30             1.00        0.10        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        20
20.00      2,012      6.00        14.00      11,937,972.06          (25,865,895.37)          (13,927,923.31)          1.00        0.11        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        20
20.00      2,011      11.00      27.00      16,072,646.92          (111,685,656.48)        (95,613,009.56)          1.00        0.42        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        20
20.00      2,010      8.00        29.00      32,687,494.84          (48,461,869.13)          (15,774,374.29)          1.00        0.10        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        16
20.00      2,009      13.00      28.00      39,359,244.14          (22,074,220.00)          17,285,024.14           1.00        (0.02)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        16
20.00      2,008      12.00      29.00      19,655,935.23          (10,696,000.00)          8,959,935.23             1.00        (0.02)       0.02        0.07        -         0.00        16
21.00      2,016      4.00        11.00      330,716,490.00        (177,460,555.20)        153,255,934.80         1.00        0.07        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.02        19
21.00      2,015      3.00        16.00      -                          (1,079,297,778.58)     (1,079,297,778.58)     1.00        (0.10)       -         0.06        1.00        0.01        19
21.00      2,014      3.00        11.00      -                          (704,344,049.66)        (704,344,049.66)        1.00        0.10        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        19
21.00      2,013      2.00        5.00        4,500,000.00           (22,786,320.05)          (18,286,320.05)          1.00        0.11        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        19
21.00      2,012      4.00        8.00        2,702,500.00           (30,766,567.84)          (28,064,067.84)          1.00        0.05        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        13
21.00      2,011      6.00        13.00      215,967.00              (12,519,222.88)          (12,303,255.88)          1.00        0.01        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        13
21.00      2,010      6.00        13.00      3,155,375.52           (24,007,182.28)          (20,851,806.77)          1.00        0.33        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
21.00      2,009      4.00        14.00      1,464,572.94           (30,240,115.66)          (28,775,542.72)          1.00        0.36        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        16
21.00      2,008      8.00        15.00      47,472,729.24          (120,790,969.47)        (73,318,240.23)          1.00        0.07        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        13
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22.00      2,016      7.00        49.00      1,392,486.12           (78,876,160.49)          (77,483,674.36)          1.00        0.12        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        18
22.00      2,015      9.00        29.00      18,644,094.08          (21,973,147.76)          (3,329,053.68)            1.00        0.06        -         0.06        -         0.00        16
22.00      2,014      3.00        8.00        11,732,000.00          (41,157,002.40)          (29,425,002.40)          1.00        0.04        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        15
22.00      2,013      5.00        21.00      23,111,750.20          (53,178,419.31)          (30,066,669.11)          1.00        0.19        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
22.00      2,012      6.00        32.00      7,973,613.56           (54,790,457.32)          (46,816,843.76)          1.00        0.10        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
22.00      2,011      4.00        13.00      76,019,000.00          (170,356,577.60)        (94,337,577.60)          1.00        0.04        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        12
22.00      2,010      6.00        26.00      7,031,468.90           (153,423,091.67)        (146,391,622.77)        1.00        (0.04)       0.02        0.05        -         0.00        12
22.00      2,009      7.00        40.00      10,204,300.00          (68,267,004.32)          (58,062,704.32)          1.00        0.05        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        13
22.00      2,008      9.00        24.00      2,327,372.00           (6,640,975.00)            (4,313,603.00)            1.00        0.17        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        12
23.00      2,016      2.00        3.00        219,146.03              (5,141,181.18)            (4,922,035.15)            1.00        0.08        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        16
23.00      2,015      5.00        7.00        264,228.58              (43,532,229.72)          (43,268,001.14)          1.00        0.12        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        16
23.00      2,014      8.00        24.00      6,655,135.22           (162,061,653.30)        (155,406,518.08)        1.00        (0.13)       0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        15
23.00      2,013      3.00        10.00      -                          (75,830,648.80)          (75,830,648.80)          1.00        (0.01)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
23.00      2,012      3.00        11.00      50,312,497.45          (130,601,571.20)        (80,289,073.75)          1.00        0.04        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
23.00      2,011      3.00        7.00        9,673,757.52           (21,875,297.04)          (12,201,539.52)          1.00        0.04        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        15
23.00      2,010      4.00        6.00        6,169,278.87           -                           6,169,278.87             1.00        0.15        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
23.00      2,009      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        (0.41)       (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        15
23.00      2,008      4.00        8.00        9,149,497.09           (8,706,804.11)            442,692.99               1.00        (0.07)       0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        15
24.00      2,016      7.00        63.00      210,629,486.58        (146,348,451.60)        64,281,034.98           1.00        0.04        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.01        15
24.00      2,015      14.00      57.00      182,844,502.48        (405,050.00)              182,439,452.48         1.00        0.13        -         0.06        1.00        0.01        15
24.00      2,014      12.00      48.00      27,717,752.89          (4,352,341.82)            23,365,411.07           1.00        0.54        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.01        14
24.00      2,013      4.00        13.00      84,137,961.75          -                           84,137,961.75           1.00        (0.11)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.01        15
24.00      2,012      1.00        7.00        -                          (3,912,880.46)            (3,912,880.46)            1.00        0.02        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
24.00      2,011      4.00        14.00      1,492,657.77           (4,342,515.34)            (2,849,857.57)            1.00        (0.10)       0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        13
24.00      2,010      3.00        13.00      489,900.00              (3,403,173.47)            (2,913,273.47)            1.00        4.73        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        13
24.00      2,009      3.00        33.00      6,913,900.00           (53,568,195.26)          (46,654,295.26)          1.00        0.38        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.01        13
24.00      2,008      1.00        5.00        -                          (6,806,625.00)            (6,806,625.00)            1.00        (0.71)       0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        11
25.00      2,016      27.00      49.00      260,281,825.79        (10,730,645.55)          249,551,180.24         1.00        0.08        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        19
25.00      2,015      7.00        21.00      3,618,337.14           (6,356,666.46)            (2,738,329.32)            1.00        0.04        -         0.06        -         0.00        19
25.00      2,014      5.00        15.00      84,777,717.18          (62,896,563.47)          21,881,153.71           1.00        0.48        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        19
25.00      2,013      5.00        18.00      24,562,639.84          (36,291,935.08)          (11,729,295.24)          1.00        0.23        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
25.00      2,012      9.00        18.00      12,004,950.96          (26,364,689.21)          (14,359,738.25)          1.00        (0.10)       0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
25.00      2,011      5.00        15.00      72,221,494.38          (33,569,660.74)          38,651,833.64           1.00        0.03        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        16
25.00      2,010      3.00        6.00        -                          (5,248,307.00)            (5,248,307.00)            1.00        0.23        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        16
25.00      2,009      9.00        16.00      70,009,151.79          (76,274,701.20)          (6,265,549.41)            1.00        0.03        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        16
25.00      2,008      9.00        10.00      132,442,894.00        -                           132,442,894.00         1.00        0.21        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        16
26.00      2,016      1.00        4.00        -                          (114,279,960.13)        (114,279,960.13)        1.00        (0.03)       (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        17
26.00      2,015      2.00        3.00        6,910,400.90           (214,831,500.00)        (207,921,099.10)        1.00        0.23        -         0.06        -         0.00        17
26.00      2,014      1.00        1.00        1,258,161.40           -                           1,258,161.40             1.00        0.26        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        18
26.00      2,013      4.00        10.00      15,222,660.35          (118,134,675.12)        (102,912,014.77)        1.00        0.10        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
26.00      2,012      1.00        1.00        1,022,408.05           -                           1,022,408.05             1.00        0.09        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        18
26.00      2,011      5.00        11.00      32,208,000.00          (2,014,049,420.92)     (1,981,841,420.92)     1.00        (0.27)       0.02        0.04        -         0.00        17
26.00      2,010      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.22        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        14
26.00      2,009      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        (0.20)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        14
26.00      2,008      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.04        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        14
27.00      2,016      19.00      47.00      41,378,344.54          (34,321,496.15)          7,056,848.38             1.00        (0.05)       (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        19
27.00      2,015      19.00      65.00      6,380,650.88           (25,029,937.67)          (18,649,286.79)          1.00        (0.10)       -         0.06        1.00        0.00        18
27.00      2,014      19.00      53.00      5,620,925.66           (10,870,555.60)          (5,249,629.93)            1.00        0.02        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        18
27.00      2,013      13.00      36.00      885,003.48              (7,367,718.70)            (6,482,715.22)            1.00        (0.07)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        18
27.00      2,012      12.00      28.00      1,048,763.00           (3,144,770.51)            (2,096,007.51)            1.00        (0.12)       0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
27.00      2,011      18.00      23.00      -                          (6,287,510.25)            (6,287,510.25)            1.00        0.11        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        15
27.00      2,010      2.00        9.00        175,254.42              (572,524.60)              (397,270.18)              1.00        0.22        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
27.00      2,009      5.00        7.00        217,640.00              (776,018.21)              (558,378.21)              1.00        (0.08)       (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        15
27.00      2,008      12.00      41.00      6,144,265.63           (5,745,484.71)            398,780.92               1.00        0.10        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        15
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28.00      2,016      7.00        39.00      39,552,012.27          (67,642,971.23)          (28,090,958.96)          1.00        0.06        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        15
28.00      2,015      7.00        29.00      10,030,795.00          (75,698,865.77)          (65,668,070.77)          1.00        (0.07)       -         0.06        1.00        0.00        17
28.00      2,014      5.00        22.00      25,870,170.45          (11,970,207.54)          13,899,962.91           1.00        0.10        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        18
28.00      2,013      7.00        20.00      13,180,881.29          (8,039,925.17)            5,140,956.12             1.00        0.09        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        18
28.00      2,012      4.00        13.00      9,938,570.52           (36,343,564.45)          (26,404,993.93)          1.00        0.19        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        17
28.00      2,011      5.00        9.00        5,386,701.12           (18,315,178.31)          (12,928,477.19)          1.00        0.10        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        17
28.00      2,010      3.00        7.00        59,385.00                (5,684,638.70)            (5,625,253.70)            1.00        0.08        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        13
28.00      2,009      9.00        12.00      1,392,529.84           (4,684,700.00)            (3,292,170.16)            1.00        0.01        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        13
28.00      2,008      12.00      28.00      15,198,454.40          (207,561,092.98)        (192,362,638.58)        1.00        0.11        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        13
29.00      2,016      12.00      18.00      -                          (39,649,293.51)          (39,649,293.51)          -         0.14        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        18
29.00      2,015      20.00      49.00      1,154,938,797.14     (33,276,969.35)          1,121,661,827.79      -         0.11        -         0.06        -         0.00        18
29.00      2,014      20.00      74.00      689,735,340.40        (542,410,083.52)        147,325,256.88         -         0.11        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        18
29.00      2,013      9.00        30.00      271,085,052.00        (615,278,857.71)        (344,193,805.71)        -         0.12        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
29.00      2,012      31.00      74.00      616,874,427.09        (538,141,684.68)        78,732,742.41           -         0.15        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        16
29.00      2,011      27.00      67.00      269,409,151.60        (47,745,168.31)          221,663,983.29         -         0.08        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        9
29.00      2,010      29.00      71.00      252,651,477.63        (51,689,081.42)          200,962,396.21         -         0.14        0.02        0.05        -         0.01        10
29.00      2,009      19.00      79.00      565,499,610.37        (455,033,300.36)        110,466,310.01         1.00        0.24        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        9
29.00      2,008      20.00      71.00      62,783,277.53          (128,747,807.80)        (65,964,530.27)          1.00        0.22        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        9
30.00      2,016      6.00        15.00      128,630,000.00        (5,388,049.44)            123,241,950.56         1.00        0.21        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        14
30.00      2,015      4.00        15.00      11,202,100.64          (10,717,573.20)          484,527.44               1.00        0.17        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        14
30.00      2,014      5.00        19.00      -                          (40,152,796.18)          (40,152,796.18)          1.00        0.10        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        15
30.00      2,013      5.00        16.00      22,457,173.94          (39,223,403.44)          (16,766,229.50)          1.00        0.11        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
30.00      2,012      5.00        22.00      12,682,935.00          (77,340,143.03)          (64,657,208.03)          1.00        0.10        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
30.00      2,011      5.00        14.00      1,262,326.04           (8,077,826.50)            (6,815,500.46)            1.00        0.10        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        15
30.00      2,010      7.00        19.00      1,413,943.04           (31,228,123.10)          (29,814,180.06)          1.00        0.08        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        12
30.00      2,009      3.00        8.00        6,011,427.28           (18,933,730.60)          (12,922,303.32)          1.00        0.09        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        12
30.00      2,008      5.00        11.00      10,672,382.06          (11,076,165.72)          (403,783.66)              1.00        0.12        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        12
31.00      2,016      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        (0.08)       (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        20
31.00      2,015      3.00        6.00        2,138,227.26           (1,668,697.00)            469,530.26               1.00        (0.09)       -         0.06        1.00        0.00        20
31.00      2,014      3.00        11.00      5,546,096.00           (12,360,296.00)          (6,814,200.00)            1.00        0.21        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        20
31.00      2,013      13.00      53.00      51,206,126.24          (110,333,907.63)        (59,127,781.39)          1.00        0.07        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        20
31.00      2,012      5.00        16.00      18,925,778.00          (15,287,176.00)          3,638,602.00             1.00        0.12        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        20
31.00      2,011      5.00        13.00      68,828,540.00          (18,595,741.00)          50,232,799.00           1.00        0.17        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        18
31.00      2,010      9.00        32.00      13,484,313.00          (24,152,925.00)          (10,668,612.00)          1.00        (0.11)       0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        17
31.00      2,009      2.00        12.00      1,066,650.00           (7,172,738.00)            (6,106,088.00)            1.00        0.06        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        18
31.00      2,008      14.00      47.00      34,097,122.00          (50,880,454.00)          (16,783,332.00)          1.00        0.32        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        18
32.00      2,016      6.00        27.00      -                          (231,208.00)              (231,208.00)              1.00        0.05        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        15
32.00      2,015      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.04        -         0.06        -         0.00        15
32.00      2,014      3.00        6.00        2,028,584.79           (8,173,560.00)            (6,144,975.21)            1.00        0.08        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        15
32.00      2,013      3.00        5.00        666,176.97              (3,833,241.00)            (3,167,064.03)            1.00        0.24        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
32.00      2,012      4.00        9.00        1,361,931.91           (15,477,461.00)          (14,115,529.09)          1.00        0.10        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
32.00      2,011      1.00        1.00        431,655.00              -                           431,655.00               1.00        0.07        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        12
32.00      2,010      2.00        4.00        4,649,432.00           (13,540,201.00)          (8,890,769.00)            1.00        (0.10)       0.02        0.05        -         0.00        12
32.00      2,009      2.00        3.00        798,400.00              (1,387,172.00)            (588,772.00)              1.00        0.07        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        14
32.00      2,008      2.00        3.00        4,614,779.00           (853,078.34)              3,761,700.66             1.00        0.01        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        14
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33.00      2,016      6.00        9.00        -                          (2,949,689.71)            (2,949,689.71)            1.00        0.01        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        13
33.00      2,015      11.00      22.00      36,749,989.82          (9,533,500.71)            27,216,489.12           1.00        0.07        -         0.06        -         0.00        13
33.00      2,014      7.00        16.00      11,183,019.05          (12,704,230.95)          (1,521,211.90)            1.00        (0.02)       0.00        0.06        -         0.00        13
33.00      2,013      6.00        15.00      41,455,221.87          (12,006,356.82)          29,448,865.05           1.00        0.08        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        13
33.00      2,012      6.00        8.00        -                          (24,602,128.66)          (24,602,128.66)          1.00        0.04        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        13
33.00      2,011      2.00        2.00        6,800,198.04           -                           6,800,198.04             1.00        0.09        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        13
33.00      2,010      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.05        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        11
33.00      2,009      6.00        19.00      64,257,160.78          -                           64,257,160.78           1.00        0.06        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        9
33.00      2,008      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.15        0.02        0.07        -         -         8
34.00      2,016      13.00      57.00      30,138,155.62          (137,651,806.77)        (107,513,651.15)        1.00        0.15        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        19
34.00      2,015      11.00      53.00      41,811,962.47          (381,627,528.26)        (339,815,565.79)        1.00        0.45        -         0.06        -         0.00        19
34.00      2,014      11.00      46.00      176,631,178.68        (72,793,602.54)          103,837,576.13         1.00        0.13        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        19
34.00      2,013      7.00        26.00      2,045,099.69           (210,133,535.63)        (208,088,435.93)        1.00        0.23        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
34.00      2,012      6.00        33.00      6,701,820.22           (254,315,813.58)        (247,613,993.37)        1.00        0.12        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
34.00      2,011      7.00        43.00      70,865,296.22          (78,960,358.66)          (8,095,062.44)            1.00        0.09        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        15
34.00      2,010      8.00        29.00      13,232,538.35          (69,094,176.02)          (55,861,637.67)          1.00        0.05        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        15
34.00      2,009      6.00        19.00      3,654,885.03           (14,000.04)                3,640,884.99             1.00        0.03        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        14
34.00      2,008      8.00        33.00      27,437,658.28          (13,786,587.19)          13,651,071.09           1.00        0.17        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        14
35.00      2,016      6.00        34.00      1,715,301.25           (100,618.10)              1,614,683.15             1.00        (0.06)       (0.01)       0.06        -         0.01        15
35.00      2,015      7.00        26.00      54,670.95                (48,389.00)                6,281.95                   1.00        (0.06)       -         0.06        -         0.00        15
35.00      2,014      9.00        42.00      24,964,662.65          (30,252,261.28)          (5,287,598.63)            1.00        0.32        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        15
35.00      2,013      7.00        64.00      18,437,876.56          (51,905,636.98)          (33,467,760.42)          1.00        (0.55)       0.01        0.05        -         0.01        15
35.00      2,012      9.00        41.00      62,780,151.34          (121,431,815.27)        (58,651,663.93)          1.00        0.19        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
35.00      2,011      10.00      62.00      79,266,323.15          (62,538,631.17)          16,727,691.98           1.00        0.36        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        15
35.00      2,010      9.00        30.00      18,130,055.08          (68,447,527.61)          (50,317,472.53)          1.00        (0.00)       0.02        0.05        -         0.01        13
35.00      2,009      10.00      29.00      16,160,602.50          (18,897,669.40)          (2,737,066.90)            1.00        (0.13)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        13
35.00      2,008      8.00        48.00      21,396,687.30          (98,460,591.47)          (77,063,904.17)          1.00        1.04        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        13
36.00      2,016      1.00        1.00        -                          (15,839.55)                (15,839.55)                1.00        (0.14)       (0.01)       0.06        -         0.02        12
36.00      2,015      3.00        6.00        3,352,018.29           -                           3,352,018.29             1.00        0.16        -         0.06        -         0.02        12
36.00      2,014      2.00        4.00        6,918,925.92           (8,627,314.00)            (1,708,388.08)            1.00        0.44        0.00        0.06        -         0.02        12
36.00      2,013      1.00        3.00        11,701,479.30          -                           11,701,479.30           1.00        (0.86)       0.01        0.05        -         0.03        12
36.00      2,012      2.00        4.00        291,525.00              (25,544,585.80)          (25,253,060.80)          1.00        0.24        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        12
36.00      2,011      2.00        2.00        4,045,000.00           -                           4,045,000.00             1.00        0.47        0.02        0.04        -         0.01        10
36.00      2,010      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        (0.22)       0.02        0.05        -         0.01        10
36.00      2,009      1.00        17.00      2,185,237.67           -                           2,185,237.67             1.00        (0.01)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.01        10
36.00      2,008      3.00        9.00        50,799,000.00          (110,000.00)              50,689,000.00           1.00        1.14        0.02        0.07        -         0.01        10
37.00      2,016      11.00      37.00      3,242,386.79           (47,479,201.05)          (44,236,814.26)          1.00        0.06        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        18
37.00      2,015      10.00      16.00      787,589.01              (8,537,703.42)            (7,750,114.41)            1.00        (0.04)       -         0.06        1.00        0.00        18
37.00      2,014      8.00        29.00      637,657.76              (19,354,761.07)          (18,717,103.31)          1.00        0.00        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        18
37.00      2,013      9.00        17.00      510,510.01              (19,472,471.08)          (18,961,961.07)          1.00        0.11        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        17
37.00      2,012      5.00        5.00        11,124,147.10          -                           11,124,147.10           1.00        0.17        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        18
37.00      2,011      1.00        2.00        -                          (4,190,376.38)            (4,190,376.38)            1.00        0.18        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        18
37.00      2,010      3.00        7.00        1,006,056.80           (1,311,285.70)            (305,228.90)              1.00        (0.06)       0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
37.00      2,009      3.00        3.00        98,691.50                -                           98,691.50                 1.00        (0.10)       (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        14
37.00      2,008      13.00      20.00      3,227,628.70           (3,713,800.00)            (486,171.30)              1.00        12.52      0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        14
38.00      2,016      3.00        17.00      7,046,775.34           (145,586,502.29)        (138,539,726.95)        1.00        0.22        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        16
38.00      2,015      3.00        15.00      24,415,310.67          (318,188,290.31)        (293,772,979.64)        1.00        0.16        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        16
38.00      2,014      3.00        20.00      31,189,483.24          (76,534,960.28)          (45,345,477.05)          1.00        0.15        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        16
38.00      2,013      5.00        19.00      45,928,678.67          (113,118,239.11)        (67,189,560.44)          1.00        0.23        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
38.00      2,012      1.00        2.00        2,492,132.77           -                           2,492,132.77             1.00        0.39        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        16
38.00      2,011      5.00        13.00      11,328,932.97          (1,709,108.75)            9,619,824.22             1.00        1.11        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        16
38.00      2,010      6.00        12.00      36,599,690.06          -                           36,599,690.06           1.00        0.37        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.01        16
38.00      2,009      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.85        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.01        16
38.00      2,008      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.28        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.01        16
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39.00      2,016      12.00      40.00      35,034,980.92          (123,147,729.11)        (88,112,748.19)          1.00        0.05        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.08        16
39.00      2,015      8.00        39.00      23,245,697.83          (228,965,781.92)        (205,720,084.09)        1.00        (0.02)       -         0.06        -         0.09        16
39.00      2,014      17.00      62.00      33,100,870.47          (654,261,598.23)        (621,160,727.76)        1.00        0.17        0.00        0.06        -         0.11        16
39.00      2,013      9.00        30.00      14,082,112.03          (86,446,117.14)          (72,364,005.11)          1.00        (0.12)       0.01        0.05        -         0.03        16
39.00      2,012      17.00      75.00      246,569,803.48        (292,516,085.47)        (45,946,281.99)          1.00        (0.05)       0.01        0.05        -         0.03        15
39.00      2,011      13.00      75.00      675,244,442.59        (545,614,773.94)        129,629,668.66         1.00        (0.05)       0.02        0.04        -         0.01        13
39.00      2,010      6.00        41.00      11,477,374.97          (31,289,647.06)          (19,812,272.09)          1.00        (0.12)       0.02        0.05        -         0.03        13
39.00      2,009      5.00        41.00      43,460,351.35          (13,181,761.37)          30,278,589.98           1.00        (0.13)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.02        14
39.00      2,008      6.00        26.00      13,942,961.96          (2,198,444.02)            11,744,517.94           1.00        0.49        0.02        0.07        -         0.01        14
40.00      2,016      13.00      95.00      11,883,489.22          (523,125,093.65)        (511,241,604.43)        1.00        0.18        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        19
40.00      2,015      8.00        73.00      209,796.55              (14,345,700.31)          (14,135,903.76)          1.00        (0.01)       -         0.06        -         0.00        19
40.00      2,014      11.00      66.00      271,563.36              (15,157,756.10)          (14,886,192.74)          1.00        0.21        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        19
40.00      2,013      5.00        59.00      9,262,035.68           (21,060,666.11)          (11,798,630.43)          1.00        (0.24)       0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
40.00      2,012      7.00        62.00      42,687,898.71          (18,602,736.90)          24,085,161.81           1.00        (0.04)       0.01        0.05        -         0.00        18
40.00      2,011      9.00        84.00      10,709,684.41          (17,541,396.11)          (6,831,711.70)            1.00        1.07        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        14
40.00      2,010      10.00      35.00      1,219,790.01           (2,359,967.22)            (1,140,177.21)            1.00        (0.38)       0.02        0.05        -         0.00        14
40.00      2,009      2.00        13.00      1,369,352.01           (2,739,832.70)            (1,370,480.69)            1.00        0.12        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        13
40.00      2,008      10.00      38.00      11,236,929.04          (8,102,098.50)            3,134,830.54             1.00        0.32        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        14
41.00      2,016      2.00        5.00        7,473,620.48           -                           7,473,620.48             1.00        0.06        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        18
41.00      2,015      8.00        35.00      153,999,750.98        (11,469,071.19)          142,530,679.79         1.00        0.07        -         0.06        -         0.00        18
41.00      2,014      13.00      72.00      145,744,600.18        (29,421,514.09)          116,323,086.09         1.00        0.11        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        18
41.00      2,013      8.00        34.00      58,383,264.09          (58,659,170.33)          (275,906.24)              -         0.17        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        18
41.00      2,012      8.00        45.00      137,218,540.94        (129,633,523.74)        7,585,017.20             -         0.25        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
41.00      2,011      10.00      35.00      122,614,997.62        (52,291,932.35)          70,323,065.27           -         0.21        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        17
41.00      2,010      2.00        6.00        7,930,100.00           (5,078,489.20)            2,851,610.80             -         0.02        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        15
41.00      2,009      8.00        29.00      74,705,098.20          (17,217,607.50)          57,487,490.70           1.00        (0.07)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        14
41.00      2,008      3.00        35.00      22,778,367.55          (13,655,454.67)          9,122,912.88             1.00        (0.14)       0.02        0.07        -         0.00        14
42.00      2,016      8.00        30.00      -                          (2,582,598.01)            (2,582,598.01)            1.00        0.13        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        19
42.00      2,015      3.00        9.00        -                          -                           -                           1.00        (0.24)       -         0.06        -         0.00        19
42.00      2,014      6.00        17.00      -                          (3,942,086.77)            (3,942,086.77)            1.00        (0.13)       0.00        0.06        -         0.00        18
42.00      2,013      6.00        17.00      6,177,837.60           (6,740,637.65)            (562,800.05)              1.00        0.20        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
42.00      2,012      7.00        26.00      11,441,628.87          (29,913,758.31)          (18,472,129.44)          1.00        (0.06)       0.01        0.05        -         0.00        16
42.00      2,011      8.00        57.00      11,775,683.46          (26,937,356.71)          (15,161,673.25)          1.00        0.25        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        17
42.00      2,010      5.00        13.00      1,931,279.60           (8,536,435.86)            (6,605,156.26)            1.00        0.65        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        13
42.00      2,009      5.00        15.00      15,282,249.34          (3,914,750.00)            11,367,499.34           1.00        0.10        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        13
42.00      2,008      6.00        26.00      2,628,301.50           (10,417,154.20)          (7,788,852.70)            1.00        0.86        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        13
43.00      2,016      6.00        35.00      2,510,468.00           (10,917,765.73)          (8,407,297.73)            1.00        0.05        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        19
43.00      2,015      7.00        44.00      15,857,329.51          (51,802,996.27)          (35,945,666.76)          1.00        (0.07)       -         0.06        -         0.00        19
43.00      2,014      6.00        38.00      1,197,899.20           (14,100,648.21)          (12,902,749.01)          1.00        0.18        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        19
43.00      2,013      3.00        12.00      -                          (4,109,905.61)            (4,109,905.61)            1.00        0.16        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        19
43.00      2,012      3.00        4.00        359,893.49              (733,645.15)              (373,751.66)              1.00        0.13        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        18
43.00      2,011      3.00        6.00        346,023.67              (133,405.13)              212,618.54               1.00        0.20        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        18
43.00      2,010      2.00        9.00        6,314,934.40           (11,133,981.04)          (4,819,046.64)            1.00        0.01        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        15
43.00      2,009      2.00        3.00        27,156.00                (13,623.51)                13,532.49                 1.00        (0.02)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        15
43.00      2,008      1.00        1.00        -                          (21,925.00)                (21,925.00)                1.00        (0.03)       0.02        0.07        -         0.00        15
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44.00      2,016      4.00        12.00      -                          (1,654,703.53)            (1,654,703.53)            1.00        0.08        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        15
44.00      2,015      4.00        9.00        -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.08        -         0.06        -         0.00        15
44.00      2,014      5.00        10.00      2,260,970.51           (593,104.25)              1,667,866.26             1.00        0.08        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        15
44.00      2,013      2.00        8.00        45,790,660.26          (21,765,292.14)          24,025,368.11           1.00        1.00        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
44.00      2,012      20.00      75.00      144,219,935.55        (181,336,633.92)        (37,116,698.37)          1.00        (0.41)       0.01        0.05        -         0.00        15
44.00      2,011      21.00      55.00      138,198,646.90        (368,413,487.46)        (230,214,840.56)        1.00        0.16        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        15
44.00      2,010      21.00      72.00      36,525,325.00          (125,044,990.39)        (88,519,665.39)          1.00        0.12        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        17
44.00      2,009      16.00      72.00      71,918,520.96          (107,482,445.15)        (35,563,924.19)          1.00        0.10        (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        16
44.00      2,008      30.00      105.00    40,678,447.94          (81,027,432.56)          (40,348,984.62)          1.00        0.08        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        16
45.00      2,016      4.00        5.00        1,637,910.61           (1,275,200.58)            362,710.03               1.00        0.07        (0.01)       0.06        -         0.00        16
45.00      2,015      2.00        4.00        5,870,416.60           (11,872,864.59)          (6,002,447.99)            1.00        0.08        -         0.06        -         0.00        16
45.00      2,014      2.00        3.00        6,184,554.00           -                           6,184,554.00             1.00        0.06        0.00        0.06        -         0.00        17
45.00      2,013      -         -         -                          -                           -                           1.00        0.06        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        16
45.00      2,012      1.00        2.00        -                          (12,017,524.84)          (12,017,524.84)          1.00        0.01        0.01        0.05        -         0.00        17
45.00      2,011      4.00        10.00      6,697,882.20           (44,308,269.52)          (37,610,387.32)          1.00        0.14        0.02        0.04        -         0.00        16
45.00      2,010      6.00        17.00      15,717,792.95          (37,969,147.14)          (22,251,354.19)          1.00        0.06        0.02        0.05        -         0.00        16
45.00      2,009      2.00        2.00        2,774,339.12           -                           2,774,339.12             1.00        (0.02)       (0.03)       0.08        -         0.00        16
45.00      2,008      3.00        6.00        1,800,000.00           (2,063,904.30)            (263,904.30)              1.00        0.17        0.02        0.07        -         0.00        14
46.00      2,016      5.00        22.00      -                          (1,620,855.63)            (1,620,855.63)            1.00        0.47        (0.01)       0.06        1.00        0.00        16
46.00      2,015      2.00        5.00        -                          (90,540,994.48)          (90,540,994.48)          1.00        0.08        -         0.06        1.00        0.00        14
46.00      2,014      7.00        39.00      23,552,526.97          (301,755,575.12)        (278,203,048.15)        1.00        0.07        0.00        0.06        1.00        0.00        16
46.00      2,013      8.00        23.00      7,186,070.92           (97,394,940.21)          (90,208,869.29)          1.00        0.11        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
46.00      2,012      6.00        17.00      1,851,114.68           (100,518,090.69)        (98,666,976.01)          1.00        0.12        0.01        0.05        1.00        0.00        15
46.00      2,011      6.00        10.00      4,008,000.00           (122,907,121.76)        (118,899,121.76)        1.00        0.13        0.02        0.04        1.00        0.00        13
46.00      2,010      6.00        20.00      56,458,120.04          (41,313,884.41)          15,144,235.63           1.00        0.11        0.02        0.05        1.00        0.00        13
46.00      2,009      9.00        14.00      14,902,286.20          (47,686,852.00)          (32,784,565.80)          1.00        0.10        (0.03)       0.08        1.00        0.00        13
46.00      2,008      9.00        29.00      15,550,555.16          (44,991,180.64)          (29,440,625.48)          1.00        0.17        0.02        0.07        1.00        0.00        13
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Appendix 9:  Summary of directors' share trades-dually listed vs single listed 
 
Dually Listed Company Name
No. of 
Directors 
who 
traded/ye
ar
Ave. No. 
of Trades 
by 
Directors
/year Single Listed Company Name
No. of 
Directors 
who 
traded/y
ear
Ave. No. 
of Trades 
by 
Directors
/year
Anglo American plc 9 38 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 4 10
BHP Billiton Plc 2 4 Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 8 29
British American Tobacco plc 4 23 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 9 16
Investec Ltd. 5 11 Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 9
Intu Properties plc 8 26 The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 27
Mediclinic International plc 5 10 Discovery Ltd. 10 31
Mondi Ltd. 4 13 FirstRand Ltd. 5 14
Old Mutual plc 4 9 Gold Fields Ltd. 11 36
Redefine Properties Ltd. 5 24 Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 16 46
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 5 15 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 5 8
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 7 26
Highest 9 38 Mr Price Group Ltd. 5 17
Lowest 2 4 MTN Group Ltd. 5 14
Average 5.1 17.3 Nedbank Group Ltd. 8 29
Naspers Ltd. 4 12
Netcare Ltd. 7 27
Remgro Ltd. 7 17
RMB Holdings Ltd. 4 5
Sappi Ltd. 12 33
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 7 20
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 19 56
Sanlam Ltd. 5 14
Sasol Ltd. 7 24
Tiger Brands Ltd. 3 9
Vodacom Group Ltd. 5 14
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 8 32
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 8 45
Assore Ltd. 4 6
Barloworld Ltd. 8 18
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 10 46
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 8 52
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 7 30
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 5 21
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 4 16
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 12 49
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 4 7
Truworths International Ltd. 6 19
Highest 19.00      56.00      
Lowest 3.00         5.00         
Average 7.30         23.89      
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Appendix 10:  Directors' net trades of shares 
 
Company Name Year 
Average No.of Directors 
who trade/year
Average No.of Trades 
by Directors/year  Buy Trans. Value  Sell Trans. Value 
 Net Trades 
(Buy/Sell) Currency
converted to £/€/R converted to £/€/R
Anglo American plc 2008-2016 8 37 3,879,533.30                6,493,676.41-                2,614,143.12-          GBP
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2008-2016 4 10 100,208,340.31            57,529,112.23-              42,679,228.08        ZAR
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 2008-2016 8 29 197,498,286.80            348,693,896.49-            151,195,609.69-     ZAR
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 10 17 156,059,031.62            162,161,202.92-            6,102,171.29-          ZAR
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 2008-2016 4 8 59,732,479.40              47,219,844.68-              12,512,634.72        ZAR
BHP Billiton Plc 2008-2016 2 4 1,966,070.90                8,321,832.00-                6,355,761.10-          GBP
British American Tobacco plc 2008-2016 4 23 15,001,774.11              12,971,173.28-              2,030,600.83          GBP
Bidvest Group Ltd. 2008-2016 9 28 182,767,780.99            1,472,272,667.00-        1,289,504,886.01-  ZAR
Discovery Ltd. 2008-2016 10 32 2,576,743,605.19        2,916,343,453.45-        339,599,848.26-     ZAR
FirstRand Ltd. 2008-2016 5 12 846,336,723.65            798,213,104.72-            48,123,618.93        ZAR
Gold Fields Ltd. 2008-2016 12 40 101,395,190.80            209,827,726.80-            108,432,535.99-     ZAR
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 2008-2016 16 50 988,875,393.88            1,587,486,787.40-        598,611,393.52-     ZAR
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 3 7 3,860,547.02                16,420,598.59-              12,560,051.57-        ZAR
Investec Ltd. 2008-2016 5 10 213,802,997.73            852,797,645.27-            638,994,647.54-     ZAR
Intu Properties plc 2008-2016 9 23 398,500,692.41            10,323,584.92-              388,177,107.49     GBP
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 5 21 26,811,755.99              145,179,189.73-            118,367,433.74-     ZAR
Mondi Ltd. 2008-2016 4 13 3,191,160.96                194,409,356.77-            191,218,195.81-     ZAR
Mr Price Group Ltd. 2008-2016 5 19 183,449,865.45            1,388,836,274.18-        1,205,386,408.73-  ZAR
MTN Group Ltd. 2008-2016 6 15 1,065,670,038.19        1,783,840,447.95-        718,170,409.76-     ZAR
Nedbank Group Ltd. 2008-2016 8 31 291,328,306.02            345,915,818.67-            54,587,512.65-        ZAR
Naspers Ltd. 2008-2016 4 12 390,227,634.70            2,202,212,761.62-        1,811,985,126.92-  ZAR
Netcare Ltd. 2008-2016 6 27 158,436,084.86            648,662,835.86-            490,226,751.00-     ZAR
Old Mutual plc 2008-2016 4 10 6,243,686.11                29,073,000.06-              22,829,313.94-        GBP
Redefine Properties Ltd. 2008-2016 5 28 514,226,161.46            223,139,232.95-            291,086,928.51     ZAR
Remgro Ltd. 2008-2016 9 19 659,919,011.08            257,733,168.70-            402,185,842.38     ZAR
RMB Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 2 5 56,621,630.70              2,461,295,556.16-        2,404,673,925.47-  ZAR
Sappi Ltd. 2008-2016 13 34 61,850,847.61              94,116,016.39-              32,265,168.79-        ZAR
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 2008-2016 7 20 120,609,499.89            435,941,144.15-            315,331,644.26-     ZAR
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 21 59 3,882,977,133.76        2,451,972,246.65-        1,431,004,887.10  ZAR
Sanlam Ltd. 2008-2016 5 15 194,332,288.00            242,137,811.21-            47,805,523.21-        ZAR
Sasol Ltd. 2008-2016 7 24 195,292,852.50            240,451,934.63-            45,159,082.13-        ZAR
Tiger Brands Ltd. 2008-2016 3 7 14,550,959.67              43,495,921.34-              28,944,961.67-        ZAR
Vodacom Group Ltd. 2008-2016 6 13 160,445,589.56            61,795,906.84-              98,649,682.72        ZAR
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 9 38 372,518,594.56            1,218,377,408.69-        845,858,814.13-     ZAR
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 2008-2016 8 42 242,906,330.78            452,083,140.28-            209,176,809.50-     ZAR
Assore Ltd. 2008-2016 2 6 79,293,186.18              34,297,739.34-              44,995,446.84        ZAR
Barloworld Ltd. 2008-2016 7 15 20,634,667.67              104,059,598.70-            83,424,931.03-        ZAR
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 2008-2016 4 14 10,794,190.38              35,505,474.91-              24,711,284.53-        GBP
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 10 48 1,096,158,595.59        1,977,621,938.27-        881,463,342.67-     ZAR
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 2008-2016 8 58 88,850,538.99              623,035,247.60-            534,184,708.61-     ZAR
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 7 33 730,848,340.04            317,426,763.07-            413,421,576.97     ZAR
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 2008-2016 6 23 49,236,980.37              92,984,777.51-              43,747,797.14-        ZAR
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 4 17 26,613,704.27              92,967,895.65-              66,354,191.38-        ZAR
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 2008-2016 14 46 479,592,507.12            887,318,089.39-            407,725,582.28-     ZAR
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 2008-2016 3 6 40,682,895.48              109,506,910.97-            68,824,015.49-        ZAR
Truworths International Ltd. 2008-2016 6 20 123,508,673.97            848,729,494.94-            725,220,820.97-     ZAR
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Appendix 11:  VaR calculations 
 
  
Market Capitalisation 101,883,423,148.69  101,883,423,148.69  101,883,423,148.69      Market Capitalisation 388,232,072,530.83  388,232,072,530.83  388,232,072,530.83  
Average Return -0.000556176 -0.000556176 -0.000556176 Average Return 0.000943511 0.000943511 0.000943511
Standard Deviation 0.016048362 0.016048362 0.016048362 Standard Deviation 0.015184409 0.015184409 0.015184409
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999 Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999
Calculations Calculations
Min Return with 95% prob -0.026953382 -0.037890248 -0.050149342 Min Return with 95% prob -0.024032619 -0.034380707 -0.04597984
Market Cap after event 99,137,320,295.71    98,023,034,929.22    96,774,036,499.60        Market Cap after event 378,901,838,894.33  374,884,379,515.13  370,381,223,854.48  
Value at Risk 2,746,102,852.98       3,860,388,219.47       5,109,386,649.09          Value at Risk 9,330,233,636.50       13,347,693,015.71    17,850,848,676.35    
Market Capitalisation 15,329,000,000.00    15,329,000,000.00    15,329,000,000.00        Market Capitalisation 233,339,467,889.45  233,339,467,889.45  233,339,467,889.45  
Average Return -0.001841852 -0.001841852 -0.001841852 Average Return -0.001725817 -0.018258174 -0.001725817
Standard Deviation 0.020867313 0.020867313 0.020867313 Standard Deviation 0.03229524 0.03229524 0.03229524
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999 Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999
Calculations Calculations
Min Return with 95% prob -0.036165527 -0.05038648 -0.066326696 Min Return with 95% prob -0.054846761 -0.076855781 -0.101525612
Market Cap after event 14,774,618,639.99    14,556,625,641.50    14,312,278,079.39        Market Cap after event 220,541,553,959.72  215,405,980,828.79  209,649,535,515.38  
Value at Risk 554,381,360.01          772,374,358.50          1,016,721,920.61          Value at Risk 12,488,591,239.15    23,753,119,485.75    42,052,721,278.71    
Market Capitalisation 334,434,449,803.20  334,434,449,803.20  334,434,449,803.20      Market Capitalisation 28,661,805,648.00    28,661,805,648.00    28,661,805,648.00    
Average Return 0.000599775 0.000599775 0.000599775 Average Return 0.001651973 0.001651973 0.001651973
Standard Deviation 0.01536679 0.01536679 0.01536679 Standard Deviation 0.014429225 0.014429225 0.014429225
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999 Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999
Calculations Calculations
Min Return with 95% prob -0.024676345 -0.035148724 -0.046887176 Min Return with 95% prob -0.022081991 -0.031915425 -0.042937685
Market Cap after event 326,181,829,928.46  322,679,505,603.64  318,753,762,958.84      Market Cap after event 28,028,895,925.71    27,747,051,947.27    27,431,134,053.10    
Value at Risk 8,252,619,874.74       11,754,944,199.56    15,680,686,844.36        Value at Risk 632,909,722.29          914,753,700.73          1,230,671,594.90       
APPENDIX 11: VaR CALCULATIONS
Tiger Brands Ltd.-Albany Bakeries Parameters: Event 14 Feb 2007
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. Parameters
Netcare Ltd. Parameters
MTN Group Ltd. Parameters: Event 29 March 2012
MTN Group Ltd. Parameters: Event 28 November 2013
MTN Group Ltd. Parameters: Event 26 October 2015
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Market Capitalisation 24,729,959,098.24    24,729,959,098.24    24,729,959,098.24        Market Capitalisation 22,747,000,000.00    22,747,000,000.00    22,747,000,000.00    
Average Return -0.001128096 -0.001128096 -0.001128096 Average Return -0.00002994 -0.00002994 -0.00002994
Standard Deviation 0.017646319 0.017646319 0.017646319 Standard Deviation 0.01133052 0.01133052 0.01133052
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999 Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999
Calculations Calculations
Min Return with 95% prob -0.030153707 -0.042179572 -0.05565932 Min Return with 95% prob -0.018666985 -0.026388669 -0.035043877
Market Cap after event 23,984,259,154.31    23,686,860,011.63    23,353,506,390.25        Market Cap after event 22,322,382,091.45    22,146,736,938.53    21,949,856,923.09    
Value at Risk 745,699,943.93          1,043,099,086.61       1,376,452,707.99          Value at Risk 424,617,908.55          600,263,061.47          797,143,076.91          
Market Capitalisation 16,104,200,000.00    16,104,200,000.00    16,104,200,000.00        
Average Return 0.000296094 0.000296094 0.000296094 Market Capitalisation 31,425,713,974.00    31,425,713,974.00    31,425,713,974.00    
Standard Deviation 0.021024169 0.021024169 0.021024169 Average Return 0.00229977 0.00229977 0.00229977
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999 Standard Deviation 0.01505838 0.01505838 0.01505838
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999
Calculations
Min Return with 95% prob -0.034285587 -0.048613437 -0.064673472 Calculations
Market Cap after event 15,552,058,055.16    15,321,319,489.29    15,062,685,466.90        Min Return with 95% prob -0.022469059 -0.032731258 -0.04423412
Value at Risk 552,141,944.84          782,880,510.71          1,041,514,533.10          Market Cap after event 30,719,607,752.36    30,397,110,818.28    30,035,625,173.44    
Value at Risk 706,106,221.64          1,028,603,155.72       1,390,088,800.56       
Market Capitalisation 35,445,730,381.20    35,445,730,381.20    35,445,730,381.20        
Average Return 0.000671057 0.000671057 0.000671057 Market Capitalisation 265,342,319,525.84  265,342,319,525.84  265,342,319,525.84  
Standard Deviation 0.017020503 0.017020503 0.017020503 Average Return 0.00134803 0.00134803 0.00134803
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999 Standard Deviation 0.012558437 0.012558437 0.012558437
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999
Calculations
Min Return with 95% prob -0.027325179 -0.038924555 -0.051926252 Calculations
Market Cap after event 34,477,169,438.13    34,066,021,112.22    33,605,166,443.54        Min Return with 95% prob -0.019308758 -0.02786726 -0.037460454
Value at Risk 968,560,943.07          1,379,709,268.98       1,840,563,937.66          Market Cap after event 260,218,888,941.66  257,947,956,094.34  255,402,475,694.64  
Value at Risk 5,728,374,201.03      7,466,684,369.92      11,258,906,519.02    
Market Capitalisation 10,374,000,000.00    10,374,000,000.00    10,374,000,000.00        
Average Return 0.001181577 0.001181577 0.001181577
Standard Deviation 0.021937554 0.021937554 0.021937554
Confidence Level 0.95 0.99 0.999
Calculations
Min Return with 95% prob -0.034902488 -0.049852804 -0.06661056
Market Cap after event 10,011,921,592.47    9,856,827,007.85       9,682,982,049.94          
Value at Risk 362,078,407.53          517,172,992.15          691,017,950.06              
APPENDIX 11: VaR CALCULATIONS
Mediclinic Parameters: Event 26 Feb 2013
British American Tobacco plc
Tiger Brands Ltd.-Adcock Ingram Critical Care (Pty) Ltd (“AICC”) Parameters: Event 11 Feb 2008
Massmart Holdings Ltd. Parameters
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. Parameters
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. Parameters
Liberty Holdings Ltd. Parameters
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Appendix 12:  s-Gini calculations 
 
Company Name Name Sector Year Ave. Wages/m (R) Ave. Emp.Wages/y (R) No. of Emp/industry Exec. Packages/y (R) Times Yi-Yj µ N N-1 GINI
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   79,924,132                   301 79,658,440      40,094,912           460,000      459,999      0.99     
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   66,662,098                   264 66,409,990      33,457,103           459,000      458,999      0.99     
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   66,510,918                   362 66,326,934      33,347,451           486,000      485,999      0.99     
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   80,108,842                   379 79,897,270      40,160,207           499,000      498,999      0.99     
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   26,353,026                   139 26,162,982      13,271,535           515,000      514,999      0.99     
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   25,272,120                   150 25,104,192      12,720,024           518,000      517,999      0.99     
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   17,786,713                   115 17,631,385      8,971,021             504,000      503,999      0.98     
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   21,199,461                   147 21,055,041      10,671,941           488,000      487,999      0.99     
Anglo American plc 1 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   23,716,232                   189 23,590,796      11,920,834           518,000      517,999      0.99     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   26,901,000                   101 26,635,308      13,583,346           460,000      459,999      0.98     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   24,333,000                   97 24,080,892      12,292,554           459,000      458,999      0.98     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   16,119,000                   88 15,935,016      8,151,492             486,000      485,999      0.98     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   17,956,000                   85 17,744,428      9,083,786             499,000      498,999      0.98     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   43,271,000                   228 43,080,956      21,730,522           515,000      514,999      0.99     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   112,183,000                 668 112,015,072    56,175,464           518,000      517,999      1.00     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   22,424,000                   144 22,268,672      11,289,664           504,000      503,999      0.99     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   20,981,000                   145 20,836,580      10,562,710           488,000      487,999      0.99     
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 2 Mining-Gold 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   16,891,000                   135 16,765,564      8,508,218             518,000      517,999      0.99     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   23,855,404                   90 23,589,712      12,060,548           460,000      459,999      0.98     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   24,326,626                   96 24,074,518      12,289,367           459,000      458,999      0.98     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   18,492,937                   101 18,308,953      9,338,461             486,000      485,999      0.98     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   17,564,638                   83 17,353,066      8,888,105             499,000      498,999      0.98     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   8,389,285                     44 8,199,241        4,289,665             515,000      514,999      0.96     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   21,534,951                   128 21,367,023      10,851,440           518,000      517,999      0.98     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   19,850,607                   128 19,695,279      10,002,968           504,000      503,999      0.98     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   8,829,567                     61 8,685,147        4,486,994             488,000      487,999      0.97     
Anglo American Platinum Ltd. 3 Mining-Platinum 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   3,685,302                     29 3,559,866        1,905,369             518,000      517,999      0.93     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2016 16,376                   196,512                        1,130,000                 17,496,000                   89 17,299,488      8,846,256             1,130,000   1,129,999   0.98     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2015 15,692                   188,304                        1,149,000                 16,387,000                   87 16,198,696      8,287,652             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.98     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2014 13,636                   163,632                        1,146,000                 15,340,000                   94 15,176,368      7,751,816             1,146,000   1,145,999   0.98     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2013 13,926                   167,112                        1,149,000                 14,563,000                   87 14,395,888      7,365,056             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.98     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2012 13,024                   156,288                        1,149,000                 14,979,000                   96 14,822,712      7,567,644             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.98     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2011 12,214                   146,568                        1,158,000                 13,100,000                   89 12,953,432      6,623,284             1,158,000   1,157,999   0.98     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2010 11,017                   132,204                        1,164,000                 9,929,000                     75 9,796,796        5,030,602             1,164,000   1,163,999   0.97     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2009 9,870                     118,440                        1,185,000                 8,500,000                     72 8,381,560        4,309,220             1,185,000   1,184,999   0.97     
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd. 4 Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical 2008 8,711                     104,532                        1,275,000                 7,300,000                     70 7,195,468        3,702,266             1,275,000   1,274,999   0.97     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 29,509,312                   127 29,277,688      14,870,468           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.98     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 28,209,313                   127 27,987,493      14,215,567           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.98     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 28,571,213                   153 28,384,697      14,378,865           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.99     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 28,658,220                   154 28,472,520      14,421,960           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.99     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 16,657,681                   92 16,476,517      8,419,423             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.98     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 20,657,293                   123 20,489,869      10,412,359           1,831,000   1,830,999   0.98     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 11,107,779                   71 10,950,603      5,632,478             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.97     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 9,177,244                     64 9,033,964        4,660,262             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.97     
Barclays Africa Group Ltd. 5 Banks-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 11,880,533                   94 11,754,737      6,003,165             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.98     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   86,883,476                   327 86,617,784      43,574,584           460,000      459,999      0.99     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   88,574,590                   351 88,322,482      44,413,349           459,000      458,999      0.99     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   77,237,075                   420 77,053,091      38,710,530           486,000      485,999      1.00     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   49,193,519                   233 48,981,947      24,702,545           499,000      498,999      0.99     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   41,125,585                   216 40,935,541      20,657,815           515,000      514,999      0.99     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   84,418,277                   503 84,250,349      42,293,102           518,000      517,999      1.00     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   82,922,497                   534 82,767,169      41,538,913           504,000      503,999      1.00     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   87,549,283                   606 87,404,863      43,846,852           488,000      487,999      1.00     
BHP Billiton Plc 6 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   56,682,904                   452 56,557,468      28,404,170           518,000      517,999      1.00     
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British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2016 16,376                   196,512                        1,130,000                 152,569,709                 776 152,373,197    76,383,111           1,130,000   1,129,999   1.00     
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2015 15,692                   188,304                        1,149,000                 88,290,679                   469 88,102,375      44,239,491           1,149,000   1,148,999   1.00     
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2014 13,636                   163,632                        1,146,000                 64,582,548                   395 64,418,916      32,373,090           1,146,000   1,145,999   0.99     
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2013 13,926                   167,112                        1,149,000                 100,781,605                 603 100,614,493    50,474,358           1,149,000   1,148,999   1.00     
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2012 13,024                   156,288                        1,149,000                 44,086,686                   282 43,930,398      22,121,487           1,149,000   1,148,999   0.99     
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2011 12,214                   146,568                        1,158,000                 41,831,810                   285 41,685,242      20,989,189           1,158,000   1,157,999   0.99     
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2010 11,017                   132,204                        1,164,000                 27,232,849                   206 27,100,645      13,682,526           1,164,000   1,163,999   0.99     
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2009 9,870                     118,440                        1,185,000                 43,430,062                   367 43,311,622      21,774,251           1,185,000   1,184,999   0.99     
British American Tobacco plc 7 Manufacturing-Tobacco 2008 8,711                     104,532                        1,275,000                 54,161,224                   518 54,056,692      27,132,878           1,275,000   1,274,999   1.00     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 36,565,000                   158 36,333,376      18,398,312           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.99     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 32,744,000                   148 32,522,180      16,482,910           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.99     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 27,953,000                   150 27,766,484      14,069,758           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.99     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 37,267,000                   201 37,081,300      18,726,350           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.99     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 38,218,000                   211 38,036,836      19,199,582           1,843,000   1,842,999   0.99     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 27,965,000                   167 27,797,576      14,066,212           1,831,000   1,830,999   0.99     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 43,382,000                   276 43,224,824      21,769,588           1,812,000   1,811,999   0.99     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 17,154,000                   120 17,010,720      8,648,640             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.98     
The Bidvest Group Ltd. 8 Industrial-Diversified 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 18,456,000                   147 18,330,204      9,290,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.99     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 63,632,000                   275 63,400,376      31,931,812           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.99     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 40,975,000                   185 40,753,180      20,598,410           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.99     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 43,078,000                   231 42,891,484      21,632,258           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.99     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 22,495,000                   121 22,309,300      11,340,350           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.98     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 16,944,000                   94 16,762,836      8,562,582             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.98     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 26,414,000                   158 26,246,576      13,290,712           1,831,000   1,830,999   0.99     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 25,375,000                   161 25,217,824      12,766,088           1,812,000   1,811,999   0.99     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 5,752,000                     40 5,608,720        2,947,640             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.95     
Discovery Ltd. 9 Insurance-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 2,906,000                     23 2,780,204        1,515,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.92     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 33,947,000                   147 33,715,376      17,089,312           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.99     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 30,255,000                   136 30,033,180      15,238,410           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.99     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 26,743,000                   143 26,556,484      13,464,758           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.99     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 23,574,000                   127 23,388,300      11,879,850           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.98     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 22,481,000                   124 22,299,836      11,331,082           1,843,000   1,842,999   0.98     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 16,811,000                   100 16,643,576      8,489,212             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.98     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 13,855,000                   88 13,697,824      7,006,088             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.98     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 11,497,000                   80 11,353,720      5,820,140             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.98     
FirstRand Ltd. 10 Banks-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 15,400,000                   122 15,274,204      7,762,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.98     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   25,984,146                   98 25,718,454      13,124,919           460,000      459,999      0.98     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   36,180,944                   144 35,928,836      18,216,526           459,000      458,999      0.99     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   28,169,400                   153 27,985,416      14,176,692           486,000      485,999      0.99     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   24,946,000                   118 24,734,428      12,578,786           499,000      498,999      0.98     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   45,332,000                   239 45,141,956      22,761,022           515,000      514,999      0.99     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   32,698,609                   195 32,530,681      16,433,269           518,000      517,999      0.99     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   9,002,889                     58 8,847,561        4,579,108             504,000      503,999      0.97     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   11,735,340                   81 11,590,920      5,939,880             488,000      487,999      0.98     
Gold Fields Ltd. 11 Mining-Gold 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   6,427,035                     51 6,301,599        3,276,236             518,000      517,999      0.96     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 11,311,450                   49 11,079,826      5,771,537             2,105,000   2,104,999   0.96     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 27,405,432                   124 27,183,612      13,813,626           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.98     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 22,856,589                   123 22,670,073      11,521,553           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.98     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 9,600,000                     52 9,414,300        4,892,850             1,847,000   1,846,999   0.96     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 9,240,401                     51 9,059,237        4,710,783             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.96     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 8,370,000                     50 8,202,576        4,268,712             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.96     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 7,761,622                     49 7,604,446        3,959,399             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.96     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 7,161,410                     50 7,018,130        3,652,345             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.96     
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. 12 Real Estate 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 11,708,961                   93 11,583,165      5,917,379             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.98     
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Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   7,466,000                     28 7,200,308        3,865,846             460,000      459,999      0.93     
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   7,494,000                     30 7,241,892        3,873,054             459,000      458,999      0.93     
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   7,484,000                     41 7,300,016        3,833,992             486,000      485,999      0.95     
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   7,549,000                     36 7,337,428        3,880,286             499,000      498,999      0.95     
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   7,059,000                     37 6,868,956        3,624,522             515,000      514,999      0.95     
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   14,361,000                   86 14,193,072      7,264,464             518,000      517,999      0.98     
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   14,244,000                   92 14,088,672      7,199,664             504,000      503,999      0.98     
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   14,675,000                   102 14,530,580      7,409,710             488,000      487,999      0.98     
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. 13 Mining-Platinum 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   16,696,000                   133 16,570,564      8,410,718             518,000      517,999      0.99     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 109,258,788                 472 109,027,164    54,745,206           2,105,000   2,104,999   1.00     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 158,704,379                 715 158,482,559    79,463,099           2,125,000   2,124,999   1.00     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 100,161,800                 537 99,975,284      50,174,158           1,854,000   1,853,999   1.00     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 72,647,817                   391 72,462,117      36,416,759           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.99     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 62,095,985                   343 61,914,821      31,138,575           1,843,000   1,842,999   0.99     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 51,532,351                   308 51,364,927      25,849,888           1,831,000   1,830,999   0.99     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 30,077,977                   191 29,920,801      15,117,576           1,812,000   1,811,999   0.99     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 21,736,322                   152 21,593,042      10,939,801           1,796,000   1,795,999   0.99     
Investec Ltd. 14 Investment-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 50,065,298                   398 49,939,502      25,095,547           1,914,000   1,913,999   0.99     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 35,892,874                   155 35,661,250      18,062,249           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.99     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 31,642,536                   143 31,420,716      15,932,178           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.99     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 20,604,993                   110 20,418,477      10,395,755           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.98     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 16,323,781                   88 16,138,081      8,254,741             1,847,000   1,846,999   0.98     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 16,058,563                   89 15,877,399      8,119,864             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.98     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 8,781,876                     52 8,614,452        4,474,650             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.96     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 8,281,225                     53 8,124,049        4,219,200             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.96     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 11,697,703                   82 11,554,423      5,920,491             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.98     
Intu Properties plc 15 Real Estate 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 9,767,773                     78 9,641,977        4,946,784             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.97     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2016 21,118                   253,416                        2,625,000                 9,171,000                     36 8,917,584        4,712,208             2,625,000   2,624,999   0.95     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2015 20,777                   249,324                        2,547,000                 7,794,000                     31 7,544,676        4,021,662             2,547,000   2,546,999   0.94     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2014 17,343                   208,116                        2,463,000                 9,374,000                     45 9,165,884        4,791,058             2,463,000   2,462,999   0.96     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2013 17,465                   209,580                        2,413,000                 13,352,000                   64 13,142,420      6,780,790             2,413,000   2,412,999   0.97     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2012 17,151                   205,812                        2,367,000                 11,569,000                   56 11,363,188      5,887,406             2,367,000   2,366,999   0.97     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2011 16,042                   192,504                        2,318,000                 9,268,000                     48 9,075,496        4,730,252             2,318,000   2,317,999   0.96     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2010 14,840                   178,080                        2,266,000                 9,859,000                     55 9,680,920        5,018,540             2,266,000   2,265,999   0.96     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2009 13,268                   159,216                        2,199,000                 7,048,000                     44 6,888,784        3,603,608             2,199,000   2,198,999   0.96     
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd. 16 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2008 11,222                   134,664                        2,159,000                 6,394,272                     52 6,259,608        3,264,468             2,159,000   2,158,999   0.96     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2016 16,376                   196,512                        1,130,000                 88,333,696                   450 88,137,184      44,265,104           1,130,000   1,129,999   1.00     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2015 15,692                   188,304                        1,149,000                 99,389,181                   528 99,200,877      49,788,742           1,149,000   1,148,999   1.00     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2014 13,636                   163,632                        1,146,000                 111,796,781                 683 111,633,149    55,980,207           1,146,000   1,145,999   1.00     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2013 13,926                   167,112                        1,149,000                 75,652,539                   453 75,485,427      37,909,826           1,149,000   1,148,999   1.00     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2012 13,024                   156,288                        1,149,000                 66,559,295                   426 66,403,007      33,357,792           1,149,000   1,148,999   1.00     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2011 12,214                   146,568                        1,158,000                 23,353,196                   159 23,206,628      11,749,882           1,158,000   1,157,999   0.99     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2010 11,017                   132,204                        1,164,000                 23,569,724                   178 23,437,520      11,850,964           1,164,000   1,163,999   0.99     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2009 9,870                     118,440                        1,185,000                 26,278,890                   222 26,160,450      13,198,665           1,185,000   1,184,999   0.99     
Mondi Ltd. 17 Manufacturing-Paper 2008 8,711                     104,532                        1,275,000                 17,915,257                   171 17,810,725      9,009,894             1,275,000   1,274,999   0.99     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2016 12,305                   147,660                        1,914,000                 15,270,000                   103 15,122,340      7,708,830             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.98     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2015 11,591                   139,092                        1,954,000                 16,112,000                   116 15,972,908      8,125,546             1,954,000   1,953,999   0.98     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2014 10,115                   121,380                        1,699,000                 15,406,000                   127 15,284,620      7,763,690             1,699,000   1,698,999   0.98     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2013 10,055                   120,660                        1,733,000                 11,522,000                   95 11,401,340      5,821,330             1,733,000   1,732,999   0.98     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2012 9,313                     111,756                        1,710,000                 10,783,000                   96 10,671,244      5,447,378             1,710,000   1,709,999   0.98     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2011 8,546                     102,552                        1,700,000                 9,693,000                     95 9,590,448        4,897,776             1,700,000   1,699,999   0.98     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2010 8,057                     96,684                         1,687,000                 9,167,000                     95 9,070,316        4,631,842             1,687,000   1,686,999   0.98     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2009 7,210                     86,520                         1,665,000                 8,231,000                     95 8,144,480        4,158,760             1,665,000   1,664,999   0.98     
Mr Price Group Ltd. 18 Retail-Soft goods 2008 6,501                     78,012                         1,747,000                 6,243,000                     80 6,164,988        3,160,506             1,747,000   1,746,999   0.98     
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MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2016 22,475                   269,700                        442,000                   72,168,000                   268 71,898,300      36,218,850           442,000      441,999      0.99     
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2015 21,355                   256,260                        461,000                   9,256,000                     36 8,999,740        4,756,130             461,000      460,999      0.95     
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2014 18,449                   221,388                        373,000                   28,128,000                   127 27,906,612      14,174,694           373,000      372,999      0.98     
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2013 19,029                   228,348                        376,000                   48,077,000                   211 47,848,652      24,152,674           376,000      375,999      0.99     
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2012 17,631                   211,572                        383,000                   23,539,000                   111 23,327,428      11,875,286           383,000      382,999      0.98     
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2011 16,827                   201,924                        369,000                   22,528,000                   112 22,326,076      11,364,962           369,000      368,999      0.98     
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2010 15,714                   188,568                        361,000                   8,063,000                     43 7,874,432        4,125,784             361,000      360,999      0.95     
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2009 13,850                   166,200                        359,000                   15,694,000                   94 15,527,800      7,930,100             359,000      358,999      0.98     
MTN Group Ltd. 19 Wireless Telecom Services 2008 12,679                   152,148                        366,000                   19,958,000                   131 19,805,852      10,055,074           366,000      365,999      0.98     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 36,781,000                   159 36,549,376      18,506,312           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.99     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 36,425,000                   164 36,203,180      18,323,410           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.99     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 35,050,000                   188 34,863,484      17,618,258           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.99     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 32,532,000                   175 32,346,300      16,358,850           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.99     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 28,747,000                   159 28,565,836      14,464,082           1,843,000   1,842,999   0.99     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 15,683,000                   94 15,515,576      7,925,212             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.98     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 12,459,000                   79 12,301,824      6,308,088             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.98     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 14,551,000                   102 14,407,720      7,347,140             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.98     
Nedbank Group Ltd. 20 Banks-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 10,413,000                   83 10,287,204      5,269,398             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.98     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2016 22,475                   269,700                        442,000                   30,579,100                   113 30,309,400      15,424,400           442,000      441,999      0.98     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2015 21,355                   256,260                        461,000                   23,105,000                   90 22,848,740      11,680,630           461,000      460,999      0.98     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2014 18,449                   221,388                        373,000                   7,518,000                     34 7,296,612        3,869,694             373,000      372,999      0.94     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2013 19,029                   228,348                        376,000                   7,392,000                     32 7,163,652        3,810,174             376,000      375,999      0.94     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2012 17,631                   211,572                        383,000                   7,200,000                     34 6,988,428        3,705,786             383,000      382,999      0.94     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2011 16,827                   201,924                        369,000                   6,154,000                     30 5,952,076        3,177,962             369,000      368,999      0.94     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2010 15,714                   188,568                        361,000                   6,235,000                     33 6,046,432        3,211,784             361,000      360,999      0.94     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2009 13,850                   166,200                        359,000                   5,325,000                     32 5,158,800        2,745,600             359,000      358,999      0.94     
Naspers Ltd. 21 Broadcasting Contractors 2008 12,679                   152,148                        366,000                   4,977,000                     33 4,824,852        2,564,574             366,000      365,999      0.94     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2016 21,118                   253,416                        2,625,000                 14,288,000                   56 14,034,584      7,270,708             2,625,000   2,624,999   0.97     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2015 20,777                   249,324                        2,547,000                 14,052,000                   56 13,802,676      7,150,662             2,547,000   2,546,999   0.97     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2014 17,343                   208,116                        2,463,000                 13,123,000                   63 12,914,884      6,665,558             2,463,000   2,462,999   0.97     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2013 17,465                   209,580                        2,413,000                 12,399,000                   59 12,189,420      6,304,290             2,413,000   2,412,999   0.97     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2012 17,151                   205,812                        2,367,000                 11,798,000                   57 11,592,188      6,001,906             2,367,000   2,366,999   0.97     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2011 16,042                   192,504                        2,318,000                 12,757,000                   66 12,564,496      6,474,752             2,318,000   2,317,999   0.97     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2010 14,840                   178,080                        2,266,000                 11,092,000                   62 10,913,920      5,635,040             2,266,000   2,265,999   0.97     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2009 13,268                   159,216                        2,199,000                 8,295,000                     52 8,135,784        4,227,108             2,199,000   2,198,999   0.96     
Netcare Ltd. 22 Hospital Mgt-Healthcare 2008 11,222                   134,664                        2,159,000                 7,016,000                     52 6,881,336        3,575,332             2,159,000   2,158,999   0.96     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 51,669,742                   223 51,438,118      25,950,683           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.99     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 93,912,548                   423 93,690,728      47,067,184           2,125,000   2,124,999   1.00     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 79,348,864                   425 79,162,348      39,767,690           1,854,000   1,853,999   1.00     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 72,739,735                   392 72,554,035      36,462,717           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.99     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 102,612,748                 566 102,431,584    51,396,956           1,843,000   1,842,999   1.00     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 27,550,563                   165 27,383,139      13,858,993           1,831,000   1,830,999   0.99     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 46,508,535                   296 46,351,359      23,332,855           1,812,000   1,811,999   0.99     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 27,563,228                   192 27,419,948      13,853,254           1,796,000   1,795,999   0.99     
Old Mutual plc 23 Insurance-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 20,008,206                   159 19,882,410      10,067,001           1,914,000   1,913,999   0.99     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 15,905,000                   69 15,673,376      8,068,312             2,105,000   2,104,999   0.97     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 12,201,000                   55 11,979,180      6,211,410             2,125,000   2,124,999   0.96     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 11,747,000                   63 11,560,484      5,966,758             1,854,000   1,853,999   0.97     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 7,984,000                     43 7,798,300        4,084,850             1,847,000   1,846,999   0.95     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 5,667,000                     31 5,485,836        2,924,082             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.94     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 4,240,000                     25 4,072,576        2,203,712             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.92     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 5,388,000                     34 5,230,824        2,772,588             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.94     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 5,442,000                     38 5,298,720        2,792,640             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.95     
Redefine Properties Ltd. 24 Real Estate 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 5,476,000                     44 5,350,204        2,800,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.96     
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Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 12,443,000                   54 12,211,376      6,337,312             2,105,000   2,104,999   0.96     
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 11,625,000                   52 11,403,180      5,923,410             2,125,000   2,124,999   0.96     
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 9,684,000                     52 9,497,484        4,935,258             1,854,000   1,853,999   0.96     
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 9,005,000                     48 8,819,300        4,595,350             1,847,000   1,846,999   0.96     
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 6,514,000                     36 6,332,836        3,347,582             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.95     
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 14,093,000                   84 13,925,576      7,130,212             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.98     
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 10,191,000                   65 10,033,824      5,174,088             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.97     
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 13,939,000                   97 13,795,720      7,041,140             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.98     
Remgro Ltd. 25 Industrial-Diversified 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 7,904,000                     63 7,778,204        4,014,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.97     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 2,893,000                     12 2,661,376        1,562,312             2,105,000   2,104,999   0.85     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 4,672,000                     21 4,450,180        2,446,910             2,125,000   2,124,999   0.91     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 9,065,000                     49 8,878,484        4,625,758             1,854,000   1,853,999   0.96     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 8,500,000                     46 8,314,300        4,342,850             1,847,000   1,846,999   0.96     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 7,256,000                     40 7,074,836        3,718,582             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.95     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 6,257,000                     37 6,089,576        3,212,212             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.95     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 7,220,000                     46 7,062,824        3,688,588             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.96     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 6,301,000                     44 6,157,720        3,222,140             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.96     
RMB Holdings Ltd. 26 Banks-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 7,454,000                     59 7,328,204        3,789,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.97     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2016 16,376                   196,512                        1,130,000                 13,072,466                   67 12,875,954      6,634,489             1,130,000   1,129,999   0.97     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2015 15,692                   188,304                        1,149,000                 11,821,706                   63 11,633,402      6,005,005             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.97     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2014 13,636                   163,632                        1,146,000                 9,112,088                     56 8,948,456        4,637,860             1,146,000   1,145,999   0.96     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2013 13,926                   167,112                        1,149,000                 4,348,366                     26 4,181,254        2,257,739             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.93     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2012 13,024                   156,288                        1,149,000                 12,074,634                   77 11,918,346      6,115,461             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.97     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2011 12,214                   146,568                        1,158,000                 7,275,213                     50 7,128,645        3,710,891             1,158,000   1,157,999   0.96     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2010 11,017                   132,204                        1,164,000                 6,763,348                     51 6,631,144        3,447,776             1,164,000   1,163,999   0.96     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2009 9,870                     118,440                        1,185,000                 9,010,213                     76 8,891,773        4,564,326             1,185,000   1,184,999   0.97     
Sappi Ltd. 27 Manufacturing-Paper 2008 8,711                     104,532                        1,275,000                 4,781,156                     46 4,676,624        2,442,844             1,275,000   1,274,999   0.96     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 32,078,000                   138 31,846,376      16,154,812           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.99     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 30,989,000                   140 30,767,180      15,605,410           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.99     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 24,278,000                   130 24,091,484      12,232,258           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.98     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 28,462,000                   153 28,276,300      14,323,850           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.99     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 21,550,000                   119 21,368,836      10,865,582           1,843,000   1,842,999   0.98     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 27,242,000                   163 27,074,576      13,704,712           1,831,000   1,830,999   0.99     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 14,970,000                   95 14,812,824      7,563,588             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.98     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 8,504,000                     59 8,360,720        4,323,640             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.97     
Standard Bank Group Ltd. 28 Banks-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 14,081,000                   112 13,955,204      7,103,398             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.98     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2016 12,305                   147,660                        1,914,000                 100,100,000                 678 99,952,340      50,123,830           1,914,000   1,913,999   1.00     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2015 11,591                   139,092                        1,954,000                 50,092,000                   360 49,952,908      25,115,546           1,954,000   1,953,999   0.99     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2014 10,115                   121,380                        1,699,000                 49,972,000                   412 49,850,620      25,046,690           1,699,000   1,698,999   1.00     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2013 10,055                   120,660                        1,733,000                 50,001,000                   414 49,880,340      25,060,830           1,733,000   1,732,999   1.00     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2012 9,313                     111,756                        1,710,000                 40,964,000                   367 40,852,244      20,537,878           1,710,000   1,709,999   0.99     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2011 8,546                     102,552                        1,700,000                 36,475,000                   356 36,372,448      18,288,776           1,700,000   1,699,999   0.99     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2010 8,057                     96,684                         1,687,000                 627,526,000                 6490 627,429,316    313,811,342          1,687,000   1,686,999   1.00     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2009 7,210                     86,520                         1,665,000                 24,128,000                   279 24,041,480      12,107,260           1,665,000   1,664,999   0.99     
Shoprite Holdings Ltd. 29 Retail-Food & Drug 2008 6,501                     78,012                         1,747,000                 16,640,000                   213 16,561,988      8,359,006             1,747,000   1,746,999   0.99     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 22,521,000                   97 22,289,376      11,376,312           2,105,000   2,104,999   0.98     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 28,730,000                   130 28,508,180      14,475,910           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.98     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 15,229,000                   82 15,042,484      7,707,758             1,854,000   1,853,999   0.98     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 12,782,000                   69 12,596,300      6,483,850             1,847,000   1,846,999   0.97     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 7,575,000                     42 7,393,836        3,878,082             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.95     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 6,787,000                     41 6,619,576        3,477,212             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.95     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 13,032,000                   83 12,874,824      6,594,588             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.98     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 10,774,000                   75 10,630,720      5,458,640             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.97     
Sanlam Ltd. 30 Insurance-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 12,676,000                   101 12,550,204      6,400,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.98     
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Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2016 16,376                   196,512                        1,130,000                 32,045,000                   163 31,848,488      16,120,756           1,130,000   1,129,999   0.99     
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2015 15,692                   188,304                        1,149,000                 47,011,000                   250 46,822,696      23,599,652           1,149,000   1,148,999   0.99     
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2014 13,636                   163,632                        1,146,000                 51,962,000                   318 51,798,368      26,062,816           1,146,000   1,145,999   0.99     
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2013 13,926                   167,112                        1,149,000                 53,668,000                   321 53,500,888      26,917,556           1,149,000   1,148,999   0.99     
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2012 13,024                   156,288                        1,149,000                 31,881,000                   204 31,724,712      16,018,644           1,149,000   1,148,999   0.99     
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2011 12,214                   146,568                        1,158,000                 24,456,000                   167 24,309,432      12,301,284           1,158,000   1,157,999   0.99     
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2010 11,017                   132,204                        1,164,000                 20,568,000                   156 20,435,796      10,350,102           1,164,000   1,163,999   0.99     
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2009 9,870                     118,440                        1,185,000                 10,280,000                   87 10,161,560      5,199,220             1,185,000   1,184,999   0.98     
Sasol Ltd. 31 Manufacturing-Chemical Speiality 2008 8,711                     104,532                        1,275,000                 13,629,000                   130 13,524,468      6,866,766             1,275,000   1,274,999   0.98     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2016 16,376                   196,512                        1,130,000                 23,782,000                   121 23,585,488      11,989,256           1,130,000   1,129,999   0.98     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2015 15,692                   188,304                        1,149,000                 12,974,000                   69 12,785,696      6,581,152             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.97     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2014 13,636                   163,632                        1,146,000                 30,480,000                   186 30,316,368      15,321,816           1,146,000   1,145,999   0.99     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2013 13,926                   167,112                        1,149,000                 17,661,000                   106 17,493,888      8,914,056             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.98     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2012 13,024                   156,288                        1,149,000                 12,967,000                   83 12,810,712      6,561,644             1,149,000   1,148,999   0.98     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2011 12,214                   146,568                        1,158,000                 12,679,000                   87 12,532,432      6,412,784             1,158,000   1,157,999   0.98     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2010 11,017                   132,204                        1,164,000                 6,478,000                     49 6,345,796        3,305,102             1,164,000   1,163,999   0.96     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2009 9,870                     118,440                        1,185,000                 7,538,000                     64 7,419,560        3,828,220             1,185,000   1,184,999   0.97     
Tiger Brands Ltd. 32 Manufacturing-Food Processors 2008 8,711                     104,532                        1,275,000                 4,972,000                     48 4,867,468        2,538,266             1,275,000   1,274,999   0.96     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2016 22,475                   269,700                        442,000                   21,796,600                   81 21,526,900      11,033,150           442,000      441,999      0.98     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2015 21,355                   256,260                        461,000                   23,430,601                   91 23,174,341      11,843,431           461,000      460,999      0.98     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2014 18,449                   221,388                        373,000                   18,042,472                   81 17,821,084      9,131,930             373,000      372,999      0.98     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2013 19,029                   228,348                        376,000                   15,772,684                   69 15,544,336      8,000,516             376,000      375,999      0.97     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2012 17,631                   211,572                        383,000                   16,523,664                   78 16,312,092      8,367,618             383,000      382,999      0.97     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2011 16,827                   201,924                        369,000                   13,190,826                   65 12,988,902      6,696,375             369,000      368,999      0.97     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2010 15,714                   188,568                        361,000                   14,205,882                   75 14,017,314      7,197,225             361,000      360,999      0.97     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2009 13,850                   166,200                        359,000                   22,276,840                   134 22,110,640      11,221,520           359,000      358,999      0.99     
Vodacom Group Ltd. 33 Wireless Telecom Services 2008 12,679                   152,148                        366,000                   11,955,261                   79 11,803,113      6,053,705             366,000      365,999      0.97     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2016 12,305                   147,660                        1,914,000                 53,748,000                   364 53,600,340      26,947,830           1,914,000   1,913,999   0.99     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2015 11,591                   139,092                        1,954,000                 49,177,000                   354 49,037,908      24,658,046           1,954,000   1,953,999   0.99     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2014 10,115                   121,380                        1,699,000                 27,527,000                   227 27,405,620      13,824,190           1,699,000   1,698,999   0.99     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2013 10,055                   120,660                        1,733,000                 27,094,000                   225 26,973,340      13,607,330           1,733,000   1,732,999   0.99     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2012 9,313                     111,756                        1,710,000                 19,542,000                   175 19,430,244      9,826,878             1,710,000   1,709,999   0.99     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2011 8,546                     102,552                        1,700,000                 19,791,000                   193 19,688,448      9,946,776             1,700,000   1,699,999   0.99     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2010 8,057                     96,684                         1,687,000                 16,430,000                   170 16,333,316      8,263,342             1,687,000   1,686,999   0.99     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2009 7,210                     86,520                         1,665,000                 9,598,000                     111 9,511,480        4,842,260             1,665,000   1,664,999   0.98     
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 34 Retail-Multi Department 2008 6,501                     78,012                         1,747,000                 8,121,000                     104 8,042,988        4,099,506             1,747,000   1,746,999   0.98     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   10,918,000                   41 10,652,308      5,591,846             460,000      459,999      0.95     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   8,320,000                     33 8,067,892        4,286,054             459,000      458,999      0.94     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   10,769,000                   59 10,585,016      5,476,492             486,000      485,999      0.97     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   12,006,000                   57 11,794,428      6,108,786             499,000      498,999      0.97     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   9,613,000                     51 9,422,956        4,901,522             515,000      514,999      0.96     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   10,230,000                   61 10,062,072      5,198,964             518,000      517,999      0.97     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   12,961,000                   83 12,805,672      6,558,164             504,000      503,999      0.98     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   6,977,000                     48 6,832,580        3,560,710             488,000      487,999      0.96     
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd. 35 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   8,683,000                     69 8,557,564        4,404,218             518,000      517,999      0.97     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   17,914,000                   67 17,648,308      9,089,846             460,000      459,999      0.97     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   20,888,000                   83 20,635,892      10,570,054           459,000      458,999      0.98     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   21,570,000                   117 21,386,016      10,876,992           486,000      485,999      0.98     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   20,363,000                   96 20,151,428      10,287,286           499,000      498,999      0.98     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   20,623,000                   109 20,432,956      10,406,522           515,000      514,999      0.98     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   32,081,000                   191 31,913,072      16,124,464           518,000      517,999      0.99     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   16,350,000                   105 16,194,672      8,252,664             504,000      503,999      0.98     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   16,406,000                   114 16,261,580      8,275,210             488,000      487,999      0.98     
Assore Ltd. 36 Mining-Metals & Minerals 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   16,148,000                   129 16,022,564      8,136,718             518,000      517,999      0.98     
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Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 16,425,000                   71 16,193,376      8,328,312             2,105,000   2,104,999   0.97     
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 14,881,000                   67 14,659,180      7,551,410             2,125,000   2,124,999   0.97     
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 15,627,000                   84 15,440,484      7,906,758             1,854,000   1,853,999   0.98     
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 18,116,000                   98 17,930,300      9,150,850             1,847,000   1,846,999   0.98     
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 15,557,000                   86 15,375,836      7,869,082             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.98     
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 14,966,000                   89 14,798,576      7,566,712             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.98     
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 13,887,000                   88 13,729,824      7,022,088             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.98     
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 9,458,000                     66 9,314,720        4,800,640             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.97     
Barloworld Ltd. 37 Industrial-Diversified 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 9,009,000                     72 8,883,204        4,567,398             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.97     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 17,919,709                   77 17,688,085      9,075,666             2,105,000   2,104,999   0.97     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 63,930,513                   288 63,708,693      32,076,167           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.99     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 60,643,530                   325 60,457,014      30,415,023           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.99     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 53,298,489                   287 53,112,789      26,742,095           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.99     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 11,718,712                   65 11,537,548      5,949,938             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.97     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 10,331,287                   62 10,163,863      5,249,355             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.97     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 9,668,136                     62 9,510,960        4,912,656             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.97     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 12,674,790                   88 12,531,510      6,409,035             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.98     
Capital & Counties Properties PLC 38 Real Estate 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 9,767,773                     78 9,641,977        4,946,784             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.97     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 12,913,000                   56 12,681,376      6,572,312             2,105,000   2,104,999   0.96     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 8,740,000                     39 8,518,180        4,480,910             2,125,000   2,124,999   0.95     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 9,092,000                     49 8,905,484        4,639,258             1,854,000   1,853,999   0.96     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 10,799,000                   58 10,613,300      5,492,350             1,847,000   1,846,999   0.97     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 10,519,000                   58 10,337,836      5,350,082             1,843,000   1,842,999   0.97     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 11,162,000                   67 10,994,576      5,664,712             1,831,000   1,830,999   0.97     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 8,947,000                     57 8,789,824        4,552,088             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.97     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 5,079,000                     35 4,935,720        2,611,140             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.95     
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. 39 Banks-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 4,960,000                     39 4,834,204        2,542,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.95     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   9,962,330                     37 9,696,638        5,114,011             460,000      459,999      0.95     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   9,327,498                     37 9,075,390        4,789,803             459,000      458,999      0.95     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   16,847,295                   92 16,663,311      8,515,640             486,000      485,999      0.98     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   23,495,457                   111 23,283,885      11,853,515           499,000      498,999      0.98     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   25,241,573                   133 25,051,529      12,715,809           515,000      514,999      0.99     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   17,064,525                   102 16,896,597      8,616,227             518,000      517,999      0.98     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   13,402,265                   86 13,246,937      6,778,797             504,000      503,999      0.98     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   6,933,493                     48 6,789,073        3,538,957             488,000      487,999      0.96     
Exxaro Resources Ltd. 40 Mining-Coal 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   14,719,290                   117 14,593,854      7,422,363             518,000      517,999      0.98     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2016 22,475                   269,700                        442,000                   15,124,000                   56 14,854,300      7,696,850             442,000      441,999      0.96     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2015 21,355                   256,260                        461,000                   13,196,000                   51 12,939,740      6,726,130             461,000      460,999      0.96     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2014 18,449                   221,388                        373,000                   20,027,000                   90 19,805,612      10,124,194           373,000      372,999      0.98     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2013 19,029                   228,348                        376,000                   20,912,000                   92 20,683,652      10,570,174           376,000      375,999      0.98     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2012 17,631                   211,572                        383,000                   16,353,000                   77 16,141,428      8,282,286             383,000      382,999      0.97     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2011 16,827                   201,924                        369,000                   12,532,000                   62 12,330,076      6,366,962             369,000      368,999      0.97     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2010 15,714                   188,568                        361,000                   12,810,000                   68 12,621,432      6,499,284             361,000      360,999      0.97     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2009 13,850                   166,200                        359,000                   11,329,000                   68 11,162,800      5,747,600             359,000      358,999      0.97     
Imperial Holdings Ltd. 41 Transportation Services 2008 12,679                   152,148                        366,000                   5,850,000                     38 5,697,852        3,001,074             366,000      365,999      0.95     
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Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2016 22,141                   265,692                        460,000                   5,329,000                     20 5,063,308        2,797,346             460,000      459,999      0.91     
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2015 21,009                   252,108                        459,000                   21,014,000                   83 20,761,892      10,633,054           459,000      458,999      0.98     
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2014 15,332                   183,984                        486,000                   19,765,000                   107 19,581,016      9,974,492             486,000      485,999      0.98     
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2013 17,631                   211,572                        499,000                   18,742,000                   89 18,530,428      9,476,786             499,000      498,999      0.98     
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2012 15,837                   190,044                        515,000                   7,773,000                     41 7,582,956        3,981,522             515,000      514,999      0.95     
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2011 13,994                   167,928                        518,000                   14,793,000                   88 14,625,072      7,480,464             518,000      517,999      0.98     
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2010 12,944                   155,328                        504,000                   6,495,000                     42 6,339,672        3,325,164             504,000      503,999      0.95     
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2009 12,035                   144,420                        488,000                   4,531,000                     31 4,386,580        2,337,710             488,000      487,999      0.94     
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 42 Mining-Steel 2008 10,453                   125,436                        518,000                   3,574,000                     28 3,448,564        1,849,718             518,000      517,999      0.93     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2016 19,302                   231,624                        2,105,000                 19,341,000                   84 19,109,376      9,786,312             2,105,000   2,104,999   0.98     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2015 18,485                   221,820                        2,125,000                 24,290,000                   110 24,068,180      12,255,910           2,125,000   2,124,999   0.98     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2014 15,543                   186,516                        1,854,000                 24,052,000                   129 23,865,484      12,119,258           1,854,000   1,853,999   0.98     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2013 15,475                   185,700                        1,847,000                 32,971,000                   178 32,785,300      16,578,350           1,847,000   1,846,999   0.99     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2012 15,097                   181,164                        1,843,000                 23,693,000                   131 23,511,836      11,937,082           1,843,000   1,842,999   0.98     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2011 13,952                   167,424                        1,831,000                 20,758,000                   124 20,590,576      10,462,712           1,831,000   1,830,999   0.98     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2010 13,098                   157,176                        1,812,000                 14,468,000                   92 14,310,824      7,312,588             1,812,000   1,811,999   0.98     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2009 11,940                   143,280                        1,796,000                 8,350,000                     58 8,206,720        4,246,640             1,796,000   1,795,999   0.97     
Liberty Holdings Ltd. 43 Insurance-Financial Services 2008 10,483                   125,796                        1,914,000                 9,164,000                     73 9,038,204        4,644,898             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.97     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2016 12,305                   147,660                        1,914,000                 13,839,000                   94 13,691,340      6,993,330             1,914,000   1,913,999   0.98     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2015 11,591                   139,092                        1,954,000                 12,790,000                   92 12,650,908      6,464,546             1,954,000   1,953,999   0.98     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2014 10,115                   121,380                        1,699,000                 12,207,000                   101 12,085,620      6,164,190             1,699,000   1,698,999   0.98     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2013 10,055                   120,660                        1,733,000                 9,069,000                     75 8,948,340        4,594,830             1,733,000   1,732,999   0.97     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2012 9,313                     111,756                        1,710,000                 23,481,000                   210 23,369,244      11,796,378           1,710,000   1,709,999   0.99     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2011 8,546                     102,552                        1,700,000                 90,056,000                   878 89,953,448      45,079,276           1,700,000   1,699,999   1.00     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2010 8,057                     96,684                         1,687,000                 9,172,000                     95 9,075,316        4,634,342             1,687,000   1,686,999   0.98     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2009 7,210                     86,520                         1,665,000                 14,152,000                   164 14,065,480      7,119,260             1,665,000   1,664,999   0.99     
Massmart Holdings Ltd. 44 Retail-Multi Department 2008 6,501                     78,012                         1,747,000                 13,000,000                   167 12,921,988      6,539,006             1,747,000   1,746,999   0.99     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2016 12,305                   147,660                        1,914,000                 24,455,400                   166 24,307,740      12,301,530           1,914,000   1,913,999   0.99     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2015 11,591                   139,092                        1,954,000                 18,732,200                   135 18,593,108      9,435,646             1,954,000   1,953,999   0.99     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2014 10,115                   121,380                        1,699,000                 15,169,400                   125 15,048,020      7,645,390             1,699,000   1,698,999   0.98     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2013 10,055                   120,660                        1,733,000                 5,727,800                     47 5,607,140        2,924,230             1,733,000   1,732,999   0.96     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2012 9,313                     111,756                        1,710,000                 18,643,400                   167 18,531,644      9,377,578             1,710,000   1,709,999   0.99     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2011 8,546                     102,552                        1,700,000                 8,528,400                     83 8,425,848        4,315,476             1,700,000   1,699,999   0.98     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2010 8,057                     96,684                         1,687,000                 8,160,000                     84 8,063,316        4,128,342             1,687,000   1,686,999   0.98     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2009 7,210                     86,520                         1,665,000                 10,771,600                   124 10,685,080      5,429,060             1,665,000   1,664,999   0.98     
Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 45 Retail-Food & Drug 2008 6,501                     78,012                         1,747,000                 7,115,300                     91 7,037,288        3,596,656             1,747,000   1,746,999   0.98     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2016 12,305                   147,660                        1,914,000                 26,575,000                   180 26,427,340      13,361,330           1,914,000   1,913,999   0.99     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2015 11,591                   139,092                        1,954,000                 15,261,000                   110 15,121,908      7,700,046             1,954,000   1,953,999   0.98     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2014 10,115                   121,380                        1,699,000                 13,501,000                   111 13,379,620      6,811,190             1,699,000   1,698,999   0.98     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2013 10,055                   120,660                        1,733,000                 17,953,000                   149 17,832,340      9,036,830             1,733,000   1,732,999   0.99     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2012 9,313                     111,756                        1,710,000                 20,713,000                   185 20,601,244      10,412,378           1,710,000   1,709,999   0.99     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2011 8,546                     102,552                        1,700,000                 19,317,000                   188 19,214,448      9,709,776             1,700,000   1,699,999   0.99     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2010 8,057                     96,684                         1,687,000                 15,574,000                   161 15,477,316      7,835,342             1,687,000   1,686,999   0.99     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2009 7,210                     86,520                         1,665,000                 14,416,000                   167 14,329,480      7,251,260             1,665,000   1,664,999   0.99     
Truworths International Ltd. 46 Retail-Soft goods 2008 6,501                     78,012                         1,747,000                 12,964,000                   166 12,885,988      6,521,006             1,747,000   1,746,999   0.99     
6490 Max Max 1.00
Estimates of average monthly earnings, including bonuses and overtime payments, at current prices, by industry within 95% confidence limits 12 Min Min 0.85
157 Average Average 0.98
NB: The Bidvest Group's wages were classified under Financial intemediation, insurance, real estate and Business Services Industry as classified by Statistics South Africa 
Statistics South Africa: Quarterly Employment Statistics
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Appendix 13: Justification of governance provisions included in the board index 
calculations 
Provision Inclusion justification 
1. No Chair/CEO Duality To promote independence, objectivity and have an arm’s length relationship 
in the management of the board’s activities. Further, the separation of duties 
ensures that power is not vested in one individual thus introducing checks 
and balances. 
2. Majority of NEDs on board are Independent  This minimises the possibility of conflicts of interest and promotes objectivity 
in the execution of duties for the greater good of shareholders and other 
stakeholders.. 
3. Presence of Deputy Chair and or Lead INED 
(LID) 
He/she is responsible for the performance evaluation of the Chair. He also 
manages actual and perceived conflict of interests of the Chair and any other 
board member. LID also supports the Chair in all his/her roles.   
4. Presence of Remuneration Committee Its governance ensures that remuneration structure aligns the executives’ 
contribution to company performance, while retaining talent within the 
company. This aspect of governance has the potential to weaken existing 
governance systems and thus warrants inclusion in the index calculation. 
5. INED Chairs Remuneration Committee To enhance the monitoring capacity of the board, the remuneration 
committee should be chaired by an INED. The provision encourages 
independent judgement with respect to executive remuneration and balances 
power as well as align principal’s and agent’s interests. 
6. Remuneration Committee comprised of NEDs & 
majority are INEDs 
To ensure the independence of the remuneration committee and eliminate 
the influence of executives in determining their own compensation. Further, 
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Provision Inclusion justification 
the independence of the committee should ensure socially acceptable and 
responsible executive compensation structures.  
7. Presence of Audit Committee This is a statutory requirement for listed companies and is part of the overall 
governance system. The audit committee provides independent oversight, 
combined assurance and integrity to financial reports it publishes. This 
committee is a key pillar in governance as investors depend on the integrity 
of the audit committee. 
8. INED Chairs Audit Committee Independent and objective leadership of this committee bolsters integrity of 
integrated annual reports and internal controls. Investors and regulatory 
authorities need to trust the independence and leadership of this committee. 
Weaknesses in the independence and leadership of this committee may 
make the company susceptible to financial reporting fraud. 
9. All Audit Committee members are INEDs Strength in the independence of this committee improves the trustworthiness 
of the committee’s oversight and integrated reports published by the 
company. This committee needs to be free from internal influences and lack 
of independence. Hence, this is a key provision if the oversight of the board 
is to be effective. This provision is also a key consideration in due diligence 
carried out during mergers and acquisitions.   
10. Presence of Nominating Committee This provision addresses how directors are appointed to the board, continuity 
through succession planning and performance evaluation of directors. The 
functioning of this committee is vital in the overall governance of the company 
as it influences other aspects like independence, objectivity and competence 
of directors. Strength and or weaknesses in the functioning of this committee 
impacts the effectiveness of the governing body. Hence, inclusion as an 
index provision. 
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Provision Inclusion justification 
11. NED or Board Chair chairs the Nominating 
Committee 
Independent leadership and nomination is critical and a fundamental building 
block in governance. Thus, inclusion as part of a governance proxy 
calculation. 
12. Nominating Committee comprised of NEDs & 
majority are INEDs 
This committee ensures that the board is comprised of members who have 
appropriate competences, independence, diversity and can discharge their 
responsibilities effectively. The committee’s functioning contributes to the 
robustness or poor overall oversight. For this reason, this provision was 
included as part of the index calculation. 
13. Presence of Risk Committee This provision is included in the index calculation because risk can expose 
the company to bankruptcy. Also, risk governance needs effective oversight 
to align to the risk appetite of the principal.  
14. NED Chairs the Risk Committee Independent leadership of this committee ensures that the business is not 
exposed to unnecessary risk which the company may be exposed to because 
the agent aspires to achieve profit targets that determine his/her 
compensation. For this reason, this provision was included in the index 
calculation. 
15. Majority of Risk Committee members are NEDs This provision is included because an objective oversight of risk is necessary 
to ensure that the company is not exposed to undue risk. Board members 
who are not involved in the day-to-day running of the business are positioned 
to evaluate the level of risk the business is exposed to. 
16. Presence of a Committee overseeing 
technology and information governance 
Technology has become a strategic pillar in the way most companies conduct 
their businesses. However, technology exposes companies to relatively high 
risks which need to be controlled. A board committee is recommended to be 
established and hence our inclusion in the index calculation. 
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Provision Inclusion justification 
17. Presence of a Social and Ethics Committee The inclusion of this requirement is based on the reason that the setting up 
of this committee is a statutory requirement. 
18. NED Chairs the Social and Ethics Committee This provision reinforces the independence and governance of the 
committee. 
19. Majority of Social & Ethics Committee members 
are NEDs  
The independence of this statutory committee or function enhances its 
objectivity. It should be free from internal influences from those who run the 
day-to-day affairs of the company. This provision is a governance pillar 
focussing on the company’s ethics, corporate citizenry, sustainability and 
relationship with stakeholders. Thus, an important component of the overall 
governance of companies. 
20. Compliance with laws, rules, codes & standards 
i.e. no reported breaches 
This provision encapsulates the functioning and efficacy of all the provisions. 
If all the provisions were adhered to and effective, the company would comply 
with the recommendations from King III and King IV. Failures to adhere to 
any provision suggest weaknesses in governance.    
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